Nebraska

Shortly after takeoff from Norfolk-Karl Stefan Airport, while in initial climb, the twin engine airplane went out of control and crashed in an open field located one-half mile south of the runway. The airplane was destroyed and the pilot, sole on board, was killed.

Shortly after takeoff from McCook-Ben Nelson Regional Airport, en route to Schreveport, Louisiana, the single engine airplane went out of control and crashed in a garden located in a residential area. One occupant was killed and the second one was injured. The airplane was destroyed.

The airplane sustained substantial damage when it was involved in an accident near Thedford, Nebraska. The pilot and passenger were uninjured. The airplane was being operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight. The pilot reported that during landing, when the nose wheel made contact with the runway, the airplane began to veer right. He attempted to use left rudder and brake to keep the airplane on the runway, but as the airspeed decreased, directional control became harder to maintain and the airplane subsequently departed the right side of the runway. During the runway excursion, the airplane impacted a runway light, spun left and the landing gear collapsed. During a post accident examination, it was determined that the airplane sustained substantial damage to the left wing.

The pilot obtained a preflight weather briefing about 2.5 hours before departing on an instrument flight rules (IFR) cross-country flight. Automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast (ADS-B) and weather data indicated the flight encountered low IFR (LIFR) conditions during the approach to the destination airport. These conditions included low ceilings, low visibility, localized areas of freezing precipitation, low-level turbulence and wind shear. The ADS-B data revealed that during the last minute of data, the airplane’s descent rate increased from 500 ft per minute to 3,000 ft per minute. In the last 30 seconds of the flight the airplane entered a 2,000 ft per minute climb followed by a descent that exceeded 5,000 ft per minute. The last data point was located about 1,000 ft from the accident site. There were no witnesses to the accident. A postaccident examination of the airframe and engine revealed no evidence of mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. The airplane’s flight instruments and avionics were destroyed during the accident and were unable to be functionally tested. The rapid ascents and descents near the end of the flight track were consistent with a pilot who was experiencing spatial disorientation, which resulted in a loss of control and high-speed impact with terrain. The pilot purchased the airplane about 3 weeks before the accident and received about 15 hours of transition training in the airplane, including 1 hour of actual instrument conditions during high-altitude training. The pilot’s logbook indicated he had 5.2 hours of actual instrument flight time. At the time of the pilot’s weather briefing, the destination airport was reporting marginal visual flight rules (MVFR) conditions with the terminal area forecast (TAF) in agreement, with MVFR conditions expected to prevail through the period of the accident flight. LIFR conditions were reported about 40 minutes before the airplane’s departure and continued to the time of the accident. Light freezing precipitation was reported intermittently before and after the accident, which was not included in the TAF. The destination airport’s automated surface observing system (ASOS) reported LIFR conditions with overcast ceilings at 300 ft above ground level (agl) and light freezing drizzle at the time of the accident. Low-level turbulence and wind shear were detected, which indicated a high probability of a moderate or greater turbulence layer between 3,600 and 5,500 ft mean sea level (msl) in the clouds. During the approach, the airplane was in instrument meteorological conditions with a high probability of encountering moderate and greater turbulence, with above freezing temperatures. The National Weather Service (NWS) had issued conflicting weather information during the accident time period. The pilot’s weather briefing indicated predominately MVFR conditions reported and forecasted by the TAFs along the route of flight, while both the NWS Aviation Weather Center (AWC) AIRMET (G-AIRMET) and the Graphic Forecast for Aviation (GFA) were depicting IFR conditions over the destination airport at the time of the briefing. The TAFs, GAIRMET, and Current Icing Product (CIP)/Forecast Icing Products (FIP) were not indicating any forecast for icing conditions or freezing precipitation surrounding the accident time. The pilot reviewed the TAF in his briefing, expecting MVFR conditions to prevail at his expected time of arrival. The TAF was amended twice between the period of his briefing and the time of the accident to indicate IFR to LIFR conditions with no mention of any potential freezing precipitation or low-level wind shear (LLWS) during the period. Given the pilot’s low actual instrument experience, minimal amount of flight experience in the accident airplane, and the instrument conditions encountered during the approach with a high probability of moderate or greater turbulence, it is likely that the pilot experienced spatial disorientation and lost control of the airplane.

According to the operator's director of safety, during landing in gusty crosswind conditions, the multi-engine, turbine-powered airplane bounced. The airplane then touched down a second time left of the runway centerline. "Recognizing their position was too far left," the flight crew attempted a go-around. However, both engines were almost at idle and "took time to spool back up." Without the appropriate airspeed, the airplane continued to veer to the left. A gust under the right wing "drove" the left wing into the ground. The airplane continued across a grass field, the nose landing gear collapsed, and the airplane slid to a stop. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the fuselage and left wing. The director of safety reported that there were no preaccident mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation. The automated weather observation system located at the accident airport reported that, about the time of the accident, the wind was from 110° at 21 knots, gusting to 35 knots. The pilot landed on runway 04. The Beechcraft airplane flight manual states the max demonstrated crosswind is 25 knots. Based on the stated wind conditions, the calculated crosswind component was 19 to 33 knots.

The instrument-rated private pilot departed on a cross-country flight in instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) with an overcast cloud layer at 500 ft above ground level (agl)
and visibility restricted to 1 ¾ miles in mist, without receiving an instrument clearance or opening his filed instrument flight rules flight plan. There was an outage of the ground communications system at the airport and there was no evidence that the pilot attempted to open his flight plan via his cellular telephone. In addition, there was a low-level outage of the radar services in the vicinity of the accident site and investigators were unable to determine the airplane's route of flight before impact. The airport manager observed the accident airplane depart from runway 35 and enter the clouds. Witnesses located to the north of the accident site did not see the airplane but reported hearing an airplane depart about the time of the accident. One witness reported hearing a lowflying airplane and commented that the engines sounded as if they were operating at full power. The witness heard a thud as he was walking into his home but attributed it to a thunderstorm in the area. The airplane impacted a field about 3.5 miles to the northeast of the departure end of the runway and off the track for the intended route of flight. The airplane was massively fragmented during the impact and debris was scattered for about 300 ft. The damage to the airplane and ground scars at the accident site were consistent with the airplane impacting in a left wing low, nose low attitude with relatively high energy. A postaccident examination of the engines and propeller assemblies did not reveal any preimpact anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. Signatures were consistent with both engines producing power and both propellers developing thrust at the time of impact. While the massive fragmentation precluded functional testing of the equipment, there was no damage or failure that suggested preimpact anomalies with the airframe or flight controls.Several days before the accident flight, the pilot encountered a "transient flag" on the air data attitude heading reference system. The pilot reported the flag to both the co-owner of the airplane and an avionics shop; however, exact details of the flag are not known. The unit was destroyed by impact forces and could not be functionally tested. If the flag affecting the display of attitude information had occurred with the unit after takeoff, the instrument panel had adequate stand-by instrumentation from which the pilot could have continued the flight. It is not known if this unit failed during the takeoff and investigators were unable to determine what role, if any, this transient issue may have played in the accident. Based upon the reported weather conditions, the location of the wreckage, and the attitude of the airplane at the time of impact with the ground, it is likely that the pilot experienced spatial disorientation shortly after takeoff which resulted in a loss of control and descent into terrain.

The private pilot was conducting a personal cross-country flight. Shortly after takeoff, the pilot told the air traffic controller that he needed to return to the airport due to an attitude heading reference system (AHRS) "miscommunication." Air traffic control radar data indicated that, at that time, the airplane was about 1.75 miles north of the airport on a southeasterly course about 2,000 ft. mean sea level. About 20 seconds after the pilot requested to return to the airport, the airplane began to descend. The airplane subsequently entered a right turn, which appeared to continue until the final radar data point. The airplane struck power lines about 3/4 of a mile from the airport while maneuvering within the traffic pattern. The power lines were about 75 ft. above ground level. A postaccident examination of the airframe and engine revealed no preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. Although the pilot reported a flight instrumentation issue to air traffic control, the investigation was unable to confirm whether such an anomaly occurred based on component testing and available information. Examination of the standby airspeed indicator revealed that the link arm had separated from the pin on the rocking shaft assembly; however, it likely separated during the accident sequence. No other anomalies were observed. Functional testing indicated that the standby airspeed indicator was likely functional and providing accurate airspeed information to the pilot throughout the flight. Finally, examination of the left and right annunciator panel bulb filaments associated with the left fuel pump advisory revealed that they were stretched, indicating that the left fuel pump advisory indication annunciated at the time of the accident; however, this likely occurred during the accident sequence as a result of an automatic attempt to activate the left fuel pump due to the loss of fuel pressure immediately after the left wing separated. Toxicology testing of the pilot detected low levels of three different sedating antihistamines; however, antemortem levels could not be determined nor could the underlying reason(s) for the pilot's use of these medications. As a result, it could not be determined whether pilot impairment occurred due to the use of the medications or the underlying condition(s) themselves. Although the pilot reported a flight instrumentation issue, this problem would not have affected his ability to control the airplane. Further, the pilot should have been able to see the power lines given the day/visual weather conditions. It is possible that the pilot become distracted by the noncritical anomaly, which resulted in his failure to maintain clearance from the power lines.

The private pilot/owner and a passenger were transporting the pilot's multi-engine airplane to another airport so it could undergo an annual inspection. Shortly after departure, the right engine began to vibrate violently and the pilot elected to make a forced landing to a pasture. The airplane caught on fire and both radial engines separated from the airframe and sustained impact damage. The pilot was not rated by the FAA to operate multi-engine airplanes and he had not received any formal training in the airplane. The accident flight was his first time flying the airplane by himself. The airplane had not received an annual inspection in approximately 8 years prior to the accident. Examination of the right engine revealed extensive mechanical damage possibly due to a connecting rod failure.

The pilot was dispatched on a nonscheduled cargo flight to an airport other than his usual destination because it had a precision instrument approach, while his usual destination airport did not. The pilot elected to fly to his usual airport, and attempted a non precision instrument approach. The airport had both a VOR and an NDB approach. The NDB approach was noted as being out of service, although there was still a radio signal coming from the navigation aid. The pilot was cleared for the VOR approach, although instrumentation inside the cockpit was found set for the NDB approach, and radar track data disclosed that the flight path was consistent with the NDB approach path, not the VOR's. The airport's reported weather was 1.25 miles visibility, with a 200-foot overcast in mist. The airport's minimum NDB approach altitude is 652 feet above touchdown height. The airplane did not reach the runway, and collided with a pole and a building. Inspection of the airplane disclosed no evidence of any preimpact mechanical malfunctions.

The twin-engine corporate jet impacted terrain while maneuvering to land after a global positioning system (GPS) approach. The pilot reported that the airplane entered icing conditions during the approach and that the airplane descended out of instrument meteorological conditions between 300-400 feet above ground level (agl). The pilot reported that his windshield had become obscured by ice accumulation during the approach and that he "had difficulty seeing the runway." The pilot elected to land the airplane instead of executing the published missed-approach procedure. The airplane impacted terrain 439 feet short of the runway threshold while in a right turn. After the accident, there was ice accumulation on all booted airframe surfaces measuring 2-4 inches wide and 1/4 to 3/8 inch thick. The upper portions of the windscreens were contaminated with ice measuring about 3/8 inch thick. The remaining airframe portions, including the heated surfaces, were free of ice accumulation. The windshield bleed air switch was selected on "High" with the pilot's side windshield heat control knob approximately mid-range. Windshield alcohol was selected "On", but the alcohol reservoir was still full upon inspection. At the time of the accident, there was an overcast ceiling of 500 feet agl, 1-3/4 statute mile visibility with mist, and an outside temperature of -08 degrees Celsius. The published minimum descent altitude (MDA) for the GPS runway 17 approach is 500 feet agl, for an airplane equipped with a lateral navigation only GPS receiver. The pilot held a private pilot certificate with multi-engine land, instrument airplane, and Cessna 500 type rating. The pilot reported having 2,200 hours total flight time and 475 hours in the same make/model as the accident airplane.