Argentina

It was determined that the accident was the consequence of a controlled flight into terrain (CFIT) and the airplane did not suffer any technical anomalies.
The following contributing factors were identified:
- The crew failed to check the approach charts according to SOP's,
- The approach was initiated and continued in conditions that were below weather minimums,
- Visibility data transmitted by Tower to the crew were inaccurate, leading to confusion on the part of the pilots and their decision-making,
- Both engines were at full power upon impact as the crew was initiating a go-around procedure.

Conclusions regarding factors related to the accident:
- At the time of the event, meteorological conditions were poor with a strong storm, rain and gusts of wind.
- Visual cues may have been reduced due to heavy rain falls.
- The aircraft was displaced from the runway center line when it made contact with the ground.
- The aircraft made contact with the left landing gear off the runway due to strong gusts of wind.
- The lateral excursion to the grassy area occurred due to the impossibility of recovering the trajectory of the aircraft, once it was displaced by the action of the wind.

Loss of control during climb due to the combination of the following factors:
- The particular characteristics of the aircraft;
- The attention required by the transponder as it is not displayed by air traffic control;
- The detour of the planned flight at the request of the inspection department of air traffic;
- Aircraft trajectory management with autopilot switched off;
- The pilot's limited experience in instrument flight conditions. In addition, the absence of additional instruction in the aircraft type (due to the lack of specific regulations) can be considered a contributing factor, according to the probable scenario described above. In addition, the research identified the following elements with potential impact in operational safety:
- Absence of the TAWS system on the aircraft in non-conformity with the established RAAC 91;
- Lack of effective means to enable the flight plan office to quickly determine whether an aircraft has operating restrictions;
- Shortcomings in the training of staff in the units ATS and SAR in search and rescue.

Failure of the right engine in flight due to fuel exhaustion. Lack of proper procedures by the operator was considerd as a contributing factor.

The most likely cause of the uncommanded acceleration and subsequent overspeed condition was a contamination of retained particles present within the fuel control unit (FCU). The contamination was a short-lived random condition, as evidenced by the fact that after about 30 seconds the power lever regained control of the left engine. On a general aviation flight, during the take-off run, the LJ35 LV-ZSZ suffered a runway excursion on the right side, and a subsequent aircraft fire.
The accident was due to the combination of the following factors:
- The uncommanded acceleration of the left engine at the start of the take-off run,
- The initial lack of response of the left engine to the requests of the corresponding power lever,
- The difficulties of the crew in managing an unusual condition of the aircraft in accordance with guidelines established in the AFM,
- The ambivalence in the existing regulations for the authorization of a co-pilot in an aircraft that require two pilots for certification,
- The duality in the application of safety standards allowed by the existing normative regulations.
Although unrelated, the state of the runway 05/23 protection zone at the San Fernando Aerodrome contributed to the severity of the accident.

The accident resulted from the combination of immediate triggers and failures in the aeronautical system's defenses, including:
- Prevailing weather conditions at the scene of the accident;
- Pilot-in-command experienced difficulties in managing aircraft control and flight path during an instrument approach;
- The probability of overload of work of the pilot in command as a result of the operational demands presented by the situation;
- The execution of the operation by a single pilot (single pilot operation), taking into account the age of the pilot; and
- Deficiencies in pilot-in-command certification denying the value of CE-6 as a defense barrier for the aeronautical system (CE-6 is a Critical Element of ICAO Annex 19 regarding responsibilities in issuing licenses).