Farmingdale-Republic

The pilot reported that he was under the impression that his airplane’s inboard fuel tanks had been topped and he had 202 gallons on board prior to departure. He had a “standing order” with the airport’s fixed base operator to top the tanks; however, the fueling was not accomplished and he did not visually check the fuel level prior to departure. He entered 202 gallons in cockpit fuel computer and unknowingly commenced the flight with 61 gallons on board. Prior to reaching his destination, his fuel supply was exhausted, both engines lost all power, and he performed a forced landing in a cemetery about one mile from the airport. The pilot and his passenger had minor injuries. Inspectors with the Federal Aviation Administration examined the wreckage and determined that damage to the wings and fuselage was substantial. The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.

The pilot reported that, during the initial climbout, about 1,000 ft above ground level, one of the engines stopped producing power. He confirmed that all engine controls were full forward and the main fuel tanks were selected. Immediately thereafter, the remaining engine began to surge, then stopped producing power. He established best glide speed and looked for an area to perform a forced landing. The airplane crashed into a solid waste disposal facility, about 2.3 nautical miles northwest of the departure airport. First responders arrived immediately after the accident and found only a trace amount of fuel within the confines of the accident site or in the fuel tanks. The only postaccident fire was centered on a small, localized area near the right engine turbocharger. Both main fuel tanks were empty, and the auxiliary bladder tanks were ruptured by impact forces. Examination of both engines revealed no evidence of a pre accident malfunction or anomaly. A surveillance video showed no evidence of smoke or mist training the airplane seconds prior to impact. The pilot reported that he departed the airport with 112 gallons of fuel on board. The pilot did not provide evidence of the latest refueling when requested by investigators. The available evidence is consistent with a total loss of engine power to both engines due to fuel exhaustion.

The flight crew were conducting an instrument landing system (ILS) approach in night instrument meteorological conditions when they were advised by the tower controller that the weather had deteriorated below minimums. The captain was the pilot monitoring, and the first officer was the pilot flying during the approach. Since the airplane was inside the final approach fix and stabilized, both pilots agreed to continue with the approach. Both pilots stated that they had visual contact with the runway approach lighting system at the 200 ft above ground level (agl) decision altitude, and they decided to continue the approach. The first officer said he then returned to flying the airplane via instruments. As the first officer continued the approach, the captain told him the airplane was drifting right of the runway centerline. The first officer said that he looked outside, saw that the weather had deteriorated, and was no longer comfortable with the approach. The first officer said he pressed the takeoff and go-around switch, while at the same time, the captain called for a go-around. The captain said that he called for the go-around because the airplane was not aligned with the runway. Although both pilots stated that the go-around was initiated when the airplane was about 50 to 100 ft agl, the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) recording revealed that the first officer flew an autopilot-coupled approach to 50 ft agl (per the approach procedure, a coupled approach was not authorized below 240 ft agl). As the airplane descended from 30 to 20 ft agl, the captain told the first officer three times to “flare” then informed him that the airplane was drifting to right and he needed to make a left correction to get realigned with the runway centerline. Three seconds passed before the first officer reacted by trying to initiate transfer control of the airplane to the captain. The captain did not take control of the airplane and called for a go-around. The first officer then added full power and called for the flaps to be retracted to 15º; however, the airplane impacted the ground about 5 seconds later, resulting in substantial damage to the fuselage. Data downloaded from both engines’ digital electronic engine control units revealed no anomalies. No mechanical issues with the airplane or engines were reported by either crew member or the operator. The sequence of events identified in the CVR recording revealed that the approach most likely became unstabilized after the autopilot was disconnected and when the first officer lost visual contact with the runway environment. The captain, who had the runway in sight, delayed calling for a go-around after the approach became unstabilized, and the airplane was too low to recover.

After flying one flight leg earlier in the day, the pilot flew to an intermediate stop on the way to his home base to purchase fuel. A surveillance video recording from the fueling airport showed the airplane land and taxi to the self-serve fuel pump where the engines were shut down for about 10 minutes while the airplane was fueled. The pilot then had difficulty starting both engines over several minutes. After the engines were running, the airplane taxied to the runway and did not appear to stop for an engine run-up. The pilot performed a rolling takeoff, and the airplane lifted off after a roll of about 2,100 ft, slightly more than half the available runway length. A passenger reported that after liftoff, at an altitude of about 50 to 100 ft above ground level (agl), both engines lost partial power and began “stuttering,” which continued for the remainder of the flight. He further reported that the engines did not stop, but they were “not producing full RPM.” The airplane drifted left of centerline, which a witness described as a left yawing motion. The pilot corrected the drift and flew the runway heading over the grass on the left side of the runway; however, the airplane would not climb. After crossing the end of the runway, the pilot pitched the airplane up to avoid obstacles. Automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast data indicated that the airplane climbed from about 20 to 120 ft agl in a gradual left turn. During this time the groundspeed decreased from about 80 knots to about 69 knots. The altitude then decreased to about 50 ft agl, the groundspeed decreased to about 66 knots, and the left turn decreased in radius until the recorded data ended about 100 ft west of the accident site. The airplane descended and
impacted a house. Witness descriptions of the airplane yawing to the left while over the runway and again during its final left turn suggest that the loss of engine power may not have been symmetric (that is, one engine may have suffered more of a loss than the other).

According to the pilot in command (PIC), he was conducting an instructional flight for his "new SIC (second in command)," who was seated in the left seat. He reported that they had flown two previous legs in the retractable landing gear-equipped airplane. He recalled that, during the approach, they discussed the events of their previous flights and had complied with the airport control tower's request to "keep our speed up." During the approach, he called for full flaps and retarded the throttle to flight idle. The PIC asserted that there was no indication that the landing gear was not extended because he did not hear a landing gear warning horn; however, he was wearing a noise-cancelling headset. He added that the landing gear position lights were not visible because the SIC's knee obstructed his view of the lights. He recalled that, following the flare, he heard the propellers hit the runway and that he made the decision not to go around because of unknown damage sustained to the propellers. The airplane touched down and slid to a stop on the runway. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the fuselage bulkheads, longerons, and stringers. The SIC reported that the flight was a training flight in visual flight rules conditions. He noted that the airspace was busy and that, during the approach, he applied full flaps, but they failed to extend the landing gear. He added that he did not hear the landing gear warning horn; however, he was wearing a noise-cancelling headset. The Federal Aviation Administration Aviation Safety Inspector that examined the wreckage reported that, during recovery, the pilot extended the nose landing gear via the normal extension process. However, due to significant damage to the main landing gear (MLG) doors, the MLG was unable to be extended hydraulically or manually. He added that an operational check of the landing gear warning horn was not accomplished because the wreckage was unsafe to enter after it was removed from the runway. The landing gear warning horn was presented by an aural tone in the cockpit and was not configured to be heard through the pilots' noise-cancelling headsets. When asked, the PIC and the SIC both stated that they could not remember who read the airplane flight manual Before Landing checklist.

The pilot and the five passengers, who were employees of an industrial services company, were returning from a job site with hazardous materials used for blasting operations. The airplane was in a climb, at an altitude of 8,500 feet, when it experienced a catastrophic engine failure. The pilot declared an emergency and subsequently performed a forced landing to a field. During the landing, the airplane's right wing struck a tree and separated. All occupants exited the airplane without injury; however, the airplane became fully engulfed in fire, which consumed the majority of the airplane. The airplane was equipped with a turbine engine that, at the time of the accident, had been operated for about 7,620 hours since new and 65 hours since it was overhauled about 19 months prior to the accident. Impact damage was observed to the interior of the engine exhaust duct. In addition, the exhaust duct contained portions of a fractured power turbine blade. Additional examination of the engine revealed damage consistent with a distressed 1st stage sun gear, and associated compressor turbine and power turbine damage. Examination of the sun gear teeth output splines revealed that they were too damaged to determine the cause of their deterioration. It was noted that the sun gear found on the accident engine was previously removed from another engine due to "spalled gear teeth" about 7 years prior to the accident. The condition of the sun gear when installed on the accident engine could not be determined.

The first officer was flying the Area Navigation, Global Positioning System, approach to runway 22. During the approach, the airplane was initially fast as the first officer had increased engine power to compensate for wind conditions. Descending below the minimum descent altitude (MDA), the first officer momentarily deployed the speed brakes, but stowed them about 200 feet above ground level (agl), and reduced the engine power to flight idle. The airplane became low and slow, and developed an excessive sink rate. The airplane subsequently landed hard on runway 22, which drove the right main landing gear into the right wing, resulting in substantial damage to the right wing spar. The first officer reported intermittent airspeed fluctuations between his airspeed indicator and the captain's airspeed indicator; however, a subsequent check of the pitot-static system did not reveal any anomalies that would have precluded normal operation of the airspeed indicators. About the time of the accident, the recorded wind was from 190 degrees at 11 knots, gusting to 24 knots; and the captain believed that the airplane had encountered windshear near the MDA, with the flaps fully extended. Review of air traffic control data revealed that no windshear advisories were contained in the automated terminal information system broadcasts. Although the local controller provided windshear advisories to prior landing aircraft, he did not provide one to the accident aircraft. Review of the airplane flight manual (AFM) revealed that deploying the speed brakes below 500 feet agl, with the flaps in any position other than the retracted position, was prohibited.

About 5 miles west of the airport, the flightcrew advised the approach controller that they had visual contact with the airport, canceled their IFR clearance, and proceeded under visual flight rules. A witness heard the airplane approach from the east, and observed the airplane at a height consistent with the approach minimums for the VOR approach. The airplane continued over the runway, and entered a "tight" downwind. The witness lost visual contact with the airplane due to it "skimming" into or behind clouds. The airplane reappeared from the clouds at an altitude of about 200 feet above the ground on a base leg. As it overshot the extended centerline for the runway, the bank angle increased to about 90-degrees. The airplane then descended out of view. The witness described the weather to the north and northeast of the airport, as poor visibility with "scuddy" clouds. According to CVR and FDR data, about 1.5 miles from the runway with the first officer at the controls, and south of the extended runway centerline, the airplane turned left, and then back toward the right. During that portion of the flight, the first officer stated, "what happens if we break out, pray tell." The captain replied, "uh, I don't see it on the left side it's gonna be a problem." When the airplane was about 1/8- mile south of the runway threshold, the first officer relinquished the controls to the captain. The captain then made an approximate 60-degree heading change to the right back toward the runway. The airplane crossed over the runway at an altitude of 200 feet, and began a left turn towards the center of the airport. During the turn, the first officer set the flaps to 20 degrees. The airplane reentered a left downwind, about 1,100 feet south of the runway, at an altitude of 400 feet. As the airplane turned onto the base leg, the captain called for "flaps twenty," and the first officer replied, "flaps twenty coming in." The CVR recorded the sound of a click, followed by the sound of a trim-in-motion clicker. The trim-in-motion audio clicker system would not sound if the flaps were positioned beyond 3 degrees. About 31 seconds later, the CVR recorded a sound similar to a stick pusher stall warning tone. The airplane impacted a rooftop of a residential home about 1/4-mile northeast of the approach end of the runway, struck trees, a second residential home, a second line of trees, a third residential home, and came to rest in a river. Examination of the wreckage revealed the captain's airspeed indicator reference bug was set to 144 knots, and the first officer's was set to 124 knots. The flap selector switch was observed in the "UP" position. A review of the Airplane Flight Manual revealed the stall speeds for flap positions of 0 and 8 degrees, and a bank angle of 60 degrees, were 164 and 148 knots respectfully. There were no charts available to calculate stall speeds for level coordinated turns in excess of 60 degrees. The flightcrew was trained to apply procedures set forth by the airplane's Technical Manual, which stated, "…The PF (Pilot Flying) will call for flap and gear extension and retraction. The PNF (Pilot not flying) will normally actuate the landing gear. The PNF will respond by checking appropriate airspeed, repeating the flap or gear setting called for, and placing the lever in the requested position... The PNF should always verify that the requested setting is reasonable and appropriate for the phase of flighty and speed/weight combination."

While descending from 5,000 feet to 3,000 feet, the pilot informed ATC that the left engine had failed and the engine cowling was open. The crew said that after feathering the left propeller, and with the right engine at full power, they could not arrest a 300-500 fpm rate of descent. The crew informed ATC that they would be landing in the water. All the occupants exited the airplane from the left front pilot's emergency door. The victims were in the water for approximately 30 minutes before being rescued. One of the passengers was in cardiac arrest when he was retrieved from the water. Examination of the left engine revealed that the #2 cylinder had separated from the engine in flight as a result of high stress fatigue cracking of the cylinder hold down studs and the #3 main bearing thru-studs. The fatigue in the studs occurred as a result of the cylinder fastener preload forces either initially inadequate or lost during service. Maintenance records indicated that the thru-stud was replaced 80 service hours prior to the accident. Examination of the cylinder hold down studs and the #3 main bearing thru-studs revealed that they were improperly torqued, resulting in low initial preload on the fasteners. Incorrect installation of the oversize thru-studs, per existing service information, could have also been a factor in the improper torquing of the studs. The locations of the fatigue origins and the edge worn into the deck indicate that the upper studs were probably the first to fail, allowing the cylinder to rock on the lower rear corner of the cylinder flange.

On an approach to land at the destination, the second-in-command (sic) was flying the airplane. The plane touched down with the landing gear retracted, and the propeller blades contacted the runway. The sic initiated a go-around (aborted landing). Witnesses saw the airplane in a steep left bank just before impact in a river next to the airport. Propeller strikes on the runway extended 380 feet, indicating a touchdown speed of 96 knots. The last propeller strikes on the right side indicated a speed of 86 knots. The last strikes on the left side indicated a slowing propeller. Published VMC for the airplane was 94 knots. The CVR tape revealed the crew completed a descent arrival check, performed an incomplete approach briefing, and did not perform a before landing check. The CVR revealed no sound of a gear warning horn. Company personnel stated that the circuit breaker for the warning horn had been found pulled at the completion of previous flights by other crew; this was to prevent a warning horn from sounding during a high rate of descent. Both pilots were killed.