Lagos

Following an uneventful flight from Port Harcourt, the crew initiated the approach to Lagos-Murtala Muhammed Airport in poor weather conditions with heavy rain falls due to CB's at 1,900 feet. On final, he was cleared to land on runway 18R and informed about a wet runway surface. Both main landing gears touched down normally and when the nose gear landed as well, both wheels apparently separated. The nose gear leg ripped the ground and the airplane rolled for few dozen metres before coming to rest. All 139 occupants evacuated safely and the airplane was later considered as damaged beyond repair.

The crew discussed some concerns about the aircraft prior to departure but at this time we are not prepared to elaborate on those concerns as there remains a lot of work to complete on the CVR analysis in order to determine the specific nature of the crew’s concerns. Associated 361 was cleared for take-off on runway one eight left at Lagos international airport. The wind was calm and weather is not considered a factor in this accident. Approximately 4 seconds after engine power was advanced to commence the take-off roll, the crew received an automated warning from the onboard computer voice which consisted of three chimes followed by “Take-off Flaps…Take-off Flaps”. This is a configuration warning that suggests that the flaps were not in the correct position for take-off and there is some evidence that the crew may have chosen not to use flaps for the take-off. The warning did not appear to come as any surprise to the crew and they continued normally with the take-off. This warning continues throughout the take-off roll. As we are in the process of verifying the accuracy of the flight data, we have not yet been able to confirm the actual flap setting however we expect to determine this in the fullness of time. It was determined from the CVR that the pilot flying was the Captain and the pilot monitoring and assisting was the First Officer. The ‘set power‘ call was made by the Captain and the ‘power is set’ call was confirmed by the First Officer as expected in normal operations. Approximately 3 seconds after the ‘power is set’ call, the First Officer noted that the aircraft was moving slowly. Approximately 7 seconds after the ‘power is set’ call, the internal Aircraft Voice warning system could be heard stating ‘Take off Flaps, Auto Feather’. Auto feather refers to the pitch of the propeller blades. In the feather position, the propeller does not produce any thrust. The FDR contains several engine related parameters which the AIB is studying. At this time, we can state that the Right engine appears to be producing considerably less thrust than the Left engine. The left engine appeared to be working normally. The aircraft automated voice continued to repeat ‘Take-off Flaps, Auto Feather’. The physical examination of the wreckage revealed that the right engine propeller was in the feather position and the engine fire handle was pulled/activated. The standard ‘eighty knots’ call was made by the First Officer. The first evidence that the crew indicated that there was a problem with the take-off roll was immediately following the ‘eighty knots’ call. The First Officer asked if the take- off should be aborted approximately 12 seconds after the ‘eighty knots’ callout. Our investigation team estimates the airspeed to be approximately 95 knots. Airspeed was one of the parameters that, while working in the cockpit, appeared not to be working on the Flight Data Recorder. We were able to estimate the speed based on the radar data that we synchronized to the FDR and CVR but it is very approximate because of this. In response to the First Officer’s question to abort, the Captain indicated that they should continue and they continued the take-off roll. The crew did not make a ‘V1’ call or a Vr’ call. V1 is the speed at which a decision to abort or continue a take-off is made. Vr is the speed at which it is planned to rotate the aircraft. Normally the non-flying pilot calls both the V1 and the Vr speeds. When Vr is called the flying pilot pulls back on the control column and the aircraft is rotated (pitched up) to climb away from the runway. During the rotation, the First Officer stated ‘gently’, which we believe reflects concern that the aircraft is not performing normally and therefore needs to be rotated very gently so as not to aerodynamically stall the aircraft. The First Officer indicated that the aircraft was not climbing and advised the Captain who was flying not to stall the aircraft. Higher climb angles can cause an aerodynamic stall. If the aircraft is not producing enough overall thrust, it is difficult or impossible to climb without the risk of an aerodynamic stall. Immediately after lift-off, the aircraft slowly veered off the runway heading to the right and was not climbing properly. This aircraft behavior appears to have resulted in the Air Traffic Controller asking Flight 361 if operation was normal. Flight 361 never responded. Less than 10 seconds after rotation of the aircraft to climb away from the runway, the stall warning sounded in the cockpit and continued to the end of the recording. The flight data shows characteristics consistent with an aerodynamic stall. 31 seconds after the stall warning was heard, the aircraft impacted the ground in a nose down near 90° right bank.

On 3rd June, 2012 at about 1545:00hrs, 5N-RAM, a Boeing MD-83, a domestic scheduled commercial flight, operated by Dana Airlines (Nig.) Limited as flight 0992 (DANACO 0992), crashed into a densely populated area of Iju-Ishaga, a suburb of Lagos, following engine number 1 loss of power seventeen minutes into the flight and engine number 2 loss of power while on final approach to Murtala Muhammed Airport Lagos, Nigeria. Visual Meteorological Conditions prevailed at the time and the airplane was on an instrument flight plan. All 153 persons onboard the airplane, including the six crew were fatally injured. There were also six confirmed ground fatalities. The airplane was destroyed. There was post impact fire. The flight originated at Abuja (ABV) and the destination was Lagos (LOS). The airplane was on the fourth flight segment of the day, consisting of two round-trips between Lagos and Abuja. The accident occurred during the return leg of the second trip. DANACO 0992 was on final approach to runway 18R at LOS when the crew declared a Mayday call “Dual Engine Failure – negative response from the throttles.” According to records, the flight arrived ABV as Dana Air flight 0993 at about 1350:00hrs and routine turn-around activities were carried out. DANACO 0992 initiated engine start up at 1436:00hrs. Abuja Control Tower cleared the aircraft to taxi to the holding point of runway 04. En-route ATC clearance was passed on to DANACO 0992 on approaching holding point of runway 04. According to the ATC ground recorder transcript, the aircraft was cleared to line-up on runway 04 and wait, but the crew requested for some time before lining-up. DANACO 0992 was airborne at 1458:00hrs after reporting a fuel endurance of 3 hours 30 minutes. The aircraft made contact with Lagos Area Control Centre at 1518:00hrs and reported 1545:00hrs as the estimated time of arrival at LOS at cruising altitude of 26,000 ft. The Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR) retained about 30 minutes 53 seconds of the flight and started recording at 1513:44hrs by which time the Captain and First Officer (F/O) were in a discussion of a non-normal condition regarding the correlation between the engine throttle setting and an engine power indication. However, they did not voice concerns then that the condition would affect the continuation of the flight. The flight crew continued to monitor the condition and became increasingly concerned as the flight transitioned through the initial descent from cruise altitude at 1522:00hrs and the subsequent approach phase. DANACO 0992 reported passing 18,100ft and 7,700ft, at 1530:00hrs and 1540:00hrs respectively. After receiving radar vectors in heading and altitude from the Controller, the aircraft was issued the final heading to intercept the final approach course for runway 18R. According to CVR transcript, at 1527:30hrs the F/O advised the Captain to use runway 18R for landing and the request was made at 1531:49hrs and subsequently approved by the Radar Controller. The crew accordingly changed the decision height to correspond with runway 18R. At 1531:12hrs, the crew confirmed that there was no throttle response on the left engine and subsequently the Captain took over control as Pilot Flying (PF) at 1531:27hrs. The flight was however continued towards Lagos with no declaration of any distress message. With the confirmation of throttle response on the right engine, the engine anti-ice, ignition and bleed-air were all switched off. At 1532:05hrs, the crew observed the loss of thrust in No.1 Engine of the aircraft. During the period between 1537:00hrs and 1541:00hrs, the flight crew engaged in prelanding tasks including deployment of the slats, and extension of the flaps and landing gears. At 1541:46hrs the First Officer inquired, "both engines coming up?" and the Captain replied “negative” at 1541:48hrs. The flight crew subsequently discussed and agreed to declare an emergency. At 1542:10hrs, DANACO 0992 radioed an emergency distress call indicating "dual engine failure . . . negative response from throttle." At 1542:35hrs, the flight crew lowered the flaps further and continued with the approach and discussed landing alternatively on runway 18L. At 1542:45hrs, the Captain reported the runway in sight and instructed the F/O to retract the flaps and four seconds later to retract the landing gears. At 1543:27hrs, the Captain informed the F/O, "we just lost everything, we lost an engine. I lost both engines". During the next 25 seconds until the end of the CVR recording, the flight crew attempted to recover engine power without reference to any Checklist. The airplane crashed into a densely populated residential area about 5.8 miles north of LOS. The airplane wreckage was approximately on the extended centreline of runway 18R, with the main wreckage concentrated at N 06o 40.310’ E 003o 18.837' coordinates, with elevation of 177ft. During the impact sequence, the airplane struck an uncompleted building, two trees and three other buildings. The wreckage was confined in a small area, with the separated tail section and engines located at the beginning of the debris trail. The airplane was mostly consumed by post crash fire. The tail section, both engines and portions of both wings representing only about 15% of the airplane, were recovered from the accident site for further examination.

On the day of the accident, Flight DV110 routing was Abidjan – Accra - Lagos. It departed Abidjan at 1015 hrs for Lagos via Accra. The aircraft finally departed Accra for Lagos at 1145 hrs with a total declared cargo weight of 50014 lbs (22733 kgs). The aircraft contacted Lagos Area Control at 1242 hrs, while maintaining FL 210 (21, 000ft) and was given an in-bound clearance to Lagos VOR (LAG) for ILS approach on runway 18L. At 1252 hrs, Lagos Approach cleared it to FL050 (5,000 feet) and at 12 NM, it was further cleared down to 3500ft on QNH 1013 hpa, and finally to 2,200 feet and to report established on the ILS. At 4 NM to the runway, the aircraft reported fully established on the ILS and was handed over to Control Tower for landing instructions. At 1303 hrs and 2 NM to the runway, the aircraft was cleared to land on runway 18L but to exercise caution, as the runway surface was wet. The cloud was low; the Captain said in his statement that the cloud base was about 100 feet above minimum. Speci weather was also available to the crew. The pilot was advised to exercise caution due to the rain and the weather at that time. In spite of all the warnings the copilot was still allowed to proceed with the landing. At the point of touch down the captain observed that it was impossible to stop on the runway and he called for a go-around. The procedure was not properly executed and thus the aircraft overshot the runway 400m into the grass area. There was no fire outbreak and no injury was sustained by any of the crew members. There was serious damage to the aircraft.

The crew departed Brussels on a cargo flight to Johannesburg with an intermediate stop in Lagos. On approach by night, the crew was cleared to land on runway 19R that was closed to traffic due to resurfacing process. After touchdown, the aircraft collided with several equipments then veered off runway to the left and came to rest. All nine occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair. ATC cleared the crew to land on runway 19R while the runway 19L was the one in service at the time of the accident.

Few minutes after takeoff from Lagos-Murtala Muhammed Airport, en route to Calabar, the pilot informed ATC about engine problems and was cleared to return. He apparently attempted an emergency landing when the aircraft struck a tree and crashed in Igbogbo, in the southern suburb of Ikorodu, about 25 km east of Lagos Airport. A passenger was seriously injured while the pilot and the second passenger were killed.

On final approach to Lagos-Murtala Muhammed Airport, both engines failed simultaneously due to fuel exhaustion. The aircraft lost height, collided with approach lights and crashed short of runway threshold. All four occupants escaped with minor injuries while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair. The exact date of the mishap remains unknown, somewhere in May 2001.

After takeoff from Port Harcourt Airport, the crew was cleared to climb to FL240. At 15:47 the flight established initial contact with Lagos Approach Control, and was assigned a transponder code. At 15:54 the flight reported crossing SEPER point. After this position report, the flight appeared not to be maintaining a listening watch, as it gave no reply to two consecutive calls from Approach Control, and then after some time replied to a transmission not meant for it. At the same time a Triax Airlines Boeing 727 (Flight TIX185) had departed Lagos and was flying at FL160 towards Enugu. The Lagos controller had terminated contact with the Triax aircraft when the ADC crew requested to descend. The permission to descend was delayed to allow a corporate jet (5N-APN) to pass beneath the 727 at FL210. At 15:59 Lagos Approach Control then cleared the flight to FL160 and subsequently requested the flight to contact Lagos Radar. The flight was identified by Lagos Radar 41 miles south-east of the airport, and instructed it to fly the heading of 320° to avoid Triax flight 185, and to descend to FL50. At 16:02.50 Lagos Radar instructed the aircraft two times in succession to maintain heading 300. The captain then took over control from the copilot by stating: "I have it." At 16:03.08 the flight reported: "I have the traffic... and I continue my heading to 330 to avoid him". This was the last transmission. The records of the FDR show that flight 086 was maintaining a steady coordinated turn towards heading 330 for the first 10 seconds of the last 50 seconds of the flight. After 15 seconds, the airplane was put in bank angle of 43.2°. It maintained this configuration for 10 seconds before the bank angle increased to 68.8 degrees. This attitude was observed for 5.5 seconds before it was further increased to 83 degrees. The airplane must have suffered from high speed stall and gone into a roll with a nose down attitude. The aircraft appeared to be recovering just before it impacted the lagoon water because it succeeded in reducing the vertical acceleration from 8.44 to 2.1 G and the bank angle to 61.6°. But it did not have sufficient height to make a full recovery and crashed in the lagoon about 7,5 km west of Ejirin. The wreckage was found in the afternoon of the following day. The aircraft disintegrated on impact and all 144 occupants were killed.

Following an uneventful flight from Kaduna, the crew started the approach to Lagos-Murtala Muhammed Airport in poor weather conditions with heavy rain falls and strong winds. On short final, the wind changed to a tail component and became stronger. This caused the aircraft to land too far down the runway, about 1,000 metres past the runway threshold. On a wet runway surface, the aircraft was unable to stop within the remaining distance, overran, struck the concrete structure of a drainage ditch and came to rest 147 metres further, bursting into flames. 65 people were rescued while 15 passengers were killed. The aircraft was destroyed.

On approach to Lagos-Murtala Muhammed Airport, the crew encountered poor weather conditions with heavy rain falls and strong winds. The copilot was in command and the airplane was too high on approach so the captain took over controls and steeped the approach. Nevertheless, the aircraft was still too high over runway 19L threshold when it encountered severe downdraft. It nosed down and struck the runway surface nose gear first. It bounced, veered off runway to the left, rolled to the apron and eventually collided with a parked Fokker F27 Friendship 200MP of the Nigerian Air Force registered NAF908. Both aircraft were destroyed and one of the pilot on board the Twin Otter was killed, all eight other occupants were injured.