Scheduled Revenue Flight

The captain, who was flying the Twin Otter from the right seat, entered a right hand traffic pattern for landing. A left quartering, 15 knot headwind, was gusting across the airport. Upon turning to the final approach the captain reduced the aircraft's engine power to the low speed range for the visual approach. As the aircraft neared the runway the rate of descent accelerated. The captain's application of full engine power failed to arrest the aircraft's rate of descent and the aircraft impacted the ground short of the runway. All 16 occupants were injured.

During the flight preparation, none of the people involved (meteo, operations) informed the crew about the possible degradation of weather conditions en route. The single engine aircraft departed Rovno Airport at 1407LT bound for Vladimirets, carrying 13 passengers and two pilots. Two minutes after takeoff, the crew was informed by ATC about the arrival of a cold front with turbulences and rain about 10 km ahead. The crew failed to respond to this alert message and continued. Eight minutes later, while flying at low height in heavy rain falls, the engine failed. The aircraft lost height, struck tree tops and crashed in a forest. All 15 occupants were injured and the aircraft was destroyed.

On final approach to Posadas-Libertador General José de San Martín Airport, the crew encountered heavy fog with visibility down to 100 meters. The crew passed the decision height and continued the approach until the aircraft struck the tops of eucalyptus trees and crashed in a dense wooded area located 3 km short of runway 01, bursting into flames. The aircraft was totally destroyed and all 22 occupants were killed.

The number one (left) engine failed during the takeoff from runway 35. It was reported that the aircraft yawed sharply left and climbed to between 50 and 100 feet agl before it began losing altitude. The aircraft struck the ground and continued to move forward on the ground several hundred feet until it struck the airport perimeter fence. The aircraft came to rest 1,600 feet west of the runway, on a heading of 290°. A post-crash fire destroyed the cargo area of the aircraft. Examination of the left engine revealed a compressor turbine blade airfoil separation. Disassembly of the propeller on the left engine indicated that the propeller had autofeathered normally after the engine failed. The captain reportedly made the takeoff. All eight occupants were injured, two seriously. The aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

During the takeoff roll on runway 07, at V1 speed, the captain started the rotation but the aircraft failed to respond. The crew decided to abandon the takeoff procedure and initiated an emergency braking maneuver. unable to stop within the remaining distance, the aircraft overran, crossed a ditch and came to rest in a field, bursting into flames. All 26 occupants escaped with minor injuries while the aircraft was destroyed by a post crash fire.

A rejected takeoff was attempted when the slat disagree light illuminated and the takeoff warning horn sounded at 166 knots (V1). The pilot aborted the takeoff, but the aircraft accelerated to 178 knots ground speed before it began to decelerate. The deceleration was normal until 130 knots where an unexpected rapid decay in the deceleration occurred. The aircraft ran off the end of the runway at 95 knots, the nose gear collapsed, and the aircraft came to a stop 1,100 feet beyond the end of the runway. Eight of the ten brake sets failed. Post-accident exam of the brakes revealed that excessive brake wear occurred during the rejected takeoff. Testing showed that dc-10 worn brakes have a much greater wear rate during an rto. The faa does not require worn brake testing. Douglas did not use brake wear data from rto certification tests to set more conservative brake wear replacement limits. New brakes were used for those tests. All 254 occupants were evacuated, among them eight were injured, two seriously. The aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

While taking off from the bay at Rivers Inlet, the seaplane was caught by strong winds, causing a wing to hit the water surface. The aircraft went out of control and came to rest. All seven occupants were uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Widerøe flight 710 took off from Trondheim (TRD), Norway, at 19:23 local time on a domestic light to Namsos (OSY), Brønnøysund (BNN), Sandnessjøen (SSJ) and Bodø Airport (BOO).
The flight to Namsos was uneventful. The aircraft took off from Namsos at 20:07 and contacted Trondheim ACC six minutes later, stating that they were climbing from FL70 to FL90. At 20:20 the crew began their descent for Brønnøysund and switched frequencies to Brønnøysund AFIS. Weather reported at Brønnøysund was: wind 220°/05 kts, visibility 9 km, 3/8 stratus at 600 feet and 6/8 at 1000 feet, temperature +6 C, QNH 1022 MB. The crew executed a VOR/DME approach to Brønnøysund's runway 04, followed by a circle for landing on runway 22. The crew left the prescribed altitude 4 NM early. The aircraft descended until it flew into the Torghatten hillside at 560 feet. A retired police officer reported in July 2013 that a passenger had taken a mobile phone on board. The police officer disembarked the plane at Namsos, a stop-over and reported that the passenger with the mobile phone was seated in the cockpits jump-seat. After the accident, he reported this fact to the Joint Rescue Coordination Centre (JRCC). After reading the investigation report during the 25th anniversary of the accident, he noticed that there was no mention of the mobile phone.
NMT 450 network-based mobiles at the time were fitted with a 15-watt transmitter and a powerful battery which could lead to disruption in electronic equipment. The Norwegian AIB conducted an investigation to determine if electronic interference from the mobile phone might have affected the flight instruments. The AIB concluded that there was no evidence to support the theory that there was any kind of interference.

On April 28, 1988, an Aloha Airline Boeing 737, N73711, was scheduled for a series of interisland flights in Hawaii. The crew flew three uneventful roundtrip flights, one each from Honolulu to Hilo (ITO), Kahului Airport, HI (OGG) on the island of Maui, and Kauai Island Airport (LIH). At 11:00, a scheduled first officer change took place for the remainder of the day. The crew flew from Honolulu to Maui and then from Maui to Hilo. At 13:25, flight 243 departed Hilo Airport en route to Honolulu. The first officer conducted the takeoff and en route climb to FL240 in VMC. As the airplane leveled at 24,000 feet, both pilots heard a loud "clap" or "whooshing" sound followed by a wind noise behind them. The first officer's head was jerked backward, and she stated that debris, including pieces of gray insulation, was floating in the cockpit. The captain observed that the cockpit entry door was missing and that "there was blue sky where the first-class ceiling had been." The captain immediately took over the controls of the airplane. He described the airplane attitude as rolling slightly left and right and that the flight controls felt "loose." Because of the decompression, both pilots and the air traffic controller in the observer seat donned their oxygen masks. The captain began an emergency descent. He stated that he extended the speed brakes and descended at an indicated airspeed (IAS) of 280 to 290 knots. Because of ambient noise, the pilots initially used hand signals to communicate. The first officer stated that she observed a rate of descent of 4,100 feet per minute at some point during the emergency descent. The captain also stated that he actuated the passenger oxygen switch. The passenger oxygen manual tee handle was not actuated. When the decompression occurred, all the passengers were seated and the seat belt sign was illuminated. The No. 1 flight attendant reportedly was standing at seat row 5. According to passenger observations, the flight attendant was immediately swept out of the cabin through a hole in the left side of the fuselage. The No. 2 flight attendant, standing by row 15/16, was thrown to the floor and sustained minor bruises. She was subsequently able to crawl up and down the aisle to render assistance and calm the passengers. The No. 3 flight attendant, standing at row 2, was struck in the head by debris and thrown to the floor. She suffered serious injuries. The first officer tuned the transponder to emergency code 7700 and attempted to notify Honolulu Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC) that the flight was diverting to Maui. Because of the cockpit noise level, she could not hear any radio transmissions, and she was not sure if the Honolulu ARTCC heard the communication. Although Honolulu ARTCC did not receive the first officer's initial communication, the controller working flight 243 observed an emergency code 7700 transponder return about 23 nautical miles south-southeast of the Kahalui Airport, Maui. Starting at 13:48:15, the controller attempted to communicate with the flight several times without success. When the airplane descended through 14,000 feet, the first officer switched the radio to the Maui Tower frequency. At 13:48:35, she informed the tower of the rapid decompression, declared an emergency, and stated the need for emergency equipment. The local controller instructed flight 243 to change to the Maui Sector transponder code to identify the flight and indicate to surrounding air traffic control (ATC) facilities that the flight was being handled by the Maui ATC facility. The first officer changed the transponder as requested. At 13:50:58, the local controller requested the flight to switch frequencies to approach control because the flight was outside radar coverage for the local controller. Although the request was acknowledged, Flight 243 continued to transmit on the local controller frequency. At 13:53:44, the first officer informed the local controller, "We're going to need assistance. We cannot communicate with the flight attendants. We'll need assistance for the passengers when we land." An ambulance request was not initiated as a result of this radio call. The captain stated that he began slowing the airplane as the flight approached 10,000 feet msl. He retracted the speed brakes, removed his oxygen mask, and began a gradual turn toward Maui's runway 02. At 210 knots IAS, the flightcrew could communicate verbally. Initially flaps 1 were selected, then flaps 5. When attempting to extend beyond flaps 5, the airplane became less controllable, and the captain decided to return to flaps 5 for the landing. Because the captain found the airplane becoming less controllable below 170 knots IAS, he elected to use 170 knots IAS for the approach and landing. Using the public address (PA) system and on-board interphone, the first officer attempted to communicate with the flight attendants; however, there was no response. At the command of the captain, the first officer lowered the landing gear at the normal point in the approach pattern. The main gear indicated down and locked; however, the nose gear position indicator light did not illuminate. Manual nose gear extension was selected and still the green indicator light did not illuminate; however, the red landing gear unsafe indicator light was not illuminated. After another manual attempt, the handle was placed down to complete the manual gear extension procedure. The captain said no attempt was made to use the nose gear downlock viewer because the center jumpseat was occupied and the captain believed it was urgent to land the airplane immediately. At 13:55:05, the first officer advised the tower, "We won't have a nose gear," and at 13:56:14, the crew advised the tower, "We'll need all the equipment you've got." While advancing the power levers to maneuver for the approach, the captain sensed a yawing motion and determined that the No.1 (left) engine had failed. At 170 to 200 knots IAS, he placed the No. 1 engine start switch to the "flight" position in an attempt to start the engine; there was no response. A normal descent profile was established 4 miles out on the final approach. The captain said that the airplane was "shaking a little, rocking slightly and felt springy." Flight 243 landed on runway 02 at Maui's Kahului Airport at 13:58:45. The captain said that he was able to make a normal touchdown and landing rollout. He used the No. 2 engine thrust reverser and brakes to stop the airplane. During the latter part of the rollout, the flaps were extended to 40° as required for an evacuation. An emergency evacuation was then accomplished on the runway.

After being cleared, the crew initiated the descent from 3,000 meters to 2,700 meters then continued when, at an altitude of 2,226 meters, the twin engine aircraft struck the slope of a mountain located 74 km from Bagdarin Airport. The aircraft disintegrated on impact and all 17 occupants were killed. At the time of the accident, the visibility was poor due to low clouds and snow falls.