Beechcraft 60 Duke

On July 19, 2024, about 1904 eastern daylight time, a Beech B-60 airplane, N23553, was destroyed when it was involved in an accident near Vienna Center, Ohio. The private pilot and two passengers were fatally injured. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight. Preliminary radar and Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) track data obtained from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) revealed that the flight departed runway 17 at Plattsburgh International Airport (PBG), Plattsburgh, New York at 1651, destined for John Glenn Columbus International Airport (CMH), Columbus, Ohio. The airplane proceeded to the southwest, and climbed to 16,500 ft. About 50 miles northeast of Youngstown/Warren Regional Airport (YNG), Vienna Center, Ohio, the pilot informed air traffic control that the airplane’s left engine had lost power and he could not maintain altitude. The arrival east radar controller (YNG tower) offered information on close by airports; however, the pilot requested YNG and its longer, 9,003-ft-long runway. While descending to YNG, the airplane circled near the approach end of runway 32, then it proceeded along the centerline of runway 32 while continuing to descend. About 3,000 ft from the departure end of the runway, the data indicated that the airplane was close to field altitude at a ground speed of 131 knots. At the end of the runway, the airplane turned left while at a ground speed of 95 knots. The airplane impacted terrain about ¼ mile west of the departure end of runway 32. A witness, who was on YNG taxiway D, observed the airplane in flight prior to the accident. He stated that the airplane circled near the approach end of runway 32, then proceeded with the approach down runway 32. The airplane was higher than normal when beginning the approach. As the airplane proceeded down the runway, it descended toward the runway; however, it did This information is preliminary and subject to change. not touch down. At the end of runway 32, the airplane pitched up rapidly to the left and began to “flip.” The airplane then descended below his field of view and crashed. The wreckage was located on airport property, outside the confines of the airport’s perimeter fence. The wreckage was found upright and oriented on a 310° heading. A postaccident fire consumed a majority of the wreckage. All structural components of the airplane were found within the wreckage debris path. The landing gear were found in the extended (down) position. The pilot, who owned and operated the airplane, possessed both Canadian and U.S. Federal Aviation Administration private pilot certificates with airplane single engine land and airplane multiengine land ratings. Recorded weather near the time of the accident included wind from 050° at 5 knots, 10 miles visibility, and few clouds at 5,500 ft above ground level.

The pilot reported that he was under the impression that his airplane’s inboard fuel tanks had been topped and he had 202 gallons on board prior to departure. He had a “standing order” with the airport’s fixed base operator to top the tanks; however, the fueling was not accomplished and he did not visually check the fuel level prior to departure. He entered 202 gallons in cockpit fuel computer and unknowingly commenced the flight with 61 gallons on board. Prior to reaching his destination, his fuel supply was exhausted, both engines lost all power, and he performed a forced landing in a cemetery about one mile from the airport. The pilot and his passenger had minor injuries. Inspectors with the Federal Aviation Administration examined the wreckage and determined that damage to the wings and fuselage was substantial. The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.

The pilot was conducting a cross-country flight at a cruise altitude of 10,500 ft mean sea level when the left engine lost all power. He secured the engine and elected to continue to his destination. Shortly thereafter, the right engine lost all power. After selecting an airport for a forced landing, he overflew the runway and entered the pattern. The pilot stated that on short final, after extending the landing gear, "the plane quit flying and the airspeed went to nothing." The airplane landed 200 to 300 yards short of the runway threshold, resulting in substantial damage to the wings and fuselage. During a postaccident examination, only tablespoons of fuel were drained from the left tank. Due to the position of the airplane, the right tank could not be drained; however, when power was applied to the airplane, both fuel quantity gauges indicated empty fuel tanks. Neither fuel tank was breached during the accident, and there was no discoloration present on either of the wings or engine nacelles to indicate a fuel leak; therefore, the loss of engine power is consistent with fuel exhaustion.

The commercial pilot was relocating the multiengine airplane following the completion of an extensive avionics upgrade, which also included the installation of new fuel flow transducers. As the pilot neared the destination airport, he reported over the common traffic advisory frequency that he had "an engine out [and] smoke in the cockpit." Witnesses observed and airport surveillance video showed fire emanating from the airplane's right wing. As the airplane turned towards the runway, it entered a rightrolling descent and impacted the ground near the airport's perimeter fence. The right propeller was found feathered. Examination of the right engine revealed evidence of a fire aft of the engine-driven fuel pump. The fuel pump was discolored by the fire. The fire sleeves on both the fuel pump inlet and outlet hoses were burned away. The fuel outlet hose from the fuel pump to the flow transducer was found loose. The reason the hose was loose was not determined. It is likely that pressurized fuel sprayed from the fuel pump outlet hose and was ignited by the hot turbocharger, which resulted in the inflight fire.

The pilot was performing a personal cross-country flight. While en route to the intended destination, the pilot contacted air traffic control to report that the airplane was having a fuel pump issue and requested to divert to the nearest airport. The pilot stated that the request was only precautionary and did not declare an emergency during the flight; he provided no further information about the fuel pump. As the airplane approached the diversion airport, witnesses observed the airplane flying low and rolling to the left just before impacting terrain, after which a postcrash fire ensued. An examination of the airframe revealed no preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. A postaccident examination and review of recorded data indicated that the left engine was secured and in the feather position, and that the right engine was operating at a high RPM setting. The left engine-driven fuel pump was found fractured. Further examination of the fuel pump revealed fatigue failure of the pressure relief valve. The fatigue failure initiated in upward bending on one side of the valve disk and progressed around both sides of the valve stem. As the cracks grew, the stem separated from the disk on one side and began to tilt in relation to the disk and the valve guide due to the non-symmetric support, which caused the lower end of the stem to rub against the valve guide, creating wear marks. The increasing stem tilt would have impinged against the valve guide, and the valve might have begun to stick in the closed position. If the valve were stuck in the closed position, it would not be able to open, and the outlet fuel pressure could rise above the set point pressure. Because the pump was driven by the engine, there would not be a way for the pilot to shut it off, disconnect it, or bypass it. Instead, the fuel pressure would continue to rise until the valve were to unstick. Thus, the pilot was likely experiencing variable fuel pressure as the valve became stuck and unstuck. Examination of the spring seat and the diaphragm plate, which were in contact with each other in the fuel pump assembly, revealed wear marks on the surface of each component, with one mark on the diaphragm plate and two wear marks on the spring seat. The two wear marks on the spring seat were distinct features separated by material with no wear indications in between. The only way that these wear marks could have occurred were if the spring seat was separated from the diaphragm plate and reinstalled in a different orientation. Thus, it is likely that the pilot had encountered a fuel pump problem before the accident flight and that someone tried to troubleshoot the problem. The last radar data point indicated that the airplane was traveling at a groundspeed of about 98 knots, and had passed north of the airport, traveling to the southwest. The minimum control speed for the airplane with single-engine operation was 88 knots. However, it is likely that if the pilot initiated a left turn back toward the airport, that the right engine torque and the 14 knot wind with gusts to 24 knots would have necessitated a higher speed. Because appropriate control inputs and airspeed were not maintained, the airplane rolled in the direction of the feathered engine (due to the left fuel pump problem), resulting in a loss of control. The pilot's toxicology report was positive for cetirizine, sumatriptan, gabapentin, topiramate, and duloxetine. All of these drugs act in the central nervous system and can be impairing alone or in combination. Although this investigation could not determine the reason(s) for the pilot's use of these drugs, they are commonly used to treat chronic pain syndromes or seizures. It is likely that the pilot was experiencing some impairment because of multiple impairing medications and was unable to successfully respond to the in-flight urgent situation and safely land the airplane.

The pilot began the takeoff roll in visual meteorological conditions. The airplane was airborne about 1,300 ft down the runway, which was about 75% of the normal ground roll distance for the airplane’s weight and the takeoff environment. About 2 seconds after rotation, the airplane rolled left. Three seconds later, the airplane had reached an altitude of about 80 ft above ground level and was in a 90° left bank. The nose then dropped as the airplane rolled inverted and struck the ground in a right-wing-low, nose-down attitude. The airplane was destroyed. Postaccident examination did not reveal any anomalies with the airframe or engines that would have precluded normal operation. The landing gear, flap, and trim positions were appropriate for takeoff and flight control continuity was confirmed. The symmetry of damage between both propeller assemblies indicated that both engines were producing equal and high amounts of power at impact. The autopsy revealed no natural disease was present that could pose a significant hazard to flight safety. Review of surveillance video footage from before the accident revealed that the elevator was in the almost full nose-up (or trailing edge up) position during the taxi and the beginning of the takeoff roll. Surveillance footage also showed that the pilot did not perform a preflight inspection of the airplane or control check before the accident flight. According to the pilot’s friend who was also in the hangar, as the accident pilot was pushing the airplane back into his hangar on the night before the accident, he manipulated and locked the elevator in the trailing edge up position to clear an obstacle in the hangar. However, no evidence of an installed elevator control lock was found in the cabin after the accident. The loss of control during takeoff was likely due to the pilot’s use of an unapproved elevator control lock device. Despite video evidence of the elevator locked in the trailing edge up position before the accident, an examination revealed no evidence of an installed control lock in the cabin. Therefore, during the night before the accident, the pilot likely placed an unapproved object between the elevator balance weight and the trailing edge of the horizontal stabilizer to lock the elevator in the trailing edge up position. The loss of control was also due to the pilot’s failure to correctly position the elevator before takeoff. The pilot’s friend at the hangar also reported that the pilot was running about one hour late; the night before, he was trying to troubleshoot an electrical issue in the airplane that caused a circuit breaker to keep tripping, which may have become a distraction to the pilot. The pilot had the opportunity to detect his error in not freeing the elevator both before boarding the airplane and again while in the airplane, either via a control check or detecting an anomalous aft position of the yoke. The pilot directed his attention to the arrival of a motorbike in the hangar alley shortly after he pulled the airplane out of the hangar, which likely distracted the pilot and further delayed his departure. He did not conduct a preflight inspection of the airplane or control check before the accident flight, due either to distraction or time pressure.

The commercial pilot and three passengers departed on a cross-country flight in a twin-engine airplane. As the flight neared the destination airport, the pilot canceled his instrument flight rules (IFR) clearance. The approach controller transferred the flight to the tower controller, and the pilot reported to the tower controller that the airplane was about 2 miles from the airport. However, the approach controller contacted the tower controller to report that the airplane was 200 ft over a nearby joint military airport at the time. GPS data revealed that, when pilot reported that the airplane was 2 miles from the destination airport, the airplane's actual location was about 10 miles from the destination airport and 2 miles from the joint military airport. The airplane impacted a remote wooded area about 8 miles northwest of the destination airport. At the time of the accident, thunderstorm cells were in the area. A review of the weather information revealed that the pilot's view of the airport was likely obscured because the airplane was in an area of light precipitation, restricting the pilot's visibility. A review of airport information noted that the IFR approach course for the destination airport passes over the joint military airport. The Federal Aviation Administration chart supplement for the destination airport noted the airport's proximity to the other airport. However, it is likely that the pilot mistook the other airport for the destination airport due to reduced visibility because of weather. The accident circumstances were consistent with controlled flight into terrain. The ethanol detected in the pilot's blood specimens but not in his urine specimens was consistent with postmortem bacteria production. The carbon monoxide and cyanide detected in the pilot's blood specimens were consistent with inhalation after the postimpact fire.

The pilot in the multi-engine, retractable landing gear airplane reported that, during an instrument flight rules cross-country flight, about 5,000 ft above mean sea level, the left engine surged several times and he performed an emergency engine shutdown. Shortly afterward, the right engine lost power. During the emergency descent, the airplane struck treetops, and landed hard in a field with the landing gear retracted. The airplane sustained substantial damage to both wings, the engine mounts, and the lower fuselage. The pilot reported that he had requested 200 gallons of fuel from his home airport fixed base operator, but they did not fuel the airplane. The pilot did not check the fuel quantity during his preflight inspection. According to the Federal Aviation Administration Airplane Flying Handbook, Chapter 2, page 2-7, pilots must always positively confirm the fuel quantity by visually inspecting the fuel level in each tank. The pilot reported that there were no mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.

The private pilot, who had recently purchased the airplane, and the flight instructor were conducting an instructional flight in the multi-engine airplane to meet insurance requirements. Radar data for the accident flight, which occurred on the second day of 2 days of training, showed the airplane maneuvering between 1,000 ft and 1,200 ft above ground level (agl) just before the accident. The witness descriptions of the accident were consistent with the airplane transitioning from slow flight into a stall that developed into a spin from which the pilots were unable to recover before the airplane impacted terrain. Examination of the wreckage did not reveal evidence of any preexisting mechanical malfunctions or anomalies that would have precluded normal operation of the airplane. After the first day of training, the pilot told friends and fellow pilots that the instructor provided non-standard training that included stall practice that required emergency recoveries at low airspeed and low altitude. The instructor used techniques that were not in keeping with established flight training standards and were not what would be expected from an individual with his extensive background in general aviation flight instruction. Most critically, the instructor used two techniques that introduced unnecessary risk: increasing power before reducing the angle of attack during a stall recovery and introducing asymmetric power while recovering from a stall in a multi-engine airplane; both techniques are dangerous errors because they can lead to an airplane entering a spin. At one point during the first day of training, the airplane entered a full stall and spun before control was regained at very low altitude. The procedures performed contradicted standard practice and Federal Aviation Administration guidance; yet, despite the pilot's experience in multi-engine airplanes and in the accident airplane make and model, he chose to continue the second day of training with the instructor instead of seeking a replacement to complete the insurance check out. The spin encountered on the accident flight likely resulted from the stall recovery errors advocated by the instructor and practiced on the prior day's flight. Unlike the previous flight, the accident flight did not have sufficient altitude for recovery because of the low altitude it was operating at, which was below the safe altitude required for stall training (one which allows recovery no lower than 3,000 ft agl).