Kona-Keahole

The flight crew was conducting a flight with two passengers and one flight attendant onboard the multiengine jet airplane. The flight crew later stated that at rotation speed, the captain applied back pressure to the control yoke; however, the nose did not rotate to a takeoff attitude. The captain attempted to rotate the airplane once more by relaxing the yoke then pulling it back again, and, with no change in the airplane’s attitude, he made the decision to reject the takeoff by retarding the thrust levers and applying maximum braking. The airplane overran the end of the runway onto a gravel pad where the landing gear collapsed. Continuity was confirmed from the flight controls to the control surfaces. No mechanical anomalies with the engines or airplane systems were noted during the investigation that would have precluded normal operation. A review of performance data indicated that the flight crew attempted to takeoff with the airplane 2,975 lbs over the maximum takeoff weight (MTOW), a center of gravity (CG) close to the most forward limit, and an incorrect stabilizer trim setting. The digital flight data recorder (DFDR) data indicated that the captain attempted takeoff at a rotation speed 23 knots (kts) slower than the calculated rotation speed for the airplane at maximum weight. Takeoff performance showed the departure runway was 575 ft shorter than the distance required for takeoff at the airplane’s weight. The captain, who was the pilot flying, did not hold any valid pilot certificates at the time of the accident because they had been revoked 2 years prior due to his falsification of logbook entries and records. Additionally, he had never held a type rating for the accident airplane and had started, but not completed, training in the accident airplane model before the accident. The first officer had accumulated about 16 hours of flight experience in the make and model of the airplane and was not authorized to operate as pilot-in-command. The airplane’s flight management system (FMS) data were not recovered; therefore, it could not be determined what data the flight crew entered into the FMS that allowed the airspeed numbers to be generated. The investigation revealed that had the actual performance numbers been entered, a “FIELD LIMITED” amber message would have illuminated warning the crew that the MTOW was exceeded, and airspeed numbers would not have been generated. Therefore, it is likely that the crew entered incorrect data into the FMS either by manually entering a longer runway length and/or decreased the weight of the fuel, passengers, and/or cargo.

The pilot ditched the twin engine airplane in the Pacific ocean after experiencing a loss of engine power and an in-flight engine fire while in cruise flight. The flight was operating at 1,000 feet msl, when the pilot noticed a loss of engine power in the right engine. At the same time the pilot was noticing the power loss, passengers noted a fire coming from the right engine cowling. The pilot secured the right engine and feathered the propeller. He attempted to land the airplane at a nearby airport; however, when he realized that the airplane was unable to maintain altitude he elected to ditch the airplane in the ocean. Prior to executing the forced landing, the pilot instructed the passengers to don their life jackets and assume the crash position. After touchdown, all but one passenger exited the airplane through the main cabin and pilot doors. It was reported that the remaining passenger was frightened, and could not swim. One survivor saw the remaining passenger sitting in the seat with the seat belt still secured and the life vest inflated. The pilot and passengers were then rescued from the ocean via rescue helicopter and boat. Postaccident examination of the airplane revealed that the right engine's oil converter plate gasket had deteriorated and extruded from behind the converter plate, allowing oil to spray in the accessory section and resulting in the subsequent engine fire. The engine manufacturer had previously issued a mandatory service bulletin (MSB) requiring inspection of the gasket every 50 hours for evidence of gasket extrusion around the cover plate or oil leakage. Maintenance records revealed that the inspection had been conducted 18.3 hours prior to the accident. At the time of the accident, the right engine had accumulated 386.8 hours since its last overhaul, and gasket replacement. The MSB was issued one month prior to the accident, after the manufacturer received reports of certain oil filter converter plate gaskets extruding around the oil filter converter plate. The protruding or swelling of the gasket allowed oil to leak and spray from between the plate and the accessory housing. A series of tests were conducted on exemplar gaskets by submerging them in engine oil heated to 245 degrees F; after about 290 hours, the gasket material displayed signs of deterioration similar to that of the accident gasket. A subsequent investigation revealed that the engine manufacturer had recently changed gasket suppliers, which resulted in a shipment of gaskets getting into the supply chain that did not meet specifications. As a result of this accident, the engine manufacturer revised the MSB to require the replacement of the gasket every 50 hours. The FAA followed suit and issued an airworthiness directive to mandate the replacement of the gasket every 50 hours.

On September 25, 1999, about 1726 Hawaiian standard time, Big Island Air flight 58, a Piper PA-31-350 (Chieftain), N411WL, crashed on the northeast slope of the Mauna Loa volcano near Volcano, Hawaii. The pilot and all nine passengers on board were killed, and the airplane was destroyed by impact forces and a postimpact fire. The sightseeing tour flight was operating under 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135 as an on-demand air taxi operation. A visual flight rules flight plan was filed, and visual meteorological conditions existed at the Keahole-Kona International Airport, Kona, Hawaii, from which the airplane departed about 1622. The investigation determined that instrument meteorological conditions prevailed in the vicinity of the accident site.

As the aircraft was departing from runway 17, smoke was observed coming from the right engine. The pilot confirmed a loss of power and made a right turn back toward the runway, then reported he had 'lost both engines.' The aircraft was extensively damaged during a landing on rough, rocky terrain about 1/4 mile southwest of the runway threshold. Investigation revealed the aircraft had just changed ownership. During pre-purchase inspection in Florida, metal particles were found in the oil screens of both engines. Oil was changed and flushed, but metal particles were found after another engine run. In May 1989, the right engine was replaced with an engine from another aircraft. The aircraft was flown to Oakland, CA, where it was painted and new interior was installed. A local mechanic noted metal particles in both eng oil screens and recommended oil analysis, but ferrying pilot refused. After flight to Hawaii, no oil stain noted on fuselage before flight on 9/9/89. Exam of wreckage revealed both engines failed from detonation. Heavy oil streaks found behind right engine, some streaks of oil found behind left engine. Right engine crankshaft/rod bearing surface was 0.010' under standard, but rod bearings were standard size. While the passenger was seriously injured, the pilot was killed.

The pilot estimated that the aircraft's reduced fuel quantity was adequate for the flight during his preflight inspection. As the aircraft descended for the traffic pattern near the destination airport both engines failed. After the loss of power the pilot executed a forced landing into a park with the landing gear not fully extended. The aircraft impacted the terrain and slid into a fence before coming to a stop.

About one minute after takeoff, between 400-500 feet msl and during the first power reduction, the right engine backfired. Following some more violent backfires the rpm went to zero. The right engine was restarted but the same result occurred. The pilot attempted to feather the right prop but to no avail. The aircraft was then deliberately ditched to avoid an outcropping of lava. The aircraft came to rest in about 25-30 feet of water. Engine inspection revealed that the #2 cylinder exhaust rocker arm shaft, p/n45937, was missing. Drive train continuity was established with the exception of the #2 exhaust valve. Centrifugal stops prevent feathering of the prop below an engine speed of 500 rpm. All 10 occupants were rescued.

On final approach to Kona-Keahole Airport, the twin engine airplane stalled and crashed short of runway threshold. The aircraft was destroyed and both occupants were killed.

While flying in poor weather conditions, the twin engine airplane struck the slope of a mountain located northwest of Hilo. The wreckage was found a day later and all 11 occupants have been killed.