Beechcraft 60 Duke

The pilot and passengers departed the Spirit of St. Louis Airport and flew to Springfield Regional Airport, a 50 to 60 minute flight. The fuel on board was about 25 to 30 gallons in the left wing tanks, and 75 to 80 gallons in the right wing tanks. Each engine burned about 25 to 30 gallons per hour. The airplane was not fueled prior to the return flight. About five minutes after takeoff, the airplane had reached 4,300 feet msl (3,033 feet agl) and began a 402 fpm descent. The airplane continued the descent away from the airport for about 7 nm before turning 180 degrees to the left. The airplane had descended to 2,200 feet msl (933 feet agl) and was 10 miles from the airport. The pilot reported to the controller that he had a '...partial engine failure on the left side.' The airplane impacted the ground in an inverted, vertical nose down attitude. The landing gear were down at impact. Neither propeller was feathered. The right wing, right engine, fuselage, and empennage received extensive fire damage. The left wing was consumed by fire between the nacelle and the wing root. The remaining left wing, left nacelle, and engine were not destroyed by fire. Examination of the engines and airframe did not reveal any pre-existing anomalies that prevented normal operation. The Airplane Flight Manual did not contain procedures which explained fuel cross feeding procedures in case of fuel exhaustion to a wing's fuel tanks.

The pilot was cleared for the localizer runway 11 approach. The airplane impacted in an open field approximately 1 mile northeast of the airport and approximately 600 feet left of the extended centerline of the departure end of the runway. A witness saw the airplane at a low altitude, and stated 'it was foggy,' and he did not see the airplane until it was directly over his head. The witness stated that he saw the airplane for about '3 seconds,' at an altitude of 'between 50 and 100 feet above the ground,' and it did not sound like it was having 'mechanical difficulty.' The airplane turned left (north), and struck the ground with the left wing. The published missed approach called for a climbing 'right turn.' The olney airport automated weather observing system (awos) was operating and current at the time of the accident, but could only be obtained by telephone; hence atc could not provide the pilot with the current awos information. The pilot was provided the Evansville, Indiana (EVV) weather; 1,200 scattered, measured 4,500 overcast, visibility 5 miles, light rain and fog. Evansville was located approximately 20 miles southeast of Olney. The local (awos) weather was; partial obscuration, 100 feet overcast, visibility 3/4 mile.

Shortly after takeoff, the pilot reported he had 'a problem...an overboost situation,' and wanted to return for landing. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed, so the pilot was cleared for the ILS runway 26 approach. A witness saw the airplane emerge from the low overcast in a wings level descent, then pitch over to a near vertical attitude and impact a shopping center sign. The left turbocharger wastegate was found in the open (low boost) position, and the right turbocharger wastegate was found in the closed (high boost) position. The right turbocharger butterfly valve was severely eroded, the pin was missing, and the valve was free to rotate on the shaft. A hole was burnt through the right engine number 1 cylinder exhaust valve. Both propellers were in the low pitch-high rpm range. Both engines and turbochargers were original equipment and had not been overhauled in 21 years. A toxicology test showed 0.564 mcg/ml of sertraline (antidepressant) in the pilot's blood. Sertraline was not approved for use while flying an aircraft.

The twin engine aircraft departed Münster-Osnabrück Airport on a flight to Dresden, carrying four passengers and one pilot. On approach to Dresden-Klotzsche Airport by night, the pilot failed to realize his altitude was too low when the aircraft struck the chimney of a bungalow and crashed in a field located in Grossnaundorf, 13 km northeast of runway 22 threshold, bursting into flames. All five occupants were killed, among them Dietman Richert.

The pilot departed Knoxville on a local pleasure flight to the Gatlinburg area. A few minutes into the flight, the pilot requested the ILS approach to Knoxville. About two minutes after the initial request, he requested immediate radar vectors. The controller requested the flight's altitude, but there was no reply from the pilot. The aircraft collided with trees at the 3,500 foot level of rising terrain seven miles southwest of gatlinburg. A hiker reported hearing, the sound of the engines running until the airplane collided with trees. The hiker also stated that clouds obscured the tops of the mountains. Examination of the accident site disclosed that wreckage debris was scattered over an area 650 feet long and 75 feet wide. The wreckage examination failed to disclose a mechanical problem. Sole on board, the pilot was killed.

During climb to cruise the pilot reported a power loss on one engine and received vectors for a return to the departure airport. The pilot was subsequently cleared for the VOR-A approach and reported intercepting the inbound radial. The impact site was right of the inbound radial and short of the extended runway centerline. Weather at the airport was VFR. Post impact fire damaged the airplane. The left engine propeller was in the feather position. Visual and metallurgical examination confirmed the turbocharger shaft separated due to fatigue. The shaft contained chromium. The aircraft overhaul manual states that 'chrome plating...restoration of the shaft...are not permitted.' Metallographics revealed a microstructure of grey iron (automotive application) in the center housing. The turbocharger was overhauled and installed on the left engine in october 1989. All three occupants were killed.

The aircraft registered N911SG arrived in Oulu on a private flight from Bremerhaven, Germany (EDWB) on 20 December 1994, with the intention to continue the flight to Murmansk, Russia (ULMM). Landing time at Oulu airport was 15.03. The aircraft had one passenger in addition to the pilot-in-command and a representative of the operator company, who had been marked as a crew member. After the landing the pilot-in-command contacted air traffic control by radio and told that the aircraft needed refuelling, without mentioning the fuel type required. The ATC officer transmitted the information by telephone to the fuel company, saying that the aircraft would take JET. According to the delivery receipt, the aircraft was refuelled with 664 litres of jet fuel, JET A-1, whereas the proper fuel type for the aircraft would have been AVGAS 100LL. The aircraft was refuelled on a stand situated in front of the terminal building. The fuel was delivered by a tanker car used only for JET A-1 refuelling and equipped with labels clearly indicating the fuel type. The representative of the aircraft operator/possessor company, who had been registered as a crew member in the aircraft log book, was present during refuelling, and the tanks were filled up according to his instructions on the quantity of fuel needed. He also accepted the fuel sample presented to him and signed the delivery receipt. He paid for the fuel in cash. The fuel tanks had not been marked with the minimum fuel grade of aviation gasoline used, as provided for in the airworthiness requirements. The filling orifices were equipped with restrictors in order to prevent jet fuel nozzles from going in and thus to prevent incorrect refuelling. The tanker car replenishment nozzle had been manufactured with an expansion, which had been shaped and dimensioned to fulfil the requirements set for jet fuel nozzles in different standards. The expansion is intended to prevent jet fuel nozzles from fitting into the orifices of aviation gasoline tanks. However, after the expansion the nozzle tip had been shaped as a Camlock coupling, which was smaller in dimension than the expansion and thus fitted into the reduced filling orifices, making it possible to fill the aviation gasoline tanks with jet fuel. During refuelling, the pilot-in-command visited meteo and paid for the landing. The aircraft had an IFR flight plan drawn up by the pilot-in-command for the continued flight from Oulu to Murmansk. According to the plan, flight time was one hour and 35 minutes, alternate aerodrome Ivalo (EFIV) and endurance 5 hours. The aircraft left for this planned flight from Oulu, runway 30, at 16.19. It had been cleared to Murmansk and to climb after take-off to FL 160 with a right turn. According to the ATC officer who had monitored the take-off, the gradient of climb was rather low. Four minutes after take-off the ATC officer gave the departure time to the aircraft and asked the crew to change over to Rovaniemi Area Control Centre radio frequency. The crew acknowledged the frequency. Without contacting Rovaniemi ACC the crew called again at Oulu ATC frequency at 4 min 47 sec after take-off, stating that they wanted to return to the airport because they were having some problems. The ATC officer cleared the aircraft to call on final 12. Approximately 10 seconds after this transmission the ATC officer asked whether any emergency equipment was needed, and the answer was negative. At 16.25.25, when the ATC officer asked if the crew had the field in sight, the crew confirmed this and reported that their DME distance was 6 nm. At 16.26.11 the crew called mayday, stating that both engines were stopping. At 16.26.38 the mayday call was repeated and emergency landing reported. Rovaniemi ACC monitored the aircraft by radar, and the last reliable radar contact was established at 16.26.30. On the basis of recorded radar data, the crash site was estimated to be approximately 1 NM from Laanila NDB, in the direction of 60°. Rescue units found the aircraft in a forest at 17.06. It had struck into trees, turned upside down and been destroyed. The aircraft door was shut and the occupants were still inside. The passenger on the back seat had been thrown away from his seat and was found dead at the accident site. The pilot-in-command was on the left front seat, seriously injured and unconscious, with his seat belt fastened (he died from his injuries 10 days later on December 30). The right crew seat occupant was injured but conscious, and his seat belt was fastened as well. It came out during the investigation that he was actually a passenger.

On Friday afternoon, July 16, 1993, at 1405 mountain daylight time, a Beech B-60, N75CX, registered to the pilot, overran the end of the runway and impacted terrain while landing at the Camas County Airport, Fairfield, Idaho. An IFR flight plan was filed for the business flight, conducted under 14 CFR 91, which departed Hermiston, Oregon at 1244, July 16, 1993. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed in the area. The private certificated pilot and passenger Peter W. VanKomen were seriously injured. Passenger Chris A. Carrow suffered minor injuries in the accident. The aircraft was destroyed in the mishap. There was no fire. Witnesses reported the pilot landed on runway 7, near the center of the 2950 feet long gravel airstrip and was unable to stop on the runway. The aircraft skidded off the east end of the runway where it impacted a ditch and dirt embankment. The Camas County Sheriff reported he examined the aircraft tire marks on the runway, which according to his measurement, started 1400 feet from the west end of the runway (See Sheriff Report). The sheriff indicated in his report that a witness, Bill Simon, stated in an interview that the pilot landed in downwind conditions, estimated to be 15 to 20 knots. Witness David Coffin, a private pilot, reported the two wind socks on the strip were fully extended, indicating the wind was blowing from west to east at a velocity in excess of 25 MPH, and gusting 30 to 35 MPH. The surface aviation weather observation, taken at Hailey, Idaho, 24 miles northeast of the accident site at 1350 MDT, July 16, 1993, was recorded as 3000 feet scattered clouds, visibility 30 miles, temperature 65 degrees F., dew point 29 degrees F., wind 210 degrees at 10 knots and altimeter 30.05 inches Hg. The density altitude at the Camas County Airport was calculated to be 6488 feet. The airport facility directory indicates the Camas County Airport has a single 2950 by 40 feet dirt runway, oriented 070 and 250 degrees. The elevation at the airport is 5058 feet above mean sea level.

While climbing in moderate icing conditions after takeoff, pilot was cleared to 17,000' feet. Radar data showed aircraft climbed at an indicated airspeed (IAS) of 82 to 123 knots. A Beech safety info booklet stated that a minimum airspeed of 140 knots must be maintained in icing conditions. Climbing at reduced airspeed would have increased angle of attack and allowed ice to accumulate under the wings and aft of the de-icing boots. Aircraft climbed to 13,500 feet, descended momentarily to 13,300 feet, then continued climbing as airspeed decreased abruptly. After slowing to 60 knots ias at 13,700 feet, the aircraft entered a steep descending turn and accelerated to high speed (above VNE). An emergency was declared, stating the aircraft 'lost an engine.' Soon thereafter, radar contact was lost and the aircraft crashed. Pieces of empennage surfaces separated in flight and were found at remote location from the main wreckage. Both counterweights separated from the elevators. Post crash tests disclosed no mechanical evidence of engine malfunction. Low ceiling, fog, light rain, snow and icing conditions were reported in area. All six occupants were killed.

During takeoff from runway 22, the pilot reported that he had a problem, then there was no further communication from the aircraft. Several witnesses saw an object fall from the aircraft and one witness observed that a 'hood' had opened. The aircraft was maneuvered onto final approach to runway 36. A witness said that as the aircraft was lining up on final approach, it entered a steep bank and descended out of his sight. Subsequently, it collided with trees in a 27° descent, crashed and burned. A bag from the nose baggage compartment was found near the departure end of runway 22. No preimpact part failure or system malfunction of the aircraft was found. Before the flight, a ramp person observed the pilot servicing the left engine with oil, but he did not know if the pilot had secured the baggage door. An examination of the recovered door assembly failed to disclose a malfunction of the rear latch assembly. The forward latch assembly area was destroyed by fire. All three occupants were killed.