Region

Crash of a Beriev A-50U off Kyrylivka: 11 killed

Date & Time: Jan 14, 2024 at 2112 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
RF-93966
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
No
MSN:
00834 76298
YOM:
1988
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
11
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
11
Captain / Total flying hours:
0
Circumstances:
Coded 37 Red and operated by the Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS-Vozdushno-kosmicheskiye sily Rossii), the airplane was engaged in a survey mission of the south Crimea area when it was apparently shot down by Ukrainian Forces and crashed into the Azov Sea off the city of Kyrylivka. It is believed that all 11 crew members have been killed.

Crash of an Antonov AN-26B-100 in Mykhailivka: 1 killed

Date & Time: Apr 22, 2022 at 0900 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
UR-UZB
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Zaporozhie - Zaporozhie
MSN:
113 05
YOM:
1981
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
3
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
1
Circumstances:
The crew departed Zaporozhie Airport on a local test flight according to local authorities, carrying three crew members. While flying at low height, the airplane collided with power line and crashed in an open field located in Mykhailivka, some 11 km northwest of the airport. A crew member was killed and two others were injured. The aircraft was destroyed.

Crash of an Antonov AN-26 in Zhukivtsi: 5 killed

Date & Time: Feb 24, 2022
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
59 blue
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
MSN:
50-03
YOM:
1977
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
14
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
5
Circumstances:
The aircraft crashed in an open field located in Zhukivtsi, about 30 km south of Kiev-Borispol Airport. It is believed there were 14 people on board and that five of them were killed. Maybe the aircraft was shot down by Russian Forces that entered Ukraine territory few hours earlier.

Crash of a PZL-Mielec AN-2R in Zolota Sloboda: 1 killed

Date & Time: Dec 9, 2020 at 1704 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
UR-33642
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
MSN:
1G-233-32
YOM:
1989
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
1
Circumstances:
The single engine airplane departed Pohorilivka Aerodrome at 1610LT on an unauthorized flight with one person on board. Approaching the village of Zolota Sloboda at night, the pilot attempted to land in an open field when the airplane rolled to the left and crashed. The airplane was destroyed and the sole occupant was killed.
Probable cause:
The cause of the accident was the collision of the airplane, which was excluded from the state register of civil aircraft of Ukraine, with the earth's surface, which led to the destruction of the aircraft and the death of the person piloting the plane ; the landing by an unprepared person at night on an unprepared and unequipped plot of land, which resulted in the person piloting the aircraft losing its spatial position and colliding with the ground.
The following contributing factors were identified:
- Failure to release the flaps into the landing position.
- Landing at high speed.
- Admission of a large left roll before landing.
Final Report:

Crash of an Antonov AN-26Sh at Chuhuiv AFB: 26 killed

Date & Time: Sep 25, 2020 at 2050 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
76 yellow
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Chuhuiv AFB - Chuhuiv AFB
MSN:
56 08
YOM:
1977
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
7
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
20
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
26
Circumstances:
The aircraft was engaged in a local training flight at Chuhuiv AFB, carrying 7 crew members and 20 cadets. On approach to runway 16, the crew apparently encountered engine problems when the aircraft lost height and crashed 2 km short of runway threshold near motorway E40, bursting into flames. Two passengers were seriously injured while 25 other occupants were killed. Few hours later, one of the survivors died from his injuries.

Crash of a Boeing 737-8F2 in Odessa

Date & Time: Nov 21, 2019 at 2055 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
TC-JGZ
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Istanbul – Odessa
MSN:
35739/2654
YOM:
2008
Flight number:
TK467
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
6
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
136
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
6094
Captain / Total hours on type:
5608.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
252
Copilot / Total hours on type:
175
Aircraft flight hours:
38464
Aircraft flight cycles:
22633
Circumstances:
On November 21, 2019, a regular THY2UT flight en-route Istanbul – Odesa at B737-800 aircraft, nationality and registration mark TC-JGZ of the Turkish Airlines, was performed by the aircraft crew consisting of the Pilot-in-Command (PIC), co-pilot and four flight attendants of the aircraft. In fact, the departure from Istanbul Airport was performed at 17:33. The actual aircraft landing took place at 18:55. According to the flight plan, the alternate aerodromes were Istanbul and Chișinău. There were 136 passengers and 2793 kg of luggage on board the aircraft. The PIC was a Pilot Flying, and the co-pilot was a Pilot Monitoring of the aircraft. The pre-flight briefing of the crew, according to its explanations, was carried out before departure from the Istanbul Airport, after which the PIC took the decision to perform the flight. The climb and level flight were performed in the normal mode. The landing approach was performed to the Runway16 with ILS system at a significant crosswind component of variable directions. At the final stage of approaching with ILS to Runway 16, the ATC controller of the aerodrome control tower (ATC Tower) gave the aircraft crew a clearance for landing. The aircraft crew confirmed the controller’s clearance and continued the landing approach. Subsequently, from a height of about 50 meters, the aircraft performed a go-around due to the aircraft non-stabilization before landing. Following the go-around, the aircraft headed to the holding area to wait for favorable values of wind force and direction. At 18:45, the PIC took the decision to carry out a repeated landing approach, reported of that to the ATC controller, who provided ATS in the Odesa Terminal Maneuvering Area (TMA.) At 18:51, the crew re-contacted the Tower controller and received the clearance to land. At 18:55, after touchdown, during the runway run, the aircraft began to deviate to the left and veered off of the runway to the left onto the cleared and graded area. After 550 m run on the soil, the aircraft returned to the runway with its right main landing gear and nose part (while moving on the soil, the nose landing gear collapsed) and came to rest at the distance of 1612 m from the runway entrance threshold. The crew performed an emergency evacuation of passengers from the aircraft. As a result of the accident, the aircraft suffered a significant damage to the nose part of the fuselage and left engine. None of the passengers or crew members was injured.
Probable cause:
The cause of the accident, i.e. runway excursion, which caused significant damage to the structural elements of the aircraft B-737-800 TC-JGZ of Turkish Airlines, which took place on 21.11.2019 during landing at «Odesa» Aerodrome, was failure to maintain the direction of the aircraft movement during the landing run in the conditions of a strong crosswind of variable directions.
Contributing Factors:
- Use by the crew of the landing approach method using the Touchdown in Crab technique, which is not recommended by FCTM B-737NG document for use on dry runways in the conditions of a strong crosswind;
- Untimely and insufficient actions of the crew to maintain the landing run direction;
- Presence of a significant cross component of the wind;
- Effect of an omnidirectional wind – from cross-headwind to cross-tailwind directions – during the landing run.
Final Report:

Crash of an Antonov AN-12BK in Lviv: 5 killed

Date & Time: Oct 4, 2019 at 0648 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
UR-CAH
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Vigo - Lviv - Bursa
MSN:
8345604
YOM:
1968
Flight number:
UKL4050
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
5
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
3
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
5
Captain / Total flying hours:
6750
Captain / Total hours on type:
6570.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
14670
Copilot / Total hours on type:
9620
Aircraft flight hours:
12922
Aircraft flight cycles:
6616
Circumstances:
On 03.10.2019, the crew of An-12BK UR-CAH aircraft operated by PJSC «AIRLINE «UKRAINE-AIR ALLIANCE», consisting of flight crew members and two aircraft technicians, performed flight UKL4010 en-route Toronto (Canada) - Toulouse (France) and at 06:15 UTC, it landed at the Toulouse aerodrome (France). The plane delivered 1537 kg cargo to the Toulouse aerodrome (France). After the completion of post-flight procedures, the flight crew went to rest at the hotel, while the technicians remained on the aircraft to perform technical works. The next flight was scheduled from Toulouse to Birmingham airport (Great Britain). However, during the day, at the initiative of the operator, it was decided to change the route and perform the flight en-route Toulouse - Vigo (Spain) - Istanbul (Turkey). At the Toulouse aerodrome, the plane was filled with 6,000 liters of fuel. Also in Toulouse, a flight engineer was replaced. At 16:16 UTC, the plane took off from Toulouse to Vigo without cargo. Landing at the Vigo aerodrome (Spain) was performed on 03.10.2020 at 18:20 UTC. At the Vigo aerodrome, the plane was loaded with vehicle spare parts with a total weight of probably 14078 kg. From the Vigo aerodrome (Spain), the plane took off on 03.10.2019 at 22:20, flight UKL4050, with a delay of 2 h 20 minutes. On 04.10.2020, at 03:17:29 UTC, the plane approached the airspace border of the Lviv control area. The crew contacted the controller of the Lviv ACC of LVE + LVW sector and reported about the approach to waypoint MALBE at FL250. The controller informed the crew about the establishment of the radar identification of the aircraft and instructed to wait for the procedure for radar guidance to RW-31 using the ILS system. At 03:20:27, under instruction the ACC controller, the crew listened to the ATIS "Romeo" information as follows: “Lviv, ATIS “Romeo” for 03:20. The ILS approach at the aerodrome uses low visibility procedures. Runway in use is RW-31. Runway surface condition known at 19:53 - wet, clear. The measured friction coefficient is 0.55. Estimated surface friction assessed as good. Transition level - 110. Warning: large flocks of birds in the aerodrome area and on the landing final. There is no wind. Visibility - 150 meters; visibility range on the runway at the touchdown point - 550 meters, in the middle of the runway - 550 meters, at the end of the runway - 550 meters, fog. Vertical visibility - 50 meters. Temperature + 3ºС, dew point + 3ºС. Atmospheric pressure QNH - 1013 hectopascals, QFE - 974 hectopascals. Weather forecast for TREND landing: visibility sometimes is 400 meters, fog; vertical visibility - 60 meters. Attention: the frequency "Lviv-taxiing" does not work, while taxiing, get in touch with the "LvivTower" at a frequency of 128.0 MHz. Please acknowledge receipt of Romeo's information." ATIS information was transmitted in English. At 03:22:14, the crew informed the controller about the completion of listening to ATIS information and received clearance to descend to FL120. At 03:22:40, the aircraft began its descent from FL250 and at 03:28:35 switched to the frequency of the ACC controller of the LVT sector. After contacting the controller of the ACC of the LVT sector, the crew reported a descend to FL120 to KOKUP point. At 03:29:08, the ACC controller of the LVT sector instructed the crew to continue descending to an altitude of 10,000 feet at atmospheric pressure QNH-1013 hPa, reported the transition level, and instructed to wait for radar guidance for ILS approach on RW-31. The crew confirmed the instruction to descent to 10,000 feet, QNH, transition level and reported expectation for radar guidance. At 03:30:14, LVT sector ACC controller began radar guidance. At 03:32:49, the controller instructed the crew to descend to 4,000 feet. At 03:35:33, LVT sector ATC controller instructed to descend to an altitude of 3200 feet, taking into account the temperature correction. The procedure for temperature correction at determination of flight levels by an air traffic controller during the radar vectoring was published in the Aeronautical Information Publication of Ukraine, UKLL AD 2.24.7-1 dated 12.09.2019. At 03:38:33, the ATC controller of the LVT sector provided the crew with information about its location of 27 km from VOR/DME LIV, instructed by the left turn to take a 340º heading, cleared the ILS landing approach to runway 31 and gave the control instruction to inform of “the localizer beam capture.” At 03:40:01 (the height above the runway was 1170 m, descent rate: -4 ... -4.5 m/s, speed 352 km/h, distance from the runway threshold: 15.7 km), the crew reported of the localizer beam capture. At 03:40:09, ATC controller of LVT sector instructed the crew to continue the ILS approach to RWY 31. At 03:40:26, the controller informed the crew about the weather conditions at the aerodrome: RW-31 runway visual range (RVR) in the touchdown zone – 800 meters, in the middle of the runway – 800 meters, at the end of the runway – 750 meters, vertical visibility – 60 meters, fog. The crew confirmed receipt of the information. At 03:41:22, the ATC controller of LVT sector instructed to switch the communication to the ATC Lviv controller at a frequency of 128.0 MHz. There were no irregularities in air traffic servicing of the An-12 aircraft, flight UKL4050, during the flight in the area of responsibility of the TMA Lviv "LVT" sector. To enter the glide path, the PIC increased the vertical descent rate. At 03:41:47, the crew established communication with the Tower controller. The distance from the threshold was 11.3 km, the elevation over the glide path was 70 m, the vertical rate of descent was -5.5 ... -6 m/s. After communication with the air traffic controller, the crew reported an ILS approach to RW-31 and the atmospheric pressure QNH setting of 1013 hPa. At 03:41:58, the Tower controller informed the crew about the absence of wind on the surface of RW-31 and gave clearance to land. The crew confirmed the landing clearance. According to the recorders, at this time the distance to the touchdown point was 7.58 km, the plane was 11 m below the glide path, the vertical descent rate was -4.5-5.5 m/s, and the speed was 290 km/h, the flight heading – 315º. At a distance of 5.0 km to the touchdown point, the plane was 25 m below the glide path. At a distance of 3 km from the touchdown, the plane descended to an altitude of 105 meters and continued the flight with the constant descent. At an altitude of 60 meters, an audible alarm was triggered on board the aircraft, when the decision height had been reached, to which none of the crew members responded. At a distance of 1348 meters from the threshold of the RW-31, at an altitude of 5-7 meters, the aircraft collided with trees, fell to the ground and came to rest at a distance of 1117 meters from the runway threshold. All three passengers were seriously injured and all five crew members were killed.
Probable cause:
The most probable cause of the accident, collision of a serviceable aircraft with the ground during the landing approach in a dense fog, was the crew’s failure to perform the flight in the instrument conditions due to the probable physical excessive fatigue, which led to an unconscious descent of the aircraft below the glide path and ground impact (controlled flight into terrain).
Contributing Factors:
Probable exceeding the aircraft takeoff weight during departure from the Vigo Airport, which could result in increase in consumption of the fuel, the remainder of which did not allow to perform the flight to the alternate Boryspil aerodrome.
Final Report:

Crash of a PZL-Mielec AN-2R in Mlyny

Date & Time: Jun 23, 2019 at 1010 LT
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
UR-43983
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Mlyny - Mlyny
MSN:
1G210-60
YOM:
1984
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
11382
Captain / Total hours on type:
11382.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
1816
Copilot / Total hours on type:
1816
Aircraft flight hours:
4091
Circumstances:
The crew was completing chemical work to protect sunflower crop from pests. This was the eighth sortie of the day. Shortly after takeoff, while climbing to a height of 20-30 metres, the engine lost power and the airplane started to lose altitude. No suitable terrain was available for an emergency landing. The airplane collided with trees and crashed in a wooded area, bursting into flames. Both crew members escaped uninjured while the aircraft was totally destroyed by a post crash fire.
Probable cause:
The immediate cause of the accident was a forced landing caused by a loss of engine power on unsuitable terrain. The most likely cause of the loss of engine power is the use of a low quality A-95 motor gasoline.
Final Report:

Crash of a McDonnell Douglas MD-83 in Kiev

Date & Time: Jun 14, 2018 at 2040 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
UR-CPR
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Antalya - Kiev
MSN:
49946/1898
YOM:
1991
Flight number:
BAY4406
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
7
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
160
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
11548
Captain / Total hours on type:
5580.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
12514
Copilot / Total hours on type:
3580
Aircraft flight hours:
43105
Aircraft flight cycles:
46810
Circumstances:
On June 14, 2018, according to the flight assignment, BAY 4406 charter flight en-route Antalya - Kyiv (Zhulyany) on MD-83 aircraft, state and registration number UR-CPR of Bravo Airways, was operated by PIC, co-pilot and five flight attendants. According to PIC’s Statement, the flight was delayed by 6 hours (departure time - 03:30 pm.) The Investigation Team did not establish the departure time from Antalya Airport. According to the PIC, the crew arrived at the airport at 02:00 pm. The takeoff time was 03:41 pm. The airline said the flight was delayed because of the aircraft non-arrival. Bravo Airways is the aircraft operator responsible for the flight and technical operation of the aircraft, maintaining its airworthiness and ensuring the flight safety. The Pilot Flying duties were performed by the PIC, and the Pilot Monitoring was the co-pilot. In accordance with the flight assignment, the PIC cross checked the copilot. According to his Statement, the flight preparation of the crew was carried out one and a half hours before the actual departure at Antalya Airport (PIC received aeronautical and meteorological information from a representative of Turkish Ground Services), after which, the PIC took a decision to perform the flight. Climb and level flight were performed in a normal mode. Landing approach was carried out to RW08 in the conditions of thunderstorm activity with ILS system. At 05:40 pm, at landing on the aerodrome of the Kyiv International Airport (Zhulyany) (hereinafter – Kyiv (Zhulyany) Aerodrome), during the landing run, at the distance of 1260 m from the entrance threshold, the aircraft suffered a runway excursion to the left of the air strip and stopped outside the cleared and graded area of the air strip at the distance of 123 m from the runway center line (according to the tire footprints at the occurrence site.) As a result of the accident, the aircraft has sustained substantial damage, in particular, to the structural elements. None of passengers or crew members received serious injuries.
Probable cause:
The cause of the accident, i.e. runway excursion of MD-83 UR-CPR aircraft operated by Bravo Airways, which took place on June 14, 2018 at the Kyiv (Zhulyany) Aerodrome at performance of flight BAY 4406 en-route Antalya-Kyiv (Zhulyany) – was the PIC’s decision to continue the landing at the Kyiv (Zhulyany) Aerodrome in the thunderstorm conditions with the following main factors:
- non-stabilized approach for landing, starting from the height of 1,000 feet;
- spoiler non-deployment by the crew;
- incorrect crew actions in application of the reverse thrust on a wet runway (EPR>1.3).
Contributing Factors:
- Air traffic control service in the classified airspace of Ukraine, which is required by the Order of the Ministry of Transport of Ukraine dated April 16, 2003, No. 293, was not provided to the crew in full;
- Wind variable in strength and direction;
- Probably, the crew’s failure to listen to the latest ATIS reports for the Kyiv (Zhulyany) Aerodrome;
- Bravo Airways Operator's Manual does not contain landing approach procedures;
- Low-quality pre-flight preparation, pre-landing preparation, checklist reading and completion at all flight stages.
Final Report:

Crash of a PZL-Mielec AN-2R in Kiliya

Date & Time: Jun 27, 2017 at 1444 LT
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
UR-19717
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Kiliya - Kiliya
MSN:
1G165-31
YOM:
1975
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
3403
Captain / Total hours on type:
2782.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
1110
Copilot / Total hours on type:
72
Aircraft flight hours:
10030
Circumstances:
The crew was engaged in a spraying mission over rice paddy fields in the region of Kiliya, Odessa. While completing the 18th sortie of the day, flying at a height of 50 metres and at a speed of 140-150 km/h, the engine failed. The crew attempted an emergency landing when the aircraft hit obstacles and trees and crashed. The captain escaped unhurt while the copilot was slightly injured. The aircraft was damaged beyond repair.
Probable cause:
Engine failure in flight due to fuel exhaustion.
The following contributing factors were identified:
- Poor flight preparation on part of the crew who failed to follow the pre-takeoff checklist,
- The fuel selector was in the wrong position,
- Poor organization on part of the operator, regarding implementation of procedures related to agricultural flghts.
Final Report: