Montana

The pilot in command of the airplane reported that, while on an instrument GPS approach, they listened to the automated surface observing system several times and determined that they would be landing with a “light quartering tailwind” on an upsloping runway. Once clear of clouds and with the runway in sight, the pilot canceled the instrument flight rules clearance, announced their position over the airport’s common traffic advisory frequency and received a reply with a report of 1/4 inch of dry snow covering the runway, unplowed. During the landing roll, they applied brakes, extended spoilers, and thrust reversers. Initially the airplane slowed; however, about halfway down the runway, the airplane’s antiskid system was functioning continuously, and the airplane’s rate of deceleration decreased. The pilot was unsure if the thrust reversers deployed, and he cycled the thrust reversers and did not feel any effects. The pilot stated that, in his experience, the airplane’s thrust reversers do not feel very effective. The pilot considered aborting the landing, started to clean up the airplane but thought it was too late. The airplane overran the departure end of the runway, onto a grass covered area and into a deep ravine, resulting in substantial damage to the fuselage and both wings. The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation. The automated weather observation station located on the airport reported that, about 44 minutes before the accident, the wind was from 090° at 12 knots. The same automated station reported that, about 16 minutes after the accident, the wind was from 090° at 12 knots. The airplane landed on runway 22. The fixed based operator owner reported that, on the day of the accident, his review of the runway conditions at the airport appeared to be around an inch of snow on the runway surface. Additionally, plowing at the airport so far this year had been “abysmal.” Big windrows and ice chunks have been left; taxiway corners had been built up to the point there could be an occurrence should an airplane be taxiing by. Earlier this year, several departures were delayed due to the runway not being plowed. According to the chairman of the airport board, there is no formal process to conduct runway assessments. However, an airport board member lives in the area and routinely visits the airport to conduct runway assessments. The runway assessments and frequency of the observations are not documented but are conveyed verbally to the airport board via cell phone. To the best of his knowledge, there is no formal snow or ice removal plan. When the runway is required to be cleared, a board member will use county provided equipment to clear the runway. The frequency of the snow removal is not documented. The airport snow removal equipment is limited to clear substance to ½ inch of the runway surface. On the day of the accident, he was not aware of a Notice to Air Misson (NOTAM) issued for the conditions of the runway environment. According to the airplane manufacturer, the estimated landing distance on a dry runway was about 3,350 ft, with loose snow and no tailwind the estimated landing distance was about 6,700 ft, and on loose snow with tailwind, the estimated landing distance was 7,531 ft. According to the Federal Aviation Administration, the airport is not required to have a snow and ice control plan. However, the airport was provided federal funds (grant) to purchase/acquire a snowplow to maintain the airport surfaces during inclement weather conditions. There may be times where issues arise, and action is delayed. In that case it is expected that a NOTAM be issued as outlined in the grant agreement.

The pilot reported that while on approach for landing, the airplane started to lose altitude quickly. After the co-pilot noticed the high decent rate and the slow airspeed, he advised the pilot to add power. However, the airplane continued to descend and impacted terrain in a right wing and nose low attitude, about 30 yards short of the runway approach threshold, which resulted in substantial damage to the right wing. The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.

After landing on runway 08 at Lewistown Airport, the twin engine airplane started to skid then veered off runway to the left. While contact a snow covered terrain, it slid for few dozen metres and came to rest with its left wing severely damaged. All three occupants evacuated safely.

The pilot stated that on the morning of the accident he filled both wing fuel tanks to full. After takeoff, he climbed to his planned cruise altitude of 24,000 ft mean sea level (msl). While en route to his destination, the pilot reported that the left engine experienced a flame-out. The pilot opted to divert from the originally planned destination and descended. When the airplane was about 7,900 ft msl, the pilot reported that the right engine experienced a loss of power and that he was not going to be able to make it to the airport. Shortly thereafter, the airplane collided with trees and the airplane came to rest with the right wing and empennage severed from the fuselage.

Air traffic control communications revealed that the pilot requested to take off from the departure runway so that he could perform traffic pattern work and return for a landing on the left adjacent runway. Shortly after takeoff and while departing to the west, the pilot was instructed twice to enter the left traffic pattern, with no response. Radar data showed the airplane departing the runway and remaining on runway centerline heading for the length of the flight. The airplane climbed to about 100 ft above ground level and the airplane’s groundspeed increased to 81 knots soon after departure then decreased to 70 knots before dropping off radar. Witnesses reported seeing the airplane depart the airport at a low climb rate and slow airspeed. Shortly after, the airplane flew out of view and a column of smoke was seen on the horizon. Accident site documentation identified symmetrical propeller strikes on the ground consistent with the airplane impacting the ground in a shallow, nose-up, wings level attitude. Examination of the airframe and both engines did not reveal any evidence of a preaccident mechanical failure or malfunction that would have precluded normal performance to allow for sufficient airspeed and climb rate after takeoff. Both the engines exhibited damage signatures consistent with the engines producing symmetrical power at impact. The pilot’s most recent flight in the accident airplane was 2 months before the accident. The pilot was reported to have problems with understanding the accident airplane’s avionics system; however, it is unknown if he was having these problems during the accident flight. Review of the pilot’s medical history revealed no significant medical concerns or conditions that could pose a hazard to flight.