Airport (less than 10 km from airport)

Shortly after takeoff from runway 18 at Little Rock-Bill & Hillary Clinton (Adams Field) Airport, while in initial climb in marginal weather conditions, the twin engine airplane went out of control and crashed in a wooded area located about 1,500 metres past the runway end, near a stone quarry, bursting into flames. The airplane was totally destroyed by impact forces and a post crash fire and all five occupants were killed. Employees of the CTEH Company, they were en route to Columbus responding to an emergency response plan. At the time of the accident, weather conditions were marginal with a visibility of 2 SM due to rain. Four minutes prior to the accident, the wind was 19 knots gusting to 27 knots and five minutes after the accident, the wind was gusting to 40 knots.

The approach and landing at Adicora Airport were completed in relative strong winds. Upon touchdown on runway 08, the twin engine airplane landed hard, bounced and went out of control. It veered off runway to the right, lost its undercarriage and came to rest. All four occupants evacuated safely and the airplane was damaged beyond repair.

The pilot was landing at the destination airport with a gusting crosswind. Upon touchdown, he established the aileron controls for the crosswind and applied the brakes; however, no braking action was observed. The airplane subsequently drifted left and departed the runway pavement. It came to rest upright in the grass infield area adjacent to the runway. The outboard portion of the right wing separated which resulted in substantial damage. Data indicated that the airplane was 14 knots or more above the published landing reference speed when it crossed the runway threshold, and it touched down about 2,000 ft from the threshold. The left and right weight-on-wheels (WOW) parameters transitioned from air to ground consistent with initial touchdown; however, the left WOW parameter transitioned back to air about 2 seconds later. The right WOW parameter remained on ground until the airplane departed the runway pavement. A detailed review of the Central Maintenance Function (CMF) data files did not reveal any record of airplane system anomalies from the time the airplane lifted off until it touched down. Multiple system anomalies were recorded after the runway excursion consistent with airframe damage sustained during the accident sequence. The brake system touchdown protection is designed to prevent brake application until wheel spin-up occurs to avoid the possibility of inadvertently landing with a locked wheel due to brake application. After weight-on-wheels has been true for three seconds, power braking is enabled. It is likely that the lack of positive weight-on-wheel parameters inhibited brake application due to the touchdown protection function and resulted in the pilot not observing any braking action. The excess airspeed, extended touchdown, and transient weight-on-wheels parameters were consistent with the airplane floating during the landing flare and with the application of aileron controls for the crosswind conditions. The airplane was not equipped with wing-mounted speed brakes which would have assisted in maintaining weight-on-wheels during the initial portion of the landing. The most recent wind report, transmitted by the tower controller when the airplane was on a 3- mile final, presented a 70° crosswind at 15 knots, gusting to 25 knots. The corresponding crosswind gust component was about 24 knots. The airplane flight manual specified a crosswind limitation of 20 kts for takeoff and landing; therefore, the crosswind at the time of the accident exceeded the airframe crosswind limitation and would have made control during touchdown difficult. The pilot reported that he had made two requests with the approach controller to land on a different runway, but those requests were denied. The investigation was unable to make any determination regarding a pilot request for an alternate runway. Federal Aviation Regulations stated that the pilot in command of an aircraft is directly responsible for, and is the final authority as to, the operation of that aircraft. The regulations also stated that no person may operate a civil aircraft without complying with the operating limitations. The pilot’s ultimate acceptance of the runway assignment which likely exceeded the crosswind limitation of the airplane was contrary to the regulations and to the safe operation of the airplane.

The pilot reported, and airport security video confirmed, that during a takeoff attempt, the right wing contacted the runway and the pilot pulled back excessively on the yoke. The airplane pitched up, stalled, and descended back on to the runway. It subsequently traveled off the end of the runway and impacted trees, before coming to rest on its side. The pilot added that in retrospect, he should have rejected the takeoff when the right wing contacted the runway. Examination of the wreckage by a Federal Aviation Administration inspector did not reveal any preimpact mechanical malfunctions, nor did the pilot report any. The inspector noted that both wings separated, and the fuselage was substantially damaged.

Shortly after takeoff from Juba Airport runway 31, while climbing, the crew encountered an unexpected situation and was forced to attempt an emergency landing. The airplane crash landed in an area located in the Hai Referendum district about 3 km northwest of the airport. All five occupants escaped with minor injuries while the airplane was severely damaged.

Shortly after taking off, the pilot was instructed to change from the airport tower frequency to the departure control frequency. Numerous radio transmissions followed between tower personnel and the pilot that indicated the airplane’s radio was operating normally on the tower frequency, but the pilot could not change frequencies to departure control as directed. The pilot subsequently requested and received approval to return to the departure airport. During the flight back to the airport, the pilot made radio transmissions that indicated he continued to troubleshoot the radio problems. The airplane’s flight track showed the pilot flew directly toward the runway aimpoint about 1,000 ft from, and perpendicular to, the runway during the left base turn to final and allowed the airplane to descend as low as 200 ft pressure altitude (PA). The pilot then made a right turn about .5 miles from the runway followed by a left turn towards the runway. A pilot witness near the accident location observed the airplane maneuvering and predicted the airplane was going to stall. The airplane’s airspeed decreased to about 53 knots (kts) during the left turn and video showed the airplane’s bank angle increased before the airplane aerodynamically stalled and impacted terrain. Post accident examination of the airframe, engines, and review of recorded engine monitoring data revealed no evidence of any preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. Toxicology testing showed the pilot had diphenhydramine, a sedating antihistamine, in his liver and muscle tissue. While therapeutic levels could not be determined, side effects such as diminished psychomotor performance from his use of diphenhydramine were not evident from operational evidence. Thus, the effects of the pilot’s use of diphenhydramine was not a factor in this accident. The accident is consistent with the pilot becoming distracted by the reported non-critical radio anomaly and turning base leg of the traffic pattern too early during his return to the airport. The pilot then failed to maintain adequate airspeed and proper bank angle while maneuvering from base leg to final approach, resulting in an aerodynamic stall and impact with terrain.

While enroute in instrument meteorological (IMC) conditions, the pilot of the twin-engine, piston-powered airplane declared an emergency following a loss of power to the right engine. The pilot secured the engine and was provided vectors by air traffic control for an instrument approach procedure at the nearest airport, which he successfully completed. The pilot reported that he flew the approach and landing with the wing flaps retracted and visually acquired the runway about 500 ft above the ground. The airplane touched down on the first third of the runway at 120 knots. The pilot knew he would not be able to stop the airplane on the 3,500-ft long runway but committed to the landing rather than risking a single-engine go-around in IMC. After landing, the airplane continued beyond the departure end of the runway and impacted a berm, collapsing the landing gear and resulting in substantial damage to the airplane. Examination of the engine revealed catastrophic damage consistent with detonation and oil starvation. The damage to the No. 5 cylinder was consistent with a subsequent over pressurization of the crankcase, which likely expelled the crankshaft nose seal and the oil supply. Detonation of the cylinder(s) can create excessive crankcase pressures capable of expelling the crankshaft nose seal. The crankshaft nose seal displacement likely created a rapid loss of oil and the resulting oil starvation of the engine. The fractured connecting rod and high-temperature signatures were consistent with oil starvation. No source or anomaly that would result in engine detonation was identified. According to the Pilot’s Operating Handbook (POH) for the accident airplane, during a single engine inoperative approach, the pilot should maintain an airspeed of 116 kts indicated (KIAS) or above until landing is assured. Once landing is assured, the pilot should extend the gear and flaps, slowly retard the power on the operative engine, and land normally. The airplane’s best single-engine rate of climb speed (blue line) was 106 KIAS, and its minimum controllable airspeed with one engine inoperative (Vmca) was 76 KIAS. The maximum speed for full flap extension (40°) was 132 KIAS. The POH also stated that a single-engine go-around should be avoided if at all possible. The pilot’s decision to commit to the landing was reasonable given the circumstances and the guidance provided by the POH; however, it is likely that his decision to conduct the landing without flaps and the airplane’s excessive airspeed at touchdown resulted in the runway overrun.

The pilot reported that while on approach for landing, the airplane started to lose altitude quickly. After the co-pilot noticed the high decent rate and the slow airspeed, he advised the pilot to add power. However, the airplane continued to descend and impacted terrain in a right wing and nose low attitude, about 30 yards short of the runway approach threshold, which resulted in substantial damage to the right wing. The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.

Following an uneventful flight from Memphis at FL260, the pilot initiated the descent to Yoakum Airport, Texas. On final approach to runway 31, the single engine airplane went out of control and crashed in an open field located about one mile southeast of the airfield. A passenger was able to get out from the cabin and was slightly injured while all four other occupants were killed.

On 15 January 2023, an ATR 72-212A version 500 was operating scheduled flights between Kathmandu (VNKT) and Pokhara International Airport (VNPR). The same flight crew operated two sectors between VNKT to VNPR and VNPR to VNKT earlier in the morning. For first sector, the aircraft landed on runway 30 of VNPR and thereafter departed from VNPR using runway 12. The accident occurred during a visual approach for runway 12 at VNPR. This was the third flight by the crew members on that day. As per the CVR recordings it was understood that the flight was operated by two Captains, one Captain was in the process of obtaining aerodrome familiarization for operating into VNPR and the other Captain was an instructor pilot. The Captain being familiarized, who was occupying the left-hand seat, was the Pilot Flying (PF) and the instructor pilot, occupying the right-hand seat, was the Pilot Monitoring (PM). The take-off, climb, cruise and descent to VNPR was normal. The weather was compatible with VMC enroute to the destination airport. During the first contact with VNPR tower, the Air Traffic Controller (ATC) assigned runway 30 for the aircraft to land. But during the later phases of flight the flight crew, without mentioning any reason for changing the allocated runway, requested and received clearance from ATC to change runway 30 to 12 for landing. At 10:51:36, the aircraft descended from 6,500 feet at fifteen miles away from VNPR and joined the downwind track for Runway 12 to the north of the runway. The aircraft was visually identified by ATC during the approach. At 10:56:12, the pilots extended the flaps to the 15 degrees position and 46 seconds later they selected the landing gears lever to the down position. At 10:56:27, the PF disengaged the Autopilot System (AP) at an altitude of 721 feet Above Ground Level (AGL). The PF then called for “FLAPS 30” at 10:56:32, and the PM replied, “Flaps 30 and continue descent. The flight data recorder (FDR) data did not record any flap surface movement at that time. Instead, the propeller rotation speed (Np) of both engines decreased simultaneously to less than 25% and the torque (Tq) started decreasing to 0%, which is consistent with both propellers going into the feathered condition . The feather condition is not recorded in the FDR parameters. On the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) area microphone recording, a single Master Caution chime was recorded at 10:56:36. As per CVR readout, the flight crew then carried out the “Before Landing Checklist” without identifying the flaps were not to the 300 position, before starting the left turn onto the base leg. During that time, the power lever angle increased from 41% to 44%. At that point, Np of both propellers was recorded as Non-Computed Data (NCD) in the FDR and the torque (Tq) of both engines was at 0%. When propellers are in feather, they are not producing thrust. When both propellers were feathered both engines of 9N-ANC were running in flight idle condition during the event flight as per design to prevent overtorque. As per the FDR data, the engine turbo machine were functioning as expected considering the propeller were feathered. At 10:56:50 when the radio altitude callout for five hundred feet was annunciated, another “click” sound was heard . The aircraft turned to the left and reached a maximum bank angle of 30 degrees. The recorded Np and Tq data remained non-computed, in line with propellers being in feather condition. The yaw damper was disconnected four seconds later. The PF consulted the PM on whether to continue the left turn and the PM replied to continue the turn. Subsequently, the PF asked the PM on whether to continue descend and the PM responded it was not necessary and instructed to apply a little power. At 10:56:54, another click was heard, followed by the flaps moving to the 30 degrees position. When ATC gave the clearance for landing at 10:57:07, the crew did not respond to the tower, the PF mentioned twice that there was no power coming from the engines. The FDR data shows that at 10:57:11, the power levers were advanced first to 62 degrees then to the maximum power position in 2 seconds. It was followed by a “click” sound at 10:57:16. One second after the “click” sound, the aircraft was at the initiation of its last left turn at 368 feet AGL, the highpressure turbine speed (Nh) of both engines increased from 73% to 77%. It is noted that at 10:57:18, in the very last stage of flight, the PF handed over control of the aircraft to the PM. At 10:57:20, the PM (who was previously the PF) repeated again that there was no power from the engines. At 10:57:24 when the aircraft was at 311 feet AGL, the stick shaker5 was activated warning the crew that the aircraft Angle of Attack (AoA) increased up to the stick shaker threshold. At 10:57:26, a second sequence of stick shaker warning was activated when the aircraft banked towards the left abruptly. Three seconds later, the radio altitude alert for two hundred feet was annunciated, and the cricket sound and stick shaker ceased. At 10:57:32, sound of impact was heard in the CVR. The FDR and CVR stopped recording at 10:57:33 and 10:57:35 respectively. The airplane was totally destroyed and all 72 occupants were killed.