Texas

After takeoff from runway 18 at Mesquite Metro Airport, the airplane continued to climb to an altitude of 950 feet in a slight turn to the right when it entered an uncontrolled descent and crashed in a wooded area located near Lawson and Clay Mathis roads. The airplane exploded upon impact and was totally destroyed. The wreckage was found approximately 2 km southwest from runway 36 threshold. The pilot, sole on board, was killed.

The pilot was engaged in a five-hour aerial photography mission. While returning to Victoria Airport, he encountered engine trouble and attempted an emergency landing when the airplane crashed on Mockingbird Lane and a feeder road to Zac Lentz Parkway, also known as State Highway Loop 463, Victoria, Texas. The aircraft was destroyed as well as several cars. The pilot and four people on the ground were injured, one seriously.

The crew was completing a flight from Odessa to Ellington Field, near Houston. After takeoff from runway 16, while in initial climb, the twin engine airplane collided with a poweline located about 270 metres past the runway end. The airplane descended to the right and crashed onto a garage located 150 metres further, bursting into flames. The airplane was totally destroyed and both occupants were killed.

Shortly after takeoff from McKinney Airport, while in initial climb, the twin engine airplane entered an uncontrolled descent and crashed inverted in a quarry, bursting into flames. Two people were killed and a third occupant was seriously injured. It is believed that the pilot encountered engine problems shortly after departure.

While on final approach to San Angelo-Mathis Field, the single engine airplane entered a rapid descent with a rate of 5,058 feet per minute then crashed in an open field located about 12 km south of the airport. The airplane was totally destroyed and both occupants were killed.

While climbing the airplane to cruise altitude after takeoff, the pilot observed an increase in engine oil temperature above the normal range and requested to return to the departure airport. While receiving vectors for an instrument approach, the pilot saw smoke in the cabin and the engine lost total power. Unable to glide to any runway, the pilot selected a field for the forced landing, during which the airplane sustained substantial damage to the wings and fuselage. Postaccident examination revealed that about 2 quarts of oil remained in the engine, and the recovered oil displayed evidence of metal contamination. There was evidence of an oil leak in the engine compartment and along the lower fuselage. There was evidence of a crankcase fracture near the oil dip stick port; however, a laboratory examination determined the fracture to be consistent with overload and likely due to impact-related damage. The engine exhibited no evidence of any loose or disconnected oil lines. The oil filter was removed, and the filter material was found to be saturated with metallic particles. The oil suction screen plug, located on the oil sump, was not secured with safety wire as required per the manufacturer’s maintenance manual. There was no evidence that the plug or required safety wire was damaged by other objects. The oil suction screen plug was found to be loose, with engine oil observed below the oil suction screen plug. The crush washer behind the oil screen plug was intact and exhibited no damage. Laboratory analysis of the metallic debris recovered from the oil suction screen was consistent with connecting rod material as well as steel from fittings, fasteners, and brackets. The metallic debris found in the recovered oil, oil filter, and oil suction screen was likely due to mechanical damage associated with oil starvation. Eleven days before the accident flight, the pilot observed decreased engine manifold pressure and a partial loss of engine power. He diverted to an airport, where he had the turbocharger replaced by an aviation mechanic. In addition to replacing the turbocharger, the mechanic also drained and replaced the engine oil, which included removal and reinstallation of the oil suction screen plug. The loss of engine power was likely due to a loss of oil during the flight that led to oil starvation within the engine. The loose oil suction screen plug, the absence of safety wire on the plug, and the evidence of an oil leak beneath the plug were consistent with the mechanic’s failure to properly secure the oil suction screen plug during recent maintenance.

The pilot was landing at the destination airport with a gusting crosswind. Upon touchdown, he established the aileron controls for the crosswind and applied the brakes; however, no braking action was observed. The airplane subsequently drifted left and departed the runway pavement. It came to rest upright in the grass infield area adjacent to the runway. The outboard portion of the right wing separated which resulted in substantial damage. Data indicated that the airplane was 14 knots or more above the published landing reference speed when it crossed the runway threshold, and it touched down about 2,000 ft from the threshold. The left and right weight-on-wheels (WOW) parameters transitioned from air to ground consistent with initial touchdown; however, the left WOW parameter transitioned back to air about 2 seconds later. The right WOW parameter remained on ground until the airplane departed the runway pavement. A detailed review of the Central Maintenance Function (CMF) data files did not reveal any record of airplane system anomalies from the time the airplane lifted off until it touched down. Multiple system anomalies were recorded after the runway excursion consistent with airframe damage sustained during the accident sequence. The brake system touchdown protection is designed to prevent brake application until wheel spin-up occurs to avoid the possibility of inadvertently landing with a locked wheel due to brake application. After weight-on-wheels has been true for three seconds, power braking is enabled. It is likely that the lack of positive weight-on-wheel parameters inhibited brake application due to the touchdown protection function and resulted in the pilot not observing any braking action. The excess airspeed, extended touchdown, and transient weight-on-wheels parameters were consistent with the airplane floating during the landing flare and with the application of aileron controls for the crosswind conditions. The airplane was not equipped with wing-mounted speed brakes which would have assisted in maintaining weight-on-wheels during the initial portion of the landing. The most recent wind report, transmitted by the tower controller when the airplane was on a 3- mile final, presented a 70° crosswind at 15 knots, gusting to 25 knots. The corresponding crosswind gust component was about 24 knots. The airplane flight manual specified a crosswind limitation of 20 kts for takeoff and landing; therefore, the crosswind at the time of the accident exceeded the airframe crosswind limitation and would have made control during touchdown difficult. The pilot reported that he had made two requests with the approach controller to land on a different runway, but those requests were denied. The investigation was unable to make any determination regarding a pilot request for an alternate runway. Federal Aviation Regulations stated that the pilot in command of an aircraft is directly responsible for, and is the final authority as to, the operation of that aircraft. The regulations also stated that no person may operate a civil aircraft without complying with the operating limitations. The pilot’s ultimate acceptance of the runway assignment which likely exceeded the crosswind limitation of the airplane was contrary to the regulations and to the safe operation of the airplane.

Following an uneventful flight from Memphis at FL260, the pilot initiated the descent to Yoakum Airport, Texas. On final approach to runway 31, the single engine airplane went out of control and crashed in an open field located about one mile southeast of the airfield. A passenger was able to get out from the cabin and was slightly injured while all four other occupants were killed.

After takeoff, the pilot proceeded about 30 miles and climbed to an altitude of about 2,200 ft mean sea level (msl). About 8 minutes after takeoff, the airplane entered a descending left turn that continued until impact. A witness observed a twin-engine airplane at a low altitude and in a descent. After the airplane descended below the tree line, a fireball emerged followed by some smoke; however, the smoke was thin and dissipated quickly. A second witness observed the airplane at a low altitude and in a slow, descending turn. The flight path was steady and the wings “never dipped.” Shortly after the airplane descended out of sight, he observed an explosion. Both engines were on fire when he arrived at the accident site, and there was a fuel leak from the right engine toward the cockpit area. He used a fire extinguisher to keep the fire off the fuselage until first responders arrived. The airplane impacted a utility pole and terrain. Burned vegetation was present over portions of the accident site. The left wing was separated outboard of the engine and was located near the utility pole. A postaccident examination revealed that the left main fuel tank was partially consumed by the postimpact fire; therefore, the amount of fuel in the tank could not be determined. The left engine nacelle was discolored consistent with the postimpact fire. The left nacelle fuel tank appeared intact, and no fuel was visible in the left nacelle fuel tank. However, the amount of fuel in the left nacelle fuel tank at the time of impact could not be determined. The right main fuel tank appeared intact, and about 1 gallon of fuel was drained from the tank during recovery of the airplane. While the postimpact fire was consistent with fuel present onboard the airplane at the time of the accident, the lack of an extensive and sustained ground fire suggested that a limited amount of fuel was present. The left and right engine cockpit fuel selectors were both positioned to the “RIGHT MAIN” fuel tank. The left fuel selector valve, located in the engine nacelle, was in the “OFF” position at the time of the exam. The right fuel selector was in the “RIGHT” fuel tank position. A teardown examination of the left engine did not reveal any anomalies consistent with a preimpact failure or malfunction. A teardown examination of the right engine revealed damage consistent with oil starvation throughout the engine. A teardown examination of the left propeller assembly revealed indications that the blades were at or near the feather pitch stop position during the impact sequence. A teardown examination of the right propeller assembly revealed indications that the blades were on or near the low pitch stop position during the impact sequence. The fuel flow indicator displayed the total fuel remaining as 8.3 gallons when powered up on a test bench. However, the fuel quantity indications are dependent on the pilot properly configuring the device when the airplane is refueled. The fuel flow indicator does not directly provide fuel quantity information. According to the airplane flight manual, the total unusable fuel for the airplane, with one engine nacelle fuel tank installed, was 7.8 gallons. Engine performance data recovered from the onboard engine monitor revealed a reduction in right engine power to near idle power. About 1 minute later, the airplane entered a descending left turn which continued until impact. About 3 minutes after the reduction in right engine power, the left engine completely lost power. Immediately afterward, right engine power increased to near full (takeoff) power. However, about 30 seconds later the right engine completely lost power. The airplane impacted the pole and the terrain a few seconds later. The pilot likely detected an impending failure of the right engine and intentionally reduced power. However, shortly afterward, the left engine lost power due to fuel starvation. At that time, the pilot likely set the left engine to crossfeed from the right main fuel tank to restore power. Unsuccessful, the pilot then decided to feather the left propeller and attempted to use any available power from the right engine, but the right engine immediately lost power as well. Whether the right engine lost power at that moment due to fuel starvation or oil starvation could not be determined. The pilot was obese and had hypertension, high cholesterol, and an enlarged heart with left ventricular thickening. While these cardiovascular conditions placed him at an increased risk for a sudden incapacitating cardiac event, the autopsy did not show any acute or remote myocardial infarction, and the flight path suggests intentional actions until the crash. Thus, the pilot’s cardiovascular disease was not a factor in this accident. Toxicology testing detected the muscle relaxant cyclobenzaprine and its active metabolite norcyclobenzaprine in the pilot’s femoral blood at low therapeutic levels. The sedative-hypnotic medication zolpidem was detected at subtherapeutic levels. While these substances are associated with side effects such as drowsiness and dizziness, the operational findings of this accident do not suggest performance issues related to fatigue. Thus, it is unlikely that the effects from the pilot’s use of cyclobenzaprine and zolpidem were factors in this accident.

On November 12, 2022, about 1322 central standard time, a Boeing B-17G, N7227C, and a Bell P-63F, N6763, collided in flight during a performance at the Commemorative Air Force’s (CAF) Wings Over Dallas air show at Dallas Executive Airport (KRBD) in Dallas, Texas. The pilot, copilot, flight engineer, and two scanners on board the Boeing B-17G and the pilot of the Bell P-63F were fatally injured, and both airplanes were destroyed. No injuries to persons on the ground were reported. Both accident airplanes (and six other historic, former military airplanes that were airborne as part of the same performance) were operated by the CAF under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91 and a certificate of waiver for the air show. The Boeing B-17G was in the first position of five historic bomber airplanes flying as solo aircraft in trail, and the Bell P-63F was in the last position of three historic fighter airplanes flying in formation. The takeoffs, repositioning turns, and passes of the eight airplanes in the accident performance were directed in real time via radio by the air boss, who had primary responsibility for the control of air show operations. Just before the accident, the bomber group and the fighter formation completed a pass in front of the crowd of spectators from show right to left (that is, right to left from the crowd’s perspective). The airplanes were setting up for the next pass when the accident occurred. This pass was intended to be from show left to right in front of the crowd, and the air boss issued directives for the fighter formation to pass off the left side of the bomber group airplanes and then cross in front of them. The position data showed that the flight path for the fighter lead and position 2 fighter airplanes passed the bomber airplanes off the bombers’ left side before crossing in front of the Boeing B-17G but that the Bell P-63F’s flight path converged with that of the Boeing B-17G. Video and photographic evidence captured by witnesses on the ground showed that the Bell P-63F was in a descending, left-banked turn when it struck the left side of the Boeing B-17G near the trailing edge of the left wing, then both airplanes broke apart in flight.