Illinois

The pilot departed Chicago-O'Hare Airport at 1643LT on a flight to Waterloo. Less than 50 minutes into the flight, he encountered an unexpected situation and was cleared to return to his departure point. On approach to runway 09L, he initiated a go around procedure then a turn to the left for a second circuit to land. While descending on final, he lost control of the airplane that crashed in a wooded area located in Elk Grove Village, less than 8 km west of O'Hare Airport. The pilot was slightly injured and the airplane was damaged beyond repair.

On August 20, 2020, about 1542 central daylight time, a Beech B200 airplane (marketed as a King Air 200), N198DM, was destroyed when it was involved in an accident near Rockford, Illinois. The private pilot was fatally injured. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91 positioning flight. The purpose of the flight was to relocate the airplane to the pilot's home base at the DuPage Airport (DPA), West Chicago, Illinois. The airplane had been at Chronos Aviation, LLC (a 14 CFR Part 145 repair station), at the Rockford International Airport (RFD), Rockford, Illinois, for maintenance work. Multiple airport-based cameras recorded the accident sequence. The videos showed the airplane taking off from runway 19. Shortly after liftoff, the airplane started turning left, and the airplane developed a large left bank angle as it was turning. The airplane departed the runway to the left and impacted the ground. During the impact sequence, an explosion occurred, and there was a postimpact fire. A video study estimated the airplane’s maximum groundspeed during the takeoff as 105.5 knots (kts). Data recovered from an Appareo Stratus device onboard the airplane showed that about 1538, the airplane began taxing to runway 19. At 1540:34, the airplane crossed the hold short line for runway 19. At 1541:19, the airplane began a takeoff roll on runway 19. At 1541:42, the airplane began to depart the runway centerline to the left of the runway. Subsequent tracklog points showed the airplane gaining some altitude, and the tracklog terminated adjacent to a taxiway in a grassy area. The Appareo Stratus data showed the airplane began to increase groundspeed on a true heading of roughly 185° about 1541. Airplane pitch began to increase at 1541:41 as the groundspeed reached about 104 kts. The groundspeed increased to 107 kts within the next 2 seconds, and the pitch angle reached around 4° nose-up at this time. In the next few seconds, pitch lowered to around 0° as the groundspeed decayed to around 98 kts. The pitch then became 15° nose-up as the groundspeed continued to decay to about 95 kts. A right roll occurred of about 13° and changed to a rapidly increasing left roll over the next 5 seconds. The left roll reached a maximum of about 86° left as the pitch angle increasingly became negative (the airplane nosed down). The pitch angle reached a maximum nose down condition of -73°. The data became invalid after 1541:53.4. An airplane performance study based on the Appareo Stratus data showed that during the takeoff from runway 19, the airplane accelerated to a groundspeed of 98 kts and an airspeed of 105 kts before rotating and lifting off. The airplane pitched up, climbed, and gained height above the ground. Then, 4 seconds after rotation, the airplane began descending and slowing, consistent with a loss of power. A nose-left sideslip, a left side force, and a left roll were recorded, consistent with the loss or reduction in thrust of the left engine. The sideslip was reduced, likely due to opposite rudder input, and the airplane briefly rolled right. The airplane pitched up and was able to begin climbing again; however, it continued to lose speed. The sideslip then reversed, and the airplane rolled left again and impacted the ground. One witness reported that he observed the accident sequence. He did not hear any abnormal engine noises, nor did he see any smoke or flames emit from the airplane before impact. The airplane came to rest on a flat grass field to the east of runway 19 on airport property. The airplane sustained fire damage and was fragmented from impacting terrain.

The pilot was conducting an instrument landing system (ILS) approach in instrument meteorological conditions at the conclusion of a cross-country flight. The airplane had been cleared to land, but the tower controller canceled the landing clearance because the airplane appeared not to be established on the localizer as it approached the locator outer marker. The approach controller asked the pilot if he was having an issue with the airplane’s navigation indicator, and the pilot replied, “yup.” Rather than accept the controller’s suggestion to use approach surveillance radar (ASR) approach instead of the ILS approach, the pilot chose to fly the ILS approach again. The pilot was vectored again for the ILS approach, and the controller issued an approach clearance after he confirmed that the pilot was receiving localizer indications on the airplane’s navigation equipment. The airplane joined the localizer and proceeded toward the runway while descending. The pilot was instructed to contact the tower controller; shortly afterward, the airplane entered a left descending turn away from the localizer centerline. At that time, the airplane was about 3 nautical miles from the locator outer marker. The pilot then told the tower controller, “we’ve got a prob.” The tower controller told the pilot to climb and maintain 3,000 ft msl and to turn left to a heading of 180°. The pilot did not respond. During the final 5 seconds of recorded track data, the airplane’s descent rate increased rapidly from 1,500 to about 5,450 ft per minute. The airplane impacted terrain about 1 nm left of the localizer centerline in a left-wing-down and slightly nose down attitude at a groundspeed of about 90 knots. A postimpact fire ensued. Although the pilot was instrument rated, his recent instrument flight experience could not be determined with the available evidence for this investigation. Most of the fuselage, cockpit, and instrument panel was destroyed during the postimpact fire, but examination of the remaining wreckage revealed no anomalies. Acoustic analysis of audio sampled from doorbell security videos was consistent with the airplane's propellers rotating at a speed of 2,500 rpm before a sudden reduction in propeller speed to about 1,200 rpm about 2 seconds before impact. The airplane’s flightpath was consistent with the airplane’s avionics receiving a valid localizer signal during both instrument approaches. However, about 5 months before the accident, the pilot told the airplane’s current maintainer that the horizontal situation indicator (HSI) displayed erroneous heading indications. The maintainer reported that a replacement HSI was purchased and shipped directly to the pilot to be installed in the airplane; however, the available evidence for the investigation did not show whether the malfunctioning HSI was replaced before the flight. The HSI installed in the airplane at the time of the accident sustained significant thermal and fire damage, which prevented testing. During both ILS approaches, the pilot was cleared to maintain 3,000 ft mean sea level (msl) until the airplane was established on the localizer. During the second ILS approach, the airplane descended immediately, even though the airplane was below the lower limit of the glideslope. Although a descent to the glideslope intercept altitude (2,100 ft msl) would have been acceptable after joining the localizer, such a descent was not consistent with how the pilot flew the previous ILS approach, during which he maintained the assigned altitude of 3,000 ft msl until the airplane intercepted the glideslope. If the HSI provided erroneous heading information during the flight, it could have increased the pilot’s workload during the instrument approach and contributed to a breakdown in his instrument scan and his ability to recognize the airplane’s deviation left of course and descent below the glideslope; however, it is unknown if the pilot had replaced the HSI.

The private pilot departed on a cross-country flight in his high-performance, turbine-powered airplane with full tanks of fuel. He landed and had the airplane serviced with 150 gallons of fuel. He subsequently departed on the return flight. As the airplane approached the destination airport, the pilot asked for priority handling and reported that the airplane "lost a transfer pump and had a little less fuel than he thought," and he did not want to come in with a single engine. When asked if he needed assistance, he replied "negative." The pilot was cleared to perform a visual approach to runway 19 during night conditions. As the airplane approached the airport, the pilot requested the runway lights for runway 25 be turned on and reported that the airplane lost engine power in one engine. The controller advised that the lights on runway 25 were being turned on and issued a landing clearance. The airplane impacted terrain before the threshold for runway 25. During examination of the recovered wreckage, flight control continuity was established. No useable amount of fuel was found in any of the airplane's fuel tanks; however, fuel was observed in the fuel lines. All transfer pumps and boost pumps were operational. The engine-driven fuel pumps on both engines contained fuel in their respective fuel filter bowls. Both pumps were able to rotate when their input shafts were manipulated by hand. Disassembly of both pumps revealed that their inlet filters were free of obstructions. Bearing surfaces in both pumps exhibited pitting consistent with pump operation with inadequate fuel lubrication and fuel not reaching the pump. The examination revealed no evidence of airframe or engine preimpact malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation of the airplane. Performance calculations using a flight planning method described in the airplane flight manual indicated that the airplane could have made the return flight with about 18 gallons (119 lbs) of fuel remaining. However, performance calculations using a fuel burn simulation method developed from the fuel burn and data from the airplane flight manual indicated that the airplane would have run out of fuel on approach. Regulations require that a flight depart with enough fuel to fly to the first point of intended landing and, assuming normal cruising speed, at night, to fly after that for at least 45 minutes. The calculated 45-minute night reserves required about 56 gallons (366 lbs) of fuel using a maximum recommended cruise power setting or about 37.8 gallons (246 lbs) of fuel using a maximum range power setting. Regardless of the flight planning method he could have used, the pilot did not depart on the accident flight with the required fuel reserves and exhausted all useable fuel while on approach to the destination. The airplane was owned by Edward B. Noakes III.

On October 28, 2016, about 1432 central daylight time, American Airlines flight 383, a Boeing 767-323, N345AN, had started its takeoff ground roll at Chicago O’Hare International Airport, Chicago, Illinois, when an uncontained engine failure in the right engine and subsequent fire occurred. The flight crew aborted the takeoff and stopped the airplane on the runway, and the flight attendants initiated an emergency evacuation. Of the 2 flight crewmembers, 7 flight attendants, and 161 passengers on board, 1 passenger received a serious injury and 1 flight attendant and 19 passengers received minor injuries during the evacuation. The airplane was substantially damaged from the fire. The airplane was operating under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident. The uncontained engine failure resulted from a high-pressure turbine (HPT) stage 2 disk rupture. The HPT stage 2 disk initially separated into two fragments. One fragment penetrated through the inboard section of the right wing, severed the main engine fuel feed line, breached the fuel tank, traveled up and over the fuselage, and landed about 2,935 ft away. The other fragment exited outboard of the right engine, impacting the runway and fracturing into three pieces. Examination of the fracture surfaces in the forward bore region of the HPT stage 2 disk revealed the presence of dark gray subsurface material discontinuities with multiple cracks initiating along the edges of the discontinuities. The multiple cracks exhibited characteristics that were consistent with low-cycle fatigue. (In airplane engines, low-cycle fatigue cracks grow in single distinct increments during each flight.) Examination of the material also revealed a discrete region underneath the largest discontinuity that appeared white compared with the surrounding material. Interspersed within this region were stringers (microscopic-sized oxide particles) referred to collectively as a “discrete dirty white spot.” The National Transportation Safety Board’s (NTSB) investigation found that the discrete dirty white spot was most likely not detectable during production inspections and subsequent in-service inspections using the procedures in place. The NTSB’s investigation also found that the evacuation of the airplane occurred initially with one engine still operating. In accordance with company procedures and training, the flight crew performed memory items on the engine fire checklist, one of which instructed the crew to shut down the engine on the affected side (in this case, the right side). The captain did not perform the remaining steps of the engine fire checklist (which applied only to airplanes that were in flight) and instead called for the evacuation checklist. The left engine was shut down as part of that checklist. However, the flight attendants had already initiated the evacuation, in accordance with their authority to do so in a life-threatening situation, due to the severity of the fire on the right side of the airplane.

The twin-engine airplane, flown by an airline transport pilot, was approaching the destination airport after a cross-country flight in night instrument meteorological conditions. The destination airport weather conditions about 1 minute before the accident included an overcast ceiling at 200 ft and 1/2-mile visibility with light rain and fog. According to air traffic control (ATC) data, the flight received radar vectors to the final approach course for an instrument landing system (ILS) approach to runway 20. As shown by a post accident simulation study based on radar data and data recovered from the airplane's electronic horizontal situation indicator (EHSI), the airplane's flight path did not properly intercept and track either the localizer or the glideslope during the instrument approach. The airplane crossed the final approach fix about 360 ft below the glideslope and then maintained a descent profile below the glideslope until it leveled briefly near the minimum descent altitude, likely for a localizer-only instrument approach. However, the lateral flight path from the final approach fix inbound was one or more dots to the right of the localizer centerline until the airplane was about 1 nautical mile from the runway 20 threshold when it turned 90° left to an east course. The turn was initiated before the airplane had reached the missed approach point; additionally, the left turn was not in accordance with the published missed approach instructions, which specified a climb on runway heading before making a right turn to a 270° magnetic heading. The airplane made a series of pitch excursions as it flew away from the localizer. The simulation study determined that dual engine power was required to match the recorded flight trajectory and ground speeds, which indicated that both engines were operating throughout the approach. The simulation results also indicated that, based on calculated angle of attack and lift coefficient data, the airplane likely encountered an aerodynamic stall during its course deviation to the east. The airplane impacted the ground about 2.2 miles east-northeast of the runway 20 threshold and about 1.75 miles east of the localizer centerline. According to FAA documentation, at the time of the accident, all components of the airport's ILS were functional, with no recorded errors, and the localizer was radiating a front-course to the correct runway. Additionally, a post accident flight check found no anomalies with the instrument approach.An onsite examination established that the airplane impacted the ground upright and in a nose-low attitude, and the lack of an appreciable debris path was consistent with an aerodynamic stall/spin. Wreckage examinations did not reveal any anomalies with the airplane's flight control systems, engines, or propellers. The glideslope antenna was found disconnected from its associated cable circuit. Laboratory examination and testing determined that the glideslope antenna cable was likely inadequately connected/secured during the flight, which resulted in an unusable glideslope signal to the cockpit avionics. There was no history of recent maintenance on the glideslope antenna, and the reason for the inadequate connection could not be determined. Data downloaded from the airplane's EHSI established that the device was in the ILS mode during the instrument approach phase and that it had achieved a valid localizer state on both navigation channels; however, the device never achieved a valid glideslope state on either channel during the flight. Further, a replay of the recorded EHSI data confirmed that, during the approach, the device displayed a large "X" through the glideslope scale and did not display a deviation pointer, both of which were indications of an invalid glideslope state. There was no evidence of cumulative sleep loss, acute sleep loss, or medical conditions that indicated poor sleep quality for the pilot. However, the accident occurred more than 2 hours after the pilot routinely went to sleep, which suggests that the pilot's circadian system would not have been promoting alertness during the flight. Further, at the time of the accident, the pilot likely had been awake for 18 hours. Thus, the time at which the accident occurred and the extended hours of continuous wakefulness likely led to the development of fatigue. The presence of low cloud ceilings and the lack of glideslope guidance would have been stresses to the pilot during a critical phase of flight. This would have increased the pilot's workload and situational stress as he flew the localizer approach, a procedure that he likely did not anticipate or plan to conduct. In addition, weight and balance calculations indicated that the airplane's center of gravity (CG) was aft of the allowable limit, and the series of pitch excursions that began shortly after the airplane turned left and flew away from the localizer suggests that the pilot had difficulty controlling airplane pitch. This difficulty was likely due to the adverse handling characteristics associated with the aft CG. These adverse handling characteristics would have further increased the pilot's workload and provided another distraction from maintaining control of the airplane. Therefore, it is likely that the higher workload caused by the pilot's attempt to fly an unanticipated localizer approach at night in low ceilings and his difficulty maintaining pitch control of the airplane with an aft CG contributed to his degraded task performance in the minutes preceding the accident.

The commercial pilot was conducting an on-demand cargo charter flight. Shortly after takeoff, the pilot informed the tower controller that he wanted to "come back and land" because he was "having trouble with the left engine." The pilot chose to fly a left traffic pattern and return for landing. No further transmissions were received from the pilot. The accident site was located about 0.50 mile southeast of the runway's displaced threshold. GPS data revealed that, after takeoff, the airplane entered a left turn to a southeasterly course and reached a maximum GPS altitude of 959 ft (about 342 ft above ground level [agl]). The airplane then entered another left turn that appeared to continue until the final data point. The altitude associated with the final data point was 890 ft (about 273 ft agl). The final GPS data point was located about 135 ft northeast of the accident site. Based on GPS data and the prevailing surface winds, the airspeed was about 45 knots during the turn. According to the airplane flight manual, the stall speed in level flight with the wing flaps extended was 59 knots. Postaccident examination and testing of the airframe, engines, and related components did not reveal any preimpact mechanical failures or malfunctions that would have precluded normal operation; therefore, the nature of any issue related to the left engine could not be determined. Based on the evidence, the pilot failed to maintain adequate airspeed while turning the airplane back toward the airport, which resulted in an aerodynamic stall/spin.

Company personnel reported that, in the weeks before the accident, the airplane's left engine had been experiencing a problem that prevented it from initially producing 100 percent power. The accident pilot and maintenance personnel attempted to correct the discrepancy; however, the discrepancy was not corrected before the accident flight, and company personnel had previously flown flights in the airplane with the known discrepancy. Witnesses reported observing a portion of the takeoff roll, which they described as slower than normal. However, the airplane was subsequently blocked from their view. Examination of the runway environment showed that, during the takeoff roll, the airplane traveled the entire length of the 4,501-ft runway, continued to travel through a 300-ft-long grassy area and a 300- ft-long soybean field, and then impacted the top of 10-ft-tall corn stalks for about 50 ft before it began to climb. About 1/2 mile from the airport, the airplane impacted several trees in a leftwing, nose-low attitude, consistent with the airplane being operated below the minimum controllable airspeed. The main wreckage was consumed by postimpact fire. Postaccident examinations revealed no evidence of mechanical anomalies with the airframe, right engine, or propellers that would have precluded normal operation. Given the left engine's preexisting condition, it is likely that its performance was degraded; however, postimpact damage and fire preluded a determination of the cause of the problem.

Before departure, the pilot performed fuel calculations and determined that he had enough fuel to fly to the intended destination. While enroute the pilot flew around thunderstorms. On arrival at his destination, the pilot executed the instrument landing system approach for runway 16. While on short final the right engine experienced a total loss of power. The pilot switched the fuel flow from the right tank to the left tank. The left engine then experienced a total loss of power and the pilot made an emergency landing on a road. The airplane received substantial damage to the wings and fuselage when it struck a tree. A postaccident examination revealed only a few gallons of unusable fuel in the left fuel tank. The right fuel tank was breached during the accident sequence but no fuel smell was noticed. The pilot performed another fuel calculation after the accident and determined that there were actually 170 gallons of fuel onboard, not 230 gallons like he originally figured. He reported no preaccident mechanical malfunctions that would have precluded normal operation and determined that he exhausted his entire fuel supply.

The airplane was substantially damaged when it impacted terrain in a residential neighborhood in Taylorville, Illinois. The commercial pilot sustained fatal injuries. Twelve parachutists on-board the airplane exited and were not injured. No persons on the ground were injured. The airplane was registered to Barron Aviation, LLC; Perry, Missouri, and operated by Barron Aviation Private Flight Services, LLC; Hannibal, Missouri, under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91, as a sport parachuting flight. Day visual meteorological conditions prevailed and no flight plan was filed. The local flight originated from Taylorville Municipal Airport (TAZ), Taylorville, Illinois, about 1100. The airplane had climbed to an altitude of about 11,000 feet mean sea level (msl) and the parachutists were seated inside the airplane on two rear facing "straddle benches". As the airplane arrived at the planned drop location, the parachutists stood up, opened the door, and moved further aft in the airplane in preparation for their jump. Five of the parachutists were positioned hanging on to the outside of the airplane with several others standing in the door and the remainder were standing in the cabin forward of the door. Several parachutists reported that they were almost ready to jump when they heard the sounds of the airplane's stall warning system. The airplane then suddenly rolled and all twelve parachutists quickly exited the airplane. Several of those who were last to exit reported that the airplane was inverted or partially inverted as they went out the door. The pilot, seated in the left front cockpit seat, did not exit the airplane. Several witnesses reported seeing the airplane turning and descending in an inverted attitude when the airplane appeared to briefly recover, but then entered a nearly vertical dive. The airplane impacted a tree and terrain in the back yard of an occupied residence. Emergency personnel who first responded to the accident scene reported a strong smell of gasoline and ordered the evacuation of several nearby homes. There was no post impact fire.