Beechcraft 60 Duke

The airplane crashed into the terminal building following a loss of control on takeoff initial climb from runway 25. Witnesses reported that shortly after takeoff, the airplane banked sharply to the left, then it seemed to momentarily stabilize and commence a climb before beginning to roll to the left again. The airplane rolled to an inverted position, entered a dive, collided with the airport terminal building and exploded on impact. The entire airplane sustained severe fire and impact damage. Examination of the engines and propellers revealed no evidence of any discrepancies that would preclude normal operation. All the propeller blades displayed signatures indicative of high rotational energy at the time of impact, indicating that both propellers were rotating, not feathered, and the engines were operating at high power at the time of impact. Components of the autopilot system, specifically the pitch servo assembly and a portion of the roll servo assembly, were identified in the wreckage. The portion of the roll servo assembly found remained attached to a piece of skin torn from the airframe and consisted of the mounting bracket for the roll servo with the capstan bolted to the bracket, clearly indicating that this component had been reinstalled and strongly suggesting that the pilot reinstalled/reactivated all of the removed autopilot components the day before the accident. Maintenance personnel started an annual inspection on the airplane the month prior to the accident and found an autopilot installed in the airplane without the proper paperwork. The pilot explained to them that he designed and built the autopilot and was in the process of getting the proper paperwork for the installation of the system in his airplane. During the inspection, a mechanic found the aileron cable rubbing on the autopilot's roll servo capstan so the mechanic removed the roll servo along with the capstan. Additionally, mechanics disabled the autopilot's pitch servo and removed the autopilot control head. They were in the process of completing the inspection when the pilot asked for the airplane stating that he needed it for a trip. The pilot also asked that the airplane be returned to him without the interior installed. Two days before the accident, the airplane was returned to the pilot with the annual inspection incomplete. The autopilot control head, roll servo and capstan were returned to the pilot in a cardboard box on this date. A friend of the pilot reported that the day before the accident, the pilot completed reinstalling the seats and "other things" in order to fly the airplane the next day. It is possible that improper installation or malfunction of the autopilot resulted in the loss of control; however, the extent of damage and fragmentation of the entire airplane wreckage precluded detailed examination of the flight control and autopilot systems and hence a conclusive determination of the reason for the loss of control.

At about the 3,000-foot marker on the 8,000-foot long runway witnesses saw the airplane at about 100 to 150-feet above the ground with the landing gear retracted when they heard a loud "bang". They said the airplane made no attempt to land on the remaining 5,000 feet of runway after the noise. The airplane continued climbing and seemed to gain a little altitude before passing the end of the runway. At that point the airplane began a right descending turn and was in a 60 to 80 degree right bank, nose low attitude when they lost sight of it. The airplane collided with the ground about 8/10 of a mile from the departure end of runway 34 in a residential area. Examination of the critical left engine found no pre-impact mechanical malfunction. Examination of the right engine found galling on all of the connecting rods. Dirt and particular contaminants were found embedded on all of the bearings, and spalling was observed on all of the cam followers. The oil suction screen was found clean, The oil filter was found contaminated with ferrous and non-ferrous small particles. The number 3 cylinder connecting rod yoke was broken on one side of the rod cap and separated into two pieces. Heavy secondary damage was noted with no signs of heat distress. Examination of the engine logbooks revealed that both engine's had been overhauled in 1986. In 1992, the airplane was registered in the Dominican Republic and the last maintenance entry indicated that the left and right engines underwent an inspection 754.3 hours since major overhaul. There were no other maintenance entries in the logbooks until the airplane was sold and moved to the United States in 2002. All three blades of the right propeller were found in the low pitch position, confirming that the pilot did not feather the right propeller as outlined in the pilot's operating handbook, under emergency procedures following a loss of engine power during takeoff.

The pilot first reported that the engine oil temperature had dropped below what he normally observed while en route. When he tired to exercise the left propeller control, and then later tried to feather the left engine, he was unable to change the engine rpm. He then heard a pop from the right engine, and advised air traffic control (ATC), he needed to perform a landing at Bradford. He also reported a double power loss. While being radar vectored for the ILS runway 32 approach, he told ATC he was getting some power back. He was radar vectored inside of the outer marker, and broke out mid-field and high. At the departure end of the runway, he executed a right turn and during the turn, the airplane descended into trees, and a post crash fire destroyed it. A witness reported he heard backfiring when the airplane over flew the runway. When the airplane was examined, the landing gear was found down, and the wing flaps were extended 15 degrees. Neither propeller was feathered. Both engines were test run and performed satisfactorily. The left engine fuel servo was used on the right engine due to impact damage on the right engine fuel servo. The right fuel servo was examined and found to run rich. However, no problems were found that would explain a power loss, prevent the engine from running, or explain the backfiring heard by a witness. Both propellers were examined and found to be satisfactory, with an indication of more power on the left propeller than on the right propeller. The weather observation taken at 1253 included a ceiling of 1,100 feet broken, visibility 1 mile, light snow and mist. The weather observation taken at 1310 included a ceiling of 900 feet broken, visibility 3/4 mile, and light snow and mist. According to the pilot's handbook, the airplane could maintain altitude or climb on one engine, but it required the propeller to be feathered, and the landing gear and wing flaps retracted.

The twin engine airplane departed Santo Domingo-Las Américas International Airport on a short flight to the Santo Domingo-Herrera Airport located downtown. Following a night takeoff, the pilot encountered a loss of power on the right engine and was unable to feather its propeller. As the propeller was windmilling, he was unable to maintain a safe altitude and elected to ditch the aircraft that crashed in the sea about 800 metres offshore. The pilot was seriously injured and the passenger was killed.

The airplane was equipped with two experimental Engine AIR Power Systems TSIVD-427, 500-horsepower, liquid-cooled, turbocharged, V8 engines. During previous flights, the right engine lost boost then overboosted intermittently, and attempted repairs were unsuccessful. The pilot elected to fly the airplane to its home base for further troubleshooting. During cruise flight, the pilot reported an engine was surging, declared an emergency, and received vectors toward the airport. The airplane collided into a field beside the airport runway and caught fire. The airplane had a total of 8 to 10 hours of flight time at the time of the accident. Records revealed that two days after the airplane's first test flight, the pilot flew the airplane from Melbourne, Florida, to an airport 336 nm miles away, then flew it to Canada to display it at a fly-in.The FAA operating limitations for the airplane restricted its operation to flight test only, which was proposed to consist of 100 flight hours, since the installation of the modified engines. No single-engine performance data was available for this airplane. Examination of the engines and accessories revealed extensive fire and impact damage. Continuity of the crankshaft, valves, rods, and pistons was established for the right engine by manually rotating the propeller reduction control unit.

The twin engine aircraft departed Nice-Côte d'Azur Airport on a flight to Locarno, Ticino, with four people on board. While cruising over Milan at an altitude of 10,000 feet, the pilot was invited to change his frequency and to contact Locarno Tower. Forty-six seconds later, he declared an emergency and informed ATC that he lost an engine. He was cleared to descent for a landing on either runway 35L or 35R but the aircraft continued to the north so he was later cleared to land on either runway 17L or 17R. Suddenly, the aircraft entered an uncontrolled descent then nosed down and crashed in a near vertical attitude in a wooded area located in Jerago con Orago, about 8 km northeast of Milan-Malpensa Airport. The aircraft was totally destroyed by impact forces and all four occupants were killed. There was no fire.

The pilot arrived at Mexia-Limestone County Airport (TX06), Mexia, Texas, sometime before 1100. Once onboard the airplane, a witness, and an acquaintance of the pilot, closed and locked the airplane's cabin door for the pilot, and walked away from the airplane. He also reported that after the engines to the airplane were started, the airplane stayed on the ramp and idled for 10 to 15 minutes. No one saw the pilot taxi to the runway, but he taxied to the north end of Runway 18 for a downwind takeoff to the south. Examination of the accident site found the wreckage oriented along a path consistent with an extended centerline of runway 18. The airplane was found along a fence line approximately 1/4 mile from the departure end of Runway 18. The airplane's track was along a 183-degree bearing, and there was a large burn area prior to and around the debris zone along the wreckage path. Examination of the cockpit revealed a 9/16-inch hex-head bolt inserted in the control lock pinhole for the control column. Under normal procedures Cockpit Check in the Duke 60 Airplane Flight Manual, for Preflight Inspection the first item listed is: 1. "Control Locks - REMOVE and STOW". In addition, under normal procedures Before Starting checklist in the Duke 60 Airplane Flight Manual, the fourth item to check is listed as: 4. "Flight Controls - FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT and PROPER RESPONSE"

The pilot had experienced engine problems during a flight and requested maintenance assistance from the local maintenance repair station. Before the maintenance personnel signed off and completed the repairs, the pilot refueled the airplane, and attempted an instrument flight back to the originating airport. While enroute, the pilot reported a low fuel situation, and deviated to a closer airport. During the approach, the airplane lost engine power on both engines, collided with trees, and subsequently the ground, about a half of a mile short of the intended runway. There was no fuel found in the fuel system at the accident site. No mechanical problems were discovered with the airplane during the post-accident examination. This accident was the second time the pilot had exhausted the fuel supply in this airplane.

The twin engine aircraft was completing a local test flight at Halle-Oppin Airport. For unknown reasons, it belly landed and came to rest. All three occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.