Port Harcourt

Following an uneventful flight from Port Harcourt, the crew initiated the approach to Lagos-Murtala Muhammed Airport in poor weather conditions with heavy rain falls due to CB's at 1,900 feet. On final, he was cleared to land on runway 18R and informed about a wet runway surface. Both main landing gears touched down normally and when the nose gear landed as well, both wheels apparently separated. The nose gear leg ripped the ground and the airplane rolled for few dozen metres before coming to rest. All 139 occupants evacuated safely and the airplane was later considered as damaged beyond repair.

On 11th June, 2015, at about 18:25 h, an HS-125-800XP aircraft with nationality and registration marks N497AG, operated by SWAT Technology Limited departed Nnamdi Azikiwe International Airport, Abuja (DNAA) for Port Harcourt International Airport (DNPO) as a charter flight on an Instrument Flight Rule (IFR) flight plan. There were five persons on board inclusive of three flight crew and two passengers. The Captain was the Pilot Flying while the Co-pilot was the Pilot Monitoring. At 18:48 h, N497AG established contact with Lagos and Port Harcourt Air Traffic Control (ATC) units cruising at Flight Level (FL) 280. At 18:55 h, the aircraft was released by Lagos to continue with Port Harcourt. Port Harcourt cleared N497AG for descent to FL210. At 19:13 h, the crew reported field in sight at 6 nautical miles to touch down to the Tower Controller (TC). TC then cleared the aircraft to land with caution “runway surface wet”. The crew experienced light rain at about 1.3 nautical miles to touch down with runway lights ON for the ILS approach. At about 1,000 ft after the extension of landing gears, the PM remarked ‘Okay...I got a little rain on the windshield’ and the PF responded, ‘We don’t have wipers sir... (Laugh) Na wa o (Na wa o – local parlance, - pidgin, for expression of surprise). From the CVR, at Decision Height, the PM called out ‘minimums’ while the PF called back ‘landing’ as his intention. The PM reported that the runway edge lights were visible on the left side. On the right side, it was missing to a large extent and only appeared for about a quarter of the way from the runway 03 end. The PM observed that the aircraft was slightly to the left of the “centreline” and pointed out “right, right, more right.” The PM further stated that at 50 ft, the PF retarded power and turned to the left. At 40 ft, the PM cautioned the PF to ‘keep light in sight don’t go to the left’. At 20 ft, the PM again said, ‘keep on the right’. PF replied, ‘Are you sure that’s not the centre line?’. At 19:16 h, the aircraft touched down with left main wheel in the grass and the right main wheel on the runway but was steered back onto the runway. The PF stated, “...but just on touchdown the right-hand lights were out, and in a bid to line up with the lights we veered off the runway to the left”. The nose wheel landing gear collapsed, and the aircraft stopped on the runway. The engines were shut down and all persons on board disembarked without any injury. From the CVR recordings, the PF told the PM that he mistook the brightly illuminated left runway edge lights for the runway centreline and apologized for the error of judgement for which the PM responded ‘I told you’. The aircraft was towed out of the runway and parked at GAT Apron at 21:50 h. The accident occurred at night in light rain.

5N-BMM departed Lagos at 1856 hrs for Port Harcourt on an Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) and estimated Port Harcourt at 1940 hrs. The aircraft was cleared to maintain FL330. The aircraft’s first contact with Port Harcourt was at 1914 hrs. The pilot reported maintaining FL330 with six souls onboard, four hours fuel endurance and estimating POT VOR at 1940hrs. The aircraft was cleared to POT, to maintain FL330 with no delay expected for ILS Approach Runway 21, QNH 1011 and to report when released by Lagos. At 1921 hrs the pilot reported 100 NM to POT and requested for descent. The aircraft was cleared to descend to FL150. At 1927 hrs the pilot requested for further descent and was cleared to 3,300 feet on QNH 1011 but the pilot acknowledged 3500 feet. At 1931 hrs the aircraft was re-cleared to FL090 initially due to departing traffic on Runway 03. At 1934 hrs 5N-BMM reported maintaining FL090 and was re-cleared to FL050. The aircraft was re-cleared to 2,000 feet on QNH 1011 at 1936 hrs and cleared for the straight-in ILS Approach Runway 21 and to report on the localizer. At 1947 hrs the pilot reported final for Runway 21 and was asked to contact Tower on 119.2 and the Tower asked 5N-BMM to report on glide slope Runway 21. At 1950 hrs the Tower asked 5N-BMM to confirm on the glide slope and the crew confirmed “Charlie, we have three miles to run”. The Tower cleared 5N-BMM to land with surface wind calm but to exercise caution since the Runway surface was wet and 5N-BMM responded “wind calm”. At 1952:26 hrs the auto voice callout "minimums minimums” alerted the crew. At 1952:40 hrs the pilot flying (PF) said "I am not on the centerline". At 1952:48 hrs he said "I can't see down". At 1952:55 hrs the pilot monitoring (PM) said to the pilot flying; " I am telling you to go down" and the pilot flying said " I will go down", five seconds later the aircraft crashed. The crew exited the aircraft without accomplishing the Emergency Evacuation Checklist and therefore left the right engine running for about 28 minutes after the crash. The Fire Service eventually used their water hose to shutdown the running engine. At 19:54 hrs the Tower called 5N-BMM to pass on the landing time as 19:53 hrs, but no response from 5N-BMM. There was no indication that the aircraft was taxing on the Runway because it was dark and no light was visible hence the need to alert the Fire personnel. The watch room was asked to give the Tower information, which they could not give since they do not have a two – way contact with the Fire trucks. The Tower could not raise the Fire truck since there was no two - way communication between them; however, the Fire truck was later cleared to proceed to the Runway as the Tower could not ascertain the position of the aircraft. The aircraft was actually turned 90° because of the big culvert that held the right wing and made the aircraft spin and turned 90o facing the runway, two meters from the active runway, the culvert was uprooted due to the aircraft impact forces. The wheel broke off because of the gully that runs parallel to the runway.

After landing at Port Harcourt Airport, the aircraft skidded then veered off runway and came to rest. All 52 occupants were rescued, among them 10 were slightly injured. The aircraft was damaged beyond repair. All passengers were members of the intervention group taking part to a disaster response operation.

On 14th July, 2008 at 16:49 h, a Boeing 737–282 aircraft with nationality and registration marks 5N-BIG, operated by Chanchangi Airlines Ltd, commenced a scheduled domestic flight from Murtala Muhammed International Airport, (DNMM) with call sign NCH138 for Port Harcourt International Airport (DNPO). Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) flight plan was filed for the flight. There were 47 persons on board (41 passengers, 2 flight crew and 4 flight attendants) and 3 hours fuel endurance. The Captain was the Pilot Flying (PF) and The First Officer (FO) was the Pilot Monitoring (PM). The FO stated that NCH138 was initially scheduled to depart at 15:30 h, but the flight was delayed due to loading of passenger baggage. The Captain stated that NCH138 was cleared to FL290 and the flight continued normally. According to the DNPO Air Traffic Control (ATC) watch supervisor on duty, NCH138 contacted DNPO Approach Control (APP) at 17:05 h with flight information estimating POT at 17:50 h. NCH138 was issued an inbound clearance to POT1 VOR2 with the following weather information for 17:00 h as: Wind calm, Visibility 10 km, Broken clouds 270 m, Scattered clouds 600 m, Cumulonimbus clouds scattered, temperature 25/24°C, Thunderstorms, Temporarily Variable 8 kt, gusting 18 kt, Visibility 3000 m, Thunderstorms and rain, and expect runway (RWY) 21 for landing. According to the First Officer NCH138 requested descent into POT at about 100 NM. The Captain added that due to ATC delay, the descent commenced at about 80 NM. The Control Tower Watch Supervisor stated that at 18:00 h, NCH138 requested to hold over POT at 3500 ft for weather improvement, because there was rain overhead the station with build-up closing in at the threshold of RWY 21. At about 15 NM, between radials 180° and 210°, NCH138 reported breaking out of weather. At 18:19 h, NCH138 requested weather information from the Tower. Tower advised the flight crew that RWY 03 was better for landing. At this time, NCH138 requested RWY 03 for approach and Approach Control cleared NCH138 for the approach to RWY 03. At 18:27 h, the flight crew reported established on approach to RWY 03, leaving 2000 ft. The Approach Control then transferred NCH138 to DNPO Tower for landing instructions. At 18:28 h, the Tower instructed NCH138 to report field in sight. The flight crew acknowledged and reported RWY 03 in sight. Tower cleared NCH138 to land on RWY 03 and NCH138 was cautioned that the runway was wet. At 18:34 h, NCH138 executed and reported a missed approach. NCH138 requested a climb to 3500 ft. NCH138 was cleared to climb and instructed to report overhead POT. At 18:39 h, NCH138 requested a descent and clearance for an approach to RWY 21. Approach Control cleared NCH138 to descend to 2000 ft and report to Tower when established on the approach and also to report leaving 2000 ft. At 18:42 h, NCH138 reported inbound maintaining 2000 ft. The Approach Control requested the distance from the runway and sought consent of NCH138 for Arik 514 at the holding point to take off. NCH138 declined, as they were about 10 miles to touchdown. At 18:45 h, NCH138 reported five miles to touchdown. Approach Control acknowledged and instructed NCH138 to report field in sight and thereafter handed over to Tower on 119.2 MHz. When contacting the Tower, NCH138 was cleared to land on RWY 21, wind 0100 /10 kt and was advised to exercise caution due to wet runway. NCH138 acknowledged the clearance. NCH138 landed hard and bounced three times on the runway. According to the ATC controller, after touch down the aircraft rolled in an s-pattern before it overran the runway. NCH138 made a 180° turn with the right engine hitting the ground. The aircraft came to a final stop on the left side and 10 m beyond the stopway. The accident occurred at night in Instrument Meteorological Conditions (IMC). The Aerodrome Rescue and Fire Fighting Service (ARFFS) arrived the scene and commenced rescue operations immediately. All occupants on board were evacuated; one passenger sustaining a minor injury.

The aircraft with call sign OSL 1 145 which departed Abuja at 1225 hrs UTC (1.25 pm local time) with endurance of 2 hours 40 minutes was on a scheduled passenger flight enroute Port Harcourt with 110 Persons on Board (103 Passengers and 7 Crew) and the flight continued normally. At 1241 hours UTC, the aircraft cruising at FL240 (24,000ft) Above Sea Level (ASL) got in contact with Port Harcourt Approach Control. The Approach control gave the OSL 1145 in - bound clearance to expect no delay on ILS Approach to runway 21, QNH of 1008 and temperature of 33° C. At about 1242 hours UTC (1.42pm local), the Approach controller passed the 1230 hours UTC weather report to the aircraft as follows: Wind - 260° /02kts Visibility - 12km Weather - Nil Cloud - BKN 420m, few CB (N-SE) at 690m QNH - 1008HPA Temperature - 33° C. About 1250 hours UTC (1.50 pm local), the aircraft, which was 90 nautical miles to the station, contacted Approach Control for initial descent clearance and was cleared down to FL 160. The aircraft continued its descent until about 1300 hours UTC (2.00 pm local) when the crew asked Approach Control whether it was raining over the station to which the controller reported negative rain but scattered CB and the crew acknowledged. At 1304 hours UTC, the crew reported established on the glide and the localizer at 8 nautical miles to touch down. Then the Approach controller informed the aircraft of precipitation approaching the station from the direction of runway 21 and passed the aircraft to Tower for landing instructions. At 1305 hours UTC, the aircraft contacted Tower and reported established on glide and localizer at 6 nautical miles to touch down. The controller then cleared the airplane to land on runway 21 but to exercise caution as the runway surface was slightly wet and the pilot acknowledged. At about 1308 hours UTC, the aircraft made impact with the grass strip between runway 21 and taxiway i.e. 70m to the left of the runway edge, and 540m from the runway 21 threshold. At about 60m from the first impact, the aircraft tail section impacted heavily with a concrete drainage culvert. The airplane then disintegrated and caught fire along its path spanning over 790m. The cockpit section and the forward fuselage were found at about 330m from the rest of the wreckage further down on the taxiway creating a total wreckage trail of 1 120m. Fire and rescue operations were carried out after which 7 survivors and 103 bodies were recovered. Five of the survivors died later in the hospital. The accident occurred in `Instrument Meteorological Conditions' (IMC) during the day.

On the day of the accident, the aircraft departed Abuja with the call Sign SXC401 en route Port Harcourt conveying 2 passengers on revenue basis. Before the commencement of the flight, the Chief Engineer was reported to have replaced the "Carbon brush" of the starboard starter generator. The source of this pair of carbon brushes is questionable. This flight was uneventful as the passengers disembarked and the aircraft picked up fuel for Port Harcourt. The aircraft departed Port Harcourt at 1750 hrs UTC with five souls on board (all crewmembers), estimating Calabar at 1827 hrs UTC. At 1800 hrs UTC, the aircraft was in contact with Calabar Tower at 5,000 feet, reporting 5 Souls-On-Board and an endurance of 3 hrs 30 minutes. The crew also requested for the hourly weather report and the control tower passed the 1700 hours weather report as "surface wind 140°/ 09 knots, visibility 10km, slight thunderstorm, cloud base scattered 300 metres, few CB N-SE 690 m broken at 9,000 m, QNH 1008 and temperature 27°C". The aircraft was also instructed to maintain the 5,000 feet level and to expect no delay for the VOR approach to runway 03. At 1809 hrs UTC, the aircraft was at 35 nautical miles to the station when the pilot requested for descent clearance and the controller gave him a clearance to 2,500 feet and to position for a straight-in approach to runway 03 and the crew acknowledged. At 1824 hrs UTC, the pilot reported having electrical problem and therefore declared emergency. Thereafter, the pilot requested for increase in the intensity of the approach lights, the controller informed him that the approach lights were, already, at their maximum intensity. The controller procedurally then requested for the aircraft's altitude but the response of the pilot was "we are coming to Calabar" and at 1830 hrs the aircraft reported 16 nautical miles to Calabar. The control tower at 1833 hrs UTC, wanted to establish the position of the aircraft by requesting repeatedly "Your position? Your position?" to which the response was "standby, standby". The verbal query continued until 1842 hrs and when there was no response from the aircraft, the controller alerted the airport fire services to be on the standby for further instructions. When the controller could no longer establish contact with the aircraft, he then contacted the relevant agencies for search and rescue operations. Meanwhile, the aircraft on descent impacted trees and crashed in a marshy area located 22 km from the airport. The aircraft was destroyed and all five occupants were killed.

The aircraft departed Luxembourg-Findel Airport on a cargo flight to Johannesburg with an intermediate stop in Port Harcourt, carrying nine passengers, four crew members and a load consisting of almost 60 tons of electronics. On a night approach to Port Harcourt Airport, the copilot who was the pilot-in-command failed to comply with the company published procedures and carried a non-standard autopilot approach, tracking a localizer radial inbound and descending using the vertical speed mode as reference. On short final, the crew failed to realize his altitude was insufficient when the aircraft struck the ground 700 metres short of runway. The undercarriage was torn off and the aircraft slid for few dozen metres before coming to rest with its front section that broke away, bursting into flames. A crew member was killed, seven occupants were injured and five escaped uninjured. The aircraft was partially destroyed by fire.

For unknown reasons, the four engine aircraft belly landed at Port Harcourt Airport and was damaged beyond repair. All 15 occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair. It is unknown if the mishap was the consequence of a technical issue or crew error.

While descending to Port Harcourt Airport, the pilot-in-command established a visual contact with the runway lights at an altitude of 2,500 feet. The approach was continued when few seconds later, while the crew was thinking his altitude was 390 feet, the aircraft collided with trees. The captain decided to initiate a go-around procedure but all four engines failed to respond properly. The aircraft continued to descend and struck the ground 250 metres short of runway threshold. Upon impact, the undercarriage were torn off and the aircraft slid for few dozen metres before coming to rest. All four crew members escaped uninjured and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair. It was reported that the aircraft was unstable on final approach.