Port Orange-Spruce Creek

Shortly after takeoff from Port Orange-Spruce Creek Airport Runway 23, the single engine airplane encountered difficulties to gain height, impacted trees and crashed on a golf course located south of the airfield. Both occupants were rescued, among them one was slightly injured. The airplane was destroyed.

The private pilot obtained a full weather briefing before departing on a long cross-country flight. The destination airport was forecast to be under visual meteorological conditions, but there was an AIRMET and Center Weather Advisory (CWA) issued for low instrument flight rules (IFR) conditions later that day. The briefer told the pilot to check the weather again en route to see if the AIRMET and CWA had been updated. At the time the pilot stopped for fuel, another CWA was issued for low IFR conditions at his destination airport; however, there were no records to indicate that the pilot obtained this information during the fuel stop or after departing on the last leg of the flight. A review of air traffic control communications revealed that, about 10 minutes before arriving at the airport, the pilot reported that he had obtained the current weather conditions at his destination airport. The most recent observation, about 1 hour before the accident indicated good visibility; however, the weather reporting equipment did not provide ceiling heights. It is unknown if the pilot obtained weather information from nearby airports, which were reporting low instrument meteorological conditions (visibility between 1/4 and 1/2 mile and ceilings 200-300 ft above ground level [agl]). Additionally, three pilot reports (PIREPs) describing the poor weather conditions were filed within the hour before the accident. The controller did not relay the PIREPs or the CWA information to the pilot, so the pilot was likely unaware of the deteriorating conditions. Based on radar information and statements from witnesses, the pilot's approach to the airport was unstabilized. He descended below the minimum descent altitude of 440 ft, and, after breaking through the fog about 100 ft agl, the airplane reentered the fog and completed a 360° right turn near the approach end of the runway, during which its altitude varied from 100 ft to 300 ft. The airplane then climbed to an altitude about 800 ft before radar contact was lost near the accident site. The airplane came to rest inverted, consistent with one witness's statement that it descended through the clouds in a spin before impact; post accident examination revealed no preimpact anomalies with the airplane or engine that would have precluded normal operation. Although the pilot was instrument rated, his recent instrument experience could not be established. The circumstances of the accident, including the restricted visibility conditions and the pilot's maneuvering of the airplane before the impact, are consistent with a spatial disorientation event. It is likely that the pilot experienced a loss of control due to spatial disorientation, which resulted in an aerodynamic stall and spin.

The pilot stated that he initiated a fuel transfer due to a fuel imbalance. To affect the fuel transfer, he said he "began crossfeed right to left." When the airplane was about 5 to 10 miles away from Spruce Creek Airport, the pilot said he began his descent from 12,500, and also executed a left turn to begin setting up to land, when suddenly, both engines ceased operating. When he leveled the wings both engines restarted due to auto-ignition. He said the fuel gages showed 300 to 350 lbs of fuel for the right tank, and 100 to 150 pounds on the left, so he decided to continue his approach to Spruce Creek Airport. As he approached Spruce Creek Airport, he again entered a left bank to prepare for a left base to runway 23, and while established in the left turn, both engines ceased operating a second time. He said he did not think he could reach the runway, and decided to make an landing on a taxiway. When the wings became level after the turn, he said both engines again restarted while in the vicinity of the beginning of the taxiway. As he was about to land, he said a car pulled out onto the taxiway, and stopped on the centerline, so he applied power to avoid the car. He said he climbed straight out, and when he made a climbing left turn, he said the engines ceased operating a third time, and the airplane descended towards a cluster of condos. With no runway or clear area in sight, the pilot said he guided the airplane to a retention pond. Follow-on/detailed examinations of the aircraft, engines, and propellers were conducted by an FAA Inspector, as well as technical representatives from Raytheon Aircraft Company, Pratt & Whitney Canada, and Hartzell Propeller Company, and no pre accident anomalies were noted with the airframe, flight controls, engines/accessories, or propellers. According to the FAA Inspector, and the technical representative from the airplane manufacturer, Raytheon Aircraft Company, the pilot was transferring fuel from the left fuel tank to the right fuel tank, and with the reduced amount of fuel in the left tank, as he performed left turns, the engine ceased operating. The Raytheon Aircraft Company representative stated that the Pilot Operating Handbook specifies the use of crossfeed for those times when the airplane is operating on a single engine.

The airplane was destroyed when it impacted trees and terrain following an in-flight loss of control during climb after takeoff. Meteorological information indicates that the cloud ceilings were between 1,200 and 1,700 feet above ground level at the time of the accident. While airborne, the accident pilot reported to another pilot that the cloud ceiling was 1,500 feet. Radar data shows that the airplane flight profile became erratic once it had climbed above about 1,700 feet pressure altitude. The final flight path sequence depicted by the radar data shows a right-hand turn of decreasing radius with an associated rapid rate of descent. The last radar return coincided with the accident location. The non-instrument rated pilot had logged 7.0 hours of simulated instrument experience. The pilot had logged 35.8 hours in the same make and model as the accident airplane, of which, all but 0.3 hours was listed as crosscountry time. No records of training in the same make and model airplane were discovered. No pre-impact mechanical deficiencies were found during the post-accident examination of the wreckage.

Witnesses observed N262MM taxi to runway 29 left and the pilot perform what appeared to be a normal engine runup. The airplane then taxied onto runway 29 left for takeoff. The wind was from the east, making the takeoff with a tail wind. During the takeoff, the engine seemed to operate at a steady level, but appeared to be low on power. The flight lifted off about halfway down the runway and the landing gear was retracted. The airplane climbed slowly and turned slowly to the left. The airplane then entered a 60-80 degree left bank followed by the airplane rolling level and the wings rocking back and forth. The airplane was now on a southerly heading and the nose dropped. The airplane then collided with trees about 15-20 feet above the ground, fell to the ground, and burst into flames. Witnesses stated they saw no smoke or flames coming from the airplane prior to impact with the trees. At the time of the accident the landing gear was retracted and the engine was running. Transcripts of recorded communications show that at 1205:40, the local controller instructed the flight to taxi into position and hold on runway 29 left. At 1206:43, N262MM was cleared for takeoff and a north bound departure was approved. At 1208:03, the passenger transmitted "we need to land we have to turn around". The local controller cleared the flight to return to the airport when able. At 1208:20, the passenger transmitted "two mike mike we're going down we're going down", followed by "over the golf (unintelligible)". The local controller responded "copy over the golf course". No further transmissions were received from the flight. Analysis of background noise contained on the ATC recordings show that at the time the passenger on N262MM transmitted to controllers that they were ready for takeoff and when he acknowledged the takeoff clearance, the propeller was rotating at 1,261 and 1,255 respectively. When the passenger transmitted to controllers after takeoff, that they needed to land, the propeller was rotating at 1,980 rpm. When the passenger transmitted we have to turn around, shortly after the above transmission, the propeller was rotating at 2,017 rpm. When the passenger made his last transmission stating they were going down, the propeller rpm was 1,965. The maximum propeller speed at takeoff is 2,000 rpm. Additional evidence was found indicating electrical arcing and progressive fatigue cracking in the engine’s P3 line, which could result in a rapid rollback of engine power. Simulator testing showed that a P3 line failure would result in the engine decelerating from full takeoff power (2,000 propeller rpm) and stabilizing at an idle power setting in less than 9 seconds. However, the sound spectrum analysis of the first radio transmission indicated the propeller rpm was 1,980, and two subsequent radio transmissions, the last of which was made 17 seconds after the initial transmission, detected the propeller rpm at near takeoff speed. Thus, there was no evidence of dramatic rpm loss, making the P3 line failure an unlikely cause of the accident. Postcrash examination of the aircraft structure, flight controls, engine, and propeller, showed no evidence of failure or malfunction. Witnesses indicated the flight used about 3,650 feet of runway for takeoff or about half of the 7,296 foot long runway. Charts contained in the Piper PA-46-500TP, Pilot's Operating Handbook, indicated that for the conditions at the time of the accident, the airplane should have used about 2,000 feet of runway for the ground roll during the takeoff with no wing flaps extended. The charts also show that the airplane indicated stall speed at 60 degrees of bank angle with the landing gear and wing flaps retracted is 111 knots.

During the takeoff roll at Port Orange-Spruce Creek Airport, the right engine caught fire and exploded. The crew failed to abort the takeoff and continued. During initial climb, the captain decided to attempt an emergency landing. The aircraft descended, crashed in a field and burst into flames. The aircraft was destroyed by fire and all three occupants were killed.