Denver-Intl

The pilot was conducting an early morning repositioning flight of the cargo airplane. Shortly after takeoff, the pilot reported to air traffic control that he had “lost an engine” and would return to the airport. Several witnesses reported that the engines were running rough and one witness reported that he did not hear any engine sounds just before the impact. The airplane impacted trees, a wooden enclosure, a chain-linked fence, and shrubs in a residential area and was damaged by the impact and postimpact fire. The airplane had been parked outside for 5 days before the accident flight and had been plugged in to engine heaters the night before the flight. It was dark and snowing lightly at the time of the accident. The operator reported that no deicing services were provided before the flight and that the pilot mechanically removed all of the snow and ice accumulation. The wreckage and witness statements were consistent with the airplane being in a right-winglow descent but the airplane did not appear to be out of control. Neither of the propellers were at or near the feathered position. The emergency procedures published by the manufacturer for a loss of engine power stated that pilots should first secure the engine and feather the propeller following a loss of engine power and then turn the fuel selector for that engine to “off.” The procedures also cautioned that continued flight might not be possible if the propeller was not feathered. The right fuel selector valve and panel were found in the off position. Investigators were not able to determine why an experienced pilot did not follow the emergency procedures and immediately secure the engine following the loss of engine power. It is not known how much snow and ice had accumulated on the airplane leading up to the accident flight or if the pilot was successful in removing all of the snow and ice with only mechanical means. The on-scene examination of the wreckage and the teardown of both engines did not reveal any preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures. While possible, it could not be determined if water or ice ingestion lead to the loss of engine power at takeoff.

On December 20, 2008, about 1818 mountain standard time, Continental Airlines flight 1404, a Boeing 737-500, N18611, departed the left side of runway 34R during takeoff from Denver International Airport (DEN), Denver, Colorado. A postcrash fire ensued. The captain and 5 of the 110 passengers were seriously injured; the first officer, 2 cabin crewmembers, and 38 passengers received minor injuries; and 1 cabin crewmember and 67 passengers (3 of whom were lap-held children) were uninjured. The airplane was substantially damaged. The scheduled, domestic passenger flight, operated under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121, was departing DEN and was destined for George Bush Intercontinental Airport, Houston, Texas. At the time of the accident, visual meteorological conditions prevailed, with strong and gusty winds out of the west. The flight operated on an instrument flight rules flight plan.

The accident involved 2 Swearingen airplanes. The pilot of the first airplane reported that he had taxied north for departure. There were several company aircraft in front of him in line for departure so he came to a complete stop. The pilot of the second airplane reported that he was also taxiing north for departure. He had seen the lights from an aircraft holding short of runway 17R; however, he did not see the lights of the first airplane until it was too late. The pilot of the second airplane reported he applied full brakes and used reverse thrust but was unable to avoid hitting the first airplane. Both airplanes were substantially damaged.

The flight was following a heavy jet on landing approach. The crew agreed to fly the approach at a slightly higher altitude than normal to avoid any possible wake turbulence. The first officer, who was flying the airplane, called for the landing gear to be lowered. When the captain placed the gear handle in the DOWN position, he noted red IN-TRANSIT lights. He recycled the landing gear, but got the same result. He consulted the emergency checklist and thought he had manually extended the landing gear because he "heard the normal 'clunk feel' and airspeed started to decay." In addition, when power was reduced to FLIGHT IDLE, the GEAR UNSAFE warning horn did not sound. The first officer agreed, noting 2,000 pounds of hydraulic pressure. The airplane landed wheels up. Propeller blade fragments penetrated the fuselage, breaching the pressure vessel. Postaccident examination revealed the nose gear had been partially extended but the main landing gear was retracted. The crew said the GEAR UNSAFE indication had been a recurring problem with the airplane. The problem had previously been attributed to a frozen squat switch in the wheel well.

With an auxiliary fuel tank system installed, the pilot filled the tanks and departed. A few minutes later, he noticed fuel on the floor of the cabin, and tried to reach an airport. However, the fuel fumes were so strong he elected to land in an open field. After touchdown, the airplane passed through a ditch the pilot had not observed from the air. The nose landing gear collapsed and the airplane nosed over. An airborne witness reported the pilot exited the airplane after about 5 minutes, and about 5 minutes later, the airplane caught fire and burned. The post crash fire consumed the cabin. In an interview, the pilot reported that he had not initiated use of the auxiliary fuel tank system when the accident occurred. He also reported he could not see where the fuel was coming from. The investigation revealed the tank installation did not match the FAA Form 337, the instructions for use of the ferry tank system were inadequate, and the pilot had reported that the auxiliary fuel pumps were secured to a board which was not secured to the airplane.

Pilot said he encountered severe to extreme turbulence upon reaching missed approach point and felt aircraft might stall if he began immediate right turn as called for in missed approach procedure. Pilot said he made left turn at 15 DME (missed approach point is at 11.5 DME) because there was higher terrain to right. Aircraft collided with trees on mountain 3 miles east of airport. Weather analysis indicated potential for light to moderate turbulence but not severe to extreme turbulence. Pilots landing and departing airport prior to and after accident reported light to moderate chop. Radar showed aircraft speed at 183.1 kts between iaf and faf. Between faf and missed approach point, aircraft speed was 95.7 kts. Pilot said he referred to current commercial instrument approach chart while executing approach. Only obsolete government instrument approach book was found in aircraft. Radios were not tuned to missed approach navaids. Pilot-rated passenger said pilot panicked after encountering turbulence.

N4581E was operating under 14 cfr 135 carrying cargo. The pilot stated that he departed VFR and had '7 to 10' miles visibility at the accident site. Witnesses at and near the accident site stated that heavy snow was falling at the time of the accident and the visibility was one mile or less. The aircraft struck a 2 story duplex in a light wing low attitude, 18 feet agl. Post crash exam of the aircraft and engines revealed no evidence of mechanical malfunction or failure. The pilot had been grounded for a couple of weeks prior to the accident due to medical problems. There was no record that indicated the pilot had been route checked for operations at Aspen.

This part 135 IFR flight was inbound for landing at Laramie, Wyoming. During the en route and approach for landing portions of the flight the aircraft picked up a moderate to heavy load of ice. During the landing flare the aircraft stalled, hit the runway, bounced, veered off the runway, and struck a VASI lighting system. The left landing gear collapsed and the aircraft skidded to a stop. All nine occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.