Sanford

The flight instructor, commercial pilot receiving instruction, and commercial pilot-rated passenger were conducting an instructional flight in the multi-engine airplane during instrument meteorological conditions. After performing a practice instrument approach, the flight was cleared for a second approach; however, the landing runway changed, and the controller vectored the airplane for an approach to the new runway. The pilot was instructed to turn to a southwesterly heading and maintain 1,600 ft until established on the localizer. Radar information revealed that the airplane turned to a southwesterly heading on a course to intercept the localizer and remained at 1,600 ft for about 1 minute 39 seconds before beginning a descending right turn to 1,400 ft. The descent continued to 1,100 ft; at which time the air traffic control controller issued a low altitude alert. Over the following 10 seconds, the airplane continued to descend at a rate in excess of 4,800 ft per minute (fpm). The controller issued a second low altitude alert to the crew with instructions to climb to 1,600 ft immediately. The pilot responded about 5 seconds later, "yeah I am sir, I am, I am." The airplane then climbed 1,400 ft over 13 seconds, resulting in a climb rate in excess of 6,700 fpm, followed by a descent to 1,400 ft over 5 seconds, resulting in a 1,500-fpm descent before radar contact was lost in the vicinity of the accident site. Radar data following the initial instrument approach indicated that the airplane was flying a relatively smooth and consistent flightpath with altitude and heading changes that were indicative of autopilot use until the final turn to intercept the localizer course. Maneuvering the airplane in restricted visibility placed the pilot in conditions conducive to the development of spatial disorientation. The accident circumstances, including altitude and course deviations and the subsequent high-energy impact, are consistent with the known effects of spatial disorientation. Additionally, examination of the airframe, engines, and propellers revealed no evidence of any preexisting anomalies that would have precludednormal operation. Therefore, it is likely that the pilot receiving instruction was experiencing the effects of spatial disorientation when the accident occurred. Toxicology testing of the flight instructor identified significant amounts of oxycodone as well as its active metabolite, oxymorphone, in liver tissue; oxycodone was also found in muscle. Oxycodone is an opioid pain medication available by prescription that may impair mental and/or physical ability required for the performance of potentially hazardous tasks. The flight instructor's tissue levels of oxycodone suggest that his blood level at the time of the accident was high enough to have had psychoactive effects, and his failure to recognize and mitigate the pilot's spatial disorientation and impending loss of control further suggest that the flight instructor was impaired by the effects of oxycodone. Toxicology testing of all three pilots identified ethanol in body tissues; however, given the varying amounts and distribution, it is likely that the identified ethanol was from postmortem production rather than ingestion.

The flight had been delayed due to severe weather over the departure airport. The preflight weather briefing received by the pilot included AIRMETS and SIGMETS for icing and severe thunderstorms, possible tornadoes, hail to 2 inches, and wind gusts to 70 knots near the ground. The Beech 18 was not equipped with a storm scope or weather radar. Prior to takeoff, a passenger stated to a witness that the weather was 'really really bad,' and that they would have to 'do some deviating to get around it.' After takeoff, the airplane cruised at 10,000 feet uneventfully for 1 hour and 50 minutes, when a center controller advised that radar contact was lost, which the pilot acknowledged. The next and last transmission occurred 13 minutes later when the controller received a 'Mayday' radio transmission that the airplane was 'going down.' The last radar target revealed a 6,000 foot per minute rate of descent. Training records revealed the pilot, also the company chief pilot, had flown solo 6.3 hours in the Beech 18 and credited it as dual flight instruction. He then passed a Part 135 evaluation with the FAA Principal Operations Inspector (POI), which lasted 1.6 hours. The next day the POI issued the pilot check airmen authorization for the Beech 18, all models. According to the POI, the airplane was not approved for Part 135 operations; however, the company had a bogus approval for the airplane, signed by the POI, that allowed the company to apply to Canadian Authorities for authorization to operate in Canada. The bogus approval had been used to justify the accident flight.

Pilot reported level at 6,000 feet; no further transmissions were received. Radar data shows that after 5 minutes at cruise flight ground speed began to slow, and as speed reached 85 knots (VMC is 83 knots) aircraft made a rapid turn to the left and the speed dropped to 74 knots. Radar contact was then lost. Witnesses reported hearing and seeing aircraft with an engine sputtering and quitting, at which time no engine noise was audible. Engine would then restart, and at one point aircraft was observed initiating a climb after engine start. Engine restarted and obtained near full power, and a short time later sound of impact was heard. The left engine fuel servo was found contaminated with corrosion and dirt, and would not allow fuel flow to the engine. The fuel strainer for this engine was installed backwards allowing unfiltered fuel to enter the engine. The left propeller was not feathered and had no signs of rotation under power. Right engine fuel servo also contained corrosion and contamination. The aircraft did not have a current annual inspection. All five occupants were killed.

The flight was cleared for a night ILS approach and advised that tower at destination had closed. Tower had reported at closing that fog was forming and the flight was advised of the fog. The aircraft was located on a remote part of the airport the next morning. The ELT had activated but the signal was weak due to crash damage. Passenger said they never saw runway lights, only taxi lights, and that pilot attempted to perform a go-around. Gear was retracted and aircraft hit level grassy area in a near level attitude. The pilot was not wearing a shoulder harness. The pax crouched in the aisle next to the pilot, helping him find the runway, not wearing restraining belts. No published approach plate for ILS procedure for that runway was found in aircraft. Toxicological report revealed pilot had 3 mcg/ml dextromethorphan, an ingredient found in over counter cold remedies. According to report, levels of that substance in blood greater than 0.1 mcg/ml was sufficient to cause drowsiness.

About 2020 EST, on September 8, 1977, Champion Home Builders Company, Gates Learjet 25B, N999HG, crashed shortly after takeoff at Sanford, North Carolina. All five persons aboard were killed, and the aircraft was destroyed. The aircraft departed Sanford Airport about 2018 EST, for a flight to Flint, Michigan. In accordance with departure instructions from Fayetteville departure control, the flight was about 3 mi west of the airport, climbing through 3,000 ft, on a heading of 270°, when it disappeared from radar. There were no distress calls, but several witnesses west of the airport saw the aircraft on fire below the 600 feet suddenly dove to the ground. People in the immediate vicinity reported that the overcast ceiling. The flight completed a right turn to a northeasterly heading and aircraft was on fire before it crashed.

The crew was engaged in a night training exercise to Greensboro with an intermediate stop in Raleigh-Durham. The aircraft left Fayetteville-Pope AFB at the end of the evening and while cruising at an altitude of some 5,000 feet, the electrical system suffered technical problems while an auxiliary generator failed. The Pitot tube deicing system failed as well, so the parameters transmitted to the airspeed indicator were erroneous. In such situation, crew decided to return to Fayetteville and while flying across the last cloud layer, the crew did not realize his altitude was insufficient due to poor visibility. The aircraft hit a mountain slope and was totally wrecked some 14 km west of Sanford. Both crew members were killed.
Crew:
Theodore Cole 1.