Groton

The crew briefed the Instrument Landing System approach, including the missed approach procedures. Weather at the time included a 100-foot broken cloud layer, and at the airport, 2 miles visibility. The approach was flown over water, and at the accident location, there was dense fog. Two smaller airplanes had successfully completed the approach prior to the accident airplane. The captain flew the approach and the first officer made 100-foot callouts during the final descent, until 200 feet above the decision height. At that point, the captain asked the first officer if he saw anything. The first officer reported "ground contact," then noted "decision height." The captain immediately reported "I got the lights" which the first officer confirmed. The captain reduced the power to flight idle. Approximately 4 seconds later, the captain attempted to increase power. However, the engines did not have time to respond before the airplane descended into the water and impacted a series of approach light stanchions, commencing about 2,000 feet from the runway. Neither crew member continued to call out altitudes after seeing the approach lights, and the captain descended the airplane below the decision height before having the requisite descent criteria. The absence of ground references could have been conducive to a featureless terrain illusion in which the captain would have believed that the airplane was at a higher altitude than it actually was. There were
no mechanical anomalies which would have precluded normal airplane operation.

About 5 miles west of the airport, the flightcrew advised the approach controller that they had visual contact with the airport, canceled their IFR clearance, and proceeded under visual flight rules. A witness heard the airplane approach from the east, and observed the airplane at a height consistent with the approach minimums for the VOR approach. The airplane continued over the runway, and entered a "tight" downwind. The witness lost visual contact with the airplane due to it "skimming" into or behind clouds. The airplane reappeared from the clouds at an altitude of about 200 feet above the ground on a base leg. As it overshot the extended centerline for the runway, the bank angle increased to about 90-degrees. The airplane then descended out of view. The witness described the weather to the north and northeast of the airport, as poor visibility with "scuddy" clouds. According to CVR and FDR data, about 1.5 miles from the runway with the first officer at the controls, and south of the extended runway centerline, the airplane turned left, and then back toward the right. During that portion of the flight, the first officer stated, "what happens if we break out, pray tell." The captain replied, "uh, I don't see it on the left side it's gonna be a problem." When the airplane was about 1/8- mile south of the runway threshold, the first officer relinquished the controls to the captain. The captain then made an approximate 60-degree heading change to the right back toward the runway. The airplane crossed over the runway at an altitude of 200 feet, and began a left turn towards the center of the airport. During the turn, the first officer set the flaps to 20 degrees. The airplane reentered a left downwind, about 1,100 feet south of the runway, at an altitude of 400 feet. As the airplane turned onto the base leg, the captain called for "flaps twenty," and the first officer replied, "flaps twenty coming in." The CVR recorded the sound of a click, followed by the sound of a trim-in-motion clicker. The trim-in-motion audio clicker system would not sound if the flaps were positioned beyond 3 degrees. About 31 seconds later, the CVR recorded a sound similar to a stick pusher stall warning tone. The airplane impacted a rooftop of a residential home about 1/4-mile northeast of the approach end of the runway, struck trees, a second residential home, a second line of trees, a third residential home, and came to rest in a river. Examination of the wreckage revealed the captain's airspeed indicator reference bug was set to 144 knots, and the first officer's was set to 124 knots. The flap selector switch was observed in the "UP" position. A review of the Airplane Flight Manual revealed the stall speeds for flap positions of 0 and 8 degrees, and a bank angle of 60 degrees, were 164 and 148 knots respectfully. There were no charts available to calculate stall speeds for level coordinated turns in excess of 60 degrees. The flightcrew was trained to apply procedures set forth by the airplane's Technical Manual, which stated, "…The PF (Pilot Flying) will call for flap and gear extension and retraction. The PNF (Pilot not flying) will normally actuate the landing gear. The PNF will respond by checking appropriate airspeed, repeating the flap or gear setting called for, and placing the lever in the requested position... The PNF should always verify that the requested setting is reasonable and appropriate for the phase of flighty and speed/weight combination."

At 4,000 feet light icing on the windshield was noted, and the deicing system was activated. After two cycles of deicing, alcohol was smelled in the cockpit, and smoke was coming up from the control yoke. An emergency landing was attempted at Providence, RI, but smoke and flames forced the crew to land on 10-12 inch thick ice on a reservoir. By then, heavy black smoke poured in the cockpit and fire was seen. Upon landing, the left main gear collapsed and the right wing was sheared off. Eleven occupants escaped and were injured while a passenger was killed.

After crossing the mondi intersection inbound for an ILS runway 05 approach, the captain felt that a proper descent was not possible due to a strong tailwind and their present altitude. They turned and proceeded outbound to lose altitude. The crew then established themselves again on the inbound course at an airspeed of approximately 120 knots. The copilot reported that around 300 feet "the bottom dropped out." the aircraft crashed onto the surface of a frozen cove and slid onto marshy terrain and stopped about 500 feet short of the runway. An NTSB weather summary shows that the following wind regimes existed when the aircraft made its approach: 5,000 to 24,000 ft asl, wind 220/50; 2,400 to 450 feet asl, wind 180/30; 450 feet asl to surface, wind 100/5. Using the above wind regimes and assuming an approach airspeed of 123 knots, the following ground speeds were computed: 5,000 to 2,400 ft asl, 155 knots; 2,400 to 450 feet asl, 147 knots; 450 feet asl to surface, 118 knots.

Pilgrim Flight 203 departed from Groton about 16:21, approximately 15 minutes behind schedule primarily because of ground delays encountered on previous flights which used the aircraft. Shortly after takeoff, Flight 203 reported on course and was instructed to contact the New York Center. Communications were established at 16:27 and the Center cleared the flight to Deer Park via its flight plan route to cross Saybrook at 4,000 feet, and then to climb and maintain 6,000 feet. At 16:33, the New York Center controller recleared the flight to Deer Park, to climb to 9,000 feet, and issued it holding instructions at Deer Park. About 2 minutes later, the controller advised that 7,000 feet was open for the flight, with the possibility of no holding, and he cleared it back to 7,000 feet. The flight reported at 7,000 immediately thereafter. About 16:36, the controller told Pilgrim 203 that if holding were necessary, its expected approach clearance time was 17.06. At 16:47 the crew contacted Kennedy Approach Control and they reported holding at Deer Park at 7,000 feet. About this time, the weather conditions at the Kennedy Airport deteriorated, and some flights which were then making instrument approaches to runway 13L began missing their approaches. Because of this, instrument approaches were changed to runway 22R, which had a better RVR. At 16:55, in connection with the runway change, Pilgrim 203 was recleared to hold in the Medford holding pattern. At 1709, Pilgrim 203 was given an expected approach clearance time of 17:46, which the flight acknowledged. At 17:39, the Kennedy approach controller cleared Pilgrim Flight 203 to descend to 6,000 feet. At 17:42, the crew of Pilgrim 203 radioed: "Pilgrim 203 request New Haven if we can get there, expedite." At 17:48, the flight was cleared to descend to 4,000 feet, and at 1750, it was cleared to Pond Point, which is the final approach fix from which VOR instrument approaches are made to New Haven-Tweed Airport. During the next minute, Pilgrim Flight 203 contacted Westchester Approach Control and asked for the latest Tweed weather. It was advised that the weather was: Scattered clouds 200 feet, estimated ceiling 500 feet broken, 700 feet overcast; visibility 2 miles, rain and fog; altimeter 29.46: wind variable 120° to 040° at 15 knots with gusts to 25 knots. At 17:53, the Westchester approach controller instructed Flight 203, "Upon reaching Pond Point hold southwest on the 205 radial, right turns, EAC 1815." Two minutes later the controller checked the position of the flight and, finding it was suitable for descent, cleared the flight to descend to 3,000 feet. At 17:57, the flight reported at Pond Point and asked if holding were still necessary. The controller advised that it was and repeated the holding instruction. At 18:12, the Westchester approach controller called Flight 203 and advised that, based on a report from the Cessna pilot who just landed, the airport was below minimums. He advised the weather was: Aircraft ceiling 200 feet broken, 500 feet, overcast: visibility 2 miles. He then asked the pilot his intentions. About 18:13, after asking for and being given the Bridgeport weather, which was lower than New Haven, the flight advised it would make the approach. The flight was cleared for the approach and instructed to contact New Haven Tower. This was done, and, at 1814, the flight advised New Haven it was inbound from Pond Point. The controller acknowledged, cleared the flight to land, and repeated the surface wind as variable 120° to 060°, 15 knots with gusts to 25 knots. Shortly before 18:17, Flight 203 reported to New Haven it had missed its approach. The tower controller immediately cleared the flight to the Madison VOR at 2,000 feet and instructed it to contact Westchester Approach Control. At 18:17, the flight asked for the Groton weather. The controller then gave the flight the Groton weather as: Measured ceiling 300 feet overcast; visibility 1-1/2 miles, moderate rain and fog; wind 100° at 15 knots, with gusts to 25 knots; altimeter 29.50. At 18:19, the crew told the controller, "Westchester, we’d like to ah get direct Groton right now." Within the same minute, the controller advised he was getting the clearance. The flight repeated that it had to get direct to Groton and the controller replied he had to coordinate (with New York Center). At 18:20, Flight 203 advised the Westchester controller, "Ah Westchester, 203 ah we got minimum fuel now, we gotta get to Groton." About 18:21, the controller cleared the flight to the Groton VOR via Victor Airway 126 and climb and maintain 3,000 feet. The flight reported it was level at 3,000 feet and asked to be cleared for an approach to Groton direct from Saybrook. The controller advised the flight to contact Quonset Approach Control. At 18:22, Flight 203 called Bradley FSS and advised it could not contact Quonset Approach Control, it was low on fuel, and wanted clearance for an instrument approach direct to Groton from Saybrook. On request, Quonset Approach Control gave this clearance to Bradley FSS and, at 18:23, the latter delivered it to the flight. About 18:24, the captain of Flight 203 called his company radio and said, "We’re coming home with this... pile of junk. We ain’t got any equipment working." He then asked to talk to the chief pilot. The captain asked initially for the Groton weather which was ceiling 300 feet, overcast; visibility 1-1/2 miles, rain and fog Later, he was advised that the ceiling had lowered to 200 feet. The captain said that Kennedy would not accept him because the aircraft transponder was not working. He said he was inbound to Groton on the 270 degree radial of the Groton VOR, flying about 100 feet above the water, and he could see the shoreline. Asked how much fuel he had remaining, the captain answered "none," and added, in essence, that fuel exhaustion could occur at anytime. Shortly thereafter, he radioed that he had lost one engine and was going to try to reach the shore. He then said he had just lost the other engine, could not make the shore, and was going into the water off Harkness Point. This was the last transmission from the aircraft.

While cruising by night and in foggy conditions, the pilot lost control of the airplane that crashed into the sea off Groton. SAR operations were conducted but eventually suspended few days later as no trace of the aircraft nor both occupants was found. The wreckage was eventually localised on 15 November 1968 by a depth of 40 feet few hundred yards offshore.

The twin engine aircraft was completing a flight from Groton-New London Airport (CT) to White Plaines with a crew of two on board and one passenger, a daughter of the company's Executive Vice-President. At 1341LT, the flight reported to Westchester Tower that it was over the outer marker, inbound, at 2,500 feet. Approximately two minutes later it crashed between the outer and inner markers of the Westchester 115. The aircraft began clipping trees about 800 feet before it struck the ground on a 680-foot knoll located on the ILS approach path. Both crew members were killed. The passenger, who sustained only minor injuries, stayed with the aircraft until approximately 1630LT, then walked out and located help. She stated that she had flown quite a bit in this same airplane with the same crew and that the subject flight was the roughest she had ever encountered; that during the approach the weather was so “soupy” she could not see the numbers on the aircraft and that she heard the pilot say to the copilot, “Keep your eyes peeled.” Weather conditions, as reported by Westchester County Airport operations personnel, were: ceiling 300 feet and visibility 1 mile. The aircraft was owned and operated by Sangamo Electric Company, Springlfield, Illinois.