Beechcraft 60 Duke

The twin engine airplane was completing a flight to Asunción, carrying one passenger and one pilot. En route, the pilot encountered an unexpected situation and was forced to attempt an emergency landing. Upon landing on a dirt road, the aircraft lost its undercarriage and slid for few dozen metres before coming to rest with its right wing torn off. Both occupants were injured and the aircraft was destroyed.

The twin engine aircraft departed Bogotá-El Dorado on a short flight to Bogotá-Guaymaral Airport, carrying three passengers and one pilot. Three minutes after takeoff from runway 13L, while climbing to a height of 200 feet in VFR conditions, the airplane entered a left turn then descended into the ground and crashed into several houses located in the district of Engativá, near the airport, bursting into flames. The aircraft as well as several houses and vehicles were destroyed. All four occupants as well as five people on the ground were killed. Thirteen others were injured, seven seriously.

The pilot reported that he had added fuel at the previous fuel stop and that he was using a fuel totalizer to determine the quantity of fuel onboard. After climbing to a cruise altitude of 14,000 feet above ground level, he discovered that the fuel mixture control was frozen and that he was unable to lean the mixture to a lower fuel flow setting. The pilot reported that because of the increased fuel consumption, he briefly considered an en route stop for additional fuel but decided to continue. During descent, the airplane experienced a complete loss of power in both engines, and the pilot made an emergency off-field, gear-up landing about 7 miles from the destination. The airplane impacted terrain and thick scrub trees, which resulted in substantial damage to both wings, both engine mounts, and the fuselage. A postaccident examination found that only a trace of fuel remained. The pilot also reported that there was no mechanical malfunction or failure and that his inadequate fuel management was partly because he had become overconfident in his abilities after 50 years of flying.

Several witnesses observed the airplane before and during its takeoff roll on the morning of the accident. One witness observed the airplane for the entire event and stated that the run-up of the engines sounded normal. During the takeoff roll, the acceleration of the airplane appeared a little slower but the engines continued to sound normal. Directional control was maintained, and at midfield, the airplane had still not rotated. As the airplane continued down the 5,132-foot-long runway, it did not appear to be accelerating, and, about 100 yards from the end of the runway, it appeared that it was not going to stop. The airplane maintained contact with the runway and turned slightly right before it overran the end of the runway. The airplane was subsequently destroyed by impact forces and a postaccident fire. The wreckage was located at the bottom of a deep gully off the end of the runway. Postaccident examination of the area at the end of the runway revealed two distinct tire tracks, both of which crossed the asphalt and dirt overrun of 175 feet. A review of the airplane's weight and balance and performance data revealed that it was within its maximum gross takeoff weight and center of gravity limits. At the time of the accident, the density altitude was calculated to be 7,100 feet; the airport's elevation is 4,830 feet. For the weight of the airplane and density altitude at the time of the accident, it should have lifted off 2,805 feet down the runway; the distance to accelerate to takeoff speed and then to safely abort the takeoff and stop the airplane was calculated to be 4,900 feet. It is unknown whether the pilot completed performance calculations accounting for the density altitude. All flight control components were accounted for at the accident site. Although three witnesses indicated that the engines did not sound right at some point during the runup or takeoff, examination of the engine and airframe revealed no evidence of any preexisting mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. Propeller signatures were consistent with rotational forces being applied at the time of impact. No conclusive evidence was found to explain why the airplane did not rotate or why the pilot did not abort the takeoff once reaching the point to safely stop the airplane.

The air traffic controller had cleared the flight for the instrument approach and the pilot acknowledged the clearance. Radar data depicted the airplane turning toward the final approach course and then continuing the turn 180 degrees before disappearing from radar at 11,200 feet. The wreckage was located at an elevation of 10,725 feet. Examination of the terrain and ground scars indicated the airplane impacted terrain in a nose down, right turn. Impact forces and a postimpact fire resulted in substantial damage to the airplane. Examination of the airplane, engines, and de-icing systems revealed no mechanical anomalies. Weather at the time of the accident was depicted as overcast skies, reduced visibility, with snow showers in the area. An icing probability chart depicted a probability of moderate rime and mixed icing. Both AIRMETs and SIGMENTs advised of moderate icing between the freezing level and flight level 220 and occasional severe rime and mixed icing below 16,000 feet. During his weather briefing, the pilot stated that he was aware of the adverse weather conditions.

The pilot was receiving instruction and an instrument proficiency check (IPC) from a flight instructor. Following an hour of uneventful instruction, the IPC was initiated. During the first takeoff of the IPC, the pilot was at the flight controls, and the flight instructor controlled the throttles. Although the pilot normally set about 40 inches of manifold pressure for takeoff, the flight instructor set about 37 inches, which resulted in a longer than expected takeoff roll. Shortly after takeoff, at an altitude of less than 100 feet, with the landing gear extended, the flight instructor retarded the left throttle at 83 to 85 knots indicated airspeed; 85 knots was the minimum single engine control speed for the airplane. The pilot attempted to advance the throttles, but was unable since the flight instructor’s hand was already on the throttles. The airplane veered sharply to the left and rolled. The pilot was able to level the wings just prior to the airplane colliding with trees and terrain. The pilot reported that procedures for simulating or demonstrating an engine failure were never discussed. Although the flight instructor’s experience in the accident airplane make and model was not determined, he reported prior to the flight that he had not flown that type of airplane recently. The flight instructor was taking medication for type II diabetes. According to his wife, the flight instructor had not experienced seizures or a loss of consciousness as a result of his medical condition.

The multiengine airplane was at an altitude of 6,000 feet when it experienced a catastrophic right engine failure, approximately 15 minutes after takeoff. The pilot elected to return to his departure airport, which was 30 miles away, instead of diverting to a suitable airport that was located about 10 miles away. The pilot reported that he was not able to maintain altitude and the airplane descended until it struck trees and impacted the ground, approximately 3 miles from the departure airport. The majority of the wreckage was consumed by fire. A 5 1/2 by 6-inch hole was observed in the top right portion of the crankcase. Examination of the right engine revealed that the No. 2 cylinder separated from the crankcase in flight. Two No. 2 cylinder studs were found to have fatigue fractures consistent with insufficient preload on their respective bolts. In addition, a fatigue fracture was observed on a portion of the right side of the crankcase, mostly perpendicular to the threaded bore of the cylinder stud. The rear top 3/8-inch and the front top 1/2-inch cylinder hold-down studs for the No. 2 cylinder exceeded the manufacturer's specified length from the case deck by .085 and .111 inches, respectively. The airplane had been operated for about 50 hours since its most recent annual inspection, which was performed about 8 months prior the accident. The right engine had been operated for about 1,425 hours since it was overhauled, and about 455 hours since the No. 2 cylinder was removed for the replacement of six cylinder studs. It was not clear why the pilot was unable to maintain altitude after the right engine failure; however, the airplane was easily capable of reaching an alternate airport had the pilot elected not to return to his departure airport.

The pilot reported that he planned to fly a round trip cross-country flight. Prior to takeoff, he ascertained the quantity of fuel on board based upon the airplane's fuel totalizer gauge indication, which indicated 89 gallons. The flight to the destination was uneventful, and upon landing, 20 gallons of fuel was purchased. Thereafter, the pilot departed for the return flight back to his originating airport. According to the pilot, on takeoff the fuel tank gauges indicated the tanks were between 1/3 and 1/4 full. While cruising, the pilot contacted an air traffic control facility and notified them that he had lost power in one engine. About 5 minutes later, the pilot broadcasted that both engines were without power. Unable to reach the nearest airport, the pilot landed on soft, uneven terrain. During rollout, the airplane nosed over and was substantially damaged. The calculated post accident fuel burn-off for the round trip flight was about 106 gallons. During the post accident inspection, an FAA inspector reported finding an estimated 2 gallons of fuel in one tank. The other tank was dry. No fuel was observed in the main fuel lines to the engines, and no mechanical malfunctions were reported by the pilot.

According to a witness, prior to arriving in the run-up area the pilot lowered the airplane's flaps. After the right flap fully extended, the flap key on the drive shaft inside the 90-degree drive assembly adapter fractured, in overload, in the direction of flap extension. Before takeoff, the pilot raised the flaps; however, with the fractured key, the right flap would have remained fully extended. The pilot could have identified this condition prior to takeoff, either visually or by means of the flap indicator, which received its input from the right flap actuator. The pilot subsequently took off, and the airplane turned left, but it is unknown at what point the pilot would have noted a control problem. The pilot climbed the airplane to 250 to 300 feet and allowed the airspeed to bleed off to where the airplane stalled and subsequently spun into the ground. Airplane manufacturer calculations revealed that the pilot should have been able to maintain control of the airplane at airspeeds over 70 knots. According to the pilot's operating handbook, the best two-engine angle of climb airspeed was 99 knots and the best two-engine rate of climb airspeed was 120 knots.

The twin engine aircraft departed Montes Claros Airport at 1200LT on a flight to Goiânia, carrying one passenger and one pilot. As he started the descent to Goiânia Airport, the pilot reported the failure of the left engine and requested the permission to proceed with a direct approach to runway 32 despite the runway 14 was in use. Few seconds later, the right engine failed as well. The pilote reduced his altitude and attempted an emergency landing when the aircraft crashed in an open field located near Silvânia, about 50 km east of Goiânia Airport. On impact, the fixing points of the seat belts broke away, causing both occupants to impact the instrument panel. The aircraft was severely damaged and both occupants were killed.