South America

Failure of the crew to follow the published procedures following a fire alarm, as stated in the Operations Manual and the late application of the procedures once the decision to abort the takeoff was taken.
Contributing factors:
- Complacency on part of the crew who failed to proceed with a pre-takeoff briefing,
- A fact that influenced the lack of appropriate action from the crew to successfully tackle any emergency,
- Lack of crew resources management,
- The braking coefficient was low because the runway surface was wet.

Non-compliance by the crew of the technical procedures, configuration, speed and bank angle of the aircraft required for the completion of the initial turn of the Instrument Approach Procedure n°4 published in the AIP Ecuador, to Latacunga Airport, a failure that placed the aircraft outside of the protected area (published pattern), leading to high elevation mountainous terrain.
Contributing factors:
- Ignorance of the crew of the area which was under the approach path.
- Lack of documentation and procedures of the airline that govern the conduct of flights to non-scheduled and special airports.

Fracture of the ring of the mechanical stop of the shock absorber on the right main gear, turning the whole gear into a solid structure incapable of absorbing the landing loads, due to the non-incorporation of the Airworthiness Directive AD-2006-14 in the general repair of the main gear.

It is believed that the accident was the consequence of an engine failure for unknown reasons.

Failure of the left engine on final due to fuel exhaustion. It remained a total of 3 gallons of fuel in the left fuel tank and 23 gallons in the right main tank.

The captain did not conduct a preflight briefing and then improvised during the descent by deciding to leave the controls to the copilot while he was still under instruction.
The following contributing factors were identified:
- The copilot who was pilot-in-command on final was in his initial training process,
- The captain authorized the copilot to be the PIC while he was still under initial training,
- The captain was not qualified to operate as an instructor,
- The captain did not make any simulator training for more than two years,
- The copilot had never completed any simulator training since the beginning of his training,
- Lack of crew coordination,
- Poor judgment on part of the captain.

Operational error of the pilot in command by not applying normal approach procedures recommended by the manufacturer and loss control of the aircraft (stall) while returning to land with the left engine cowling open.
The following contributing factors were identified:
- During the preflight inspection, the pilot failed to detect that the left engine cowling was unlatched,
- Return with the intention of landing with a speed very close to the stall speed, possibly to avoid the detachment of the engine cowling due to the wind force,
- Probable increased stall speed by altering the left wing aerodynamics due to the engine open cowl,
- Not having high enough altitude to recover from a stall condition,
- Possible decreased physiological capabilities of the commander of the aircraft, due to the presence of alcohol in his system,
- Possible pilot distraction due to weather conditions and the opening of the engine cowling.

The inability of the accident aircraft to maintain flight after the loss of power of two engines.
The following contributing factors were identified:
A non-recoverable surge on the engine n°4 during the rotation, resulting in a loss of engine power. Contributing to the surge were the combined effects of the inefficient high pressure turbine, excessive blade-tip clearance, reduced cord of the fan blades and of the leading edges and the effects of high altitude. An undetermined anomaly in the engine n°1, which manifested itself during the extra power, resulted in loss of engine power. Contributing to the loss of engine power was inadequate n°1 operation to maintain the proper speed during the ascent of the aircraft, resulting in extra power use and, in turn, exposing the anomaly of the engine.