Arkansas

The single engine airplane departed Pensacola Regional Airport, Florida, on a private flight to Batesville, Arkansas, with two people on board. About 1,5 hour into the flight, while cruising at an altitude of 28,000 feet, the pilot initiated a descent when control was lost. The airplane crashed in an open field located southeast of Marianna and was destroyed. Both occupants were killed.

On February 14, 2024, about 1410 central standard time, a Beech 400A airplane, N95GK, was substantially damage when it was involved in an accident in Bentonville, Arkansas. The 2 pilots and 3 passengers were not injured and 2 passengers were seriously injured. The airplane was operated under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 as a business flight. According to preliminary information, while on takeoff from the Bentonville Municipal Airport (VBT), Bentonville, Arkansas, the pilot pulled the control yoke back to rotate the airplane and the control yoke was unresponsive. He aborted the takeoff, but insufficient runway remained to stop. The airplane departed the end of runway 18 and came to rest in mud and grass. During the runway overrun, the right main landing gear collapsed, and the right wing sustained substantial damage. Inspectors from the Federal Aviation Administration responded to the accident site and visually examined the airplane. The elevator control cable was found separated in the area of the vertical stabilizer.

The pilot departed University-Oxford Airport on a private flight to Fayetteville. On approach to Drake Airport Runway 34, the twin engine airplane crashed in unknown circumstances in rugged terrain located south of the airfield. The pilot, sole on board, was killed.

Shortly after takeoff from runway 18 at Little Rock-Bill & Hillary Clinton (Adams Field) Airport, while in initial climb in marginal weather conditions, the twin engine airplane went out of control and crashed in a wooded area located about 1,500 metres past the runway end, near a stone quarry, bursting into flames. The airplane was totally destroyed by impact forces and a post crash fire and all five occupants were killed. Employees of the CTEH Company, they were en route to Columbus responding to an emergency response plan. At the time of the accident, weather conditions were marginal with a visibility of 2 SM due to rain. Four minutes prior to the accident, the wind was 19 knots gusting to 27 knots and five minutes after the accident, the wind was gusting to 40 knots.

The two pilots were conducting a business flight with six passengers when the accident occurred. During the night arrival the captain flew a visual approach with excessive airspeed
and the airplane crossed the runway threshold more than 50 knots above approach speed (Vref). The before-landing checklist was not completed, and the flaps were at an incorrect 20° position instead of 40°. The airplane touched down near the midfield point of the 6,022 ft non grooved runway, which was wet due to earlier precipitation. The captain initially applied intermittent braking, then applied continuous braking starting about 2,069 ft from the end of the runway. The captain did not deploy the thrust reversers. The airplane exited the runway above 100 knots ground speed, then continued into a ditch and airport perimeter fence, which resulted in substantial damage to the forward fuselage. Examination of the airplane revealed no mechanical anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. The operator’s flight manual directed that all approaches were to be flown using the stabilized approach concept. For a visual approach, this included establishing and maintaining the proper approach speed and correct landing configuration at least 500 ft above the airport elevation. Neither pilot recognized the requirement to execute a go-around due to the excessive approach speed or the long landing on a wet runway, which resulted in the runway excursion.

The pilot was conducting an instrument flight rules cross-country flight and climbing to a planned altitude of 23,000 ft mean sea level (msl). According to air traffic control data, as the airplane climbed through 18,600 ft msl, its groundspeed was 171 knots, and a gradual reduction in groundspeed began. After reaching an altitude of about 20,200 ft msl, the airplane began a descent on a southeast heading. Just before the descent began, the airplane’s groundspeed had decreased to 145 knots. About 2 minutes after the descent began, the airplane turned right to a northeast heading on which it continued for about 30 seconds. The flightpath then became erratic before the data ended. The pilot made no distress calls and did not respond to repeated calls from the controller. The main wreckage of the airplane was located in densely forested terrain at an elevation of about 930 ft about 1,000 ft south of the last radar return. The outboard portion of the right wing, right aileron, right horizontal stabilizer, and right elevator were not located with the main wreckage and, despite ground and aerial searches with a small unmanned aircraft system, were not found. Examination of the wreckage indicated that the missing wing and tail sections separated in flight due to overload. Examination of the recovered airframe and engine did not reveal evidence of any pre-existing mechanical malfunctions or anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. Weather forecasts indicated that the accident site was in an area where moderate icing conditions up to 25,000 ft msl, embedded thunderstorms, and 2-inch hail were forecasted. Review of preflight weather information received by the pilot indicated that he was aware of the conditions forecast on the route of flight before initiating the flight. Meteorological data revealed that the airplane likely entered icing conditions that ranged from light to heavy as it climbed through 14,000 ft msl about 23 minutes after takeoff and remained in icing conditions for the remaining 16-minute duration of the flight. Freezing drizzle conditions were likely present along the flightpath. Although the airplane was equipped for flight in icing conditions, the pilot’s operating handbook contained a warning about flight into severe icing conditions, which stated that flight in freezing drizzle could result in ice build-up on protected surfaces exceeding the capability of the ice protection system. The airplane’s gradual loss of groundspeed as it climbed was consistent with ice accumulating on the airplane. It is likely that during the 16 minutes the airplane was operating in icing conditions, the capability of the ice protection system was exceeded, which resulted in a degradation of aircraft performance and subsequent aerodynamic stall. During the ensuing uncontrolled descent, the structural capability of the airplane was exceeded, which resulted in an inflight break up. A review of the pilot’s records revealed multiple certificate application failures for reasons that included inadequate knowledge of cross-country flight planning, aircraft performance, and stalls. Review of the pilot’s airman knowledge written tests found areas answered incorrectly over multiple exams included meteorology, aircraft performance, aeronautical decision-making, and stalls. The ethanol identified in the pilot’s cavity blood was most likely the result of postmortem production. Therefore, effects from ethanol did not play any role in this accident. The cargo was documented as it was removed from the airplane and remained secure until after it was weighed. Based upon the weight of the cargo, passengers, airplane, and fuel from the filed flight plan, at the time of departure, the airplane would have been about 361 lbs over maximum gross weight. According to the FAA Pilot’s Handbook of Aeronautical Knowledge, an overloaded airplane “may exhibit unexpected and unusually poor flight characteristics,” which include reduced maneuverability and an increased stall speed.

As the airplane was descending toward its destination airport, the pilot reported to an air traffic controller en route that he needed to change his destination to a closer airport because the airplane was low on fuel. The controller advised him to land at an airport that was 4 miles away. Shortly after, the pilot contacted the alternate airport’s air traffic control tower (ATCT) and reported that he was low on fuel. The tower controller cleared the airplane to land, and, about 30 seconds later, the pilot advised that he was not going to make it to the airport. The airplane subsequently impacted a field 3.25 miles southeast of the airport. One witness reported hearing the engine sputter, and another witness reported that the engine “did not sound right.” Forty-foot power lines crossed the field 311 feet from the point of impact. It is likely that the pilot was attempting to avoid the power lines during the forced landing and that the airplane then experienced an inadvertent stall and an uncontrolled collision with terrain. About 1 quart of fuel was observed in each fuel tank. No evidence of fuel spillage was found on the ground; no fuel stains were observed on the undersides of the wing panels, wing trailing edges, or engine nacelles; and no fuel smell was observed at the accident site. However, the fuel totalizer showed that 123 gallons of fuel was remaining. Magnification of the annunciator panel light bulbs revealed that the left and right low fuel pressure annunciator lights were illuminated at the time of impact. An examination of the airframe and engines revealed no anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. About 1 month before the accident, the pilot had instructed the fixed-base operator at Camden, Arkansas, to put 25 gallons of fuel in each wing tank; however, it is unknown how much fuel was already onboard the airplane. Although the fuel totalizer showed that the airplane had 123 gallons of fuel remaining at the time of the crash, information in the fuel totalizer is based on pilot inputs, and it is likely the pilot did not update the fuel totalizer properly before the accident flight. The pilot was likely relying on the fuel totalizer instead of the fuel gauges for fuel information, and he likely reported his low fuel situation to the ATCT after the annunciator lights illuminated.