Oregon

After takeoff from runway 25 at Troutdale Airport, the twin engine airplane climbed to an altitude of 1,700 feet when the pilot was contacted by ATC about the fact that his altitude was well above the VFR altitude restrictions for the Gresham-Troutdale area. The pilot reported handling problem when the airplane entered an uncontrolled descent and crashed onto a house located in Fairview, about two km southwest from runway 07 threshold, bursting into flames. Both occupants as well as one people in the house were killed. The airplane was en route to Saint George, Utah.

The airplane was departing into instrument meteorological conditions using a standard instrument departure. The takeoff instructions consisted of making a climbing right turn direct to a nondirectional beacon. After departing, the pilot made a radio communication to an air traffic controller asking if he will tell him when to turn. The controller replied that he would not be calling his turn and that the pilot should fly the departure as published making a climbing right turn to overfly the approach end of the runway. The pilot acknowledged the communication, which was his last transmission. The airplane made a 360° turn and descended below the cloud layer. The airplane then climbed back into the cloud layer and made an inverted loop, descending into the ground in a near-vertical attitude. A postaccident examination of the airplane revealed no evidence of preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures. Recorded audio of the airplane before the accident was consistent with the engines operating. The signatures on both propellers were consistent with one another and consistent with the engines operating at a similar rpm. The pilot was qualified and recently underwent recurrent training. The reasons the pilot became spatially disoriented could not definitely determined. The pilot left the anti-collision lights on while in the clouds, which may have resulted in him having flicker vertigo.

During the first 15 minutes of the flight, the pilot of the complex, high performance, jet airplane appeared to have difficulty maintaining the headings and altitudes assigned by air traffic controllers, and throughout the flight, responded intermittently to controller instructions. After reaching an altitude of 27,000 ft, the airplane began to deviate about 30° right of course while continuing to climb. The controller alerted the pilot, who did not respond, and the airplane continued to climb. Two minutes later, the airplane entered a tight, spiraling descent that lasted 8 minutes until the airplane impacted the ground at high speed in a rightwing-low attitude. The airplane was highly fragmented on impact; however, examination did not reveal any evidence of structural failure, in-flight fire, a bird strike, or a cabin depressurization event, and both engines appeared to be producing power at impact. Although the 72-year-old private pilot had extensive flight experience in multiple types of aircraft, including jets, he did not hold a type rating in the accident airplane, and the accident flight was likely the first time he had flown it solo. He had received training in the airplane about two months before the accident but was not issued a type rating and left before the training was complete. During the training, he struggled significantly in high workload environments and had difficulty operating the airplane’s avionics suite, which had recently been installed. He revealed to a fellow pilot that he preferred to “hand fly” the airplane rather than use the autopilot. The airplane’s heading and flight path before the spiraling descent were consistent with the pilot not using the autopilot; however, review of the flight path during the spiraling descent indicated that the speed variations appeared to closely match the airplane’s open loop phugoid response as documented during manufacturer flight tests; therefore, it is likely that the pilot was not manipulating the controls during that time.

On February 6, 2019, about 1530 Pacific standard time, a Piper PA 46-350P, N997MA, was substantially damaged when it was involved in an accident near Aurora, Oregon. The private pilot and flight instructor were seriously injured. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 instructional flight. The pilot reported that the purpose of the flight was to practice commercial pilot maneuvers. After practicing slow flight, chandelles, lazy eights, and eights on pylons, they returned to the airport and discussed how to conduct a practice a power-off 180° landing as they entered the traffic pattern. When the airplane was abeam the 1,000-foot runway markings, the pilot reduced the power to idle and started a left turn toward the runway. He stated that he realized that the airplane was “probably not going to make the runway” and that the airplane was “not on final course.” He recalled the airplane turning sharply to the left as he was pulled up on the control yoke and added right rudder. He could not recall whether he applied power. The pilot did not report any mechanical malfunctions or anomalies with the airplane. A video of the event showed the airplane in a left turn as it descended toward the runway. The airplane’s left bank decreased to a wings-level attitude before the airplane entered a steeper left bank, followed immediately by a right bank as the airplane descended into the ground short of the runway. The airplane’s right wing and fuselage sustained substantial damage.

The commercial pilot and three passengers departed on an instrument flight rules crosscountry flight. While on approach to the destination airport, the pilot indicated to the air traffic controller that the airplane was passing through areas of moderate-to-extreme precipitation. After clearing the airplane for the approach, the controller noted that the airplane descended below its assigned altitude; the controller issued a low altitude alert, but no response was received from the pilot. The airplane subsequently impacted terrain in a level attitude about 12 miles from the airport. Examination of the airframe, engine, and system components revealed no evidence of preimpact mechanical malfunction that would have precluded normal operation. An area of disturbed, flattened, tall grass was located about 450 ft southwest of the accident site. Based on the images of the grass, the National Weather Service estimated that it would take greater than 35 knots of wind to lay over tall grass as the images indicated, and that a downburst/microburst event could not be ruled out. A downburst is an intense downdraft that creates strong, often damaging winds. About 6 hours before the flight, the pilot obtained weather information through a mobile application. Review of weather data indicated the presence of strong winds, heavy precipitation, turbulence, and low-level wind shear (LLWS) in the area at the time of arrival, which was reflected in the information the pilot received. Given the weather conditions, it is likely that the airplane encountered an intense downdraft, or downburst, which would have resulted in a sudden, major change in wind velocity. The airplane was on approach for landing at the time and was particularly susceptible to this hazardous condition given its lower altitude and slower airspeed. The downburst likely exceeded the climb performance capabilities of the airplane and resulted in a subsequent descent into terrain. It is unknown if the accident pilot checked or received additional weather information before or during the accident flight. While the flight was en route, several PIREPs were issued for the area of the accident site, which also indicated the potential of LLWS near the destination airport; however, the controller did not provide this information to the pilot, nor did he solicit PIREP information from the pilot. Based on published Federal Aviation Administration guidance for controllers and the widespread adverse weather conditions in the vicinity of the accident site, the controller should have both solicited PIREP information from the pilot and disseminated information from previous PIREPs to him; this would have provided the pilot with more complete information about the conditions to expect during the approach and landing at the destination.