Landing (descent or approach)

Wrong approach configuration on part of the crew who completed the approach at an excessive speed and above the glide. This caused the aircraft to land too far down a runway and the landing distance available was insufficient. After touchdown, the crew failed to identify the situation in due time and the decision to initiate a go-around procedure was taken too late. The following contributing factors were reported:
- Poor crew coordination,
- Poor planned approach and crew decisions,
- Wet runway surface (poor braking coefficient),
- Rain falls.

Failure of all four engines on final approach due to fuel exhaustion. Poor flight planning on part of the crew. At takeoff, the aircraft weight was 7 tons above the MTOW. The crew deliberately decided to load more cargo and less fuel. Investigations determined that the fuel quantity was insufficient for the planned flight.

It is believed that the crew focused on the main gear problems and failed to adhere to standard approach procedure, causing the aircraft to descend prematurely and to struck the mountain. Lack of crew coordination and lack of visibility were considered as contributing factors.

Wrong approach configuration on part of the flying crew who continued the approach above the glide and landed too far down the runway, reducing the landing distance available. It was also reported that the crew was unable to initiate a second go-around because the fuel reserve were insufficient to perform a third circuit.

The accident occurred due to aircraft landing without extension of landing gears on account of negligent flying by the commander disregarding the laid down operating procedures. Failure of the copilot to bring to notice of the commander the deviations from the procedures and to verify and cross check that gears were down was the contributory factor to the accident.

The pilot's failure to select the main fuel tanks prior to the approach, resulting in fuel starvation and engine stoppage.

Due to lack of evidences, the exact cause of the accident could not be determined. However, it is believed that the loss of control on approach by night and limited visibility due to poor weather conditions occurred after the pilot-in-command suffered a spatial disorientation while flying over water without any ground visual references.

The accident was the consequence of a series of error and omissions on part of the flying crew, resulting in a controlled flight into terrain.
The following contributing factors were reported:
- The pilots did not slow the aircraft to approach speed when directed by ATC (Event69). This error put the aircraft over VJN VOR/DME approximately 15 minutes earlier than ATC expected. The average ground speed inbound to the VOR/DME, between Event65 (DME 37 nmi) and Event104 (DME 0.0 nmi), was 400 knots.
- The pilots did not descend according to the published descent profile for their arrival sector. If the pilots had done this the aircraft would have been at 4,000 feet altitude over the VJN VOR/DME and in position for the initial approach segment for a VOR/DME approach procedure.
- The CVR recording indicates the pilots did not consider any published approach other than the ILS approach. Nevertheless, the pilots did not specifically request the ILS approach.
- The radiotelephone communication methods used by copilot Johnston were sloppy and not compliant with ICAO standards. Specifically, Johnston indicated to ATC he understood and would comply with the ATC directive to descend over the VJN VOR/DME to 9,500 feet. He did this by repeating (part of) the directive at Event118 suggesting to ATC he understood the directive and would comply.
- The pilots did not ask for clarification on the ATC directive to “descend south of the airfield” and put the aircraft on a heading 180o. The aircraft ground track suggested by Frank Petersen in his deposition and in his report titled “REPORT OF INVESTIGATION INTO THE ACCIDENT INVOLVING N204C” (April 24, 1992) has the aircraft flying outbound from the VJN VOR/DME on the 180° radial. This ground track can not be correct since it would put the aircraft 3 nmi east of the crash site at the time the pilots initiated the right turn. The 3 nmi distance could not have been covered in the 25 seconds between initiating the right turn and the impact. (At 230 knots it would take over 46 seconds to cover this distance.) Furthermore, the aircraft would have crashed before it did into the mountains along the 180° radial from the VJN VOR/DME.
- The cockpit conversation at Event179 indicates both pilots saw high terrain 52 seconds before impact. At this time the aircraft was less than 1 nmi from eye-level hills at 4,000 feet and less than 1.7 nmi from a peak at 4,875 feet. The pilots should have realized they were violating IFR approach procedures. (At this time of day the cloud cover near these hills would have been broken with cloud bases above 4,000 feet.) The pilots made no comment to ATC about the terrain or the cloud conditions.
Source: DuPont GII N204C Crash by Roger K. Parsons - Seagull Publishing, Houston, TX