Country
code

Queensland

Crash of a Cessna 208B Grand Caravan on Lizard Island

Date & Time: Jan 8, 2024 at 0700 LT
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
VH-NWJ
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Lizard Island - Cairns
MSN:
208B-2161
YOM:
2010
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
8
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
After takeoff from Lizard Island Airport, the crew continued to climb until he reached the altitude of 4,000 feet. Due to an engine malfunction, the crew decided to return to Lizard Island Airport but the airplane overshot and crashed, coming to rest upside down. All 10 occupants were injured and evacuated.

Crash of a Cessna 421C Golden Eagle III off Sunshine Coast

Date & Time: Nov 10, 2023 at 0906 LT
Operator:
Registration:
VH-VPY
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Sunshine Coast - Pago Pago
MSN:
421C-0688
YOM:
1979
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
1
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
The twin engine airplane departed Sunshine Coast-Caloundra Airport at 0733LT on a flight to Pago Pago, US Samoa, with two people on board. About 45 minutes into the flight, while cruising at an approximate altitude of 12,000 feet, the pilot inform ATC about an engine failure and elected to return to Sunshine Coast. He made a 180 turn and reduced his altitude. About 45 minutes later, unable to reach his departure airport, the pilot ditched the airplane some 30 nautical miles east of Sunshine Coast. Both occupants found refuge in a dinghy and were quickly rescued. The airplane sank and was lost.

Crash of a Rockwell Gulfstream 695A Jetprop 1000 near Cloncurry: 3 killed

Date & Time: Nov 4, 2023 at 1430 LT
Operator:
Registration:
VH-HPY
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Toowoomba - Mount Isa
MSN:
96051
YOM:
1982
Flight number:
BDOG370
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
3
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
3
Circumstances:
In the early afternoon, the twin engine airplane departed Toowoomba Airport on an aerial survey flight under callsign BDOG370 to Mount Isa with three people on board. The purpose of the flight was to conduct a survey mission of the area in case of bushfire. While cruising at an altitude of 28,000 feet, the airplane entered an uncontrolled descent. It reached a rate of descent of 9,600 feet per minute until it crashed in an uninhabited area located approximately 70 km southeast of Cloncurry. All three occupants were killed.

Crash of a Piper PA-31-350 Navajo Chieftain in Hillcrest

Date & Time: Apr 7, 2023 at 0605 LT
Operator:
Registration:
VH-HJE
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Bankstown – Brisbane
MSN:
31-7852074
YOM:
1978
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
1473
Captain / Total hours on type:
204.00
Circumstances:
On 7 April 2023, the pilot of a Piper Aircraft Corporation PA-31-350 Chieftain (PA-31), registered VH-HJE and operated by Air Link, was conducting a freight charter flight from Archerfield, Queensland. The planned flight included one intermediate stop at Bankstown, New South Wales before returning to Archerfield, and was conducted under the instrument flight rules at night. The aircraft departed Archerfield at about 0024 local time and during the first leg to Bankstown, the pilot reported an intermittent fault with the autopilot, producing uncommanded pitch changes and associated rates of climb and descent of around 1,000 ft/min. As a result, much of the first leg was flown by hand. After landing at Bankstown at about 0248, a defect entry was made on the maintenance release; however, the pilot was confident that they would be able to hand fly the aircraft for the return leg and elected to continue with the planned flight. The aircraft was refueled to its maximum capacity for the return leg after which a small quantity of water was detected in the samples taken from both main fuel tanks. Additional fuel drains were conducted until the fuel sample was free of water. The manifested freight for the return leg was considered a light load and the aircraft was within weight and balance limitations. After taking off at 0351, the pilot climbed to the flight planned altitude of 9,000 ft. Once established in cruise, the pilot changed the left and right fuel selectors from the respective main tank to the auxiliary tank. The pilot advised that, during cruise, they engaged the autopilot and the uncommanded pitch events continued. Consequently, the pilot did not use the autopilot for part of the flight. Approaching top of descent, the pilot recalled conducting their normal flow checks by memory before referring to the checklist. During this time, the pilot completed a number of other tasks not related to the fuel system, such as changing the radio frequency, checking the weather at the destination and briefing themselves on the expected arrival into Archerfield. Shortly after, the pilot remembered changing from the auxiliary fuel tanks back to the main fuel tanks and using the fuel quantity gauges to confirm tank selection. The pilot calculated that 11 minutes of fuel remained in the auxiliary tanks (with an estimated 177 L in each main tank). Around eight minutes after commencing descent and 28 NM (52 km) south of Archerfield (at 0552), the pilot observed the right ‘low fuel flow’ warning light (or ‘low fuel pressure’) illuminate on the annunciator panel. This was followed soon after by a slight reduction in noise from the right engine. As the aircraft descended through approximately 4,700 ft, the ADS-B data showed a moderate deceleration with a gradual deviation right of track. While the power loss produced a minor yaw to the right, the pilot recalled that only a small amount of rudder input was required to counter the adverse yaw once the autopilot was disconnected. Without any sign of rough running or engine surging, they advised that had they not seen the annunciator light, they would not have thought there was a problem. Over the next few minutes, the pilot attempted to troubleshoot and diagnose the problem with the right engine. Immediately following power loss, the pilot reported they:
• switched on both emergency fuel boost pumps
• advanced both mixture levers to RICH
• cycled the throttle to full throttle and then returned it to its previous setting without fully closing the throttle
• moved the right fuel selector from main tank to auxiliary
• disconnected the autopilot and retrimmed the aircraft. This did not alter the abnormal operation of the right engine, and the pilot conducted the engine roughness checklist from the aircraft pilot’s operating handbook noting the following:
• oil temperature, oil pressure, and cylinder head temperature indicated normally
• manifold absolute pressure (MAP) had decreased from 31 in Hg to 27 inHg
• exhaust gas temperature (EGT) indicated in the green range
• fuel flow indicated zero.
With no indication of mechanical failure, the pilot advised they could not rule out the possibility of fuel contamination and chose not to reselect the main tank for the remainder of the flight. After considering the aircraft’s performance, handling characteristics and engine instrument indications, the pilot assessed that the right engine, while not able to generate normal power, was still producing some power and that this would assist in reaching Archerfield. Based on the partial power loss diagnosis, the pilot decided not to shut down and secure the engine which would have included feathering the propeller. At 0556, at about 20 NM south of Archerfield at approximately 3,300 ft, the pilot advised air traffic control (ATC) that they had experienced an engine malfunction and requested to maintain altitude. With maximum power being set on the fully operating left engine, the aircraft was unable to maintain height and was descending at about 100 ft/min. Even though the aircraft was unable to maintain height, the pilot calculated that the aircraft should have been able to make it to Archerfield and did not declare an emergency at that time. At 0602, about 12 minutes after the power loss on the right engine, the left engine began to run rough and the pilot observed the left low fuel flow warning light illuminate on the annunciator panel. This was followed by severe rough running and surging from the left engine which produced a series of pronounced yawing movements. The pilot did not run through the checklist a second time for the left engine, reporting that they completed the remaining item on the checklist for the left engine by switching the left engine’s fuel supply to the auxiliary tank. The pilot once again elected not to change tank selections back to mains. With both engines malfunctioning and both propellers unfeathered, the rate of descent increased to about 1,500 ft/min. The pilot advised that following the second power loss, it was clear that the aircraft would not be able to make it to Archerfield and their attention shifted from troubleshooting and performance management to finding somewhere to conduct a forced landing. ADS-B data showed the aircraft was at about 1,600 ft when the left engine malfunctioned. The pilot stated that they aimed to stay above the minimum control speed, which for VH-HJE was 72 kt. The aircraft was manoeuvred during the brief search), during which time the ground speed fluctuated from 110 kt to a low of 75 kt. It was calculated that in the prevailing wind, this would have provided an approximate indicated airspeed of 71 kt; equal to the aircraft’s clean configuration stall speed. The pilot declared an emergency and advised ATC that they were unable to make Archerfield Airport and would be conducting an off-airport forced landing. With very limited suitable landing areas available, the pilot elected to leave the flaps and gear retracted to minimize drag to ensure they would be able to make the selected landing area. At about 0605, the aircraft touched down in a rail corridor beside the railway line, and the aircraft’s left wing struck a wire fence. The aircraft hit several trees, sustaining substantial damage to the fuselage and wings. The pilot received only minor injuries in the accident and was able to exit through the rear door of the aircraft.
Probable cause:
The following contributing factors were identified:
- It is likely that the pilot did not action the checklist items relating to the selection of main fuel tanks for descent. The fuel supply in the auxiliary tanks was subsequently consumed resulting in fuel starvation and loss of power from the right then left engine.
- Following the loss of power to the right engine, the pilot misinterpreted the engine instrument indications as a partial power loss and carried out the rough running checklist but did not select the main tanks that contained substantial fuel to restore engine power, or feather the propeller. This reduced the available performance resulting in the aircraft being unable to maintain altitude.
- When the left engine started to surge and run rough, the pilot did not switch to the main tank that contained substantial fuel, necessitating an off‑airport forced landing.
- It is likely that the pilot was experiencing a level of fatigue shown to have an effect on performance.
- As the pilot was maneuvering for the forced landing there was a significant reduction of airspeed. This reduced the margin over the stall speed and increased the risk of loss of control.
- Operator guidance material provided different fuel flow figures in the fuel policy and flight crew operating manual for the PA-31 aircraft type.
- The operator’s fuel monitoring practices did not detect higher fuel burns than what was specified in fuel planning data.
- The forced landing site selected minimized the risk of damage and injury to those on the ground and the controlled touchdown maximized the chances of survivability.
Final Report:

Crash of a Britten-Norman BN-2A-21 Islander on Moa Island

Date & Time: Oct 3, 2022 at 1338 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
VH-WQA
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Saibai Island - Horn Island
MSN:
494
YOM:
1975
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
6
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
2400
Captain / Total hours on type:
250.00
Aircraft flight hours:
14081
Circumstances:
On the afternoon of 3 October 2022, a Pilatus Britten-Norman Islander BN2A-21, registered VHWQA and operated by Torres Strait Air, was conducting a non-scheduled passenger air transport flight from Saibai Island Airport, Queensland (QLD) to Horn Island Airport, QLD. There was 1 pilot and 6 passengers (students) on board. About 19 km NE of Moa Island both engines began to surge. The pilot diverted towards Kubin Airport on Moa Island. As the aircraft passed to the south of the township of Saint Pauls, the pilot determined there was insufficient altitude remaining to reach the airport. As a result, the pilot conducted a forced landing on a road 7 km ENE of Kubin Airport. There were no reported injuries to the pilot or the passengers. The aircraft was substantially damaged.
Probable cause:
The ATSB found that the dual engine speed fluctuations and associated power loss was probably the result of fuel starvation. The mechanism was not conclusively determined, however it was identified that the pilot did not operate the aircraft's fuel system in accordance with the aircraft flight manual, and that the configuration and location of the aircraft’s fuel controls and tank quantity gauges were probably not conducive to rapid and accurate interpretation. The aircraft manufacturer released a service letter in June 2022 that detailed an optional modification to centralize the fuel system controls and gauges, however this modification was not fitted to VH-WQA. The ATSB considered that these factors increased the risk of inadvertent fuel tank selection.
Final Report:

Crash of a Cessna 404 Titan in Lockhart River: 5 killed

Date & Time: Mar 11, 2020 at 0919 LT
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
VH-OZO
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Cairns – Lockhart River
MSN:
404-0653
YOM:
1980
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
4
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
5
Captain / Total flying hours:
3220
Captain / Total hours on type:
399.00
Circumstances:
On 11 March 2020, a Cessna 404 aircraft, registered VH-OZO, was being operated by Air Connect Australia to conduct a passenger charter flight from Cairns to Lockhart River, Queensland. On board were the pilot and 4 passengers, and the flight was being conducted under the instrument flight rules (IFR). Consistent with the forecast, there were areas of cloud and rain that significantly reduced visibility at Lockhart River Airport. On descent, the pilot obtained the latest weather information from the airport’s automated weather information system (AWIS) and soon after commenced an area navigation (RNAV) global satellite system (GNSS) instrument approach to runway 30. The pilot conducted the first approach consistent with the recommended (3°) constant descent profile, and the aircraft kept descending through the minimum descent altitude (MDA) of 730 ft and passed the missed approach point (MAPt). At about 400 ft, the pilot commenced a missed approach. After conducting the missed approach, the pilot immediately commenced a second RNAV GNSS approach to runway 30. During this approach, the pilot commenced descent from 3,500 ft about 2.7 NM prior to the intermediate fix (or 12.7 NM prior to the MAPt). The descent was flown at about a normal 3° flight path, although about 1,000 ft below the recommended descent profile. While continuing on this descent profile, the aircraft descended below the MDA. It then kept descending until it collided with terrain 6.4 km (3.5 NM) short of the runway. The pilot and 4 passengers were fatally injured, and the aircraft was destroyed.
Probable cause:
The accident was the consequence of a controlled flight into terrain.
The following contributing factors were identified:
• While the pilot was operating in the vicinity of Lockhart River Airport, there were areas of cloud and rain that significantly reduced visibility and increased the risk of controlled flight into terrain.
In particular, the aircraft probably entered areas of significantly reduced visibility during the second approach.
• After an area navigation (RNAV) global satellite system (GNSS) approach to runway 30 and missed approach, the pilot immediately conducted another approach to the same runway that was on a similar gradient to the recommended descent profile but displaced about 1,000 ft below that profile. While continuing on this descent profile, the aircraft descended below a segment minimum safe altitude and the minimum descent altitude, then kept descending until the collision with terrain about 6 km before the runway threshold.
• Although the exact reasons for the aircraft being significantly below the recommended descent profile and the continued descent below the minimum descent altitude could not be determined, it was evident that the pilot did not effectively monitor the aircraft’s altitude and descent rate for an extended period.
• When passing the final approach fix (FAF), the aircraft’s lateral position was at about full-scale deflection on the course deviation indicator (CDI), and it then exceeded full-scale deflection for
an extended period. In accordance with the operator’s stabilized approach procedures, a missed approach should have been conducted if the aircraft exceeded half full-scale deflection at the FAF, however a missed approach was not conducted.
• The pilot was probably experiencing a very high workload during periods of the second approach. In addition to the normal high workload associated with a single pilot hand flying an approach in instrument meteorological conditions, the pilot’s workload was elevated due to conducting an immediate entry into the second approach, conducting the approach in a different manner to their normal method, the need to correct lateral tracking deviations throughout the approach, and higher than appropriate speeds in the final approach segment.
• The aircraft was not fitted with a terrain avoidance and warning system (TAWS). Such a system would have provided visual and aural alerts to the pilot of the approaching terrain for an extended period, reducing the risk of controlled flight into terrain.
• Although the aircraft was fitted with a GPS/navigational system suitable for an area navigation (RNAV) global satellite system (GNSS) approach and other non-precision approaches, it was not fitted with a system that provided vertical guidance information, which would have explicitly indicated that the aircraft was well below the recommended descent profile. Although the operator had specified a flight profile for a straight-in approaches and stabilized approach criteria in its operations manual, and encouraged the use of stabilized approaches, there were limitations with the design of these procedures. In addition, there were limitations with other risk controls for minimizing the risk of controlled flight into terrain (CFIT), including no procedures or guidance for the use of the terrain awareness function on the aircraft’s GNS 430W GPS/navigational units and limited monitoring of the conduct of line operations.

Other factors that increased risk:
• Although an applicable height of 1,000 ft for stabilized approach criteria in instrument meteorological conditions has been widely recommended by organizations such as the International Civil Aviation Organization for over 20 years, the Civil Aviation Safety Authority had not provided formal guidance information to Australian operators regarding the content of stabilized approach criteria. (Safety issue)
• The Australian requirements for installing a terrain avoidance and warning system (TAWS) were less than those of other comparable countries for some types of small aeroplanes conducting air transport operations, and the requirements were not consistent with International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) standards and recommended practices. More specifically, although there was a TAWS requirement in Australia for turbine-engine aeroplanes carrying 10 or more passengers under the instrument flight rules:
- There was no requirement for piston-engine aeroplanes to be fitted with a TAWS, even though this was an ICAO standard for such aeroplanes authorized to carry 10 or more passengers, and this standard had been adopted as a requirement in many comparable countries.
- There was no requirement for turbine-engine aeroplanes authorized to carry 6–9 passengers to be fitted with a TAWS, even though this had been an ICAO recommended practice since 2007, and this recommended practice had been adopted as a requirement in many comparable countries. (Safety Issue)

Other findings:
• The forecast weather at Lockhart River for the time of the aircraft’s arrival required the pilot to plan for 60 minutes holding or diversion to an alternate aerodrome. The aircraft had sufficient fuel for that purpose; and the aircraft had sufficient fuel to conduct the flight from Cairns to Lockhart River and return, with additional fuel for holding on both sectors if required.
• There was no evidence of any organizational or commercial pressure to conduct the flight to Lockhart River or to complete the flight once to commenced.
• Based on the available evidence, it is very unlikely that the pilot was incapacitated or impaired during the flight.
• There was no evidence of any aircraft system or mechanical anomalies that would have directly influenced the accident. However, as a consequence of extensive aircraft damage, it was not possible to be conclusive about the aircraft’s serviceability.
• The aircraft was fitted with Garmin GNS 430W GPS/navigational units that could be configured to provide visual (but not aural) terrain alerts. However, it could not be determined whether the
terrain awareness function was selected on during the accident flight.
Final Report:

Crash of an Angel Aircraft Corporation Model 44 Angel in Mareeba: 2 killed

Date & Time: Dec 14, 2019 at 1115 LT
Registration:
VH-IAZ
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Mareeba - Mareeba
MSN:
004
YOM:
2008
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
1
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
2
Captain / Total flying hours:
20000
Captain / Total hours on type:
300.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
5029
Copilot / Total hours on type:
0
Aircraft flight hours:
1803
Circumstances:
On 14 December 2019, at 1046 Eastern Standard Time, an Angel Aircraft Corporation Model 44 aircraft, registered VH-IAZ, commenced taxiing at Mareeba Airport, Queensland. On board the aircraft were two pilots. The pilot in the left seat (‘the pilot’) owned the aircraft and was undertaking a flight review, which was being conducted by the Grade 1 flight instructor in the right seat (‘the instructor’). The planned flight was to operate in the local area, as a private flight and under visual flight rules. As the aircraft taxied towards the runway intersection, the pilot broadcast on the common traffic advisory frequency (CTAF) that VH-IAZ was taxiing for runway 28. The pilot made another broadcast when entering and backtracking the runway, then at 1058, broadcast that the aircraft had commenced the take-off roll. Witnesses who heard the aircraft during the take-off reported that it sounded like one of the engines was hesitating and misfiring. An aircraft maintainer who observed the aircraft take off, reported seeing black sooty smoke trailing from the right engine. The maintainer then watched the aircraft climb slowly and turn right towards the north. Another witness who heard the aircraft in flight soon afterwards, reported that it sounded normal for that aircraft, which had a distinctive sound because the engines’ exhaust gases pass through the propellers. Once airborne, the pilot broadcast that they were ‘making a low-level right-hand turn and then climbing up to not above 4,500 [feet] for the south-west training area.’ About 2 minutes later, the instructor broadcast that they were just to the west of the airfield in the training area at 2,500 ft and on climb to 4,000 ft, and communicated with a helicopter pilot operating in the area. After 8 minutes in the training area, the pilot broadcast that they were inbound to the aerodrome. At 1112, the aircraft’s final transmission was broadcast by the pilot, advising that they were joining the crosswind circuit leg for runway 28. Witnesses then saw the aircraft touch down on the runway and continue to take off again, consistent with a ‘touch-and-go’ manoeuvre, and heard one engine ‘splutter’ as the aircraft climbed to an estimated 100–150 ft above ground level. At about 1115, the aircraft was observed overhead a banana plantation beyond the end of the runway, banked to the right in a descending turn, before it suddenly rolled right. Witnesses observed the right wing drop to near vertical and the aircraft impacted terrain in a cornfield. Both pilots were fatally injured and the aircraft was destroyed.
Probable cause:
Contributing factors:
• The flight instructor very likely conducted a simulated engine failure after take-off in environmental conditions and a configuration in which the aircraft was unable to maintain altitude with one engine inoperative.
• Having not acted quickly to restore power to the simulated inoperative engine, the pilots did not reduce power and land ahead (in accordance with the Airplane Flight Manual procedure) before the combination of low airspeed and bank angle resulted in a loss of directional control at a height too low to recover.
• The instructor had very limited experience with the aircraft type, and with limited preparation for the flight, was likely unaware of the landing gear and flap retraction time and the extent of their influence on performance with one engine inoperative.

Other factors that increased risk:
• The pilot had not flown for 3 years prior to the accident flight, which likely resulted in a decay in skills at managing tasks such as an engine failure after take-off and in decision-making ability. The absence of flying practice before the flight review probably affected the pilot’s ability to manage the asymmetric low-level flight.
• The aircraft had not been flown for more than 2 years and had not been stored in accordance with the airframe and engine manufacturers’ recommendations. This very likely resulted in some of the right engine cylinders running with excessive fuel to air ratio for complete combustion and may also have reduced the expected service life of both engines’ components.
• The right-side altimeter was probably set to an incorrect barometric pressure, resulting in it over-reading the aircraft’s altitude by about 90 ft.
Final Report:

Crash of a Cessna 208 Caravan I in Whitsunday Island

Date & Time: Jan 28, 2016 at 1518 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
VH-WTY
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Hamilton Island - Whitsunday Island
MSN:
208-0522
YOM:
2010
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
10
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
1350
Captain / Total hours on type:
230.00
Aircraft flight hours:
1510
Circumstances:
On 28 January 2016 the pilot of a Cessna Aircraft Company Caravan 208 amphibian aircraft, registered VH-WTY (WTY) was conducting a series of charter flights in the Whitsunday region of Queensland. The pilot was conducting his third flight of the day when the aircraft departed Hamilton Island Airport at about 1415 Eastern Standard Time with 10 passengers on board. The tour included a scenic flight over the Great Barrier Reef for about 50 minutes before heading to Chance Bay, on the south-east tip of Whitsunday Island, about 11 km north east of Hamilton Island Airport. Following a water landing at Chance Bay, the group was to spend 90 minutes at the beach before a short flight back to Hamilton Island. The tour was originally planned to include a landing at Whitehaven Beach, however wind conditions at the time required the water landing be altered to Chance Bay. Radar surveillance data showed WTY approach Whitsunday Island from the north and conduct an orbit about 2 km north of Whitehaven Beach at about 1510, before heading toward Whitehaven Beach. WTY flew over the southern end of Whitehaven Beach and the strip of land that separates it from Chance Bay. At about 1515, after crossing Chance Bay beach in a southerly direction, WTY descended below radar surveillance for the remainder of the flight. The pilot advised that he flew WTY over the western end of Chance Bay’s main beach in order to conduct a visual pre-landing check of the bay. The pilot noted the positions of various vessels moored in the bay to determine the best taxi path to the beach. During this fly-over, the pilot also noted the sea state and observed evidence of wind gusts on the water surface. The pilot then initiated a right downwind turn toward the landing area. The approach was from the south with the intent to land in the most suitable location within the designated landing area and then taxi to the beach. The pilot reported setting up for landing at about 50 ft above the water and then delayed the landing in order to fly through an observed wind gust. Passenger video footage indicated that, during the subsequent landing, WTY bounced three times on the surface of the water. After the second bounce, with WTY getting closer to the beach and terrain, the pilot increased engine power and initiated a go-around. The third bounce, which occurred almost immediately after the second, was the most pronounced and resulted in the aircraft rebounding about 30 to 50 ft above the water. While increasing power, the pilot perceived that the torque was indicating red, suggesting an over-torque for the selected propeller configuration. Noticing that the climb performance was less than expected with the flaps at 30˚, the pilot stopped increasing power and reduced the flap to 20˚. As the aircraft climbed straight ahead towards a saddle, climb performance was still below the pilot’s expectations and he assessed that WTY would not clear the terrain. In response, the pilot turned right to avoid the surrounding rising terrain. WTY clipped trees during this turn, before colliding with terrain and coming to rest in dense scrub about 150 m from the eastern end of the main beach, near the top of the ridge. The pilot promptly advised the passengers to exit and move away from the aircraft. Some of the 11 people on board suffered minor injuries but all were able to quickly leave the aircraft. There was no post-impact fire. The aircraft’s fixed emergency beacon self-activated during the collision with terrain and was detected by the Australian Maritime Safety Authority (AMSA), resulting in a search and rescue response being initiated by the Joint Rescue Coordination Centre (JRCC) Australia. The pilot reported also activating his personal locator beacon, however this was not detected by AMSA. In addition, the pilot used the company satellite phone to advise the operator of the occurrence and current status of all on board. At about the same time, several witnesses who were located in Chance Bay made their way to the aircraft before assisting everyone down to the beach. A tourist boat was utilized to transfer the pilot and passengers to Hamilton Island, arriving at about 1600. From there, one passenger was transferred by helicopter to Mackay for further treatment.
Probable cause:
From the evidence available, the following findings are made with respect to the collision with terrain involving amphibian Cessna Aircraft Company C208 Caravan aircraft, registered VH-WTY that occurred at Chance Bay, 11 km north-east of Hamilton Island airport, Queensland, on 28 January 2016. These findings should not be read as apportioning blame or liability to any particular organisation or individual.
Contributing factors:
- The aircraft's initial touches with water were past the nominated decision point and beyond the northern boundary of the ALA, which reduced the safety margins available for a successful water landing or go-around.
- The pilot initiated a go-around without using all available power and the optimal speed, turned towards higher terrain and placed the aircraft in a down-wind situation, which ultimately resulted in the collision with terrain.
Other findings:
- The aircraft was equipped with lap-sash seatbelts, which have been demonstrated to reduce injury, and the use of emergency beacons and satellite phone facilitated a timely response to the accident.
Final Report:

Crash of a Rockwell 500U Shrike Commander in Badu Island

Date & Time: Mar 8, 2015 at 1230 LT
Operator:
Registration:
VH-WZV
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Badu Island - Horn Island
MSN:
500-1656-11
YOM:
1966
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
5
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
On 8 March 2015, the pilot of an Aero Commander 500 aircraft, registered VH-WZV, prepared to conduct a charter flight from Badu Island to Horn Island, Queensland, with five passengers. The aircraft had been refuelled earlier that day at Horn Island, where the pilot conducted fuel drains with no contaminants found. He had operated the aircraft for about 2 hours prior to landing at Badu Island with no abnormal performance or indications. At about 1330 Eastern Standard Time (EST), the pilot started the engines and conducted the standard checks with all indications normal, obtained the relevant clearances from air traffic control, and taxied for a departure from runway 30. As the pilot lined the aircraft up on the runway centreline at the threshold, he performed a pre-take-off safety self-brief and conducted the pre-takeoff checks. He then applied full power, released the brakes and commenced the take-off run. All engine indications were normal during the taxi and commencement of the take-off run. When the airspeed had increased to about 80 kt, the pilot commenced rotation and the nose and main landing gear lifted off the runway. Just as the main landing gear lifted off, the pilot detected a significant loss of power from the left engine. The aircraft yawed to the left, which the pilot counteracted with right rudder. He heard the left engine noise decrease noticeably and the aircraft dropped back onto the runway. The pilot immediately rejected the take-off; reduced the power to idle, and used rudder and brakes to maintain the runway centreline. The pilot initially assessed that there was sufficient runway remaining to stop on but, due to the wet runway surface, the aircraft did not decelerate as quickly as expected and he anticipated that the aircraft would overrun the runway. As there was a steep slope and trees beyond the end of the runway, he steered the aircraft to the right towards more open and level ground. The aircraft departed the runway to the right, collided with a fence and a bush resulting in substantial damage. The pilot and passengers were not injured.
Final Report:

Crash of a De Havilland DH.84 Dragon near Borumba Dam: 6 killed

Date & Time: Oct 1, 2012 at 1413 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
VH-UXG
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Monto - Caboolture
MSN:
6077
YOM:
1934
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
5
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
6
Captain / Total flying hours:
1134
Captain / Total hours on type:
662.00
Circumstances:
At about 1107 Eastern Standard Time on 01OCT2012, a de Havilland Aircraft Pty Ltd DH-84 Dragon, registered VH-UXG (UXG), took off from Monto on a private flight to Caboolture, Queensland under the visual flight rules (VFR). On board the aircraft were the pilot/owner and five passengers. The weather conditions on departure were reported to include a light south-easterly wind with a high overcast and good visibility. Sometime after about 1230, the aircraft was seen near Tansey, about 150 km north-west of Caboolture on the direct track from Monto to Caboolture. The aircraft was reported flying in a south-easterly direction at the time, at an estimated height of 3,000 ft and in fine but overcast conditions. At 1315, the pilot contacted Brisbane Radar air traffic control (ATC) and advised that the aircraft’s position was about 37 NM (69 km) north of Caboolture and requested navigation assistance. At 1318, the pilot advised ATC that the aircraft was in ‘full cloud’. For most of the remainder of the flight, the pilot and ATC exchanged communications, at times relayed through a commercial flight and a rescue flight in the area due to the limited ATC radio coverage in the area at low altitude. At about 1320, a friend of one of the aircraft’s passengers received a telephone call from the passenger to say that she was in an aircraft and that they were ‘lost in a cloud’ and kept losing altitude. Witnesses in the Borumba Dam, Imbil and Kandanga areas 70 to 80 km north-north-west of Caboolture later reported that they heard and briefly saw the aircraft flying in and out of low cloud between about 1315 and 1415. At 1348, the pilot advised ATC that the aircraft had about an hour’s endurance remaining. The pilot’s last recorded transmission was at 1404. A search for the aircraft was coordinated by Australian Search and Rescue (AusSAR). The aircraft wreckage was located on 3 October 2012, about 87 km north-west of Caboolture on the northern side of a steep, densely wooded ridge about 500 m above mean sea level. The Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) later determined that the aircraft probably impacted terrain at about 1421 on 01OCT2012. Preliminary analysis indicated that the aircraft collided with trees and terrain at a moderate to high speed, with a left angle of bank. The aircraft’s direction of travel at impact was toward the south-south-west.
Probable cause:
From the evidence available, the following findings are made with respect to the visual flight rules into instrument meteorological conditions accident involving de Havilland Aircraft Pty Ltd DH-84 Dragon, registered VH-UXG, that occurred 36 km south-west of Gympie, Queensland, on 1 October 2012. These findings should not be read as apportioning blame or liability to any particular organisation or individual. Safety issues, or system problems, are highlighted in bold to emphasize their importance. A safety issue is an event or condition that increases safety risk and (a) can reasonably be regarded as having the potential to adversely affect the safety of future operations, and (b) is a characteristic of an organisation or a system, rather than a characteristic of a specific individual, or characteristic of an operating environment at a specific point in time.
Contributing factors:
- The pilot unintentionally entered instrument meteorological conditions and was unable to reattain and maintain visual conditions.
- It is likely that the pilot became spatially disoriented and lost control due to a combination of factors such as the absence of a visible horizon, cumulative workload, stress and/or distraction.
Other factors that increased risk:
- Though it probably did not have a significant bearing on the event, the aircraft was almost certainly above its maximum take-off weight (MTOW) on take-off, and around the MTOW at the time of the accident.
- Though airborne search and rescue service providers were regularly tasked to provide assistance to pilots in distress, there was limited specific guidance on the conduct of such assistance. Other findings:
- The aircraft wreckage was not located for 2 days as the search was hindered by difficult local weather conditions and terrain, and the cessation of the aircraft’s emergency beacon due to impact damage.
Final Report: