Texas

The crew was completing a flight from Odessa to Ellington Field, near Houston. After takeoff from runway 16, while in initial climb, the twin engine airplane collided with a poweline located about 270 metres past the runway end. The airplane descended to the right and crashed onto a garage located 150 metres further, bursting into flames. The airplane was totally destroyed and both occupants were killed.

Shortly after takeoff from McKinney Airport, while in initial climb, the twin engine airplane entered an uncontrolled descent and crashed inverted in a quarry, bursting into flames. Two people were killed and a third occupant was seriously injured. It is believed that the pilot encountered engine problems shortly after departure.

While on final approach to San Angelo-Mathis Field, the single engine airplane entered a rapid descent with a rate of 5,058 feet per minute then crashed in an open field located about 12 km south of the airport. The airplane was totally destroyed and both occupants were killed.

Following an uneventful flight from Miami-Executive (Kendall-Tamiami) Airport, the pilot started the approach to Houston-William P. Hobby Airport Runway 04 at 1058LT. Four minutes later, he initiated a go around procedure and a circuit before starting a second approach to land. After touchdown, the airplane deviated to the left and veered off runway in a grassy area. In soft ground, the airplane lost its nose gear then slid for few dozen metres before coming to rest with its right wing severely damaged. All six occupants escaped uninjured.

Following an uneventful flight from Memphis at FL260, the pilot initiated the descent to Yoakum Airport, Texas. On final approach to runway 31, the single engine airplane went out of control and crashed in an open field located about one mile southeast of the airfield. A passenger was able to get out from the cabin and was slightly injured while all four other occupants were killed.

The twin engine airplane departed Denton Enterprise Airport runway 36 at 1459LT and continued to the west at an altitude of 2,000 feet. Eight minutes later, the pilot initiated a left hand circuit to land at Decatur Airport. While descending on final, the speed decreased and the airplane crashed nearby a wooded area located 6 km short of runway 35. The aircraft was destroyed and the pilot, sole on board, was killed.

The Boeing B-17 was taking part to an airshow at Dallas-Executive (Redbird) Airport, carrying five people. While passing over the airfield at a relative low altitude, it collided with a Bell P-63 Kingcobra that was engaged in the same manoeuvre and coming from its left. The B-17 was cut in two, entered an uncontrolled descent and crashed in a field, bursting into flames. The P-63 was also destroyed. All six people in both aircraft were killed. At the time of the collision, the B-17 was following a straight-in course while the P-63 was supposed to cut its trajectory behind. Obviously, the pilot of the P-63 misjudged the situation.

The pilot reported that, before the flight, the airplane was fueled with 140 gallons of Jet A fuel. Shortly after takeoff, both engines lost total power. Because the airplane had insufficient altitude to return to the airport, the pilot executed a forced landing to a field and the left wing sustained substantial damage. A postcrash fire ensued. The investigation determined that the airplane was inadvertently fueled with Jet A fuel rather than AVGAS, which was required for the airplane’s reciprocating engines. The line service worker who fueled the airplane reported that there were no decals at the airplane fuel ports; however, postaccident examination of the airplane found that a decal specifying AVGAS was present at the right-wing fuel port. The investigation could not determine whether the same or a similar decal was present at the left-wing fuel port because the left wing was partially consumed during the postimpact fire.

A Cessna 208B airplane collided with a powered paraglider during cruise flight at 5,000 feet mean sea level (msl) in Class E airspace. Based on video evidence, the powered paraglider operator impacted the Cessna’s right wing leading edge, outboard of the lift strut attachment point. The outboard 10 ft of the Cessna’s right wing separated during the collision. The Cessna impacted terrain at high vertical speed in a steep nose-down and inverted attitude. The powered paraglider operator was found separated from his seat style harness. The paraglider wing, harness, and emergency parachute were located about 3.9 miles south of the Cessna’s main wreckage site. Based on video evidence and automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast (ADS-B) data, the Cessna and the powered paraglider converged with a 90° collision angle and a closing speed of about 164 knots. About 8 seconds before the collision, the powered paraglider operator suddenly turned his head to the right and about 6 seconds before the collision, the powered paraglider maneuvered in a manner consistent with an attempt to avoid a collision with the converging Cessna. Research indicates that about 12.5 seconds can be expected to elapse between the time that a pilot sees a conflicting aircraft and the time an avoidance maneuver begins. Additionally, research suggests that general aviation pilots may only spend 30-50% of their time scanning outside the cockpit. About 8 seconds before the collision (when the powered paraglider operator’s head suddenly turned to the right), the Cessna would have appeared in the powered paraglider operator’s peripheral view, where research has demonstrated visual acuity is very poor. Additionally, there would have been little apparent motion because the Cessna and the powered paraglider were on a collision course. Under optimal viewing conditions, the powered paraglider may have been recognizable to the Cessna pilot about 17.5 seconds before the collision. However, despite the powered paraglider’s position near the center of his field of view, the Cessna pilot did not attempt to maneuver his airplane to avoid a collision. Further review of the video evidence revealed that the powered paraglider was superimposed on a horizon containing terrain features creating a complex background. Research suggests that the powered paraglider in a complex background may have been recognizable about 7.4 seconds before the collision. However, the limited visual contrast of the powered paraglider and its occupant against the background may have further reduced visual detection to 2-3 seconds before the collision. Thus, after considering all the known variables, it is likely that the Cessna pilot did not see the powered paraglider with sufficient time to avoid the collision. The Cessna was equipped with a transponder and an ADS-B OUT transmitter, which made the airplane visible to the air traffic control system. The operation of the powered paraglider in Class E airspace did not require two-way radio communication with air traffic control, the use of a transponder, or an ADS-B OUT transmitter and therefore was not visible to air traffic control. Neither the Cessna nor the powered paraglider were equipped with ADS-B IN technology, cockpit display of traffic information, or a traffic alerting system. Postmortem toxicological testing detected the prescription antipsychotic medication quetiapine, which is not approved by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), in the Cessna pilot’s muscle specimen but the test results did not provide sufficient basis for determining whether he was drowsy or otherwise impaired at the time of the collision (especially in the absence of any supporting details to suggest quetiapine use). Testing also detected ethanol at a low level (0.022 g/dL) in the Cessna pilot’s muscle specimen, but ethanol was not detected (less than 0.01 g/dL) in another muscle specimen. Based on the available results, some, or all of the small amount of detected ethanol may have been from postmortem production, and it is unlikely that ethanol effects contributed to the accident. The Cessna pilot likely did not have sufficient time to see and avoid the powered paraglider (regardless of whether he was impaired by the quetiapine) and, thus, it is unlikely the effects of quetiapine or an associated medical condition contributed to the accident.

The captain (who was the pilot flying) initiated the takeoff roll, and the airplane accelerated normally. According to the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) transcript, the first officer made the “V1” and then “rotate” callouts. According to the captain (in a postaccident interview), when he pulled back on the control column to rotate the airplane, “nothing happened,” and the control column felt like it “was in concrete” and “frozen.” The CVR captured that the first officer subsequently made the “V2” callout, then the captain said “come on” in a strained voice. Both pilots recalled in postaccident interviews that they both attempted to pull back on the controls, but the airplane did not rotate. The CVR captured that the first officer called out “abort.” The first officer pulled the thrust levers to idle and applied the brakes, and the captain deployed the thrust reversers. (See “Execution of Rejected Takeoff” for more information.) The airplane overran the departure end of the runway and continued through the airport perimeter fence and across a road, striking electrical distribution lines and trees before coming to rest in a pasture, where a postcrash fire ensued. The pilots, two additional crewmembers, and all passengers evacuated the airplane. Two passengers received serious injuries, and one received a minor injury. The airplane was totally destroyed by a post crash fire.