Landing (descent or approach)

The single engine airplane was engaged in a local training flight at Puerto Ayacucho Airport, carrying five pilots. While completing a turn on approach to runway 04, the airplane went out of control and crashed in a wooded area located about 3 km south of the airport, bursting into flames. The airplane was totally destroyed by impact forces and a post crash fire and all five occupants were killed. Puerto Ayacucho Airport is named Cacique Aramare but the military side is named José Antonio Páez.
Crew:
Cpt José Castillo Tovar,
Cpt Jefferson Aular,
1st Lt Roberto Aponte,
Lt Santiago Collado,
Lt Joé Rivas.

The pilot reported that he was under the impression that his airplane’s inboard fuel tanks had been topped and he had 202 gallons on board prior to departure. He had a “standing order” with the airport’s fixed base operator to top the tanks; however, the fueling was not accomplished and he did not visually check the fuel level prior to departure. He entered 202 gallons in cockpit fuel computer and unknowingly commenced the flight with 61 gallons on board. Prior to reaching his destination, his fuel supply was exhausted, both engines lost all power, and he performed a forced landing in a cemetery about one mile from the airport. The pilot and his passenger had minor injuries. Inspectors with the Federal Aviation Administration examined the wreckage and determined that damage to the wings and fuselage was substantial. The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.

The airplane departed Seoul-Incheon Airport at 1920LT on a schedule service to Mactan, Philippines, carrying 165 passagers and a crew of 11. On approach to Mactan Airport Runway 22 at night, the crew encountered poor weather conditions with thunderstorm activity. Due to the presence of CB's at 1,800 feet, the captain decided to abort the approach and initiated a go around procedure. Fourteen minutes later, at 2226LT, on short final and after crossing the runway threshold, the airplane encountered windshear and apparently touched down hard. The crew aborted the landing procedure for a second time and initiated a second go around manoeuvre. The crew followed a holding pattern for about 30 minutes then was cleared for a third approach. After touchdown on a wet runway 22 (3,310 metres long), the airplane was unable to stop within the remaining distance and overran at a speed of 80 knots. While contacting soft ground, the nose gear was torn off then the airplane collided with various equipment of the localizer antenna and came to rest 360 metres past the runway end. All 176 occupants evacuated safely.

The airplane departed Palenque Airport, Chiapas, on a private flight to Puerto Limón, Costa Rica. While on approach at an altitude of about 2,000 feet at night, the airplane entered an uncontrolled descent and crashed into the sea some 28 km southeast of the destination airport. The accident occurred three minutes prior to ETA. Few debris and two dead bodies were found two days later. On board were the German businessman Rainer Schaller, founder of the fitness chain 'McFit', his wife, two children and a friend.

Shortly after departure to pick up a passenger at their destination airport about 75 nm away, the pilots climbed and turned onto a track of about 115° before leveling off about 11,000 ft mean sea level (msl), where the airplane remained for a majority of the flight. Pilot and controller communications during the flight were routine and there were no irregularities reported. As the airplane descended into the destination airport area, the airplane passed through areas of light to heavy icing where there was a 20 to 80% probability of encountering supercooled large droplets (SLD) during their initial descent and approach. While level at 4,000 ft msl, the flight remained in icing conditions, and then was cleared for the instrument approach to the runway. The flight emerged from the overcast layer as it crossed the final approach fix at 2,800 ft msl; the flight continued its descent and was cleared to land. The controller informed the flight that there was a vehicle on the runway but it would be cleared shortly, which was acknowledged; this was the final communication from the flight crew. Multiple eyewitnesses and security camera footage revealed that the airplane, while flying straight and level, suddenly began a steep, spinning, nearly vertical descent until it impacted a commercial business parking lot; the airplane subsequently collided with several unoccupied vehicles and caught fire. The airplane was certified for flight in known icing conditions and was equipped with pneumatic deice boots on each of the wings and tail surfaces. The pneumatic anti-icing system was consumed by the postimpact fire; the control switches were impact and thermally damaged and a reliable determination of their preimpact operation could not be made. Further examination of the airframe and engines revealed no indications of any preimpact mechanical anomalies that would have precluded normal engine operation or performance. During the approach it is likely that the airframe had been exposed to and had built-up ice on the control surfaces. It could not be determined if the pilots used the pneumatic anti-icing system, or if the system was inoperative, based on available evidence. Review of the weather conditions and the airplane’s calculated performance based on ADS-B data, given the speeds at which the airplane was flying, and the lack of any discernable deviations that might have been expected due to an extreme amount of ice accumulating on the airframe, it is also likely that the deice system, if operating at the time of the icing encounter, should have been able to sufficiently remove the ice from the surfaces. Although it is also uncertain when the pilots extended the landing gear and flaps, it is likely that the before-landing checklist would be conducted between the final approach fix and when the flight was on its 3-mile final approach to land. Given this information, the available evidence suggests that the sudden loss of control from a stable and established final approach was likely due to the accumulation of ice on the tailplane. It is likely that once the pilots changed the airplane’s configuration by extending the landing gear and flaps, the sudden aerodynamic shift resulted in the tailplane immediately entering an aerodynamic stall that maneuvered the airplane into an attitude from which there was no possibility to recover given the height above the ground. Postaccident toxicological testing detected the presence of delta-8 THC. Delta-8 THC has a potential to alter perception and cause impairment, but only the non-psychoactive metabolite carboxy-delta-8-THC was present in the pilot’s liver and lung tissue. Thus, it is unlikely that the pilot’s delta-8-THC use contributed to the accident.

On 12 October 2022, the True North Airways Inc. de Havilland DHC-3 Otter aircraft on floats (registration C-FDDX, serial number 165) was conducting a visual flight rules flight, with 1 pilot on board, from Mistissini Water Aerodrome (CSE6), Quebec, to Pluto Lake, Quebec, where it would deliver cargo and pick up passengers. At approximately 0929 Eastern Daylight Time, while manoeuvring for landing on Pluto Lake, the aircraft collided with the surface of the water. The pilot sustained serious injuries. The passengers, who had been waiting near the lake for the aircraft’s arrival, transported the pilot to a nearby cabin from where he was later taken to hospital by a search and rescue helicopter. The emergency locator transmitter activated. There was significant damage to the aircraft.

After an uneventful flight, a jet airplane on a business flight was landing at its destination. The pilot reported to the tower controller that the airport was in sight and requested to land. The pilot further reported that, while on left base, he started to lower the flaps and extended the gear handle. He did not recall confirming whether the gear was down and locked but reported that there were no landing caution annunciations or aural warnings. Before making contact with the runway, the pilot noticed that the airplane floated longer than expected and upon touchdown realized that the landing gear was not extended. The airplane skidded down the runway and came to a stop just past the departure end of the runway. The pilot secured the engines and assisted the passengers out of the airplane. During the evacuation, the pilot reported that the airplane was on fire near the right engine. Shortly thereafter, the airplane was engulfed in flames. When the airplane was raised for recovery, all three-landing gear were free from their uplocks and dropped down to the extended position. Post accident examination confirmed the main landing gear uplocks were in the gear release (unlocked) position. In addition, the left main landing gear door was also partially extended on the airplane after it came to rest. The landing gear handle was observed in the down (extended) position during the examination. Accounting for the position of the landing gear uplocks, the landing gear door upon landing, and the witnesses’ observation of the airplane not having its landing gear extended, it is likely that the pilot positioned the landing gear handle to the down (extended) position just before or during landing. Nevertheless, the pilot failed to ensure that the landing gear was down and locked before landing. Examination of the landing gear handle and landing gear circuit cards revealed no anomalies. A review of the ADS-B data revealed that the airplane’s airspeed was fast on the approach and landing. The airplane’s ground speed was about 143 knots as it passed over the runway threshold, which was above the airspeed that the landing gear not extended warning system would activate (130 knots). Additionally, the airplane’s flaps were likely configured in the takeoff/approach setting (15°), which would not activate the landing gear not extended warning system. Stabilized approach criteria for airspeed and configuration were not maintained on the approach and landing.

The airplane departed Bukavu-Kavumu Airport at 1150LT on a cargo flight to Kasese with three crew members on board. As the airplane failed to arrive at destination, SAR operations were initiated and the wreckage was found two days later in a wooded and hilly terrain near Kasese. All three occupants were killed.

The pilot obtained multiple preflight weather briefings that resulted in him delaying the flight’s departure until the afternoon. After departure, while near his intended destination, the pilot was twice advised by air traffic controllers of adverse weather, including heavy to extreme precipitation along the intended final approach. While in visual meteorological conditions the pilot requested an RNAV approach to his destination airport. While flying towards the final approach fix at a low thrust setting the autopilot attempted to maintain 2,000 ft while pitching up and slowing to about 100 knots, causing an airspeed aural warning. The pilot applied partial thrust and while in instrument meteorological conditions the flight encountered extreme precipitation and turbulence associated with the previously reported thunderstorm. The pilot turned off the autopilot; the airplane then climbed at a rate that was well beyond the performance capability of the airplane, likely caused by updrafts from the mature thunderstorm and application of takeoff thrust. The High Electronic Stability & Protection (ESP) engaged, pitching the airplane nose-down coupled with the pilot pushing the control stick forward. The airplane then began descending followed by pitching up and climbing again. The pilot pulled the Cirrus Airframe Parachute System (CAPS) and descended under canopy into a marsh but the airplane was dragged a short distance from wind that inflated the CAPS canopy. Post accident examination of the recovered airplane revealed substantial damage to the front pressure bulkhead and to both sides of the fuselage immediately behind the front pressure bulkhead. There was no evidence of preimpact failure or malfunction of the flight controls for roll, pitch, or yaw. Data downloaded from the Recoverable Data Module (RDM) revealed no faults with the autopilot or stability protection systems until the CAPS system was activated, when those recorded faults would have been expected. Further, there were no discrepancies with the engine. Although the pilot perceived a malfunction of the autopilot at several times during the final portion of the flight, the perceived autopilot discrepancies were likely normal system responses based on the autopilot mode changes.

The flight crew was supporting a United States Navy (USN) training mission and ended the flight early due to icing conditions. The flight crew calculated a landing reference speed (Vref) of 140 knots (kts) indicated airspeed (KIAS) and landing distance required of 4,200 ft for a wet runway and a flap setting of 20°. Due to underwing-mounted external storage, the landing flaps were limited to a maximum extension of 20°. The flight crew configured the airplane with 20° flaps and reported that the airplane touched down at 140 kts. Although the runway was 8,001 ft long, an arresting cable was located 1,701 ft from the runway threshold, resulting in a runway distance available of about 6,300 ft. After landing, the second in command (SIC) reported that the pilot-in-command (PIC) deployed the spoilers and brakes, then announced that the airplane was not slowing down. The PIC stated that the airplane did not decelerate normally, that the brake anti-skid system was active, and that the airplane seemed to be hydroplaning. He cycled the brakes, which had no effect.The airplane subsequently overran the departure end of the runway, breached an ocean sea wall and came to rest in a nose-down attitude on a sandbar. The airport weather observation system recorded that 0.06 inches of liquid equivalent precipitation fell between 18 and 9 minutes before the accident. In the 4 hours before the accident, the airport received 0.31 inches of liquid equivalent precipitation. A landing performance study conducted by the airplane manufacturer modeled a variety of landing scenarios considered during the investigation. The modeling used factual information provided by the investigation, including ADS-B data, as well as manufacturer-provided airplane performance data specific to the airplane. The study considered the effect on landing distance of both a wet and dry runway, a contaminated runway, both full and intermittent hydroplaning, a localized tailwind (which was not present in the weather data), and an inboard brake failure. The study showed that the most likely scenario, based on the available data, was that the airplane touched down with a ground speed well in excess of the 140 kts Vref speed reported by the crew, and that subsequent to the touchdown encountered full hydroplaning at speeds above 104 kts. The airplane sat overnight on the sandbar and was submerged in saltwater before the airplane was recovered. As a result, the airplane’s braking system could not be functionally tested. However, the physical evidence from the brakes as found post accident, combined with the results of the landing distance modeling, did not indicate that a brake failure occurred. Similarly, ADS-B data did not support the presence of a localized tailwind when such a landing was modeled in the study. Thus, it’s likely that the flight crew landed too fast and then encountered hydroplaning during the landing roll as a result of a recent heavy rain shower, which diminished the calculated stopping distance.