Country
Crash of an Antonov AN-26-100 in Utrenniy
Date & Time:
Jun 14, 2024 at 1340 LT
Operator:
Registration:
RA-26662
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Sabetta - Utrenniy
MSN:
81 01
YOM:
1979
Flight number:
UT9706
Crew on board:
5
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
36
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
On final approach to Utrenniy Airport in marginal weather conditions, the airplane impacted the ground and crash landed about one km from the airport. All 41 occupants were rescued and transported to the airport terminal, among them three were injured including both pilots. The airplane was completing a special service from Sabetta.
Crash of an Antonov AN-26 in Yida
Date & Time:
Mar 19, 2024 at 0748 LT
Registration:
AVIONS-401
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Juba - Yida
Crew on board:
4
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
3
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
The airplane departed Juba Airport at 0618LT on a flight to Yida on behalf of the South Sudan Air Force (aka SSPDF-South Sudan People’s Defense Forces) with three passengers and a crew of four on board. The approach to Yida Airfield was initiated in limited visibility due to haze and fog. Upon landing on a dirt runway, the airplane suffered an apparent collapse of the left main gear, went out of control and came to rest, bursting into flames. All seven occupants were rescued, among them three were slightly injured. The airplane was totally destroyed by fire.
Crash of an Antonov AN-26B-100 in Mykhailivka: 1 killed
Date & Time:
Apr 22, 2022 at 0900 LT
Operator:
Registration:
UR-UZB
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Zaporozhie - Zaporozhie
MSN:
113 05
YOM:
1981
Crew on board:
3
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
1
Circumstances:
The crew departed Zaporozhie Airport on a local test flight according to local authorities, carrying three crew members. While flying at low height, the airplane collided with power line and crashed in an open field located in Mykhailivka, some 11 km northwest of the airport. A crew member was killed and two others were injured. The aircraft was destroyed.
Crash of an Antonov AN-26 in Ostrogozhsk
Date & Time:
Feb 24, 2022
Operator:
Registration:
RF-36074
Survivors:
No
MSN:
75 10
YOM:
1979
Crew on board:
0
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
The aircraft crashed in unknown circumstances in a snow covered field located in Ostrogozhsk. Russian Authorities reported that all occupants were killed.
Crash of an Antonov AN-26 in Zhukivtsi: 5 killed
Date & Time:
Feb 24, 2022
Operator:
Registration:
59 blue
Survivors:
Yes
MSN:
50-03
YOM:
1977
Crew on board:
14
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
5
Circumstances:
The aircraft crashed in an open field located in Zhukivtsi, about 30 km south of Kiev-Borispol Airport. It is believed there were 14 people on board and that five of them were killed. Maybe the aircraft was shot down by Russian Forces that entered Ukraine territory few hours earlier.
Crash of an Antonov AN-26 in Juba: 5 killed
Date & Time:
Nov 2, 2021 at 1237 LT
Operator:
Registration:
TR-NGT
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Juba - Maban
Crew on board:
5
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
5
Circumstances:
The airplane departed Juba Airport Runway 13 at 1233LT on a cargo flight to Maban, carrying five crew members and a load consisting of 28 drums of diesel. Three minutes after takeoff, while climbing, the crew declared an emergency. One minute later, the entered an uncontrolled descent and crashed less than 2 km past the runway end, bursting into flames. The aircraft was destroyed and all five occupants were killed. Registration and MSN to be confirmed. It is believed that the aircraft was operated on behalf of Euro Airlines.
Crash of an Antonov AN-26KPA near Khabarovsk: 6 killed
Date & Time:
Sep 22, 2021 at 1811 LT
Operator:
Registration:
RA-26673
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Khabarovsk - Khabarovsk
MSN:
84 08
YOM:
1979
Crew on board:
6
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
6
Captain / Total hours on type:
3276.00
Copilot / Total hours on type:
390
Aircraft flight hours:
36881
Circumstances:
The airplane was engaged in a calibration mission at Khabarovsk-Novy Airport, carrying six crew members. The goal of the flight was to caliber the ILS system of runway 05R. In the afternoon, the airplane departed Khabarovsk-Novy Airport and completed several circuits over the aerodrome and the area. The crew was instructed to climb away from the airport to an altitude of 600 metres and to turn to follow the reverse approach course. However, the minimum published altitude for that sector up to a distance of 46 km was fixed to 1,200 metres. The crew continued at an altitude of 600 metres with a heading of 220° for few minutes. While initiating a slight climb and while flying at an altitude of 742 metres in poor visibility due to marginal weather conditions, the airplane impacted trees and crashed on the wooded slope of Mt Khrebtovaya (793 metres high) located in the Bolchoï Khekhtsir Mountain Range, some 40 km southwest of Khabarovsk Airport. The aircraft was totally destroyed by impact forces and all six occupants were killed.
Probable cause:
The cause of the accident was that the airplane was flying over the radio beacons of runway 05R of Khabarovsk-Novy) Airport in instrumental meteorological conditions (IMC) at an altitude of 600 metres QFE, which was significantly lower than the established minimum safe altitude of 1,200 metres QFE in the sector where the accident occurred, which led to a collision with the mountain slope and resulted in a controlled flight into terrain (CFIT).
The following contributing factors were identified:
- Lack of current regulatory documents governing the conduct of flight inspections of ground-based flight support equipment, avionics, and civil aviation lighting equipment systems, including for airfields whose topographical features do not allow inspections to be conducted according to standard procedure;
- Unreasonable establishment of a continuous exclusion zone from 0 m to 6000 m by altitude within a radius of 99900 m from KTA for the function of signaling aircraft descent below the minimum safe altitude (MSAW), which excluded issuing a corresponding warning to a DPC dispatcher;
- Absence of the ATC Dispatcher's Work Procedure at the ATC and other documents of the ATC of EU ATS (Khabarovsk):
- procedure for ATC specialists when flying over the aerodrome's RMS;
- procedure for practical training of ATC specialist performing direct ATC under the control of ATC instructor, including their interaction and responsibility for ensuring flight safety.
- Making a decision to combine two sections of trainee navigator training without the necessary risk analysis and risk mitigation measures;
- Insufficient preliminary preparation of the crew for the overflight, including failure to take into account the terrain features (presence of zones with considerable elevation) and geographical features (proximity to the state border) of the airfield, as well as the presence in the crew of a trainee navigator not admitted to independent flights and to this particular type of work;
- Insufficient cooperation between the crew and ATC specialists when preparing and performing the overflight, including coordination by the crew and ATC specialists during the flight of the maneuver with violation of the established minimum safe altitude when performing a flight under instrumental weather conditions;
- Interference of the instructor navigator in the flight procedure (route change) without assessing the relevant risks in the absence of the pilot's control;
- Failure of the trainee navigator to comply with the operating procedures in terms of comprehensive use of aircraft equipment for precise piloting, maintenance of safe altitudes and timely informing the crew about turns, as well as lack of proper control over his actions on the part of the instructor navigator;
- Lack of control over the aircraft flight by the trainee controller and instructor controller at their minimum workload (controlling only the aircraft which had suffered a crash).
- The Operator's Flight Operations Manual lacked standard operating procedures for crew operation regarding the EGPWS Mark VIII system installed on board the aircraft. There were no warnings of this system during the flight. Probably, the system was not activated by the crew prior to the flight, maybe to avoid frequent activation during the flight. Due to the complete destruction of the system as a result of the crash, it was impossible to determine the cause of its failure. A proper use of this system may have prevent the accident.
The following contributing factors were identified:
- Lack of current regulatory documents governing the conduct of flight inspections of ground-based flight support equipment, avionics, and civil aviation lighting equipment systems, including for airfields whose topographical features do not allow inspections to be conducted according to standard procedure;
- Unreasonable establishment of a continuous exclusion zone from 0 m to 6000 m by altitude within a radius of 99900 m from KTA for the function of signaling aircraft descent below the minimum safe altitude (MSAW), which excluded issuing a corresponding warning to a DPC dispatcher;
- Absence of the ATC Dispatcher's Work Procedure at the ATC and other documents of the ATC of EU ATS (Khabarovsk):
- procedure for ATC specialists when flying over the aerodrome's RMS;
- procedure for practical training of ATC specialist performing direct ATC under the control of ATC instructor, including their interaction and responsibility for ensuring flight safety.
- Making a decision to combine two sections of trainee navigator training without the necessary risk analysis and risk mitigation measures;
- Insufficient preliminary preparation of the crew for the overflight, including failure to take into account the terrain features (presence of zones with considerable elevation) and geographical features (proximity to the state border) of the airfield, as well as the presence in the crew of a trainee navigator not admitted to independent flights and to this particular type of work;
- Insufficient cooperation between the crew and ATC specialists when preparing and performing the overflight, including coordination by the crew and ATC specialists during the flight of the maneuver with violation of the established minimum safe altitude when performing a flight under instrumental weather conditions;
- Interference of the instructor navigator in the flight procedure (route change) without assessing the relevant risks in the absence of the pilot's control;
- Failure of the trainee navigator to comply with the operating procedures in terms of comprehensive use of aircraft equipment for precise piloting, maintenance of safe altitudes and timely informing the crew about turns, as well as lack of proper control over his actions on the part of the instructor navigator;
- Lack of control over the aircraft flight by the trainee controller and instructor controller at their minimum workload (controlling only the aircraft which had suffered a crash).
- The Operator's Flight Operations Manual lacked standard operating procedures for crew operation regarding the EGPWS Mark VIII system installed on board the aircraft. There were no warnings of this system during the flight. Probably, the system was not activated by the crew prior to the flight, maybe to avoid frequent activation during the flight. Due to the complete destruction of the system as a result of the crash, it was impossible to determine the cause of its failure. A proper use of this system may have prevent the accident.
Final Report:
Crash of an Antonov AN-26B-100 in Palana: 28 killed
Date & Time:
Jul 6, 2021 at 1450 LT
Operator:
Registration:
RA-26085
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky – Palana
MSN:
123 10
YOM:
1982
Flight number:
PTK251
Crew on board:
6
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
22
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
28
Captain / Total hours on type:
2885.00
Copilot / Total hours on type:
1091
Aircraft flight hours:
21492
Aircraft flight cycles:
10498
Circumstances:
The aircraft departed Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky Airport at 1257LT on a schedule service (flight PTK251) to Palana, carrying 22 passengers and a crew of six, among them Olga Mokhiriova, chief of the municipality of Palana. At 1439LT, the crew contacted Palana ATC and was cleared to start the descent. While completing an NDB approach to runway 29, the crew encountered marginal weather conditions with fog and ceiling at 300 metres. Too low, the aircraft impacted terrain about 4 km northwest of the airport. The wreckage was found in the evening on the top of a rocky wall. The aircraft disintegrated on impact and debris fall down on the sea bank. All 28 occupants were killed.
Probable cause:
The cause of the An-26B-100 RA-26085 aircraft crash was the crew's violation of the established instrument approach procedure to Palana aerodrome, which was manifested in flying with significant deviation from the set route and descent well below the established minimum descent height (MDH) under weather conditions that excluded stable visual contact with ground landmarks, leading to the collision of the aircraft with a coastal cliff in controlled flight, its destruction, and the death of the crew and passengers.
The following contributing factors were identified:
- The crew's failure to execute a missed approach with the acquisition of the established minimum safety altitude (MSA) when information about the bearing indicated a significant deviation of the aircraft from the established approach procedure;
- The absence in the Palana aerodrome dispatcher's work technology of actions in the presence of information about the bearing indicating a significant deviation of the aircraft from the established approach scheme, as well as the dispatcher's passivity when such information was available;
- The lack of warning signals from the early ground proximity warning system under conditions that should have triggered it. It is not possible to determine the reason for the absence of the warning signals;
- The overestimation of the barometric altimeter readings in the final phase of the flight due to the specific airflow around the steep coastline creating a low-pressure zone and the overestimation of the variometer readings, the cause of which cannot be determined.
The following contributing factors were identified:
- The crew's failure to execute a missed approach with the acquisition of the established minimum safety altitude (MSA) when information about the bearing indicated a significant deviation of the aircraft from the established approach procedure;
- The absence in the Palana aerodrome dispatcher's work technology of actions in the presence of information about the bearing indicating a significant deviation of the aircraft from the established approach scheme, as well as the dispatcher's passivity when such information was available;
- The lack of warning signals from the early ground proximity warning system under conditions that should have triggered it. It is not possible to determine the reason for the absence of the warning signals;
- The overestimation of the barometric altimeter readings in the final phase of the flight due to the specific airflow around the steep coastline creating a low-pressure zone and the overestimation of the variometer readings, the cause of which cannot be determined.
Final Report:
