Takeoff (climb)

Controlled flight into terrain.

The ingestion of large birds into each engine, which resulted in an almost total loss of thrust in both engines and the subsequent ditching on the Hudson River. Contributing to the fuselage damage and resulting unavailability of the aft slide/rafts were:
-the Federal Aviation Administration’s approval of ditching certification without determining whether pilots could attain the ditching parameters without engine thrust,
-the lack of industry flight crew training and guidance on ditching techniques,
-the captain’s resulting difficulty maintaining his intended airspeed on final approach due to the task saturation resulting from the emergency situation.
Contributing to the survivability of the accident was:
-the decision-making of the flight crew members and their crew resource management during the accident sequence,
-the fortuitous use of an airplane that was equipped for an extended overwater flight, including the availability of the forward slide/rafts, even though it was not required to be so equipped
-the performance of the cabin crew members while expediting the evacuation of the airplane,
-the proximity of the emergency responders to the accident site and their immediate and appropriate response to the accident.

The pilot's loss of control due to snow/ice contamination on the airplane's lifting surfaces as a result of his decision not to deice the airplane before departure.

Left main gear collapsed during the takeoff roll for unknown reasons.

The captain’s cessation of right rudder input, which was needed to maintain directional control of the airplane, about 4 seconds before the excursion, when the airplane encountered a strong and gusty crosswind that exceeded the captain’s training and experience.
Contributing to the accident were the following factors:
1) an air traffic control system that did not require or facilitate the dissemination of key, available wind information to the air traffic controllers and pilots; and
2) inadequate crosswind training in the airline industry due to deficient simulator wind gust modeling.

A loss of power on the left engine shortly after takeoff for undetermined reasons.
The following contributing factors were identified:
- A probable inadequate compliance with emergency procedures,
- Probable little and discontinuous flight activity on the aircraft type during the year 2008,
- Low turn.

Conclusions:
- The pilot was appropriately licensed, held the appropriate Medical Certificate, was experienced and fit to carry out aerial topdressing operations.
- The aircraft had been operating normally from the airstrip up to the time of the accident.
- The aircraft descended after take-off and struck a fence. The collision with the fence damaged the elevator control cable system which jammed the elevator control surface. This resulted in the pilot being unable to adequately control the aircraft in pitch, and the aircraft subsequently struck the ground.
- The aircraft was loaded with 1900 kg of lime product on the accident flight, this was in excess of the 1860 kg maximum structural hopper load. No variation above the maximum structural hopper load is allowed for in CAR Part 137. The aircraft’s all-up weight at the time of the accident was under the maximum allowed under the overload provisions of CAR Part 137 by 145 kg.
- The Aircraft Flight Manual does not provide take-off performance data for operation over the maximum certificated take-off weight and up to the maximum agricultural weight as allowed by CAR Part 137.
- A change in wind direction had occurred in the late morning which may have presented the pilot with a slight tail-wind or possible low level turbulence, including down draught conditions, during and after take-off.
- The windsock was not in the most suitable position to indicate the wind conditions to the pilot.
- Partial or full load jettisons had taken place on previous flights, indicating that the pilot was having difficulty achieving the required aircraft performance during or after take-off.
- On the accident flight, the aircraft was probably overloaded for the prevailing environmental conditions.
- The reported poor flowing qualities of the lime product being spread may have hampered the pilot’s efforts to jettison the load after take-off. The effectiveness of the jettison may have also been reduced by the downward flight path of the aircraft on leaving the end of the airstrip. It is unlikely that the pilot could comply with the CAR Part 137.103 requirement to jettison 80% of the load within five seconds.
- The possibility of a pre-existing airframe or engine defect that could have contributed to the accident was eliminated as far as practicable by the investigation.
- The ELT fitted to the aircraft was no longer an approved type, therefore the aircraft was not airworthy in accordance with CARs. The ELT was incapable of being detected by satellite and therefore would not automatically alert rescue services, however, this did not hamper rescue efforts in this accident.
- The accident was not survivable.

Findings as to Causes and Contributing Factors:
1. An electrical short circuit in the cockpit pedestal area produced flames and smoke, which induced the crew to take emergency action.
2. The detrimental effects of aging on the wires involved may have been a factor in this electrical arc event.
3. The crew elected to return to the airport at low level in an environment with inadequate visual references. As a result, control of the aircraft was lost at an altitude from which a recovery was not possible.
Findings as to Risk:
1. The actions specified in the standard operating procedures (SOP) do not include procedures for an electrical fire encountered at low altitude at night, which could lead to a loss of control.
2. Visual inspection procedures in accordance with normal phase inspection requirements may be inadequate to detect defects progressing within wiring bundles, increasing the risk of electrical fires.
3. In the event of an in-flight cockpit pedestal fire, the first officer does not have ready access to available fire extinguishers, reducing the likelihood of successfully fighting a fire of this nature.
4. Sealed in plastic containers and stored behind each pilot seat, the oxygen masks and goggles are time consuming to access and cumbersome to apply and activate. This could increase the probability of injury or incapacitation through extended exposure to smoke or fumes, or could deter crews from using them, especially during periods of high cockpit workload.
Other Finding:
1. A failure of the hot-mic recording function of the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) had gone undetected and information that would have been helpful to the investigation was not available.