Tuscany

The cause of the accident is attributable to the detachment of the horizontal stabilizer following the impact with a skydiver dragged by his auxiliary parachute that accidentally opened while he was still inside the aircraft. This detachment led to the loss of governability of the aircraft.
The following factors contributed to the incident:
- The conformation of the throwing material, with closing flap of the safety flap covering the pin, which, tending to come out of its seat, did not guarantee adequate protection of the locking pin from accidental interference.
- The conformation of the structure of the right front seat, which interferes with the closing system of the auxiliary parachute bag, which determined the opening.
- The non-optimal disposition of the skydivers and the DL on board the aircraft (first skydiver to go out not immediately to the door and DL with his back addressed to the skydiver student).

The accident, reasonably triggered by a technical problem that the investigations could not identify with indisputable certainty, was attributable to an in-flight loss of control of the aircraft following an aerodynamic stall at low altitude during initial climb. The pilot's attempt to return to the airport was unsuccessful and the short distance between the aircraft and the ground did not allow him to expect a stall recovery.

The accident was the consequence of an in-flight collision with a power line because the crew adopted a wrong approach configuration to the fire area. The following contributing factors were identified:
- Poor decision making in attacking the fire, causing the crew to focus their attention on obstacles (pylons) of power line n°500, without considering the presence of the cable guard line n°550,
- The reduced visibility of obstacles resulting from the smoke of the forest,
- The inadequate reporting of electricity pylons and associated overhead lines,
- Non-activation of the required radio links, so the crew could not receive reports on the presence of obstacles,
- Short and discontinuous experience of the captain in that role, coming from the institution of the "PIC Frozen",
- The combination of to similar qualified pilots ("PIC Frozen") in the cockpit for the operation of a flight, one just rehabilitated to a high command function, the other still employed in the role of co-pilot: This condition could have a negative impact in terms of crew integration, obscuring decision making,
- The existence of criticality in corporate manuals used at the date of the accident,
- Reduced operational capacity of the crew in the last phase of flight, resulting from the strong heat of the fire under the left wing which penetrated the airplane through an opening created by the separation of a porthole.

The accident occurred due to a loss of control of the aircraft following the separation of the right wing, due to the structural failure produced at the sub-wing attack of the bracing section. In particular, in the light of what has been highlighted, it is believed that the accident was caused by a fatigue damage mechanism which, developed without being detected, significantly reducing the residual section of the right sub-alar attack of the trunk. This suddenly led to the structural failure of the right wing and the consequent loss of control of the aircraft that crashed in the sea.

The following findings were identified:
- Weather conditions were considered as good with light wind,
- The pilot acting as captain was flying on this route for the first time and this was also his first landing at Peretola Airport,
- Florence-Peretola Airport runway 23 is 1,650 metres long but has a displaced threshold, so the landing distance available is 1,030 metres only,
- The copilot was the pilot-in-command at the time of the accident. He was also a captain and could operate as an instructor,
- The approach configuration was incorrect since the aircraft's touchdown speed was 30 knots above the speed prescribed in the flight manuals,
- Failure of the crew to initiate a go-around procedure while the landing manoeuvre was obviously missed.