Beechcraft 90 King Air

Few minutes after takeoff from the Pousada Amazônia Fisching Lodge Airstrip located at the border between Pará and Mato Grosso, while climbing, the twin engine airplane entered an uncontrolled descent and crashed in a wooded area, bursting into flames. The airplane was destroyed by impact forces and a post crash fire and all five occupants were killed.
Crew:
Hélder de Souza, pilot.
Passengers:
Arni Alberto Spiering,
Ademar de Oliveira,
Arni Alberto Spiering Benez,
João Marcos Trojan Spiering.

Following an uneventful flight from Tuxtla Gutiérrez-Francisco Sarabia Airport, the crew initiated the descent to Palenque Airport in limited visibility. On approach, the twin engine airplane impacted the slope of a wooded terrain located in the Cerro Norte about 12 km southwest of the destination airport. The airplane disintegrated on impact and all occupants were killed, among them Juan Pablo Montes de Oca, Federal Deputy who was flying to Palenque with his family.
Crew:
Roberto Villanueva Valdez, pilot,
Carlos Alberto Culebro Esquinca, copilot.
Passengers:
Juan Pablo Montes de Oca,
Sofía Montes de Oca, Juan Pablo's daughter,
Pablo Montes de Oca, Juan Pablo's son,
Guillermina Rincón Cruz, Juan Pablo's wife,
Rosalía, Juan Pablo's sister,
Daniela, Juan Pablo's nephew,
Eduardo, juan Pablo's nephew.

The twin engine airplane departed Montería-Los Garzones Airport on an ambulance flight to Medellín, carrying two pilots, a doctor and a nurse. About 30 minutes into the flight, while cruising at an altitude of 19,000 feet, the airplane initiated a descent and the speed started to decrease until it stalled and crashed in a prairie, bursting into flames. All four occupants were killed.

Just after liftoff from runway 35 at Bom Futuro Airport, while in initial climb, the twin engine airplane rolled to the left, descended and impacted the surface of the apron with its left wing. Upon impact, the undercarriage were torn off then the airplane slid for few dozen metres before it crashed against a hangar under construction, bursting into flames. Both passengers were injured while the pilot and one person on the ground were killed.

The pilot departed University-Oxford Airport on a private flight to Fayetteville. On approach to Drake Airport Runway 34, the twin engine airplane crashed in unknown circumstances in rugged terrain located south of the airfield. The pilot, sole on board, was killed.

The medical transport flight was en route to pick up a patient on a neighboring island on an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan in dark night conditions over the ocean. About 13 minutes after departure, at 13,000 ft mean sea level (msl), the airplane’s vertical gyro failed, which subsequently failed the pilot’s Electric Attitude Director Indicator (EADI), which also caused the autopilot to disconnect. The failure of the EADI and autopilot disconnect required the pilot to manually fly the airplane using the copilot’s attitude gyro for his horizon information (bank angle and pitch attitude) for the duration of the flight. The pilot did not declare an emergency, nor did he inform air traffic control (ATC) that his electric attitude indicator had failed and that his autopilot had disengaged. After the instrumentation failure and autopilot disconnect, the airplane entered a series of right banks before being brought back to level, followed by a left turn, and then subsequent right banks. ATC asked the pilot to change course and the pilot agreed. The copilot attitude indicator indicated that the airplane entered a descending, steep right bank turn. Over the next 5 minutes, ATC issued varying instructions to the pilot. During this time, the airplane entered several right- and left-hand banks and rolls and descended 1,000 ft per minute (fpm), which increased to -3,500 fpm as the airplane’s airspeed increased. About 7 minutes after the instrumentation failure, the airplane was in a 65° bank angle when ATC asked the pilot to verify his heading. As the pilot responded, the airplane bank angle increased to 90° and the airspeed exceeded 260 knots. The bank angle and airspeed continued to increase; a loud metallic bang was recorded that was consistent with an in-flight separation of the empennage from the fuselage before impacting with the water. After an extensive underwater search, the main wreckage was located on the seabed at a depth of about 6,420 ft. The wreckage was recovered and transported to a facility for examination.

The pilot flew a visual approach to his home airport but did a go-around due to ground fog. After receiving an instrument flight rules clearance, he flew an RNAV/GPS approach that he also discontinued due to ground fog. After executing a missed approach, the pilot flew another RNAV/GPS approach. The pilot reported that during this last approach he lost visual references and initiated a go-around, during which the airplane impacted trees about 800 ft to the right of the runway. The main wreckage came to rest upright and was consumed by a post-impact fire. The postaccident examination revealed no preimpact anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. The pilot reported that he observed the right engine was slower to accelerate than the left engine during the attempted go-around, and that he was distracted looking at the engine indications. He reported that he did not notice if the airplane yaw to the right and, before he could correct for the altitude loss, the airplane descended into and struck the trees.

Shortly after departure to pick up a passenger at their destination airport about 75 nm away, the pilots climbed and turned onto a track of about 115° before leveling off about 11,000 ft mean sea level (msl), where the airplane remained for a majority of the flight. Pilot and controller communications during the flight were routine and there were no irregularities reported. As the airplane descended into the destination airport area, the airplane passed through areas of light to heavy icing where there was a 20 to 80% probability of encountering supercooled large droplets (SLD) during their initial descent and approach. While level at 4,000 ft msl, the flight remained in icing conditions, and then was cleared for the instrument approach to the runway. The flight emerged from the overcast layer as it crossed the final approach fix at 2,800 ft msl; the flight continued its descent and was cleared to land. The controller informed the flight that there was a vehicle on the runway but it would be cleared shortly, which was acknowledged; this was the final communication from the flight crew. Multiple eyewitnesses and security camera footage revealed that the airplane, while flying straight and level, suddenly began a steep, spinning, nearly vertical descent until it impacted a commercial business parking lot; the airplane subsequently collided with several unoccupied vehicles and caught fire. The airplane was certified for flight in known icing conditions and was equipped with pneumatic deice boots on each of the wings and tail surfaces. The pneumatic anti-icing system was consumed by the postimpact fire; the control switches were impact and thermally damaged and a reliable determination of their preimpact operation could not be made. Further examination of the airframe and engines revealed no indications of any preimpact mechanical anomalies that would have precluded normal engine operation or performance. During the approach it is likely that the airframe had been exposed to and had built-up ice on the control surfaces. It could not be determined if the pilots used the pneumatic anti-icing system, or if the system was inoperative, based on available evidence. Review of the weather conditions and the airplane’s calculated performance based on ADS-B data, given the speeds at which the airplane was flying, and the lack of any discernable deviations that might have been expected due to an extreme amount of ice accumulating on the airframe, it is also likely that the deice system, if operating at the time of the icing encounter, should have been able to sufficiently remove the ice from the surfaces. Although it is also uncertain when the pilots extended the landing gear and flaps, it is likely that the before-landing checklist would be conducted between the final approach fix and when the flight was on its 3-mile final approach to land. Given this information, the available evidence suggests that the sudden loss of control from a stable and established final approach was likely due to the accumulation of ice on the tailplane. It is likely that once the pilots changed the airplane’s configuration by extending the landing gear and flaps, the sudden aerodynamic shift resulted in the tailplane immediately entering an aerodynamic stall that maneuvered the airplane into an attitude from which there was no possibility to recover given the height above the ground. Postaccident toxicological testing detected the presence of delta-8 THC. Delta-8 THC has a potential to alter perception and cause impairment, but only the non-psychoactive metabolite carboxy-delta-8-THC was present in the pilot’s liver and lung tissue. Thus, it is unlikely that the pilot’s delta-8-THC use contributed to the accident.