Landing (descent or approach)

The twin engine aircraft was performing a charter flight from Beira to Harare with an intermediate stop in Mutare on behalf of the Mozambican company Cornelder. Ten minutes before its ETA in Mutare Airport, while descending to the altitude of 5,200 feet, the crew encountered marginal weather conditions when the aircraft hit obstacles and crashed on the slope of a mountain located in the Vumba Botanical Reserve. The wreckage was found 23 km southeast from the airport. It appears that a passenger survived but later died from his injuries. Among the passengers were Adelino Mesquita, brother of the Minister of Transport and Communications of the Republic of Mozambique.

The private pilot departed on an instrument flight rules flight plan in his twin-engine turbojet airplane. The flight was uneventful until the air traffic controller amended the flight plan, which required the pilot to manually enter the new routing information into the GPS. A few minutes later, the pilot told the controller that he was having problems with the GPS and asked for a direct route to his destination. The controller authorized the direct route and instructed the pilot to descend from 22,000 ft to 6,000 ft, during which time the sound of the autopilot disconnect was heard on the cockpit voice recorder (CVR). During the descent, the pilot told the controller that the airplane had a steering problem and was in the clouds. The pilot was instructed to descend the airplane to 4,100 ft, which was the minimum vectoring altitude. The airplane continued to descend, entered visual meteorological conditions, and then descended below the assigned altitude. The controller queried the pilot about the airplane's low altitude and instructed the pilot to maintain 4,100 ft. The pilot responded that he was unsure if he would be able to climb the airplane back to that altitude due to steering issues. The controller issued a low altitude warning and again advised the pilot to climb back to 4,100 ft. The pilot responded that the autopilot was working again and that he was able to climb the airplane to the assigned altitude. The controller then instructed the pilot to change to another radio frequency, but the pilot responded that he was still having a problem with the GPS. The pilot asked the controller to give him direct routing to the airport. A few minutes later, the pilot told the controller that he was barely able to keep the airplane straight and its wings level. The controller asked the pilot if he had the airport in sight, which he did not. The pilot then declared an emergency and expressed concerns related to identifying the landing runway. Afterward, radio contact between the controller and the pilot was lost. Shortly before the airplane impacted the ground, a witness saw the airplane make a complete 360° roll to the left, enter a steep 90° bank to the left, roll inverted, and enter a vertical nose-down dive. Another witness saw the airplane spiral to the ground. The airplane impacted the front lawn of a private residence, and a postcrash fire ensued.The pilot held a type rating for the airplane, but the pilot's personal logbooks were not available for review. As a result, his overall currency and total flight experience in the accident airplane could not be determined. The airplane was originally certified for operations with a pilot and copilot. To obtain an exemption to operate the airplane as a single pilot, a pilot must successfully complete an approved single-pilot exemption training course annually. The accident airplane was modified, and the previous owner was issued a single-pilot conformity certificate by the company that performed the modifications. However, there was no record indicating that the accident pilot received training under this exemption. Several facilities that have single-pilot exemption training for the accident airplane series also had no record of the pilot receiving training for single-pilot operations in the accident airplane. Therefore, unlikely that the pilot was properly certificated to act as a single-pilot. The GPS was installed in the airplane about 3.5 years before the accident. A friend of the pilot trained him on how to use the GPS. The friend said that the pilot generally was confused about how the unit operated and struggled with pulling up pages and correlating data. The friend of the pilot had flown with him several times and indicated that, if an air traffic controller amended a preprogrammed flight plan while en route, the pilot would be confused with the procedure for amending the flight plan. The friend also said the pilot depended heavily on the autopilot, which was integrated with the GPS, and that he would activate the autopilot immediately after takeoff and deactivate it on short final approach to a runway. The pilot would not trim the airplane before turning on the autopilot because he assumed that the autopilot would automatically trim the airplane, which led to the autopilot working against the mis-trimmed airplane. The friend added that the pilot was "constantly complaining" that the airplane was "uncontrollable." A postaccident examination of the airplane and the autopilot system revealed no evidence of any preimpact deficiencies that would have precluded normal operation. This information suggests that pilot historically had difficulty flying the airplane without the aid of the autopilot. When coupled with his performance flying the airplane during the accident flight without the aid of the autopilot, it further suggests that the pilot was consistently unable to manually fly the airplane. Additionally, given the pilot's previous experience with the GPS installed on the airplane, it is likely that during the accident flight the pilot became confused about how to operate the GPS and ultimately was unable to properly control of the airplane without the autopilot engaged. Based on witness information, it is likely that during the final moments of the flight the pilot lost control of the airplane and it entered an aerodynamic stall. The pilot was then unable to regain control of the airplane as it spun 4,000 ft to the ground.

Following an uneventful flight from Juba, the crew initiated the approach to Wau Airport when he encountered poor weather conditions and limited visibility. On short final, during the last segment, the aircraft collided with a fire truck and near the runway 27 threshold, bursting into flames. All 45 occupants were rescued, among them 18 were injured. The airplane was totally destroyed by a post crash fire.

On 14 Mar 17, at 1835 local time (L), a U-28A, tail number 0724, crashed one-quarter mile south of Clovis Municipal Airport (KCVN), New Mexico (NM). This aircraft was operated by the 318th Special Operations Squadron, 27th Special Operations Wing, Cannon Air Force Base (AFB), NM. The aircraft was destroyed and all three crewmembers died upon impact. The Mishap Aircraft (MA) departed Cannon AFB at 1512L for tactical training over Lubbock, Texas, followed by pilot proficiency training at KCVN. The Mishap Crew (MC) entered Lubbock airspace at 1545L, completed their tactical training, and departed Lubbock airspace at 1735L enroute to KCVN. The MC entered the KCVN traffic pattern at 1806L, where they conducted multiple approaches and landings prior to executing the mishap maneuver, a practice turnback Emergency Landing Pattern (ELP). The MC entered the practice turnback ELP with 0° flaps led to increased aircraft nose-down attitudes and higher descent rates required to maintain a safe angle of attack versus a comparative 15° flap approach. In addition, 0° flap stall speeds are higher than 15° flap stall speeds – 15 to 25 knots higher for the range of bank angles flown by the MC during the practice turnback ELP. The MC was also late to achieve the bank angle required to enable the MA to align with the extended centerline for the runway resulting in an overshoot condition. The MC attempted to arrest their excessive nose-down attitude, descent rate, and shallow bank angle by pulling back on the aircraft yoke and increasing bank angle. The g-load from the MC pull back, coupled with the MA's increased bank angle, slowed the MA airspeed below 0° flap stall speed and it departed controlled flight. Subsequent power increase and flight control inputs would not have enabled the aircraft to recover from the stall within remaining altitude. After entering the stall, the MC increased power; however, it was not enough to overcome the MA descent rate. At no point during the practice turnback ELP did the MA performance reflect a MC intent to abort the maneuver. The MA impacted the ground with a 13° nose-high, 7° left-wing low attitude. The aircraft was destroyed upon impact and all three occupants were killed.
Crew:
Cpt Andrew Becker, pilot,
1st Lt Frederick Dellecker, copilot,
Cpt Kenneth Dalga, combat systems officer.

Pilot advised that upon making his approach to land at Cat Cay (MYCC), on short final he experienced an unexpected accelerated sink rate. To compensate for the sink rate he increased the pitch of the aircraft. While going over the threshold, a slight impact was felt as the landing gear came into contact with the seawall. He flew the aircraft until it came to a stop about 600 feet down the runway. No injuries were sustained, aircraft received substantial damage.

The single engine aircraft departed New Delhi at 0842LT on an ambulance flight to Bangkok with two pilots and three doctors on board. A refueling stop was completed at Calcutta Airport. At 1903LT, en route to Bangkok-Don Mueang Airport, the crew contacted ATC and requested permission to divert to Kamphaeng Saen Airport due to an emergency. The permission was granted and the crew initiated the descent when the aircraft disappeared from radar screens at 1916LT. The burned wreckage was found an hour and 30 minutes later, at 2048LT, in a wooded area located few km from runway 22L threshold. All five occupants were injured while the aircraft was destroyed. Few hours later, the copilot died from his injuries.

The 69-year-old commercial pilot was making a personal cross-country flight in the newly purchased airplane. When the airplane was on final approach to the destination airport in night visual meteorological conditions, airport surveillance video showed it pitch up and roll to the right. The airplane then descended in a nose-down attitude to impact in a ravine on the right side of the runway. During the descent over the ravine the right wing came in contact with a powerline that briefly cut power to the airport. Postaccident examination of the airframe, engines, and their components revealed no evidence of mechanical anomalies or malfunctions that would have precluded normal operation. The pilot's toxicology findings identified five different impairing medications: clonazepam, temazepam, hydrocodone, nortriptyline, and diphenhydramine. Although the results were from cavity blood and may not accurately reflect antemortem levels, the hydrocodone, temazepam, and diphenhydramine levels were high enough to likely have had some psychoactive effects. While the exact effects of these drugs in combination are not known, it is likely that the pilot was impaired to some degree by his use of this combination of medications, which likely contributed to his failure to maintain control of the airplane.

The pilot of the twin-engine airplane and the pilot-rated passenger reported that, during a missed approach in instrument meteorological conditions, at 2,000 ft mean sea level, the right engine seized. The pilot attempted to feather the right engine by pulling the propeller control to the feather position; however, the engine did not feather. The airplane would not maintain level flight, so the pilot navigated to a known airport, and the passenger made emergency communications with air traffic control. The pilot was unable to maintain visual reference with the ground until the airplane descended through about 100 to 200 ft and the visibility was 1 statute mile. The pilot stated that he was forced to ditch the airplane in the water about 5 miles short of the airport. The pilot and passenger egressed the airplane and swam ashore before it sank in about 89 ft of water. Both the pilot and passenger reported that there was postimpact fire on the surface of the water. The airplane was not recovered, which precluded a postaccident examination. Thus, the reason for the loss of engine power could not be determined.

While overflying the Yucatán Province, en route from Monterrey to Cancún, the pilot informed ATC that he was low of fuel and requested the permission to divert to Chichén Itzá Airport for an emergency landing. While approaching the airfield by night, the single engine aircraft descended into trees and crashed few km from the airport. The airplane was destroyed and there was no fire. All five occupants were injured.

Following an uneventful flight, the aircraft belly landed at Unalaska-Tom Madsen Airport runway 13/31. The airplane slid for few dozen metres before coming to rest and was damaged beyond repair. All three occupants evacuated safely.