Cincinnati-Northern Kentucky

On August 13, 2004, about 0049 eastern daylight time, Air Tahoma, Inc., flight 185, a Convair 580, N586P, crashed about 1 mile south of Cincinnati/Northern Kentucky International Airport (CVG), Covington, Kentucky, while on approach to runway 36R. The first officer was killed, and the captain received minor injuries. The airplane was destroyed by impact forces. The flight was operating under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 121 as a cargo flight for DHL Express from Memphis International Airport (MEM), Memphis, Tennessee, to CVG. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the flight, which operated on an instrument flight rules flight plan. The flight crew was scheduled to fly the accident airplane on a roundtrip sequence from MEM to CVG. Flight 185 departed MEM about 2329. The first officer was the flying pilot, and the captain performed the non flying pilot duties. During postaccident interviews, the captain stated that the takeoff and climb portions of the flight were normal. According to the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) transcript, at 0017:49, the captain stated that he was just going to “balance out the fuel here.” The first officer acknowledged. From 0026:30 to 0027:08, the CVR recorded the captain discussing the airplane’s weight and balance with the first officer. Specifically, the captain stated, “couldn’t figure out why on the landing I was out and I was okay on the takeoff.” The captain added, “the momentum is one six six seven and I…put one zero six seven and I couldn’t work it.” He then stated, “so…we were okay all along.” At 0030:40, the first officer stated, “weird.” At 0032:31, the captain stated, “okay just let me finish this [the weight and balance paperwork] off and…I’m happy,” and, about 2 minutes later, he stated, “okay, back with you here.” At 0037:08, the captain contacted Cincinnati Terminal Radar Approach Control (TRACON) and reported an altitude of 11,000 feet mean sea level. About 1 minute later, the first officer stated, “something’s messed up with this thing,” and, at 0039:07, he asked “why is this thing?” At 0041:21, the first officer stated that the control wheel felt “funny.” He added, “feels like I need a lot of force. it is pushing to the right for some reason. I don’t know why…I don’t know what’s going on.” The first officer then repeated twice that it felt like he needed “a lot of force.” The CVR did not record the captain responding to any of these comments. At 0043:53, when the airplane was at an altitude of about 4,000 feet, the captain reported to Cincinnati TRACON that he had the runway in sight. The approach controller cleared flight 185 for a visual approach to runway 36R and added, “keep your speed up.” The captain acknowledged the clearance and the instruction. The first officer then stated, “what in the world is going on with this plane? sucker is acting so funny.” The captain replied, “we’ll do a full control check on the ground.” At 0044:43, the approach controller again told the captain to “keep your speed up” and instructed him to contact the CVG Air Traffic Control Tower (ATCT). At 0045:11, the captain contacted the CVG ATCT and requested clearance to land on runway 36R, and the local control west controller issued the landing clearance. Flight data recorder (FDR) data indicated that, shortly afterward, the airplane passed through about 3,200 feet, and its airspeed began to decrease from about 240 knots indicated airspeed. At 0045:37, when the airplane was at an altitude of about 3,000 feet, the captain started the in-range checklist, stating, “bypass is down. hydraulic pressure. quantity checks. AC [alternating current] pump is on. green light. fuel panel. boost pumps on.” About 0046, the first officer stated, “I’m telling you, what is wrong with this plane? it is really funny. I got something all messed up here.” The captain replied, “yeah.” The first officer then asked, “can you feel it? it’s like swinging back and forth.” The captain replied, “we’ve got an imbalance on this…crossfeed I left open.” The first officer responded, “oh, is that what it is?” A few seconds later, the first officer stated, “we’re gonna flame out.” The captain responded, “I got the crossfeed open. just keep power on.” At 0046:45, the CVR recorded a sound similar to decreasing engine rpm. Immediately thereafter, the first officer stated, “we’re losing power.” At 0046:52, the first officer stated, “we’ve lost both of them. did we?” The captain responded, “nope.” FDR data showed that, about 1 second later, a momentary electrical power interruption occurred when the airplane was at an altitude of about 2,400 feet. At 0046:55, the CVR stopped recording. Airplane performance calculations indicated that, shortly after the power interruption, the airplane’s descent rate was about 900 feet per minute (fpm). According to air traffic control (ATC) transcripts, at 0047:12, the captain reported to the CVG ATCT that the airplane was “having engine problems.” The local control west controller asked, “you’re having engine problems?” The captain replied, “affirmative.” At 0047:28, the controller asked the captain if he needed emergency equipment, and the captain replied, “negative.’” This was the last transmission received by ATC from the accident flight crew. The FDR continued recording until about 0049. The wreckage was located about 1.2 miles short of runway 36R.

The flight was being vectored for the approach to runway 3R at Detroit Metropolitan Wayne County Airport (DTW) when the aircraft descended and impacted the ground. The aircraft struck the ground in a steep nose-down attitude in a level field in a rural area about 19 nm southwest of DTW. The flight carried 26 passengers and 3 crew members. There were no survivors and the airplane was destroyed by impact forces and a post crash fire. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident. The investigation revealed that it was likely that the airplane gradually accumulated a thin, rough glaze/mixed ice coverage on the leading edge deicing boot surfaces, possibly with ice ridge formation on the leading edge upper surface, as the airplane descended from 7,000 feet mean sea level (msl) to 4,000 feet msl in icing conditions, which may have been imperceptible to the pilots. The pilots had been instructed by air traffic control to slow to 150 knots and according to flight data recorder information, the airplane began to show signs of departure from controlled flight as it decelerated from 155 to 156 knots while in a flaps-up configuration. The investigation disclosed that the FAA failed to adopt a systematic and proactive approach to the certification, and operational issues of turbopropeller-driven transport airplane icing. The icing certification process has been inadequate because it has not required manufacturers to demonstrate the airplane's flight handling and stall characteristics under a sufficiently realistic range of adverse ice accretion/flight handling conditions. The aircraft manufacturer had issued a revision in April, 1996 to the approved flight manual which included activation of the leading edge deicing boots at the first sign of ice formation. The airplane operator did not incorporate the procedure, because it was contrary to the company's trained procedures and practices and of the belief that enacting the changes would result in potentially unsafe operation. Investigators' discussion with management personnel at each of the seven U.S.-based operators of the aircraft indicated that at the time of the accident only two of these operators had changed their procedures to reflect the information in the revision. The FAA, at the time of the accident, did not require manufacturers of all turbine-engine driven airplanes to publish minimum airspeed information for various flap configurations and phases and conditions of flight. During Safety Board investigators postaccident interviews with company pilots, there were inconsistent answers on the complex and varied minimum airspeed requirements established by the company for both icing and nonicing conditions. It was also noted that the pilots uncertainty of the appropriate airspeeds might have been associated with the language used, the different airspeeds and criteria contained in the guidance, the company's methods of distribution, and the company's failure t o incorporate the guidance as a formal, permanent revision to the flight standards manual.

The pilot, a company check airman, and an FAA inspector were on board the aircraft for a checkride which was intended to reassess the pilot's competency. A maintenance test (aileron rigging) was to be performed in conjunction with the check ride. The first maneuver to be performed was a no-flap landing. All three pilots stated that the pilot had difficulty managing the aircraft while in the traffic pattern; airspeeds were too slow, and the pilot was constantly manipulating power. The pilot never called for the before landing checklist, and the aircraft touched down on the runway with the landing gear up. The check pilot stated that the landing gear warning horn came on briefly, but the pilot added power and silenced the horn. The FAA inspector was seated in a passenger seat for takeoff and landing, and was not aware that the landing gear was not extended.

N3281T was attempting an instrument departure when it crashed left of the extended centerline of runway 18. The flight was observed climbing through 200 feet prior to descending to the ground. Prior to taxiing to takeoff the pilot failed to deice the airframe. Airplanes on the parking ramp around N3281T deiced prior to takeoff. Weather reports indicated that temp/dew point were 26 and 23° respectively. The surface observation also reported fog as a restriction to visibility. According to the airplane's handbook that tests prove that a coat of frost on a wing can destroy its lift. The pilot, sole on board, was killed.

The aircraft departed Dallas on a regularly scheduled international passenger flight to Montreal, Quebec, Canada, with an en route stop at Toronto, Ontario, Canada. The flight left Dallas with 5 crew members and 41 passengers on board. About 1903, eastern daylight time, while en route at flight level 330 (about 33,000 feet m.s.l.), the cabin crew discovered smoke in the left aft lavatory. After attempting to extinguish the hidden fire and then contacting air traffic control (ATC) and declaring an emergency, the crew made an emergency descent and ATC vectored Flight 797 to the Greater Cincinnati International Airport, Covington, Kentucky. At 1920:09, eastern daylight time, Flight 797 landed on runway 27L at the Greater Cincinnati International Airport. As the pilot stopped the airplane, the airport fire department, which had been alerted by the tower to the fire on board the incoming plane, was in place and began firefighting operations. Also, as soon as the airplane stopped, the flight attendants and passengers opened the left and right forward doors, the left forward overwing exit, and the right forward and aft overwing exits. About 60 to 90 seconds after the exits were opened, a flash fire engulfed the airplane interior. While 18 passengers and 3 flight attendants exited through the forward doors and slides and the three open overwing exits to evacuate the airplane, the captain and first officer exited through their respective cockpit sliding windows. However, 23 passengers were not able to get out of the plane and died in the fire. The airplane was destroyed.

The twin engine airplane was engaged in a schedule service (flight OH444) from Cincinnati-Northern Kentucky Airport (Greater Cincinnati) to Nashville, carrying seven passengers and one pilot. After a roll of about 1,500 - 2,000 feet on runway 18, the pilot started the rotation. During initial climb, at an altitude of about 150 feet, the right engine lost power. The airplane entered a right turn then lost height and crashed in a field located 1,188 feet to the west of runway 18. The aircraft was totally destroyed by impact forces and all eight occupants were killed.

Flight 128 was a scheduled domestic flight from Los Angeles International Airport, California, to Boston, Massachusetts, with intermediate stops at Cincinnati, Ohio and Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. The departure from Los Angeles was delayed due to an equipment change but the aircraft was airworthy at the time of departure. The only carry- over discrepancy was an inoperative generator which had no bearing on this accident. The flight took off from Los Angeles at 1737 hours Eastern Standard Time. The descent into the Cincinnati area from cruising altitude was delayed due to conflicting traffic and was initiated closer to the destination than normal. It required the crew to conduct the descent with a higher than normal rate toward the initial approach fix. The crew discussed the technique they were going to use to increase the rate of descent, and evidence revealed that they were relaxed, unworried and operating within the established operating limits of the aircraft. As the flight reported leaving 15 500 ft remarks were made in the cockpit about the rapidity of the descent and the hope, apparently with reference to the underlying cloud conditions, that it would be a thin layer. The crew checked the anti-icing equipment and conversations after that time indicated that they were not aware of any discrepancies regarding that system. Control of the flight was normal until the flight was turned over to the approach controller who failed to provide the crew with the current altimeter setting of 30.07 in Hg instead of 30.06 previously given to the crew. However, shortly after the crew intercepted a transmission to another aircraft containing the current altimeter setting of 30.07 they set and cross-checked that setting on their altimeters. Throughout the descent, the co-pilot called out the appropriate warnings to the pilot-in-command as the aircraft approached assigned altitudes and apparently performed all of his assigned duties without prompting by the pilot-in-command. Crew coordination was very good during that portion of the flight. The weather conditions in the Cincinnati area were such that the crew should have established visual contact with the ground by the time they reached 3 000 to 4 000 ft. As the flight approached the final fix, approximately 7 minutes before the accident, the crew was given the latest reported weather which indicated that the ceiling was approximately 1 000 ft and the visibility was 13 miles in snow and haze. Approximately 1 minute later they were reminded that the ILS glide slope was out of service, as well as the middle marker beacon and the approach lights. The crew acknowledged receipt of this information and planned their approach to the proper minimum altitude of 1 290 ft AMSL, 400 ft above the ground, to allow for these outages. From this point in the approach to the outer marker, the aircraft altitudes and headings were in general agreement with altitudes reported by the crew and the headings they were instructed to fly. Operation of the aircraft was normal and the proper configuration was established for the approach to the outer marker in accordance with the company's operating instructions. The crew reported over the outer marker at 2056 hours and were cleared to land on runway 18 and advised that the wind was 090°/8 kt and the RVR more than 6 000 ft (see Fig. 22-1). The co-pilot reported to the pilot-in-command that they were past the marker and that there was no glide slope. The pilot-in-command acknowledged this and stated ". . . We gotta go down to, ah, four hundred, that would be, ah." At this point, the co-pilot supplied the information "twelve ninety" and the pilot-in-command repeated "twelve ninety." The flight had arrived at the outer marker with the landing gear down, the flaps set at 40' down at an altitude of approximately 2 340 it and at an airspeed of approximately 200 kt. (The prescribed minimum altitude over the outer marker beacon, 4 miles from the threshold, was 1 973 ft AMSL). After the aircraft passed the outer marker, a rate of descent of 1 800 ft/min was established at an airspeed of about 190 kt. The rate of descent was greater than that recommended by the company for an instrument approach and remained nearly constant until approximately 20 sec before the first recorded sound of impact. At that time the rate increased to approximately 3 000 ft/min coincident with a request for 50° flaps, and a decrease in thrust, and then decreased to about 1 800 ft/min until about 5 sec before the initial contact. Prior to initial contact, the aircraft was rotated to a virtually level attitude, the rate of descent was decreasing, the airspeed was about 191 kt, and the indicated altitude was about 900 ft AMSL. The aircraft first struck small tree limbs at an elevation of approximately 875 ft AMSL, 9 357 it short of the approach end of runway 18 and 429 it right of the extended runway centre line. After several more impacts with trees and the ground, the aircraft came to rest approximately 6 878 it from the runway and 442 ft right of the extended runway centre line and burst into flames. A stewardess who survived the accident stated that the first noticeable impact felt like a hard landing. None of the survivors recalled any increase of engine power or felt any rotation of the aircraft. The accident occurred at 2057 hours during darkness in an area where snow was falling. Five crew members and 65 passengers were killed while 12 other occupants were seriously injured.

TWA Flight 159 was a scheduled domestic flight from New York to Los Angeles with an intermediate stop at the Greater Cincinnati Airport. It departed the ramp at Cincinnati at 1833 hours Eastern Standard Time. As it was approaching runway 27L for take-off, Delta Air Lines, Inc., DC-9, N-3317L, operating as Flight DAL 379, was landing. As DAL 379 was completing its landing roll, the crew requested and received clearance for a 180° turnaround on the runway in order to return to the intersection of runway 18-36 which they had just passed. After turning through approximately 90°, the nosewheel slipped off the paved surface and the aircraft moved straight ahead off the runway during which time it became mired. The throttles were retarded to idle, and power was not increased again. At 1839:05 hours as DAL 379 was in the process of clearing the runway, TWA 159 was cleared for take-off. The local controller testified that before TWA 159 began moving, he observed that DAL 379 had stopped. He stated that although DAL 379 appeared to be clear of the runway, he requested confirmation from the crew who replied, "Yeah, we're in the dirt, though." Following this report the controller stated "TWA 159 he's clear of the runway, cleared for take-off, company jet on final behind you." Take- off performance had been computed as V1 132 knots, VR 140 knots, V2 150 knots. In fact DAL 379 was stopped on a heading of 004' and located 4 600 ft from the threshold of runway 27L with its aft-most point being approximately 7 ft north of the runway edge, the aft-most exterior lights located on the wing tip and the upper and lower anti-collision lights being approximately 45 ft from the runway edge. The crew of TWA 159 did not have DAL 379 in sight when they commenced the take-off roll. The co-pilot was performing the take-off and the pilot-in-command drew his attention to DAL 379 as the aircraft appeared in their landing lights they could see that it was off the runway by Some 5-7 ft. As TWA 159 passed abeam of DAL 379 the co-pilot experienced a movement of the flight controls and the aircraft yawed. Simultaneously there was a loud bang from the right side of the aircraft. The last airspeed he had observed was 120 knots and assuming that the aircraft was at or near V1, and that a collision had occurred, he elected to abort the take-off . He stated that he closed the power levers, placed them in full reverse, applied maximum braking, and called for the spoilers which the pilot-in-command operated. Directional control was maintained but the aircraft ran off the end of the runway, rolled across the terrain for approximately 225 ft, to the brow of a hill, and became airborne momentarily. It next contacted the ground approximately 67 ft further down the embankment, the main landing gear was torn off and the nosewheel was displaced rearward, forcing the cabin floor upward by approximately 15 in. The aircraft slid down the embankment and came to rest on a road approximately 421 ft from the end of the runway. The accident occurred at approximately 1841 hours, in darkness. A passenger was killed, another was seriously injured, five others were slightly injured. The aircraft was written off.

American Airlines Flight 383, a Boeing 727, N1996, departed New York-LaGuardia Airport (LGA) at 17:38 for a scheduled flight to the Greater Cincinnati Airport (CVG). It was to be an IFR flight with a requested cruising altitude of 35,000 ft and an estimated time en route of 1 hour 23 minutes. The en route part of the flight was uneventful. About 18:55, when the flight was about 27 miles southeast of the Greater Cincinnati Airport, radar traffic control was effected by Cincinnati Approach Control. Subsequent descent clearances were issued to the flight and at 18:57 flight 383 reported: "...out of five for four and how about a control VFR, we have the airport." The Approach Controller replied: "... continue to the airport and cleared for a visual approach to runway one eight, precip lying just to the west boundary of the airport and its ... southbound." The crew acknowledged the clearance and the controller cleared the flight to descend to 2,000 feet at their discretion. At 18:58 Approach Control advised the flight that its radar position was six miles southeast of the airport and instructed them to change to the Cincinnati tower frequency. One minute later the tower controller cleared the flight to land. During the approach the visibility at the airport deteriorated as it began to rain. The tower controller reported: "American three eighty three we are beginning to pickup a little rain right now." At 19:01:14 the tower asked: "American three eighty three you still got the runway Okay?" To which the crew replied "Ah just barely we'll ah pickup the ILS here". At this point, thirteen seconds before impact, the 727 was descending at a rate of 2100 feet/min to an altitude of approximately 725 feet (165 ft below published field elevation) with the airspeed holding at 160 knots. The descent rate then decreased to about 625 ft/min for approximately the last 10 seconds of flight with the airspeed decreasing to 147 knots at impact. The right wing struck a tree at an altitude of 665 feet msl which is approximately 225 feet below the published field elevation. The aircraft slid a distance of 340 feet relatively intact through scrub trees and ground foilage before impacting and coming to rest amidst a group of larger trees. Following impact an intense ground fire erupted which completely destroyed the aircraft cabin forward of the tail section. A stewardess and three passengers survived while 58 other occupants were killed.

On touchdown, the aircraft went out of control and came to rest in flames. All three crew members were injured and the aircraft was destroyed by fire.