PAC Cresco 08-600 (08-750)

The following findings were identified:
- The pilot did not make the necessary left turn during the take-off roll to align with the strip centreline, so the aeroplane continued the take-off roll in a straight line.
- The right-rear undercarriage struck uneven ground with sufficient force to break the undercarriage mounting brackets and dislodge the undercarriage assembly from the aeroplane.
- The right main undercarriage subsequently struck the right flap, resulting in a partial dislocation of the flap. This very likely resulted in the aeroplane becoming uncontrollable.
- The pilot was about as likely as not to have been incapacitated early in the take-off roll.

Conclusions:
- The pilot was appropriately licensed, held the appropriate Medical Certificate, was experienced and fit to carry out aerial topdressing operations.
- The aircraft had been operating normally from the airstrip up to the time of the accident.
- The aircraft descended after take-off and struck a fence. The collision with the fence damaged the elevator control cable system which jammed the elevator control surface. This resulted in the pilot being unable to adequately control the aircraft in pitch, and the aircraft subsequently struck the ground.
- The aircraft was loaded with 1900 kg of lime product on the accident flight, this was in excess of the 1860 kg maximum structural hopper load. No variation above the maximum structural hopper load is allowed for in CAR Part 137. The aircraft’s all-up weight at the time of the accident was under the maximum allowed under the overload provisions of CAR Part 137 by 145 kg.
- The Aircraft Flight Manual does not provide take-off performance data for operation over the maximum certificated take-off weight and up to the maximum agricultural weight as allowed by CAR Part 137.
- A change in wind direction had occurred in the late morning which may have presented the pilot with a slight tail-wind or possible low level turbulence, including down draught conditions, during and after take-off.
- The windsock was not in the most suitable position to indicate the wind conditions to the pilot.
- Partial or full load jettisons had taken place on previous flights, indicating that the pilot was having difficulty achieving the required aircraft performance during or after take-off.
- On the accident flight, the aircraft was probably overloaded for the prevailing environmental conditions.
- The reported poor flowing qualities of the lime product being spread may have hampered the pilot’s efforts to jettison the load after take-off. The effectiveness of the jettison may have also been reduced by the downward flight path of the aircraft on leaving the end of the airstrip. It is unlikely that the pilot could comply with the CAR Part 137.103 requirement to jettison 80% of the load within five seconds.
- The possibility of a pre-existing airframe or engine defect that could have contributed to the accident was eliminated as far as practicable by the investigation.
- The ELT fitted to the aircraft was no longer an approved type, therefore the aircraft was not airworthy in accordance with CARs. The ELT was incapable of being detected by satellite and therefore would not automatically alert rescue services, however, this did not hamper rescue efforts in this accident.
- The accident was not survivable.

Contributing safety factors:
• The aircraft probably entered an area of weather that deteriorated below visual meteorological conditions and for which the pilot was not experienced or qualified.
• The pilot probably became unsure of his position in poor visibility, leading to controlled flight into terrain, fatally injuring the pilot and destroying the aircraft.
Other safety factors:
• The aircraft had not been configured for poor visibility operations, possibly increasing the pilot’s difficulty in navigating.
• The pilot did not submit any form of flight notification such as a SARTIME or Flight Note, as required for a flight in a designated remote area, resulting in a delay to the search and rescue response.
• The operator did not have procedures to provide assurance that a search and rescue would be initiated in a timely way if one of their aircraft did not arrive at the planned destination. [Safety issue]
• As a result of damage to the emergency locator beacon antenna, the beacon did not alert search and rescue organisations to the aircraft accident.

The following findings were identified:
- The pilot was appropriately licensed, rated and fit for the flights being undertaken.
- The aircraft had a valid airworthiness certificate and had been maintained in accordance with current requirements.
- No pre-accident defect was found with the aircraft.
- The pilot had turned left after take-off from the strip, against the advice of the property owner.
- The advice was given in light of a previous accident in virtually identical circumstances.
- There was insufficient space available after take-off for the aeroplane to accelerate to a speed at which the bank angle necessary to clear the terrain could be sustained in level flight or a climb.
- The accident was not survivable.

Structural failure of the tail in flight.