Atlanta-Fulton County-Brown Field

The flight crew of the jet obtained weather information for the destination airport, which indicated quartering tailwind conditions for the runway in use at the time, with wind at 3 knots gusting to 16 knots. The crew determined the wind to be within limitations. The cockpit voice recorder transcript and airport surveillance video indicated that the landing approach was normal. The captain, who was the pilot flying, stated that, after touchdown, the thrust reversers were deployed and the airplane turned “sharply to the right.” He reported that remedial control inputs were ineffective in maintaining directional control. Airport surveillance video footage of the landing roll and accident sequence showed that, about 9 seconds into the landing roll, the airplane turned sharply to its right. The airplane departed the runway, its left wingtip struck the ground, the entire wing structure (left wing/right wing/wingbox) separated from the airplane as one assembly, and the fuselage continued a short distance before it came to rest upright. The thrust reversers on each engine were deployed and their extended positions were about equal. A windsock could be seen in the surveillance video footage nearly parallel to the ground, indicating nearly a direct crosswind to the landing runway that would have been towards the airplane’s right side. Recorded wind shortly after the accident was consistent with a 90° right crosswind for the landing runway at 6 knots with gusts to 14 knots. A detailed examination of the airplane and system components revealed that all flight control, steering, and braking systems and their actuator components operated as designed. Although the copilot's yaw force sensor did not meet manufacturer acceptance testing during post accident examination, this would not have affected the directional controllability of the airplane. Based on the available information, it is likely that the pilot’s compensation for the crosswind conditions was inadequate, which resulted in a loss of directional control and runway excursion.

The pilot departed on an instrument flight rules flight into instrument meteorological conditions (IMC). Radar data indicated that the airplane entered a left turn after takeoff, consistent with the pilot's instrument clearance. As the airplane climbed to an altitude about 2,410 ft above ground level, its rate of climb increased from about 3,500 ft per minute to 9,600 ft per minute, the stick shaker activated, and the airplane decelerated to about 75 knots. The airplane then entered a descending right turn and rolled inverted before impacting terrain about 1 mile from the airport. All major components of the airplane were located at the accident site, and examination of the wreckage revealed no anomalies with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation. The weather conditions about the time of the accident included an overcast cloud ceiling about 600 ft above ground level. It is likely that the pilot became spatially disoriented after entering the cloud layer, which resulted in the airplane's high rate of climb, rapid loss of airspeed, and a likely aerodynamic stall. The steep descending right turn, the airplane's roll to an inverted attitude, and the high-energy impact are also consistent with a loss of control due to spatial disorientation.

The private pilot departed on an instrument flight rules flight plan in his twin-engine turbojet airplane. The flight was uneventful until the air traffic controller amended the flight plan, which required the pilot to manually enter the new routing information into the GPS. A few minutes later, the pilot told the controller that he was having problems with the GPS and asked for a direct route to his destination. The controller authorized the direct route and instructed the pilot to descend from 22,000 ft to 6,000 ft, during which time the sound of the autopilot disconnect was heard on the cockpit voice recorder (CVR). During the descent, the pilot told the controller that the airplane had a steering problem and was in the clouds. The pilot was instructed to descend the airplane to 4,100 ft, which was the minimum vectoring altitude. The airplane continued to descend, entered visual meteorological conditions, and then descended below the assigned altitude. The controller queried the pilot about the airplane's low altitude and instructed the pilot to maintain 4,100 ft. The pilot responded that he was unsure if he would be able to climb the airplane back to that altitude due to steering issues. The controller issued a low altitude warning and again advised the pilot to climb back to 4,100 ft. The pilot responded that the autopilot was working again and that he was able to climb the airplane to the assigned altitude. The controller then instructed the pilot to change to another radio frequency, but the pilot responded that he was still having a problem with the GPS. The pilot asked the controller to give him direct routing to the airport. A few minutes later, the pilot told the controller that he was barely able to keep the airplane straight and its wings level. The controller asked the pilot if he had the airport in sight, which he did not. The pilot then declared an emergency and expressed concerns related to identifying the landing runway. Afterward, radio contact between the controller and the pilot was lost. Shortly before the airplane impacted the ground, a witness saw the airplane make a complete 360° roll to the left, enter a steep 90° bank to the left, roll inverted, and enter a vertical nose-down dive. Another witness saw the airplane spiral to the ground. The airplane impacted the front lawn of a private residence, and a postcrash fire ensued.The pilot held a type rating for the airplane, but the pilot's personal logbooks were not available for review. As a result, his overall currency and total flight experience in the accident airplane could not be determined. The airplane was originally certified for operations with a pilot and copilot. To obtain an exemption to operate the airplane as a single pilot, a pilot must successfully complete an approved single-pilot exemption training course annually. The accident airplane was modified, and the previous owner was issued a single-pilot conformity certificate by the company that performed the modifications. However, there was no record indicating that the accident pilot received training under this exemption. Several facilities that have single-pilot exemption training for the accident airplane series also had no record of the pilot receiving training for single-pilot operations in the accident airplane. Therefore, unlikely that the pilot was properly certificated to act as a single-pilot. The GPS was installed in the airplane about 3.5 years before the accident. A friend of the pilot trained him on how to use the GPS. The friend said that the pilot generally was confused about how the unit operated and struggled with pulling up pages and correlating data. The friend of the pilot had flown with him several times and indicated that, if an air traffic controller amended a preprogrammed flight plan while en route, the pilot would be confused with the procedure for amending the flight plan. The friend also said the pilot depended heavily on the autopilot, which was integrated with the GPS, and that he would activate the autopilot immediately after takeoff and deactivate it on short final approach to a runway. The pilot would not trim the airplane before turning on the autopilot because he assumed that the autopilot would automatically trim the airplane, which led to the autopilot working against the mis-trimmed airplane. The friend added that the pilot was "constantly complaining" that the airplane was "uncontrollable." A postaccident examination of the airplane and the autopilot system revealed no evidence of any preimpact deficiencies that would have precluded normal operation. This information suggests that pilot historically had difficulty flying the airplane without the aid of the autopilot. When coupled with his performance flying the airplane during the accident flight without the aid of the autopilot, it further suggests that the pilot was consistently unable to manually fly the airplane. Additionally, given the pilot's previous experience with the GPS installed on the airplane, it is likely that during the accident flight the pilot became confused about how to operate the GPS and ultimately was unable to properly control of the airplane without the autopilot engaged. Based on witness information, it is likely that during the final moments of the flight the pilot lost control of the airplane and it entered an aerodynamic stall. The pilot was then unable to regain control of the airplane as it spun 4,000 ft to the ground.

The pilot and passenger departed on a night personal flight. A review of the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) transcript revealed that, immediately after departure, the passenger asked the pilot if he had turned on the heat. The pilot subsequently informed the tower air traffic controller that he needed to return to the airport. The controller then cleared the airplane to land and asked the pilot if he needed assistance. The pilot replied "negative" and did not declare an emergency. The pilot acknowledged to the passenger that it was hot in the cabin. The CVR recorded the enhanced ground proximity warning system (EGPWS) issue 11 warnings, including obstacle, terrain, and stall warnings; these warnings occurred while the airplane was on the downwind leg for the airport. The airplane subsequently impacted trees and terrain and was consumed by postimpact fire. Postaccident examination of the airplane revealed no malfunctions or anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. During the attempted return to the airport, possibly to resolve a cabin heat problem, the pilot was operating in a high workload environment due to, in part, his maneuvering visually at low altitude in the traffic pattern at night, acquiring inbound traffic, and being distracted by the reported high cabin temperature and multiple EGPWS alerts. The passenger was seated in the right front seat and in the immediate vicinity of the flight controls, but no evidence was found indicating that she was operating the flight controls during the flight. Although the pilot had a history of coronary artery disease, the autopsy found no evidence of a recent cardiac event, and an analysis of the CVR data revealed that the pilot was awake, speaking, and not complaining of chest pain or shortness of breath; therefore, it is unlikely that the pilot's cardiac condition contributed to the accident. Toxicological testing detected several prescription medications in the pilot's blood, lung, and liver, including one to treat his heart disease; however, it is unlikely that any of these medications resulted in impairment. Although the testing revealed that the pilot had used marijuana at some time before the accident, insufficient evidence existed to determine whether the pilot was impaired by its use at the time of the accident. Toxicology testing also detected methylone in the pilot's blood. Methylone is a stimulant similar to cocaine and Ecstasy, and its effects can include relaxation, euphoria, and excited calm, and it can cause acute changes in cognitive performance and impair information processing. Given the level of methylone (0.34 ug/ml) detected in the pilot's blood, it is likely that the pilot was impaired at the time of the accident. The pilot's drug impairment likely contributed to his failure to maintain control of the airplane.

About 20 minutes before the accident, the pilot reported to the air traffic controller that he had a problem with an engine and needed to shut the engine down. The flight had just leveled at 23,000 feet. The controller told the pilot that he was near Jackson, Tennessee, and that he could descend to 7,000 feet. About 10 minutes later, the pilot reported he was at 8,000 feet and requested radar vectors for the instrument landing system approach to runway 2 at the McKellar-Sipes Regional Airport, at Jackson. The pilot told the controller he had the left engine shut down. About 5 minutes later, the pilot reported he had a propeller runaway. About 1 minute later, the pilot reported he was in visual conditions and requested radar vectors direct to the airport. About 2 minutes later, the pilot reported he had a cloud layer under him and that he had the localizer frequency for runway 2 set. About 1 minute later, the pilot was told to contact the McKellar Airport control tower. The pilot acknowledged this instruction. No further transmissions were received from the flight. Examination of the left engine at the accident site showed the left propeller control was found disconnected at the point the propeller control extension bracket attaches to the propeller governor. The propeller control cable had also pulled loose from a swaged point at the control rod and was also separated further aft due to overstress. The housing for the propeller control rod was found securely attached to the engine and the control rod was securely attached to the extension bracket. The propeller governor control arm, which was disconnected from the propeller control cable and rod, was found spring loaded into the high RPM position. Examination of the fractured left propeller bracket assembly was performed by the NTSB Materials Laboratory, Washington, D.C. The bracket assembly was fractured in the area of the outermost eyehole, at the point a bolt passes through the bracket assembly and the propeller governor arm. The fracture surface contained small amounts of dirt, grease, and minor corrosion. The fracture surface features include flat areas that lie on multiple planes separated by ratchet marks, features typically left behind by the propagation of a fatigue crack. The fatigue crack emanated from multiple origins on opposite sides of the bracket. The total area of the fatigue crack occupied approximately 85 percent of the fracture surfaces. The fatigue fractures initiated on the outer edges of the surface and propagated inward toward the center. The remaining 15% of the fracture surface had features consistent with overstress separation. Near the middle of each fatigue region were microfissures suggesting that the crack propagated under high-stress conditions. The NTSB Materials Laboratory also examined the separation point between the left propeller control flexible cable and the rigid rod that connects to the bracket assembly. The cable and the swaged part of the rigid rod were in good condition with no fractures or damage. The Piper PA-31-T2 Pilot Operating Handbook, Section 3, Emergency Procedures, does not contain a procedure for loss of propeller control. Section 3 did contain a procedure for "Over speeding Propeller", which stated that if a propellers speed should exceed 1,976 rpm, to place the power lever of the engine with the over speeding propeller to idle, feather the propeller, place the engine condition lever in the stop position, and complete the engine shutdown procedures. Pilot logbook records show the pilot completed a simulator training course for the accident model airplane about 9 days before the accident and had about 13 flight hours in the Piper PA-31-T2.

The pilot had experienced engine problems during a flight and requested maintenance assistance from the local maintenance repair station. Before the maintenance personnel signed off and completed the repairs, the pilot refueled the airplane, and attempted an instrument flight back to the originating airport. While enroute, the pilot reported a low fuel situation, and deviated to a closer airport. During the approach, the airplane lost engine power on both engines, collided with trees, and subsequently the ground, about a half of a mile short of the intended runway. There was no fuel found in the fuel system at the accident site. No mechanical problems were discovered with the airplane during the post-accident examination. This accident was the second time the pilot had exhausted the fuel supply in this airplane.

The flight was cleared for a night ILS approach and advised that tower at destination had closed. Tower had reported at closing that fog was forming and the flight was advised of the fog. The aircraft was located on a remote part of the airport the next morning. The ELT had activated but the signal was weak due to crash damage. Passenger said they never saw runway lights, only taxi lights, and that pilot attempted to perform a go-around. Gear was retracted and aircraft hit level grassy area in a near level attitude. The pilot was not wearing a shoulder harness. The pax crouched in the aisle next to the pilot, helping him find the runway, not wearing restraining belts. No published approach plate for ILS procedure for that runway was found in aircraft. Toxicological report revealed pilot had 3 mcg/ml dextromethorphan, an ingredient found in over counter cold remedies. According to report, levels of that substance in blood greater than 0.1 mcg/ml was sufficient to cause drowsiness.

During a night takeoff from Atlanta-Fulton County- Brown Field Airport, the decision of the pilot to abort the takeoff procedure was taken too late. The airplane overran, struck trees and crashed, bursting into flames. The aircraft was destroyed by fire and the pilot was seriously injured.

On a final VOR approach to Atlanta-Fulton County-Brown Field Airport, the crew encountered marginal weather conditions. The aircraft went out of control and crashed few miles short of runway 08, bursting into flames. A pilot and two passengers were killed while three other occupants were seriously injured. The aircraft was on a round robin IFR service at the time of the accident.
Crew:
Cw3 Lawrence J. Screptock +1.
Passengers:
Ltc Joseph E. Burke Jr.,
Col Lester M. Conger +3.