Mountains

The accident occurred after the pilot suffered a loss of situational awareness while flying at low altitude, which did not allow him to avoid the collision with the mountain. Such operation conducted in a single pilot configuration was considered as a contributing factor as the workload was high.

The pilot's misinterpretation of the airplane's position relative to the final approach fix, which resulted in the displacement of the descent profile by 6 nautical miles and the subsequent controlled flight into rising terrain. Contributing to the accident were the low clouds.

Controlled flight into terrain.

Loss of control following an engine failure. According to Antonov Design Bureau, the airworthiness certificate expired on March 30, 2001. Also, the aircraft was operated without valid documentation and the airworthiness certificate was still registered to the old operator with the registration 9U-BHN.

Findings as to Causes and Contributing Factors:
1. The pilot entered the valley at an altitude above ground that did not provide sufficient terrain clearance given the aircraft’s performance.
2. The pilot encountered steeply rising terrain, where false horizon and relative scale illusions in the climb are likely. Realizing that the aircraft would not likely be able to out-climb the approaching terrain, he turned to reverse his course.
3. The aircraft’s configuration, relatively high weight, combined with the effects of increased drag from the equipment, density altitude, down-flowing winds, and manoeuvring resulted in the aircraft colliding with terrain during the turn.
Findings as to Risk:
1. A detailed flight plan was not filed and special equipment, such as laser radiation emitting devices and/or hazardous substances were not reported. The absence of flight plan information regarding these devices could delay search and rescue efforts and expose first responders to unknown risks.
2. Transport Canada (TC) does not issue a rating/endorsement for mountain flying training. There are no standards established to ascertain the proficiency of a pilot in this environment. Pilots who complete a mountain flying course may not acquire the required skill sets.
3. There was no emergency locator transmitter (ELT) signal received. The ELT was destroyed in the impact and subsequent fire. Present standards do not require that ELTs resist crash damage.
4. “Flight permits – specific purpose” are issued for aircraft that do not perform as per the original type design but are deemed capable of safe flight. Placards are not required; therefore, pilots and observers approved to board may be unaware of the limitations of the aircraft and the associated risks.
5. The TC approval process allowed the continued operation of this modified aircraft for sustained environmental research missions under a flight permit authority. This circumvented the requirement to meet the latest airworthiness standards and removed the risk mitigation built into the approval process for a modification to a type design.
Other Findings:
1. The fuel system obstruction found during disassembly was a result of the post-crash fire.
2. The aircraft was operated at an increased weight allowance proposed by the design approval representative (DAR). Such operation was to be approved only in accordance with a suitably worded flight permit and instructions contained in the proposed document CN-MSC-011; however, this increased weight allowance was not incorporated to any flight authority issued by TC.

Controlled flight into terrain after the crew started the descent prematurely.

Controlled flight into terrain after the crew failed to follow the prescribed route and executed a direct route over the mountains at an unsafe altitude in poor visibility due to weather.

Controlled flight into terrain after the crew continued the approach at an unsafe altitude in marginal weather conditions.

Controlled flight into terrain after the crew decided to continue under VFR mode in IMC conditions. The following contributing factors were identified:
- Overconfidence on part of the captain who was familiar with the area,
- The organizational culture of the company proved to be complacent by not inhibiting the adoption of procedures incompatible with flight safety, such as the low altitude flights made by the instructor captain,
- There was inadequate assessment of the situation by the crew, causing them to fly at a lower altitude than the safe limits under visual conditions unsuitable for visual flight, resulting in the collision of the aircraft with high ground,
- The use of human resources for the operation of the aircraft was unsuitable because of failure to comply with operational standards, leading the crew to perform a passenger flight to the lower altitude limits of safety, under inadequate visual conditions,
- The preparation for the flight proved inadequate because the crew did not have a meteorological analysis of the appropriate level of flight performed, considering that the conditions for the region were overshadowing the Serra do Mar and surrounding areas of low clouds and / or mist, especially on the slopes of the mountain,
- The weather conditions prevailing in the region made visual flight impossible, resulting in the concealment of the elevation at which the aircraft crashed,
- The pilots intentionally not complying with rules of air traffic and civil aviation rules, without grounds, performing flight at low altitude, under conditions of visibility below the limits established for VFR flight, colliding with high grounD,
- The company has not taken appropriate supervisory measures, enabling the existence of a culture of undeveloped flight safety, which prevented advance identification of actions taken by the crew and injured misconception exists in the CRM business, which represented a potential risk to their operations, as well as by the failure of some educational measures provided for in its PPAA (Plan for the Prevention of Aeronautical Accidents).