Pokhara

The airplane departed Kathmandu-Tribhuvan Airport at 1111LT, carrying technical engineers and staff of the airline. The airplane was ferried to Pokhara to proceed with a C-check maintenance program. Less than two minutes after takeoff from runway 02, the crew encountered an unexpected situation when the airplane rolled to the right, went to an almost vertical attitude before it crashed 200 meters to the right of the runway centerline, bursting into flames. The captain was seriously injured while 18 other occupants were killed.

On 15 January 2023, an ATR 72-212A version 500 was operating scheduled flights between Kathmandu (VNKT) and Pokhara International Airport (VNPR). The same flight crew operated two sectors between VNKT to VNPR and VNPR to VNKT earlier in the morning. For first sector, the aircraft landed on runway 30 of VNPR and thereafter departed from VNPR using runway 12. The accident occurred during a visual approach for runway 12 at VNPR. This was the third flight by the crew members on that day. As per the CVR recordings it was understood that the flight was operated by two Captains, one Captain was in the process of obtaining aerodrome familiarization for operating into VNPR and the other Captain was an instructor pilot. The Captain being familiarized, who was occupying the left-hand seat, was the Pilot Flying (PF) and the instructor pilot, occupying the right-hand seat, was the Pilot Monitoring (PM). The take-off, climb, cruise and descent to VNPR was normal. The weather was compatible with VMC enroute to the destination airport. During the first contact with VNPR tower, the Air Traffic Controller (ATC) assigned runway 30 for the aircraft to land. But during the later phases of flight the flight crew, without mentioning any reason for changing the allocated runway, requested and received clearance from ATC to change runway 30 to 12 for landing. At 10:51:36, the aircraft descended from 6,500 feet at fifteen miles away from VNPR and joined the downwind track for Runway 12 to the north of the runway. The aircraft was visually identified by ATC during the approach. At 10:56:12, the pilots extended the flaps to the 15 degrees position and 46 seconds later they selected the landing gears lever to the down position. At 10:56:27, the PF disengaged the Autopilot System (AP) at an altitude of 721 feet Above Ground Level (AGL). The PF then called for “FLAPS 30” at 10:56:32, and the PM replied, “Flaps 30 and continue descent. The flight data recorder (FDR) data did not record any flap surface movement at that time. Instead, the propeller rotation speed (Np) of both engines decreased simultaneously to less than 25% and the torque (Tq) started decreasing to 0%, which is consistent with both propellers going into the feathered condition . The feather condition is not recorded in the FDR parameters. On the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) area microphone recording, a single Master Caution chime was recorded at 10:56:36. As per CVR readout, the flight crew then carried out the “Before Landing Checklist” without identifying the flaps were not to the 300 position, before starting the left turn onto the base leg. During that time, the power lever angle increased from 41% to 44%. At that point, Np of both propellers was recorded as Non-Computed Data (NCD) in the FDR and the torque (Tq) of both engines was at 0%. When propellers are in feather, they are not producing thrust. When both propellers were feathered both engines of 9N-ANC were running in flight idle condition during the event flight as per design to prevent overtorque. As per the FDR data, the engine turbo machine were functioning as expected considering the propeller were feathered. At 10:56:50 when the radio altitude callout for five hundred feet was annunciated, another “click” sound was heard . The aircraft turned to the left and reached a maximum bank angle of 30 degrees. The recorded Np and Tq data remained non-computed, in line with propellers being in feather condition. The yaw damper was disconnected four seconds later. The PF consulted the PM on whether to continue the left turn and the PM replied to continue the turn. Subsequently, the PF asked the PM on whether to continue descend and the PM responded it was not necessary and instructed to apply a little power. At 10:56:54, another click was heard, followed by the flaps moving to the 30 degrees position. When ATC gave the clearance for landing at 10:57:07, the crew did not respond to the tower, the PF mentioned twice that there was no power coming from the engines. The FDR data shows that at 10:57:11, the power levers were advanced first to 62 degrees then to the maximum power position in 2 seconds. It was followed by a “click” sound at 10:57:16. One second after the “click” sound, the aircraft was at the initiation of its last left turn at 368 feet AGL, the highpressure turbine speed (Nh) of both engines increased from 73% to 77%. It is noted that at 10:57:18, in the very last stage of flight, the PF handed over control of the aircraft to the PM. At 10:57:20, the PM (who was previously the PF) repeated again that there was no power from the engines. At 10:57:24 when the aircraft was at 311 feet AGL, the stick shaker5 was activated warning the crew that the aircraft Angle of Attack (AoA) increased up to the stick shaker threshold. At 10:57:26, a second sequence of stick shaker warning was activated when the aircraft banked towards the left abruptly. Three seconds later, the radio altitude alert for two hundred feet was annunciated, and the cricket sound and stick shaker ceased. At 10:57:32, sound of impact was heard in the CVR. The FDR and CVR stopped recording at 10:57:33 and 10:57:35 respectively. The airplane was totally destroyed and all 72 occupants were killed.

On 29 May 2022, Tara Air’s 9N-AET, Twin Otter (DHC-6/300) aircraft was scheduled for three flights on Pokhara-Jomsom-Pokhara sector. Tara Air had also filed flight plans for two additional Charter flights on the same sector. Among those five flights, four flights were to be conducted by a set of crews already positioned at Pokhara while the last flight was scheduled to be commanded by the PIC who had reached Pokhara from Kathmandu that very morning. Since Jomsom Airport was closed for operations due to bad weather, the PIC went to Tara Air crew camp and waited for the updates of weather improvement of Jomsom. After Jomsom Airport was open for operations at 0321 UTC, Tara Air operation decided to operate the first scheduled flight. However suspecting the next flight operation to Jomsom could not be operated, the original PIC assigned to the flight seated on board as a passenger to Jomsom for his scheduled business trip and the PIC assigned for the last flight took command. The Flight Plan was amended accordingly. At 0342 UTC, Summit Air’s 9N-AKZ, LET-410 took-off from Pokhara to Jomsom. At 0405 UTC, it reported an altitude of 12,500 ft and patches of cloud over Tatopani. At 0409 UTC, Summit Air’s second aircraft 9N-AMG, LET-410, took-off for Jomsom and subsequently, at 0410 UTC, 9N-AET of Tara Air (TRA197) took-off with 19 passengers and three crews on board. The Copilot had initially reported 3 crew and 18 passengers onboard to Pokhara Tower but later, revised the passenger figure was 19 prior to takeoff. 9N-AET was supposed to take-off before SMT 601 but the PIC seemed hesitant to commence the flight due to weather PIREP from 9N-AKZ that, the en-route weather was not favorable for VFR flights and critical around LETE and TATOPANI. All the crew members of TRA 197 and SMT 601 were in their respective cockpits and communicating with the preceding flight 9N-AKZ as well as with Pokhara tower for the updated information of en-route and destination weather. No flights had been conducted since morning and most of the passengers of Tara air and Summit Air were already at airport. In this situation it can be assumed that there was pressure to conduct flight from each angle. While listening to the CVR of TRA 197, it was observed that someone, either ground staff or some intimate passenger to the crew, advising strongly to the PIC to conduct the flight. Following the PIREP from 9NAKZ, both TRA197 and SMT 601 subsequently started their engines to commence the flights. The PIC of TRA 197 was still hesitant to conduct the flight for Jomsom even after the engine start and delayed the taxi as he was not yet convinced about the weather report received from preceding 9N-AKZ aircraft. In the meantime, SMT 601 lined up for departure to Jomsom. That was one of the most important pressure points to the PIC of TRA 197 to initiate departure. TRA 197 finally lined up and took off from Pokhara at 0410 UTC following the SMT 601 based on the en-route weather information (VMC) from 9N-AKZ, through Pokhara Tower. The en-route weather provided by Summit Air’s 9N-AKZ to Pokhara Tower and the crewmembers of TRA 197 and SMT 601 was not the same. Aircraft took off from Pokhara from runway 04 heading North. Tower instructed “report 5 DME northwest RW 04”. Then after departure at 90 climb power aircraft turned left to maintain a heading of 345 and planned to join heading 305 degree towards Ghodepani. After four minutes, TRA 197 reported, “Now on course…. 6000 climbing and ETA Jomsom 32” (0432 UTC). At 04:21 TRA 197 reported to Pokhara Tower as position approaching Ghodepani 12000 climbing for 12500. After 6 Seconds ATC Pokhara asked TRA 197, “confirm would like to change level and TRA 197 replied, “No Ma'am we have crossed Ghodepani and like to be on”. Pokhara Tower instructed, “Tara 197 contact Jomsom Tower 122.5” CVR recordings show that after TRA 197 crossed Ghodepani, the PIC was not comfortable with the en-route weather. However, the flight was continued following the advice of SMT 601. At 0426 UTC, TRA 197made the first contact with Jomsom AFS and reported its position to which Jomsom Tower conveyed the prevailing weather as “Wind South Westerly up to 30 kts, QNH 1019, Temp 18º”. The PIC of TRA 197 reconfirmed twice if the wind was maximum, up to 30 Kts and currently South Westerly-25kts. The crew was discussing about the bad weather being encountered and the PIC himself voiced his dissatisfaction about the behavior of other pilots who conduct VFR flights in such unfavorable weather. The CVR recordings reveal that the aircraft was encountering clouds and the PIC was trying his best to remain clear of the clouds. During the course of flight, TRA 197 hadn’t reported any abnormalities encountered and neither any technical defect on aircraft either to Jomsom tower or Pokhara Tower. As per CVR, PIC was searching for light and brighter areas and adamantly heading towards it. As per CVR and V2 tracker data, the aircraft was maintaining 12000 ft and was in a climbing attitude. During the continuous attempts of crew to avoid the clouds with Terrain Avoidance and Warning System [TAWS] inhibited, the aircraft met with an unfortunate CFIT accident into the rocky terrain at an altitude of 4050 meter AMSL at Sanusare Mountain, Thasang Rural Municipality, Mustang. As per V2 tracker, last position of 9N-AET was 7.7 nm SW of Jomsom Airport. The aircraft was completely destroyed by the impact and there were no survivors.

As per the flight plan submitted on 23rd February 2016, the aircraft was scheduled for VFR flight to Jomsom (VNJS) on 24th February with estimated off-block time of 01:00, intended cruising speed of 150 knots, intended level of 10,500 ft and via direct track. The first and second alternate aerodromes were Bhairahawa (VNBW) and Pokhara (VNPK) respectively and estimated elapsed time was 20 minutes with the fuel endurance of 2 hours and 30 minute. Based on the information from the CVR, FDR and ATC records, the following description of the history of the flight was reconstructed: At 01:55, the first-officer contacted Pokhara tower requesting Jomsom and Bhairahawa weather. Upon receiving Jomsom weather which was 8 km visibility towards Lete (arrival track) and foothill partially visible; at 01:56 F/O requested start-up for Jomsom. First-officer then briefed the weather to the captain, in response to this the captain responded by saying 'Let‘s have a look, if not possible we will return' (Translated from Nepali conversation). While performing the 'before start checklist', they received weather of Bhairahawa as closed. After completing the checklist and start-up the first-officer at 02:00 requested taxi clearance. The ATC informed runway change to 22 instead of runway 04 and gave taxi clearance. At 02:03 while taxiing the captain considering bad weather condition expressed his concern over the runway change with F/O but failed to express it to the ATC. As briefed by captain earlier, the control was transferred to F/O and at 02:04 F/O made a normal take-off. At 02:08 the captain reported 5 miles at 6,200 ft to ATC. At 02:09, while passing through 7,000 ft the captain informed the actual weather, which was light haze, mountain not visible but had ground contact, to an ultra-light aircraft upon his request. As per the cockpit conversation, the crew were comparing the base of the cloud which was higher than the day before and proposed to continue climb to 12,500 ft if not on-top of the cloud at 10,500 ft. Around 5 miles before Ghorepani passing 10,100 ft, the captain told that cells were still present so advised F/O to continue climb to 12,000 ft and told that they will proceed till TATOPANI and decide to continue or divert. At 02:14 approaching GHOREPANI and passing 11,400 ft, Captain told F/O to maintain level to be in between the cloud layers and briefed F/O that if they had to divert it would be a left turn. At the same time captain asked repeatedly to F/O if his side was raining for which F/O told and confirmed not visual, after which captain told they would see and decide (regarding continuation of flight). At 02:14:50 while over Ghorepani area at 11,500 ft the EGPWS TERRAIN alert and at 02:14:52 PULL UP warning came while they were not visual and at 02:15:01 it was stated that they were visual and by 02:14:53 the warning stopped. At 02:15 while maintaining 11,500 ft the captain reported ATC that they are at Ghorepani at level 10,500 ft after which frequency changeover to Jomsom tower was given. At 02:15:27 the captain instructed F/O to maintain heading of 3300 and flight level just below the cloud, after which a shallow descent was initiated. At this time captain asked F/O if his side was visual, in response F/O replied somewhat visual. The Captain then instructed F/O to descent to 10,000 ft. Once the descent was started at 02:15:55 passing 11,000 ft an OVERSPEED warning sounded in the cockpit for 2 seconds as the speed reached 152 knots. At 02:16 while passing 10,700 ft captain advised F/O to make a left turn so that it would be easy to turn if required as he was able to see his side. Then F/O asked if left side was visual for which the captain informed that not that side (towards the track) but somewhat visual to the left of him and told that the TRACK TO GO was TO THE LEFT whereas they were actually left of the track and had descended to 10,300 ft. At 02:17:58 EGPWS TERRAIN alert sounded when the aircraft was at 10,200 ft and descending on heading of 3210 with right bank angle of around 30 . At 02:18:06 when the aircraft had descended to 10,100 ft the PULL UP WARNING sounded for which the captain said not to worry and at 02:18:12; when the aircraft was at 10,000 ft the captain took-over the control, continued descent and asked F/O if his side was visual. The F/O informed that right side was not visual at all by which the aircraft had continued shallow descent on heading 3250 with right bank angle reaching up to 130 at 2:18:19 and by 02:18:23 the aircraft once again returned back to 0° bank angle. At 02:18:23 the captain started left bank followed by right bank again while still on a shallow descent until 02:18:27.Upon reaching 9,850 ft (lowest altitude) the aircraft started very shallow climb. At 02:18:35 when aircraft was 9,920 ft the captain told F/O that they reached Landslide (a checkpoint which is on track to Jomsom on the right side of the Kali-Gandaki River). At 02:18:44 when aircraft reached 10,150 ft captain told ―what I will do is now I will turn to heading of LETTE‖ (another way point on route to Jomsom); while the PULL-UP warning was continuously sounding. At 02:18:49 when the aircraft was at 10,300 ft right bank angle increased up to 16° with pitch up attitude of 7°. At 02:18:52 the captain told that he would start climb when the aircraft had reached 10,350 ft; pitch attitude of 10° and still on right bank. The aircraft reached zero degree bank at 02:18:53 and started shallow left bank with pitch attitude of 12° nose up. By 02:18:57 the bank angle reached 200 left with pitch attitude of 11.8 and altitude of 10,550 ft and captain was still questioning F/O about the visibility towards his side but F/O informed his side not visible completely. The last data recorded in FDR was at 02:19:03 when the altitude had reached around 10,700 ft; pitch attitude of 7° nose up and left bank angle of 25° heading of 335° with EGPWS PULL-UP warning ON.

On 16 February 2014, the Twin Otter (DHC6/300) aircraft with registration number 9N-ABB, owned and operated by Nepal Airlines Corporation (NAC), departed Kathmandu at 0610 UTC (1155 LT) on its schedule flight to Jumla carrying 18 persons on board including 3 crews. Detailed sectors to be covered by the flight No. RA 183/718 was Kathmandu–Pokhara–Jumla-Nepālganj (Night stop). Flight from Kathmandu to Pokhara completed in normal condition. After 17 minutes on ground at Pokhara airport and refueling 9N-ABB departed Pokhara at 0658 for Jumla. After Jumla flight, the aircraft was scheduled to Night stop at Nepālganj. Next day it was to do a series of shuttle flights from Nepālganj. Prevailing westerly weather had a severe impact on most of the domestic flights since last two days. A.M.E. of Engineering Department of NAC who had performed D.I. of 9N ABB had mentioned in his written report to the Commission that he had reminded the diversion of Bhojpur flight of NAC due weather and asked the Captain whether he had weather briefing of the Western Nepal or not. In response to the AME's query the Captain had replied casually that- "weather is moving from west to east and now west is improving". Pilots behavior was reported normal by the ground staffs of Kathmandu and Pokhara airports prior to the commencement of flight on that day. All the pre and post departure procedure of the flight were completed in normal manner. Before departure to Jumla from Pokhara, Pilots obtained Jumla and Bhairahawa weather and seems to be encouraged with VFR Weather at both stations. However, they were unable to make proper assessment of en route weather. PIC decided to remain south of track to avoid the terrain and weather. CVR read out revealed that pilots were aware and concerned about the icing conditions due to low outside air temperature. After around 25 minutes, probably maneuvering to avoid weather, the PIC instructed the co-pilot to plan a route further south of their position, to fly through the Dang valley. The copilot selected Dang in the GPS, on a bearing of 283°, and determined the required altitude was 8500ft. He then raised concerns that the aircraft may not have enough fuel to reach the planned destination. Approximately two and a half minutes before the accident, the PIC initiated a descent, and the copilot advised against this. As per CVR read out, last heading recorded by copilot, approximately one minute before the crash, was 280. The last one minute was a very critical phase of the flight during which PIC said I am entering (perhaps inside the cloud). At that time copilot called Bhairahawa Tower on his own and got latest Bhairahawa weather. While copilot was transmitting its last position report to Bhairahawa Control Tower (approximately 25 miles from Bhairahawa), PIC interrupted and declared to divert Bhairahawa. Bhairahawa Control Tower wanted the pilots to confirm their present position. But crews were very much occupied and copilot said STANDBY. Just few seconds before crash copilot had told PIC not to descend. Copilot also suggested PIC in two occasions - sir don't turn. Very unfortunately aircraft was crashed. The aircraft disintegrated on impact and all 18 occupants were killed.

The Twin Otter (DHC6/300) aircraft with registration number 9N-ABO, owned and operated by Nepal Airlines Corporation (NAC), departed Kathmandu to Pokhara for night stop on 15 May 2013 in order to accomplish up to 5 (five) Pokhara-Jomsom-Pokhara charter flights planned for the subsequent day on 16 May 2013. As per the programme, the aircraft completed first charter flight from Pokhara to Jomsom sector on 16 May 2013 morning after one and half hour waiting on ground due weather. For this second flight, the aircraft departed at 0225 UTC (08:10LT) from Pokhara to Jomsom in the command of Capt. Dipendra Pradhan and Mr. Suresh K.C. as co-pilot. There were 19 passengers including one infant and 3 crew members on board. The aircraft was operating under Visual Flight Rules (VFR). As per the CVR readout there was no reported difficulties and all the pre and post departure procedure and en-route portion of the flight were completed in normal manner. There was no indication of lacking of information and advice from Jomsom Tower. At first contact the co-pilot called Jomsom Tower and reported its position at PLATO (a compulsory reporting point) at 9 miles from Jomsom airport at 12500ft. AMSL. The Jomsom Tower advised runway 24 wind south westerly 08-12 KTS, QNH 1020, Temp 13 degree and advised to report downwind for runway 24.The co-pilot accepted by replying to join downwind for runway 24. There was no briefing and discussion between the two pilots regarding the tail wind at the airport. The PIC, then, took over the communication function from co-pilot and called Jomsom Tower, requesting to use runway 06 instead of runway 24, despite the advice of tower to use runway 24 to avoid tail wind effect in runway 06. Jomsom Tower repeated the wind speed to be 08-12 KTS for the runway 06, to which the PIC read back the wind and answered to have ”no problem”. As per the PIC request the Jomsom Tower designated runway 06 for landing and advised to report on final runway 06. The PIC did read back the same. The pre landing checklist was used, flaps with full fine in propeller rpm were taken and full flaps was also taken before touchdown. In the briefing of “missed approach” the PIC had answered to be “standard”. The aircraft touched down runway of Jomsom airport at 0245 UTC (08:30LT) at a distance of approximately 776 ft, far from the threshold of runway 06. After rolling 194 ft. in the runway, the aircraft left runway and entered grass area in the right side. The aircraft rolled around 705 ft in the grass area and entered the runway again. The maximum deviation from the runway edge was 19 ft. The Commission has observed that when aircraft touched down the runway, it was not heading in parallel to the runway centreline. After touchdown the aircraft rolled around 194ft on the runway, left the paved area and started rolling in the grass area in the right side. During the landing roll, when the aircraft was decelerating, the co-pilot had raised the flaps as per the existing practice of carrying out “after the landing “checks". As per the observation of passenger seated just behind the cockpit, after touchdown of the aircraft there was no communication between pilot and co-pilot. It seemed that pilot was busy in cockpit and facing problem. It was obvious that PIC was in dilemma in controlling aircraft. He added power to bring aircraft into the runway with an intention to lift up the aircraft. He did not brief anything to copilot about his intention and action. He started adding power with the intention of lifting up, but the aircraft was already losing its speed, due to extension of flaps by co-pilot without briefing to PIC and use of brakes (light or heavy, knowingly and unknowingly) simultaneously by the PIC. The accelerating aircraft with insufficient speed and lift to take off ran out of the runway 24 end, continued towards the river, hit the barbed fence and gabion wall with an initial impact and finally fell down into the edge of river. The left wing was rested in the mid of the river preventing the aircraft submerged into the river.

On final approach to Jomsom Airport runway 06, the crew lowered the landing gear when they noticed a technical issue. On short final, the captain decided to initiate a go-around procedure and to divert to Pokhara. He made a sharp U-turn to the left at a speed of 73 knots when the left wing impacted a rocky hill located 270 meters above the runway 24 threshold. The aircraft stalled and crashed on the slope of the hill and was destroyed by impact forces. The stewardess and five passengers were seriously injured while all 15 other occupants, among them both pilots, were killed.

The twin engine aircraft departed Jomsom Airport at 0941LT for a 25-minutes flight to Pokhara, carrying three crew members and 15 passengers, 13 Germans, one American and one British. While descending to Pokhara Airport, the crew encountered poor weather conditions with low clouds. At an altitude of 4,600 feet, the aircraft struck the slope of a mountain located 6 km southwest of the airport, near the village of Kristi Nachnechaur. The aircraft was totally destroyed by impact forces and all 18 occupants were killed. There was no fire.

On approach to Kathmandu-Tribhuvan Airport under VFR mode, the crew encountered limited visibility due to a low cloud layer. On final, at an altitude of about 6,000 feet, the aircraft collided with a radio antenna (100 feet high) located on the top of a hill and owned by the Nepalese National Broadcasting Company. The aircraft went out of control and crashed seven km short of runway 02. All 15 occupants.

The twin engine aircraft departed Jomsom Airport at 1110LT on a 20-minutes flight to Pokhara, carrying 15 passengers and three crew members. While cruising at an altitude of 10,500 feet in good weather conditions, the aircraft struck the slope of a mountain. The wreckage was found two days later and all 18 occupants were killed.