Kentucky

The airplane was fueled with 140 gallons of fuel before the second of three flight segments. The pilot reported that, while en route on the third segment, a fuel crossfeed light illuminated. He reset the indicator and decided to land the airplane to troubleshoot. He requested to divert to the nearest airport, which was directly beneath the airplane. Subsequently, the right engine lost power, and the autofeather system feathered the right engine propeller. He reduced power on the left engine, lowered the nose, and extended the landing gear while entering the traffic pattern. The pilot indicated that, after the landing gear was extended, the electrical system "failed," and shortly after, the left engine would not respond to power lever inputs. As the flight was on a base leg approach, the airplane was below the intended flightpath to reach the runway. The pilot stated that he pulled "gently on the control wheel"; however, the airplane impacted an embankment and came to rest on airport property, which resulted in substantial damage to both wings and the fuselage. Postaccident examination of the engines and airframe revealed no evidence of mechanical malfunctions or abnormalities that would have precluded normal operation. Signatures on the left propeller indicated that the engine was likely producing power at the time of impact; however, actual power settings could not be conclusively determined. Signatures on the right propeller indicated that little or no power was being produced. The quantity of fuel in the airplane's fuel system, as well as the configuration of the fuel system at the time of the accident, could not be determined based on the available evidence. Although the position of the master switch (which includes the battery, generator 1, and generator 2) was found in the OFF position, the airplane had been operating for about 30 minutes when the electrical power was lost; thus, it is likely that the airplane had been operating on battery power throughout the flight. This could have been the result of the pilot's failure to activate, or his inadvertent deactivation of, the generator 1 and 2 switch. If the flight were operating on battery power, it would explain what the pilot described as an electrical system failure after the landing gear extension due to the exhaustion of the airplane's battery. The postaccident examination of the left engine and propeller revealed that the engine was likely producing some power at the time of impact, and an explanation for why the engine reportedly did not respond to the pilot's throttle movements could not be determined. Additionally, given the available evidence, the reason for the loss of power to the right engine could not be determined.

The airplane departed on a long cross country flight, with thunderstorms and rain squalls along the general route. Approaching the destination airport, the airplane entered a rain squall, stalled, and impacted the ground in an almost vertical descent. Other than the onboard weather radar being previously removed for maintenance, there were no mechanical anomalies noted with the airplane. The pilot, whose logbook was not recovered, was not instrument qualified. Although he was recently observed flying four to five times weekly, when the pilot applied for a multi-engine rating about 3 1/2 months earlier, he indicated 107 hours of total flight experience.

The aircraft crashed during takeoff from Blue Grass Airport, Lexington, Kentucky. The flight crew was instructed to take off from runway 22 but instead lined up the airplane on runway 26 and began the takeoff roll. The airplane ran off the end of the runway and impacted the airport perimeter fence, trees, and terrain. The captain, flight attendant, and 47 passengers were killed, and the first officer received serious injuries. The airplane was destroyed by impact forces and post crash fire. The flight was operating under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 and was en route to Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport, Atlanta, Georgia. Night visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident.

On August 13, 2004, about 0049 eastern daylight time, Air Tahoma, Inc., flight 185, a Convair 580, N586P, crashed about 1 mile south of Cincinnati/Northern Kentucky International Airport (CVG), Covington, Kentucky, while on approach to runway 36R. The first officer was killed, and the captain received minor injuries. The airplane was destroyed by impact forces. The flight was operating under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 121 as a cargo flight for DHL Express from Memphis International Airport (MEM), Memphis, Tennessee, to CVG. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the flight, which operated on an instrument flight rules flight plan. The flight crew was scheduled to fly the accident airplane on a roundtrip sequence from MEM to CVG. Flight 185 departed MEM about 2329. The first officer was the flying pilot, and the captain performed the non flying pilot duties. During postaccident interviews, the captain stated that the takeoff and climb portions of the flight were normal. According to the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) transcript, at 0017:49, the captain stated that he was just going to “balance out the fuel here.” The first officer acknowledged. From 0026:30 to 0027:08, the CVR recorded the captain discussing the airplane’s weight and balance with the first officer. Specifically, the captain stated, “couldn’t figure out why on the landing I was out and I was okay on the takeoff.” The captain added, “the momentum is one six six seven and I…put one zero six seven and I couldn’t work it.” He then stated, “so…we were okay all along.” At 0030:40, the first officer stated, “weird.” At 0032:31, the captain stated, “okay just let me finish this [the weight and balance paperwork] off and…I’m happy,” and, about 2 minutes later, he stated, “okay, back with you here.” At 0037:08, the captain contacted Cincinnati Terminal Radar Approach Control (TRACON) and reported an altitude of 11,000 feet mean sea level. About 1 minute later, the first officer stated, “something’s messed up with this thing,” and, at 0039:07, he asked “why is this thing?” At 0041:21, the first officer stated that the control wheel felt “funny.” He added, “feels like I need a lot of force. it is pushing to the right for some reason. I don’t know why…I don’t know what’s going on.” The first officer then repeated twice that it felt like he needed “a lot of force.” The CVR did not record the captain responding to any of these comments. At 0043:53, when the airplane was at an altitude of about 4,000 feet, the captain reported to Cincinnati TRACON that he had the runway in sight. The approach controller cleared flight 185 for a visual approach to runway 36R and added, “keep your speed up.” The captain acknowledged the clearance and the instruction. The first officer then stated, “what in the world is going on with this plane? sucker is acting so funny.” The captain replied, “we’ll do a full control check on the ground.” At 0044:43, the approach controller again told the captain to “keep your speed up” and instructed him to contact the CVG Air Traffic Control Tower (ATCT). At 0045:11, the captain contacted the CVG ATCT and requested clearance to land on runway 36R, and the local control west controller issued the landing clearance. Flight data recorder (FDR) data indicated that, shortly afterward, the airplane passed through about 3,200 feet, and its airspeed began to decrease from about 240 knots indicated airspeed. At 0045:37, when the airplane was at an altitude of about 3,000 feet, the captain started the in-range checklist, stating, “bypass is down. hydraulic pressure. quantity checks. AC [alternating current] pump is on. green light. fuel panel. boost pumps on.” About 0046, the first officer stated, “I’m telling you, what is wrong with this plane? it is really funny. I got something all messed up here.” The captain replied, “yeah.” The first officer then asked, “can you feel it? it’s like swinging back and forth.” The captain replied, “we’ve got an imbalance on this…crossfeed I left open.” The first officer responded, “oh, is that what it is?” A few seconds later, the first officer stated, “we’re gonna flame out.” The captain responded, “I got the crossfeed open. just keep power on.” At 0046:45, the CVR recorded a sound similar to decreasing engine rpm. Immediately thereafter, the first officer stated, “we’re losing power.” At 0046:52, the first officer stated, “we’ve lost both of them. did we?” The captain responded, “nope.” FDR data showed that, about 1 second later, a momentary electrical power interruption occurred when the airplane was at an altitude of about 2,400 feet. At 0046:55, the CVR stopped recording. Airplane performance calculations indicated that, shortly after the power interruption, the airplane’s descent rate was about 900 feet per minute (fpm). According to air traffic control (ATC) transcripts, at 0047:12, the captain reported to the CVG ATCT that the airplane was “having engine problems.” The local control west controller asked, “you’re having engine problems?” The captain replied, “affirmative.” At 0047:28, the controller asked the captain if he needed emergency equipment, and the captain replied, “negative.’” This was the last transmission received by ATC from the accident flight crew. The FDR continued recording until about 0049. The wreckage was located about 1.2 miles short of runway 36R.

The airplane joined the inbound course for the GPS instrument approach between the intermediate approach fix and the final approach fix, and maintained an altitude about 200 feet below the sector minimum. The last radar return revealed the airplane to be about 3/4 nautical miles beyond the final approach fix, approximately 1,000 feet left of course centerline. An initial tree strike was found about 1 nautical mile before the missed approach point, about 700 feet left of course centerline, at an elevation about 480 feet below the minimum descent altitude. Witnesses reported seeing the airplane flying at a "very low altitude" just prior to its impact with hilly terrain, and also described the sound of the airplane's engines as "really loud" and "a constant roar." Night instrument meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident. There was no evidence of mechanical malfunction.

According to the pilot, he planned the estimated the 726 statute mile flight would take approximately 3 hours and 46 minutes, with one stop to pick up cargo. The available fuel for the flight was 182 gallons, which equaled an approximate 4 hour and 55 minutes endurance, assuming a 40 gallon per hour fuel burn. The flight proceeded uneventfully to the first stop; the airplane was not fueled, and it departed. As the flight neared the destination airport, the pilot began to get nervous because the main tanks were "going fast." He switched to the auxiliary fuel tanks, to "get all of the fuel out of them," and switched back to the main tanks. While executing an approach to the airport, the pilot advised the approach controller that he had lost power to the right engine, and then shortly thereafter, reported losing power to the left engine. The pilot elected to perform a forced landing to a railroad yard. After touching down, the left wing struck a four-foot high dirt mound, and separated from the main fuselage. The airplane came to rest upright on a railroad track. The pilot additionally stated that the loss of power to both engines was due to fuel exhaustion, and poor fuel planning.

Shortly before landing, the crew confirmed that the hydraulic and emergency air pressures were "good", and that the circuit breakers on the "right and left" were in. In addition, the first officer reported "arming one and two." The airplane landed 1,000 - 1,500 feet from the landing threshold of runway 04, which was 7,003 feet in length. The captain utilized aerodynamic braking during part of the landing roll. About 3 seconds after touchdown, the first officer stated, "they're not deployed, they're armed only." About 6 seconds after touchdown, there was an increase in engine rpm. Shortly after that, there was an expletive from the captain. One and a half seconds later, there was another expletive. Slightly less than 2 seconds later, the captain told the first officer to "brake me," and 2.7 seconds after that, stated "emergency brake." About 4 seconds later, there was a "clunk", followed by a decrease in engine rpm 1 second later. Immediately after that, the captain stated, "we're going off the end." The airplane subsequently dropped off an embankment at the end of the runway, impacted and descended through a localizer tower, then impacted the ground and slid across a highway. The airplane had been fitted with a conversion that included thrust reversers. An examination of the wreckage revealed that the thrust reversers were out of the stowed position, but not deployed. The drag chute was also not deployed. Brake calipers were tested with compressed air, and operated normally. Brake disc pads were measured, and found to be within limits. According to an excerpt from the conversion maintenance manual, reverser deployment was hydraulically actuated and electrically controlled. There was also an accumulator which allowed deploy/stow cycling in the event of hydraulic system failure. Interlocks were provided so that the reverser doors could not be deployed until the control panel ARM switch was on, the main throttle levers were in idle position, and the airplane was on the ground with the squat switches engaged. The previous crew reported no mechanical anomalies. Runway elevation rose by approximately 35 feet during the first 2/3 of its length, then decreased until it was 8 feet lower at its departure end. Winds were reported as being from 050 degrees true at 7 knots. At the airplane's projected landing weight, without the use of thrust reversers, the estimated landing distance was about 2,850 feet with the anti-skid operative, and 3,400 feet with the anti-skid inoperative.

The pilot requested and received clearance to execute the SDF approach, and was instructed to maintain 4,000 feet until established on the approach. Radar data revealed the airplane was never established on the approach, and started to descend before reaching the IAF. The airplane passed the IAF at 2,900 feet, and continued in a descending left hand turn into unprotected airspace. The airplane disappeared from radar at 1,900 feet, as it completed 180 degrees of turn. The turn did not match any of the four instrument approaches to the airport. The airplane struck a guy wire on a lighted communications antenna 3.3 MN southeast of the airport on a heading of 360 degrees. No evidence of a mechanical failure or malfunction of the airplane or its systems was found. A flight check by the FAA confirmed no navigation signal was received for the approach, which had been turned off and listed as out of service for over 4 years. In addition, the pilot did not report the lack of a navigation signal to ATC or execute a missed approach. Interviews disclosed the ATC controller failed to verify the approach was in service before issuing the approach clearance.

According to an FAA inspector, the airplane '...was unable to get airborne...' during the takeoff roll. He stated that after travelling the full length of the 4,997-foot runway, the airplane ran off the departure end of runway 5 and continued approximately 2,257 feet through an open field, a fence, a corn field and into a depression where it impacted terrain and came to rest. The pilot reported that during the takeoff roll he discovered that he had not removed the gust lock from the control column and that his attempts to remove it were unsuccessful. The pilot stated that the aircraft '...went off the end of the runway through a fence and impacted an earthen berm that collapsed the gear [and] blade strikes that stopped the engines.'

The pilot stated that the airplane was cruising at an altitude of 18,000 feet 30 minutes after refueling when the left engine lost power. He stated that he was in radio contact with Indianapolis ARTCC so he advised them of the situation and requested a lower altitude. The center cleared the flight to 10,000 feet msl. The pilot stated that his attempt to restart the engine was unsuccessful. Shortly thereafter the pilot reported that the right engine lost power. According to the controller at the center, the pilot was nine miles from the nearest airport and he provided the pilot with radar vectors to the nearest airport, and the weather conditions. The airplane touched down in a wooded area. The faa examined the airplane at the accident site. The engines were removed to Pratt & Whitney for further examination. The examination of the engine and engine accessories did not disclose any pre-existing defects. Fuel samples were removed and tested at the laboratory at Pratt & Whitney. The tests revealed evidence of contaminants.