United States of America

Grand Canyon Airlines flight 5 (De Havilland DHC-6, N75GC) departed Grand Canyon National Park Airport on a local part 135, sightseeing flight. After returning from a normal trip, the flight was cleared to land on runway 21. Observers reported the approach to the airport was normal, but the aircraft traveled about 1,000 feet down the runway at an altitude of about 5 feet before touchdown. Reportedly, it bounced and traveled another 1,000 feet before touching down again. The aircraft then veered to the right and the flight crew initiated a go around (aborted landing). The aircraft climbed in a nose high altitude to about 150 feet to 200 feet agl, then it rolled to the left and crashed onto a wooded hill about 120 feet left of the runway. A power line was severed during impact, which interrupted electrical power to the airport and delayed emergency response to the crash. Surviving passengers reported the right seat pilot was flying the aircraft, while the left seat pilot narrated the tour; but after a hard touchdown, the left seat pilot took control of the aircraft and applied full power for a go-around. A scrape mark was found where the right wingtip scraped the runway during the 2nd touchdown. Both pilots and eight passengers were killed while 11 other passengers were injured, nine of them seriously.

A USAir Boeing 737-401, registration N416US, was scheduled to depart from Baltimore/Washington (BWI) as flight 1846 at 15:10, but air traffic inbound to New York-LaGuardia (LGA) delayed the takeoff until 19:35. Holding on the taxiway at BWI for 1.5 hours required the flight to return to the terminal area for fuel. The Boeing 737-400 left BWI uneventfully and arrived at LGA's Gate 15 at 20:40. Weather and air traffic in the LGA terminal area had caused cancellations and delayed most flights for several hours. The USAir dispatcher decided to cancel the Norfolk leg of Flight 1846, unload the passengers, and send the flight to Charlotte (CLT) without passengers. Several minutes later, the dispatcher told the captain that his airplane would not be flown empty but would carry passengers to Charlotte as USAir flight 5050. This seemed to upset the captain. He expressed concern for the passengers because more delays would cause him and the first officer to exceed crew duty time limitations before the end of the trip. While passengers were boarding, the captain visited USAir's ground movement control tower to ask about how decisions were made about flights and passengers. The captain returned to the cockpit as the last of the passengers were boarding, and the entry door was closed. After the jetway was retracted, the passenger service representative told the captain through the open cockpit window that he wanted to open the door again to board more passengers. The captain refused, and flight 5050 left Gate 15 at 22:52. The 737 taxied out to runway 31. Two minutes after push-back, the ground controller told the crew to hold short of taxiway Golf Golf. However, the captain failed to hold short of that taxiway and received modified taxi instructions from the ground controller at 22:56. The captain then briefed takeoff speeds as V1: 125 knots, VR: 128 knots, and V2: 139 knots. The first officer was to be the flying pilot. He was conducting his first non supervised line takeoff in a Boeing 737. About 2 minutes later, the first officer announced "stabilizer and trim" as part of the before-takeoff checklist. The captain responded with "set" and then corrected himself by saying: "Stabilizer trim, I forgot the answer. Set for takeoff." Flight 5050 was cleared into position to hold at the end of the runway at 23:18:26 and received takeoff clearance at 23:20:05. The first officer pressed the autothrottle disengage and then pressed the TO/GA button, but noted no throttle movement. He then advanced the throttles manually to a "rough" takeoff-power setting. The captain then said: "Okay, that's the wrong button pushed" and 9 seconds later said: "All right, I'll set your power." During the takeoff roll the airplane began tracking to the left. The captain initially used the nosewheel steering tiller to maintain directional control. About 18 seconds after beginning the roll a "bang" was heard followed shortly by a loud rumble, which was due to the cocked nosewheel as a result of using the nosewheel steering during the takeoff roll. At 23:20:53, the captain said "got the steering." The captain later testified that he had said, "You've got the steering." The first officer testified that he thought the captain had said: "I've got the steering." When the first officer heard the captain, he said "Watch it then" and began releasing force on the right rudder pedal but kept his hands on the yoke in anticipation of the V1 and rotation callouts. At 23:20:58.1, the captain said: "Let's take it back then" which he later testified meant that he was aborting the takeoff. According to the captain, he rejected the takeoff because of the continuing left drift and the rumbling noise. He used differential braking and nose wheel steering to return toward the centerline and stop. The throttle levers were brought back to their idle stops at 23:20:58.4. The indicated airspeed at that time was 130 knots. Increasing engine sound indicating employment of reverse thrust was heard on the CVR almost 9 seconds after the abort maneuver began. The airplane did not stop on the runway but crossed the end of the runway at 34 knots ground speed. The aircraft dropped onto the wooden approach light pier, which collapsed causing the aircraft break in three and drop into 7-12 m deep East River. The accident was not survivable for the occupants of seats 21A and 21B because of the massive upward crush of the cabin floor.

Following an uneventful refueling mission, the crew returned to Eielson AFB. After landing, the aircraft was parked on the apron and when the crew shut down the engine, an explosion occurred. The aircraft was totally destroyed by fire and two crew members were killed while five others were rescued.

The airplane was on a positioning flight and had two passengers along for the ride. The airplane was on base leg when the left engine sputtered. The pilot turned on the secondary boost pump and the engine operated normally until both engines flamed out. During the forced landing in a residential area, the airplane hit a powerline, trees, a house, a fireplug, a tree and a van, then another house. There was no smell of fuel in the entire area, and no usable fuel in the fuel system. All three occupants were seriously injured.

During arrival, the flight was issued the current Paducah altimeter setting. The pilot requested vectors for an approach to runway 18, but the ARTCC controller (ctlr) could not accommodate the request. The pilot was cleared for a VOR/DME-a approach. MDA for the approach was 1,080 feet msl (600 feet agl). At 2108 cdt, the flight changed to the FBO frequency. FBO personnel observed the aircraft fly over the airport and advised that it was too low. One of the pilots replied that they would be 'staying under the clouds.' The pilots had planned to land on runway 36, but reported they lost sight of the runway and would change to runway 18. Subsequently, the aircraft collided with a tree about 1 mile north-northeast of the airport, while on a westerly heading (approximately position of base leg for a VFR pattern). The aircraft came to rest about 700 feet west of the tree and was destroyed by impact and fire. No preimpact part failure/malfunction of the aircraft was found. Approximately 30 miles west at Paducah, the weather was in part: 200 feet scattered, 900 feet overcast visibility 3 miles with rain and fog, wind from 360° at 7 knots. The airport manager estimated there was a 200 feet ceiling at the airport. All six occupants were killed.

The pilot and two mechanics were on a maintenance test flight. As the aircraft was on a straight-in approach to runway 11 from the west, the pilot was advised of traffic ahead and told to slow his speed as much as possible. The pilot acknowledged. About 15 seconds later, the controller told the pilot (of N63XL) to make a 360° turn to the left for spacing. Shortly hereafter, witnesses observed the aircraft enter a steep bank (turn), then go into a steep spiraling, nose down, descent and crash. No preimpact mechanical malfunction or failure of the aircraft or engines was found. All three occupants were killed.

The propeller separated from the right engine during the initial climb. Examination of the wreckage revealed the propeller hub fracture resulted in one of the three propeller blades detaching from the hub. The rest of the propeller hub then separated striking the right front of the fuselage. Oil was spread across the aircraft nose and windshield. The fuselage right side damage increased aerodynamic drag. Witnesses reported the engine cowling was torn. The aircraft entered a right turn and dive. It impacted the ground in a near inverted attitude. Metallurgical examination of the failed prop hub revealed metal fatigue emanating from the threaded hole for the grease fitting. The threads had been deformed by shot peening, resulting in increased stress concentrations at the threads. The pilot, sole on board, was killed.

As the aircraft was departing from runway 17, smoke was observed coming from the right engine. The pilot confirmed a loss of power and made a right turn back toward the runway, then reported he had 'lost both engines.' The aircraft was extensively damaged during a landing on rough, rocky terrain about 1/4 mile southwest of the runway threshold. Investigation revealed the aircraft had just changed ownership. During pre-purchase inspection in Florida, metal particles were found in the oil screens of both engines. Oil was changed and flushed, but metal particles were found after another engine run. In May 1989, the right engine was replaced with an engine from another aircraft. The aircraft was flown to Oakland, CA, where it was painted and new interior was installed. A local mechanic noted metal particles in both eng oil screens and recommended oil analysis, but ferrying pilot refused. After flight to Hawaii, no oil stain noted on fuselage before flight on 9/9/89. Exam of wreckage revealed both engines failed from detonation. Heavy oil streaks found behind right engine, some streaks of oil found behind left engine. Right engine crankshaft/rod bearing surface was 0.010' under standard, but rod bearings were standard size. While the passenger was seriously injured, the pilot was killed.

The pilot unsuccessfully tried twice to land on runway 03. He did a visual approach and then an ILS approach. The pilot and witnesses reported foggy conditions at the airport. The pilot flew the ILS approach as a third attempt to land when the crash occurred. Radar data showed the aircraft descended to 1,100 feet msl on the approach, about 1/2 mile from the runway. The published decision height was 1,118 feet. The radar data indicated the aircraft passed east of the runway threshold at an altitude of 1,000 feet msl. The next and last radar data shows the aircraft about 2,300 feet beyond and 400 feet east of the runway. The investigation revealed the aircraft struck trees east of the runway and then crashed in a cornfield. An examination did not disclose evidence of a malfunction. The landing gear was retracted and the flaps were extended 10°. All five occupants were killed.

Witnesses heard the airplane circle twice before the approach. A fog bank had just rolled into the area and visibility was reduced to approximately one mile with the bases at 200 to 300 feet. The airplane was observed emerging from the fog in a steep left turn and descending rapidly; right of center line, on a one mile final. The left bank angle increased to near 90° when the nose dipped down and the airplane collided with a parked vehicle 150 feet right of centerline and 50 feet short of the runway. Unicom not manned. No radio in ambulance on ground. Basic weather data shown from north bend, 60 miles north. All three pilots were killed.