Takeoff (climb)

After takeoff from El Obeid Airport, the aircraft stalled and crashed by the runway, bursting into flames. All 16 occupants were rescued and the aircraft was destroyed by fire. It was en route to Wau, carrying foods.

The crew was completing a local training mission at Nakhon Ratchasima AFB. After takeoff, in unknown circumstances, the single engine aircraft crashed in Nong Phai Lom, near the airport. Both pilots were killed.

Shortly after takeoff from San José-Tobías Bolaños Airport, while climbing, the aircraft suffered an engine failure and stalled. It crashed in a field, bursting into flames. A passenger was killed while four other occupants were injured. The aircraft was totally destroyed by a post crash fire.

On February 15, 1996, about 0554 universal time, a Piper PA-46, N2514Q (serial number 46-8508098), registered to a partnership in Canby, Oregon, crashed near Kitwe, Zambia. The airplane was destroyed and all five persons on the airplane were fatally injured. The weather conditions at the accident site are unknown. It is not known if a flight plan had been filed for the flight.

On February 12, 1996, about 1201 eastern standard time, a Rockwell Australian Nomad N24A, N224E, registered to Four Eagles Aviation Inc., operated by Haiti Express Airways, crashed on takeoff from Port-Au-Prince International Airport, Port-Au-Prince, Haiti. The flight was a scheduled domestic passenger flight bound for Cap-Haïten, Haiti. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed and an IFR flight plan was filed. The airplane was destroyed. The airline transport pilot-in-command, airline transport second-in-command, and nine passengers were fatally injured. Four passengers sustained serious injuries. The flight was originating at the time of the accident. The DGAC stated the airplane was on takeoff from runway 27. The airplane appeared to lose power on the right engine and the pilot made a forced landing northwest of runway 27. On touchdown the airplane nosed over and was consumed by a post crash fire.

The aircraft was engaged on a charter flight for the BHP Cannington mine, and departed from Townsville at 0630 EST. The flight was uneventful and the aircraft landed at Cannington at 0840. The aircraft was refuelled and at about 0945 seven passengers and baggage were loaded. The aircraft was started and taxied for runway 36. During this time the necessary checks were completed. The takeoff was commenced, and after the aircraft became airborne and was accelerating with a positive rate of climb, the landing gear was selected up. While the gear was still in transit, there was a sudden power loss from the left engine. The pilot described a simultaneous height loss, roll, pitch, and yaw accompanied by a sound similar to a buzz saw from the left engine. The pilot immediately recognised that the left engine had failed and attempted to maintain speed and directional control. Power was reduced on the right engine to maintain directional control, and it was the pilot's intention to land the aircraft with gear retracted beyond the end of the runway. However, the left wingtip struck a steel fence post, and this spun the aircraft to the left. The aircraft struck a low earth bank while travelling sideways and rearwards. When the aircraft came to rest, all windows were obscured and the pilot believed the aircraft was on fire. The pilot tried unsuccessfully to open the main cabin door, and the passengers were then evacuated through the emergency exit.

On behalf of Alas Nacionales, the aircraft was completing a charter flight from Puerto Plata to Frankfurt with intermediate stops in Gander and Berlin, carrying 176 Germans and 13 Turkish crew members. During the takeoff roll, at a speed of 80 knots, the captain noted that his air speed indicator (ASI) seemed to be incorrect while the copilot's ASI seemed to be correct. During initial climb, at an altitude of about 4,700 feet, the captain's ASI read 350 knots while the real speed was 220 knots. This resulted in an autopilot/autothrottle reaction to increase the pitch-up attitude and a power reduction in order to lower the airspeed. At that time the crew got 'Rudder ratio' and 'Mach airspeed' advisory warnings. Both pilots got confused when the copilot stated that his ASI read 200 knots decreasing while getting an excessive speed warning, followed by a stick shaker warning. This led the pilots to believe that both ASIs were unreliable. Finally realizing that they were losing speed and altitude they disconnected the autopilot. The autopilot, fed by the captain's faulty ASI, had reduced the speed close to the stall speed. Full thrust was then applied. At 23:47:17 an aural GPWS warning sounded and eight seconds later, the aircraft crashed in the ocean. All 189 occupants were killed.

Witnesses observed the aircraft departing from runway 14 with a rolling start. They said the aircraft rotated at the departure end of the runway and remained in ground effect with an excessive, nose high attitude. It then struck the airport perimeter fence, a barrier wall, and power lines. Power line wires were dragged through a residential area, resulting in additional damage. The airplane then crashed in a pasture and burned. Investigation revealed the airplane had been loaded to a gross weight (GW) of 50,870 lbs. Its maximum GW was limited to 48,000 lbs at sea level with the use of antidetonation injection (ADI) fluid and 40,900 lbs without ADI. Density altitude at the airport was 6200 feet. For conditions at the airport, maximum GW for takeoff with ADI and 15° of flaps was 43,205 lbs; without ADI and with 13 degrees of flaps, maximum GW was 38,909 lbs. The airplane flaps were found in the retracted position, but there was no performance data for takeoff with the flaps retracted. No ADI fluid was found in the line to the right engine, although it was intact; the ADI tank was destroyed; the ADI line to the left engine was damaged. The airplane was being flown under provision of a ferry permit, which did not provide for the cargo or the two passengers that were aboard. The first pilot (PIC) had accrued about 8 hours of flight experience in the make and model of airplane.

The aircraft was completing a positioning flight from Asunción to Campinas on behalf of Alas Paraguayas, under flight number ALA028. As there was no cargo on board, the crew decided to make profit of the situation to perform training upon takeoff. During the takeoff roll on runway 02, at Vr speed, the captain reduced the power on engine n°1 and after liftoff, he reduced power on engine n°2. With the undercarriage still down and the flaps at 15°, the aircraft became unstable, lost height and crashed in the district of Mariano Roque Alonso, about 1,500 metres past the runway end. The aircraft was destroyed by impact forces and a post crash fire and all four occupants were killed as well as 18 people on ground, most of them children taking part to a volleyball game.

The aircraft departed at night from runway 4R on a flight to transport mail. The pilot-in-command (PIC) was in the left seat, a pilot-rated cargo loader was in the right seat, and another cargo loader was aboard the aircraft, but was not in a seat. During takeoff, the aircraft entered a turn and flew into gradually rising terrain. The initial impact point was about 15 feet higher than the runway elevation and about 0.3 miles abeam the departure end of the runway. Investigation revealed that the company allowed pilot-rated cargo loaders to fly the aircraft from the right seat during positioning and ferry flight segments (to build multiengine flight time) as part of their compensation. There was evidence that at the time of the accident, the aircraft was being piloted on this flight from the copilot's position. The right side of the instrument panel was equipped with only EGT gauges (no flight instruments on the copilot's side). There were cloud layers in the vicinity, no moon illumination, and no visible ground lighting in the direction of flight. No preimpact mechanical malfunction or failure was identified during the investigation. Except at the pilot and copilot positions, the airplane had no other seat and/or restraint system. The operator stated that the pilot was not authorized to carry company personnel or passengers without the required seating.