Lockheed C-130 Hercules

The four engine aircraft departed Cagayan de Oro Airport to transfer troops to Jolo. On board were 88 passengers and a crew of 8, including three pilots. After landing on runway 09 at Jolo Airport, the aircraft was unable to stop within the remaining distance. It overran, collided with several house and came to rest in a wooded area, bursting into flames. At least 49 occupants were killed as well as three people on the ground. All others were injured.

On 8 June 2020, at approximately 2205 hours local time (L), the mishap aircraft (MA), a C-130H (tail number (T/N) 94-6706), was involved in a mishap during a routine mobility airlift mission from Ali Al Salem Air Base, Kuwait, into Al Taji (Camp Taji), Iraq, when it failed to come to a stop during landing, overran the runway, and impacted a concrete barrier. All 26 mishap crew (MC) members and passengers survived the mishap, with relatively minor injuries to two of the individuals. The MA was damaged beyond repair, and was valued at $35,900,000. The MA was from the 165th Airlift Wing (165 AW), Georgia Air National Guard (ANG), was manned with Wyoming ANG crew members deployed from the 153d Airlift Wing (153 AW), in Cheyenne, Wyoming, and assigned to the 386th Air Expeditionary Wing (386 AEW) at Ali Al Salem Air Base, Kuwait. The mishap occurred at the end of the first planned leg of the MC’s mission on 8 June 2020. The MC departed Ali Al Salem Air Base, Kuwait, at approximately 2053L, with an uneventful start, taxi, takeoff, and cruise to Camp Taji. During descent into Camp Taji, the MC prepared the MA for a nighttime landing, using night vision devices. During this time, the MC turned the MA earlier than their planned turn point, did not descend to lower altitudes in accordance with their planned descent, and allowed the airspeed to exceed recommended maximum speeds for the configuration the plane was in. During the landing, the MA continued to be above the planned glideslope and maintained excessive airspeed, with a nose-down attitude until touchdown. The MA proceeded to “porpoise” or oscillate down the runway from the point of touchdown until the MA was slowed sufficiently by use of reverse thrust from the engines to allow the MA to settle onto the wheels, which in turn allowed for the brakes to engage. The MA, despite slowing somewhat, had less than 1,000 feet of runway remaining by that point, and thus overran the runway and did not come to a complete stop until it impacted a 12-foot-high concrete barrier, approximately 600 feet past the runway.

At about 1205, while B137 was overhead the Adaminaby fire-ground, and about the same time the SAD logged the birddog rejection, B134 departed Richmond as initial attack. On board were the PIC, the copilot and flight engineer. In response to the draft report, the RFS provided excerpts from the state operations controller (SOC) log. An entry was written in the log by the SOC following the accident. The SOC noted having been advised that the birddog had indicated it was ‘not safe to fly’ and that B137 was not returning to the area until the conditions had eased. However, B134 would continue with the PIC to make the ‘decision of safety of bombing operations’. The RFS advised the ATSB that the SOC had the authority to cancel B134’s tasking, but instead allowed it to proceed, with the intention of gathering additional intelligence to assist in determining whether further aerial operations would proceed. The RFS further reported that this indicated an ongoing intelligence gathering and assessment process by the SOC. At about 1235, while returning to Richmond, the PIC of B137 heard the PIC of B134 on the Canberra approach frequency, and contacted them via their designated operating frequency. At that time, B134 was about 112 km north-east of Adaminaby, en route to the fire-ground. In this conversation, the PIC of B137 informed them of the actual conditions and that they would not be returning to Adaminaby. The PIC of B137 reported that they could not recall the specific details of the call, but that the conversation included that they were ‘getting crazy winds’ and ‘you can go take a look’ ’but I am not going back’. It was also noted that the PIC of B134 had asked several questions. It was reported by the majority of the operator’s pilots that, despite receiving information from another pilot, they would have also continued with the tasking under these circumstances, to assess the conditions themselves. At about 1242, the crew of B134 contacted air traffic control to advise them of the coordinates they would be working at, provide an ‘ops normal’ call time, and confirm there was no reported instrument flight rules aircraft in the area. About 5 minutes later, the Richmond ABM also attempted to contact the crew of B134 to confirm ‘ops normal’, firstly by radio, and then by text to the PIC’s mobile phone, but did not receive a response. The automatic dependent surveillance broadcast (ADS-B) data showed that, after arriving at the Adaminaby fire-ground at about 1251, the crew of B134 completed several circuits at about 2,000 ft AGL. At about 1255, the crew advised the Cooma ARO that it was too smoky and windy to complete a retardant drop at that location. The Cooma ARO then provided the crew with the approximate coordinates of the Good Good fire, about 58 km to the east of Adaminaby. The ARO further indicated that they had no specific requirements, but they could look for targets of opportunity, with the objective of conducting structure and property protection near Peak View. At about 1259, the crew of B134 contacted air traffic control to advise that they had been re-tasked to the Good Good fire-ground, and provided updated coordinates. At about the same time, the RFS ground firefighters at the Good Good fire-ground, near Feeney’s Road in Peak View, contacted the Cooma FCC and requested additional assets for property protection. They were advised that a LAT would be passing overhead in about 10 minutes. The firefighters acknowledged the intention of a LAT retardant drop and advised the Cooma FCC they would wait in open country on Feeney’s Road, clear of any properties targeted for protection. At about 1307, B134 arrived overhead the drop area. The drop area was located to the east of a ridgeline, with the fire on the western side of the ridgeline. The aircraft’s recorded track data (SkyTrac) showed that the crew conducted 3 left circuits, at about 1,500 ft, 500 ft and 1,000 ft AGL respectively, prior to commencing the drop circuit. At about 1312, after conducting about 2 circuits, they advised the Cooma ARO of their intention to complete multiple drops on the eastern side of the Good Good fire, and that they would advise the coordinates after the first delivery. At 1315:15, a partial retardant drop was conducted on a heading of about 190°, at about 190 ft AGL (3,600 ft above mean sea level). During the drop, about 1,200 US gallons (4,500 L) of fire retardant was released over a period of about 2 seconds. A ground speed of 144 kt was recorded at the time of the drop. A witness video taken by ground fire-fighters captured the drop and showed the aircraft immediately after the drop in an initial left turn with a positive rate of climb, before it became obscured by smoke. While being intermittently obscured by smoke, the aircraft climbed to about 330 ft AGL (3,770 ft above mean sea level). At about this time, ATSB analysis of the video showed that the aircraft was rolling from about 18° left angle of bank to about a 6° right angle of bank. Following this, the aircraft descended and about 17 seconds after the completion of the partial retardant drop, it was seen at a very low height above the ground, in a slight left bank. Video analysis and accident site examination showed there was no further (emergency) drop of retardant. Throughout this period, the recorded groundspeed increased slightly to a maximum of 151 kt. Shortly after, there was a significant left roll just prior to ground impact. At about 1315:37, the aircraft collided with terrain and a post-impact fuel-fed fire ensued. The 3 crew were fatally injured and the aircraft was destroyed. A review of the Airservices Australia audio recording of the applicable air traffic control frequency found no distress calls were received by controllers prior to the impact.

The four engine airplane was completing a flight from Beni to Goma, carrying 59 South African troops and eight crew members from the 28th Squadron on behalf of the MONUSCO (Mission de l’Organisation des Nations unies pour la stabilisation en République Démocratique du Congo). The approach and landing were completed in heavy rain falls. After touchdown, the airplane veered off runway to the left and came to rest in a grassy area with the left wing broken in two and the n°1 engine on fire. All 67 occupants escaped uninjured and the fire was quickly contained. However, the aircraft seems to be damaged beyond repair.

The four engine airplane departed Santiago de Chile at 1021LT and landed at Punta Arenas for a technical stop at 1444LT. It took off at 1653LT on a leg to Teniente Rodolfo Marsh-Presidente Eduardo Frei Montalva Airport located on King George Island, Antarctica, carrying 21 passengers and 17 crew members. After flying a distance of about 390 NM, while in cruising altitude, the radar contact was lost, vertical to the Drake Passage. SAR operations were initiated jointly by the Chilean, Uruguay and Argentine Air Forces which dispatched several aircraft over the area. Two days later, debris were found floating on water. It seems that none of the 38 occupants survived the crash.