Landing (descent or approach)

The Piper PA-31 (registration C-FQQB, serial number 31-310) operated by Exact Air Inc., with 2 pilots on board, was conducting its 2nd magnetometric survey flight of the day, from Schefferville Airport, Quebec, under visual flight rules. At 1336 Eastern Daylight Time, the aircraft took off and began flying toward the survey area located 90 nautical miles northwest of the airport. After completing the magnetometric survey work at 300 feet above ground level, the aircraft began the return flight segment to Schefferville Airport. At that time, the aircraft descended and flew over the terrain at an altitude varying between 100 and 40 feet above ground level. At 1756, while the aircraft was flying over railway tracks, it struck power transmission line conductor cables and crashed on top of a mine tailings deposit about 3.5 nautical miles northwest of Schefferville Airport. Both occupants were fatally injured. The accident occurred during daylight hours. Following the impact, there was no fire, and no emergency locator transmitter signal was captured.

While conducting a post maintenance test flight in visual flight rules conditions, the private pilot of the multi-engine airplane reported an oil leak to air traffic control. The controller provided vectors for the pilot to enter a right base leg for a landing to the south at the nearest airport, about 7 miles away. The pilot turned toward the airport but indicated that he did not have the airport in sight. Further, while maneuvering toward the airport, the pilot reported that the engine was "dead," and he still did not see the airport. The final radar data point recorded the airplane's position about 3.5 miles west-northwest of the approach end of the runway; the wreckage site was located about 4 miles northeast of the runway, indicating that the pilot flew past the airport rather than turning onto a final approach for landing. The reason that the pilot did not see the runway during the approach to the alternate airport, given that the airplane was operating in visual conditions and the controller was issuing guidance information, could not be determined. Regardless, the pilot did not execute a precautionary landing in a timely manner and lost control of the airplane. Examination of the airplane's left engine revealed that the No. 2 connecting rod was broken. The connecting rod bearings exhibited signs of heat distress and discoloration consistent with a lack of lubrication. The engine's oil pump was intact, and the gears were wet with oil. Based on the available evidence, the engine failure was the result of oil starvation; however, examination could not identify the reason for the starvation.

On 22 April 2017, a Gippsland Aeronautics GA-8 aircraft, registered VH-AJZ, was being used to conduct incendiary bombing aerial work operations in the Prince Regent River area of northern Western Australia (WA). On board were a pilot, a navigator seated in the co-pilot seat and a bombardier in the rear of the aircraft cabin. While conducting the incendiary bombing operations, the bombardier advised the pilot that he was suffering from motion sickness. The pilot elected to land at Gibb River aircraft landing area (ALA), WA, to take a lunch break and provide the bombardier with time to recover from the motion sickness. At about 1255 Western Standard Time (WST), the aircraft landed on runway 07 at Gibb River. During the landing roll, the engine failed. The aircraft had sufficient momentum to enable the pilot to turn the aircraft around on the runway and begin to taxi to the parking area at the western end of runway 07. Shortly after turning around, the aircraft came to rest on the runway. The pilot attempted to restart the engine, but the engine did not start. The pilot waited about 10–20 seconds before again attempting to restart the engine. While attempting the second restart of the engine, the pilot heard a loud noise similar to that of a backfire. The navigator then observed flames and smoke coming from around the front of the engine and immediately notified the pilot. After being notified of the fire, the pilot immediately shut down the engine and switched off the aircraft electrical system. As the pilot switched off the aircraft electrical system, the navigator located the aircraft fire extinguisher and evacuated from the aircraft through the co-pilot door. After evacuating from the aircraft, the navigator observed fire on the aircraft nose wheel. The navigator had difficulty preparing the fire extinguisher for use and was unable to discharge the fire extinguisher onto the fire. While the navigator was attempting to extinguish the fire, the pilot exited the aircraft through the pilot door and assisted the bombardier to exit the aircraft. After assisting the bombardier, the pilot moved to the front of the aircraft to assist the navigator with the firefighting. The pilot was able to activate the fire extinguisher and extinguished the fire on the nose wheel. The pilot observed fire continuing to burn within the engine compartment. Due to the heat of the fire, the pilot was unable to access the engine compartment to extinguish this fire. The pilot determined that no more could be done to contain the fire, and therefore, the pilot, navigator and bombardier moved clear of the aircraft to a safe location as the fire continued. The crew members were not injured. As a result of the fire, the aircraft was destroyed.

The commercial pilot and three passengers departed on an instrument flight rules crosscountry flight. While on approach to the destination airport, the pilot indicated to the air traffic controller that the airplane was passing through areas of moderate-to-extreme precipitation. After clearing the airplane for the approach, the controller noted that the airplane descended below its assigned altitude; the controller issued a low altitude alert, but no response was received from the pilot. The airplane subsequently impacted terrain in a level attitude about 12 miles from the airport. Examination of the airframe, engine, and system components revealed no evidence of preimpact mechanical malfunction that would have precluded normal operation. An area of disturbed, flattened, tall grass was located about 450 ft southwest of the accident site. Based on the images of the grass, the National Weather Service estimated that it would take greater than 35 knots of wind to lay over tall grass as the images indicated, and that a downburst/microburst event could not be ruled out. A downburst is an intense downdraft that creates strong, often damaging winds. About 6 hours before the flight, the pilot obtained weather information through a mobile application. Review of weather data indicated the presence of strong winds, heavy precipitation, turbulence, and low-level wind shear (LLWS) in the area at the time of arrival, which was reflected in the information the pilot received. Given the weather conditions, it is likely that the airplane encountered an intense downdraft, or downburst, which would have resulted in a sudden, major change in wind velocity. The airplane was on approach for landing at the time and was particularly susceptible to this hazardous condition given its lower altitude and slower airspeed. The downburst likely exceeded the climb performance capabilities of the airplane and resulted in a subsequent descent into terrain. It is unknown if the accident pilot checked or received additional weather information before or during the accident flight. While the flight was en route, several PIREPs were issued for the area of the accident site, which also indicated the potential of LLWS near the destination airport; however, the controller did not provide this information to the pilot, nor did he solicit PIREP information from the pilot. Based on published Federal Aviation Administration guidance for controllers and the widespread adverse weather conditions in the vicinity of the accident site, the controller should have both solicited PIREP information from the pilot and disseminated information from previous PIREPs to him; this would have provided the pilot with more complete information about the conditions to expect during the approach and landing at the destination.

The twin engine aircraft departed Manaus-Aeroclub de Flores Airport on a flight to Barra do Garças, carrying one passenger and one pilot. After takeoff from Manaus, the pilot changed his mind and decided to fly to Sorocaba. On final approach to Sorocaba-Bertram Luiz Leupolz Airport in good weather conditions, the aircraft impacted trees and crashed in a wooded area located about one km short of runway 18. The aircraft was destroyed and both occupants were killed. There was no fire.

The aircraft departed Lima-Jorge Chavez Airport on a 20-minute flight to Jauja, carrying 142 passengers and 7 seven crew members. The approach to Jauja-Francisco Carlé was uneventful and completed in good weather conditions. Two seconds after the nose gear touched down on runway 31, the crew activated the reverse systems when he felt strong vibrations and oscillations. The aircraft started to bounce and became uncontrollable. The right main gear collapsed then the aircraft veered off runway to the right, lost its right engine and came to rest in a grassy area, bursting into flames. All 149 occupants evacuated safely and the aircraft was totally destroyed by fire.

The twin engine aircraft was performing a charter flight from Beira to Harare with an intermediate stop in Mutare on behalf of the Mozambican company Cornelder. Ten minutes before its ETA in Mutare Airport, while descending to the altitude of 5,200 feet, the crew encountered marginal weather conditions when the aircraft hit obstacles and crashed on the slope of a mountain located in the Vumba Botanical Reserve. The wreckage was found 23 km southeast from the airport. It appears that a passenger survived but later died from his injuries. Among the passengers were Adelino Mesquita, brother of the Minister of Transport and Communications of the Republic of Mozambique.

The private pilot departed on an instrument flight rules flight plan in his twin-engine turbojet airplane. The flight was uneventful until the air traffic controller amended the flight plan, which required the pilot to manually enter the new routing information into the GPS. A few minutes later, the pilot told the controller that he was having problems with the GPS and asked for a direct route to his destination. The controller authorized the direct route and instructed the pilot to descend from 22,000 ft to 6,000 ft, during which time the sound of the autopilot disconnect was heard on the cockpit voice recorder (CVR). During the descent, the pilot told the controller that the airplane had a steering problem and was in the clouds. The pilot was instructed to descend the airplane to 4,100 ft, which was the minimum vectoring altitude. The airplane continued to descend, entered visual meteorological conditions, and then descended below the assigned altitude. The controller queried the pilot about the airplane's low altitude and instructed the pilot to maintain 4,100 ft. The pilot responded that he was unsure if he would be able to climb the airplane back to that altitude due to steering issues. The controller issued a low altitude warning and again advised the pilot to climb back to 4,100 ft. The pilot responded that the autopilot was working again and that he was able to climb the airplane to the assigned altitude. The controller then instructed the pilot to change to another radio frequency, but the pilot responded that he was still having a problem with the GPS. The pilot asked the controller to give him direct routing to the airport. A few minutes later, the pilot told the controller that he was barely able to keep the airplane straight and its wings level. The controller asked the pilot if he had the airport in sight, which he did not. The pilot then declared an emergency and expressed concerns related to identifying the landing runway. Afterward, radio contact between the controller and the pilot was lost. Shortly before the airplane impacted the ground, a witness saw the airplane make a complete 360° roll to the left, enter a steep 90° bank to the left, roll inverted, and enter a vertical nose-down dive. Another witness saw the airplane spiral to the ground. The airplane impacted the front lawn of a private residence, and a postcrash fire ensued.The pilot held a type rating for the airplane, but the pilot's personal logbooks were not available for review. As a result, his overall currency and total flight experience in the accident airplane could not be determined. The airplane was originally certified for operations with a pilot and copilot. To obtain an exemption to operate the airplane as a single pilot, a pilot must successfully complete an approved single-pilot exemption training course annually. The accident airplane was modified, and the previous owner was issued a single-pilot conformity certificate by the company that performed the modifications. However, there was no record indicating that the accident pilot received training under this exemption. Several facilities that have single-pilot exemption training for the accident airplane series also had no record of the pilot receiving training for single-pilot operations in the accident airplane. Therefore, unlikely that the pilot was properly certificated to act as a single-pilot. The GPS was installed in the airplane about 3.5 years before the accident. A friend of the pilot trained him on how to use the GPS. The friend said that the pilot generally was confused about how the unit operated and struggled with pulling up pages and correlating data. The friend of the pilot had flown with him several times and indicated that, if an air traffic controller amended a preprogrammed flight plan while en route, the pilot would be confused with the procedure for amending the flight plan. The friend also said the pilot depended heavily on the autopilot, which was integrated with the GPS, and that he would activate the autopilot immediately after takeoff and deactivate it on short final approach to a runway. The pilot would not trim the airplane before turning on the autopilot because he assumed that the autopilot would automatically trim the airplane, which led to the autopilot working against the mis-trimmed airplane. The friend added that the pilot was "constantly complaining" that the airplane was "uncontrollable." A postaccident examination of the airplane and the autopilot system revealed no evidence of any preimpact deficiencies that would have precluded normal operation. This information suggests that pilot historically had difficulty flying the airplane without the aid of the autopilot. When coupled with his performance flying the airplane during the accident flight without the aid of the autopilot, it further suggests that the pilot was consistently unable to manually fly the airplane. Additionally, given the pilot's previous experience with the GPS installed on the airplane, it is likely that during the accident flight the pilot became confused about how to operate the GPS and ultimately was unable to properly control of the airplane without the autopilot engaged. Based on witness information, it is likely that during the final moments of the flight the pilot lost control of the airplane and it entered an aerodynamic stall. The pilot was then unable to regain control of the airplane as it spun 4,000 ft to the ground.

Following an uneventful flight from Juba, the crew initiated the approach to Wau Airport when he encountered poor weather conditions and limited visibility. On short final, during the last segment, the aircraft collided with a fire truck and near the runway 27 threshold, bursting into flames. All 45 occupants were rescued, among them 18 were injured. The airplane was totally destroyed by a post crash fire.

On 14 Mar 17, at 1835 local time (L), a U-28A, tail number 0724, crashed one-quarter mile south of Clovis Municipal Airport (KCVN), New Mexico (NM). This aircraft was operated by the 318th Special Operations Squadron, 27th Special Operations Wing, Cannon Air Force Base (AFB), NM. The aircraft was destroyed and all three crewmembers died upon impact. The Mishap Aircraft (MA) departed Cannon AFB at 1512L for tactical training over Lubbock, Texas, followed by pilot proficiency training at KCVN. The Mishap Crew (MC) entered Lubbock airspace at 1545L, completed their tactical training, and departed Lubbock airspace at 1735L enroute to KCVN. The MC entered the KCVN traffic pattern at 1806L, where they conducted multiple approaches and landings prior to executing the mishap maneuver, a practice turnback Emergency Landing Pattern (ELP). The MC entered the practice turnback ELP with 0° flaps led to increased aircraft nose-down attitudes and higher descent rates required to maintain a safe angle of attack versus a comparative 15° flap approach. In addition, 0° flap stall speeds are higher than 15° flap stall speeds – 15 to 25 knots higher for the range of bank angles flown by the MC during the practice turnback ELP. The MC was also late to achieve the bank angle required to enable the MA to align with the extended centerline for the runway resulting in an overshoot condition. The MC attempted to arrest their excessive nose-down attitude, descent rate, and shallow bank angle by pulling back on the aircraft yoke and increasing bank angle. The g-load from the MC pull back, coupled with the MA's increased bank angle, slowed the MA airspeed below 0° flap stall speed and it departed controlled flight. Subsequent power increase and flight control inputs would not have enabled the aircraft to recover from the stall within remaining altitude. After entering the stall, the MC increased power; however, it was not enough to overcome the MA descent rate. At no point during the practice turnback ELP did the MA performance reflect a MC intent to abort the maneuver. The MA impacted the ground with a 13° nose-high, 7° left-wing low attitude. The aircraft was destroyed upon impact and all three occupants were killed.
Crew:
Cpt Andrew Becker, pilot,
1st Lt Frederick Dellecker, copilot,
Cpt Kenneth Dalga, combat systems officer.