Airport (less than 10 km from airport)

While taking off from Provo Airport runway 13/31, the airplane went out of control and crashed. Both passengers escaped with minor injuries while both pilots were seriously injured. One of them died from injuries sustained. The airplane was destroyed. It was snowing at the time of the accident.

After landing at Mweya Airstrip located in the Queen Elizabeth National Park, the single engine airplane was unable to stop within the remaining distance. It overran and collided with a house. All five occupants escaped uninjured and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair. It just completed a charter flight with three European citizens and two pilots on board.

The single engine airplane departed Nashua Airport, New Hampshire, on December 13 on a flight to Nuuk, Greenland, with an intermediate stop in Goose Bay. Due to poor weather conditions at destination, the pilot diverted to Seven Islands Airport, Quebec, where the couple passed the overnight. On the morning of December 14, the airplane departed Seven Islands Airport at 0820LT bound for Goose Bay. At about 0958LT, the aircraft crossed the final approach fix / final approach waypoint FAFKO at 2,800 feet ASL, travelling at a ground speed of 104 knots, and began the final descent. Although the descent remained steady on a 3° profile, the ground speed decreased continuously for about 60 seconds. At 1000:31, the occurrence pilot reported at waypoint SATAK, and the ground speed had increased to above 80 knots. The tower provided the pilot with updated wind information and cleared the aircraft to land on Runway 08. The pilot acknowledged the clearance at 1000:49. Soon after, the ground speed began to decrease at a rate similar to the previous rate. At 1002:47, it had decreased to 51 knots. The aircraft departed controlled flight and impacted terrain when it was about 2.5 NM southwest of the airport along the extended centreline for Runway 08. The 406 MHz emergency locator transmitter activated, and the signal was received by the Joint Rescue Coordination Centre in Halifax, Nova Scotia, at 1006. A helicopter search and rescue mission was launched from Canadian Forces Base 5 Wing Goose Bay at 1036; the helicopter arrived at the accident site 3 minutes later. Medical technicians extricated the 2 occupants, who were both seriously injured. The occupants were airlifted to a waiting ambulance and then transported to the local hospital. The pilot later died of his injuries. The aircraft was destroyed.

After landing on runway 08 at Lewistown Airport, the twin engine airplane started to skid then veered off runway to the left. While contact a snow covered terrain, it slid for few dozen metres and came to rest with its left wing severely damaged. All three occupants evacuated safely.

The two pilots were conducting a business flight with six passengers when the accident occurred. During the night arrival the captain flew a visual approach with excessive airspeed
and the airplane crossed the runway threshold more than 50 knots above approach speed (Vref). The before-landing checklist was not completed, and the flaps were at an incorrect 20° position instead of 40°. The airplane touched down near the midfield point of the 6,022 ft non grooved runway, which was wet due to earlier precipitation. The captain initially applied intermittent braking, then applied continuous braking starting about 2,069 ft from the end of the runway. The captain did not deploy the thrust reversers. The airplane exited the runway above 100 knots ground speed, then continued into a ditch and airport perimeter fence, which resulted in substantial damage to the forward fuselage. Examination of the airplane revealed no mechanical anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. The operator’s flight manual directed that all approaches were to be flown using the stabilized approach concept. For a visual approach, this included establishing and maintaining the proper approach speed and correct landing configuration at least 500 ft above the airport elevation. Neither pilot recognized the requirement to execute a go-around due to the excessive approach speed or the long landing on a wet runway, which resulted in the runway excursion.

The airplane was on a schedule service (flight LA2213) from Lima to Juliaca. On board were 102 passengers and a crew of six. During the takeoff roll on runway 16L, after a course of 1,200 metres and at a speed of 131 knots, the aircraft collided with a fire truck that entered the active runway from the right, at taxiway Bravo. A team of two heavy fire trucks and one light support vehicle were engaged in a 'Response Time' exercise that started at 1510LT, one minute prior to the accident. The goal of this exercise was to test the capacity of the new fire station. The first fire truck entered the active runway while the airplane was accelerating for takeoff. Upon impact, the right main gear and the right engine were torn off. The airplane caught fire and slid for about 1,600 metres then veered to the right and came to rest, bursting into flames. Forty passengers were injured, among them four seriously. The airplane was heavily damaged by fire and written off. Among the personnel in the fire truck, two were killed and a third was seriously injured.

The twin engine airplane departed Denton Enterprise Airport runway 36 at 1459LT and continued to the west at an altitude of 2,000 feet. Eight minutes later, the pilot initiated a left hand circuit to land at Decatur Airport. While descending on final, the speed decreased and the airplane crashed nearby a wooded area located 6 km short of runway 35. The aircraft was destroyed and the pilot, sole on board, was killed.

The airplane departed New Orleans-Lakefront Airport on a cargo flight to Waukesha, carrying three crew members and a load consisting of 53 dogs in dog crates. On final approach to Waukesha Airport, the crew encountered marginal weather conditions with limited visibility due to snow falls. The airplane crash landed into the third hole on the Western Lakes Golf Course located about 5,5 km short of runway 10 threshold. The airplane slid on its belly for few dozen metres on a snow covered ground before colliding with trees. There was no fire. All three crew members and all 53 dogs were uninjured. Both wings were severely damaged due to the collision with trees.

The Boeing B-17 was taking part to an airshow at Dallas-Executive (Redbird) Airport, carrying five people. While passing over the airfield at a relative low altitude, it collided with a Bell P-63 Kingcobra that was engaged in the same manoeuvre and coming from its left. The B-17 was cut in two, entered an uncontrolled descent and crashed in a field, bursting into flames. The P-63 was also destroyed. All six people in both aircraft were killed. At the time of the collision, the B-17 was following a straight-in course while the P-63 was supposed to cut its trajectory behind. Obviously, the pilot of the P-63 misjudged the situation.

The pilot obtained a preflight weather briefing about 2.5 hours before departing on an instrument flight rules (IFR) cross-country flight. Automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast (ADS-B) and weather data indicated the flight encountered low IFR (LIFR) conditions during the approach to the destination airport. These conditions included low ceilings, low visibility, localized areas of freezing precipitation, low-level turbulence and wind shear. The ADS-B data revealed that during the last minute of data, the airplane’s descent rate increased from 500 ft per minute to 3,000 ft per minute. In the last 30 seconds of the flight the airplane entered a 2,000 ft per minute climb followed by a descent that exceeded 5,000 ft per minute. The last data point was located about 1,000 ft from the accident site. There were no witnesses to the accident. A postaccident examination of the airframe and engine revealed no evidence of mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. The airplane’s flight instruments and avionics were destroyed during the accident and were unable to be functionally tested. The rapid ascents and descents near the end of the flight track were consistent with a pilot who was experiencing spatial disorientation, which resulted in a loss of control and high-speed impact with terrain. The pilot purchased the airplane about 3 weeks before the accident and received about 15 hours of transition training in the airplane, including 1 hour of actual instrument conditions during high-altitude training. The pilot’s logbook indicated he had 5.2 hours of actual instrument flight time. At the time of the pilot’s weather briefing, the destination airport was reporting marginal visual flight rules (MVFR) conditions with the terminal area forecast (TAF) in agreement, with MVFR conditions expected to prevail through the period of the accident flight. LIFR conditions were reported about 40 minutes before the airplane’s departure and continued to the time of the accident. Light freezing precipitation was reported intermittently before and after the accident, which was not included in the TAF. The destination airport’s automated surface observing system (ASOS) reported LIFR conditions with overcast ceilings at 300 ft above ground level (agl) and light freezing drizzle at the time of the accident. Low-level turbulence and wind shear were detected, which indicated a high probability of a moderate or greater turbulence layer between 3,600 and 5,500 ft mean sea level (msl) in the clouds. During the approach, the airplane was in instrument meteorological conditions with a high probability of encountering moderate and greater turbulence, with above freezing temperatures. The National Weather Service (NWS) had issued conflicting weather information during the accident time period. The pilot’s weather briefing indicated predominately MVFR conditions reported and forecasted by the TAFs along the route of flight, while both the NWS Aviation Weather Center (AWC) AIRMET (G-AIRMET) and the Graphic Forecast for Aviation (GFA) were depicting IFR conditions over the destination airport at the time of the briefing. The TAFs, GAIRMET, and Current Icing Product (CIP)/Forecast Icing Products (FIP) were not indicating any forecast for icing conditions or freezing precipitation surrounding the accident time. The pilot reviewed the TAF in his briefing, expecting MVFR conditions to prevail at his expected time of arrival. The TAF was amended twice between the period of his briefing and the time of the accident to indicate IFR to LIFR conditions with no mention of any potential freezing precipitation or low-level wind shear (LLWS) during the period. Given the pilot’s low actual instrument experience, minimal amount of flight experience in the accident airplane, and the instrument conditions encountered during the approach with a high probability of moderate or greater turbulence, it is likely that the pilot experienced spatial disorientation and lost control of the airplane.