Kiev oblast

The cause of the accident, i.e. runway excursion of MD-83 UR-CPR aircraft operated by Bravo Airways, which took place on June 14, 2018 at the Kyiv (Zhulyany) Aerodrome at performance of flight BAY 4406 en-route Antalya-Kyiv (Zhulyany) – was the PIC’s decision to continue the landing at the Kyiv (Zhulyany) Aerodrome in the thunderstorm conditions with the following main factors:
- non-stabilized approach for landing, starting from the height of 1,000 feet;
- spoiler non-deployment by the crew;
- incorrect crew actions in application of the reverse thrust on a wet runway (EPR>1.3).
Contributing Factors:
- Air traffic control service in the classified airspace of Ukraine, which is required by the Order of the Ministry of Transport of Ukraine dated April 16, 2003, No. 293, was not provided to the crew in full;
- Wind variable in strength and direction;
- Probably, the crew’s failure to listen to the latest ATIS reports for the Kyiv (Zhulyany) Aerodrome;
- Bravo Airways Operator's Manual does not contain landing approach procedures;
- Low-quality pre-flight preparation, pre-landing preparation, checklist reading and completion at all flight stages.

According to the findings of the commission of inquiry, the most likely cause of the crash was the impact of the aircraft in a low-altitude wind due to strong downward air flow (micro-burst) during the landing of the aircraft in thunderstorms due to coincidence of the following negative factors.
- Failure of the crew to perform a go around or divert to the alternate aerodrome;
- A rapid increase in the speed of movement of the thunderstorm in the direction of the Borodyanka airfield area;
- Lack of training on the simulator in the conditions of wind shear, lack of experience in the crew on approach to landing in the conditions of wind shear, in particular micro-burst;
- Insufficient aeronautical equipment (lack of meteorological radar on the plane and airfield);
- Lack of information for the crew about the forecasted and actual meteorological conditions at the landing aerodrome, warnings about the forecasted / available wind shift at Borodyanka aerodrome;
- The crew was not sufficiently informed about the flight conditions due to insufficient lighting of the cockpit and failure of the instrumentation of the aircraft due to a power failure during approach in thunderstorm conditions;
- Lack of sufficient experience of the crew to perform activities and landings in conditions when the landing weight exceeded the maximum allowable, due to the presence of skydivers on board the aircraft;
- Motivation of the crew to perform the landing approach on the first attempt, due to insufficient information about the storm at the aerodrome. The information on wind increase and its direction (provided to the pilot) was perceived by the crew as possible conditions for landing because their parameters did not exceed the limits allowed by the AOM of the aircraft;
- Overloading of the aircraft, motivation of the decision of the captain to perform landing at the aerodrome of departure (Borodyanka) due to the presence of unregistered passengers on board, due to improper organization of boarding of skydivers at the aerodrome Borodyanka;
- Insufficient organization of flights at Borodyanka airfield in terms of meteorological support;
- Insufficient (weak) regulatory, regulatory, legislative framework for parachuting.

It was determined that the aircraft impacted ground after the pilot continued the approach in below minima weather conditions.
The following findings were identified:
- The pilot continued the descent below MDA until the aircraft impacted ground,
- Few seconds prior to the accident, ATC instructed twice the pilot to initiate a go-around procedure, but this was too late,
- The pilot was approaching the airport at an excessive speed and below the glide,
- Poor visibility due to low clouds (below minimums).