Crash of an Antonov AN-2T near Nogliki

Date & Time: Apr 18, 1988
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
CCCP-35420
Flight Phase:
Site:
MSN:
1 133 473 04
YOM:
1960
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
0
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
En route, the crew entered an area of poor visibility due to low clouds when the aircraft encountered downdrafts and crashed onto a hill. Occupant's fate unknown.

Crash of a De Havilland Dash-8-100 in Seattle

Date & Time: Apr 16, 1988 at 1832 LT
Operator:
Registration:
N819PH
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Seattle - Spokane
MSN:
061
YOM:
1986
Flight number:
QX2658
Crew on board:
3
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
37
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
9328
Captain / Total hours on type:
981.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
3849
Copilot / Total hours on type:
642
Aircraft flight hours:
3106
Aircraft flight cycles:
4097
Circumstances:
Shortly after takeoff from Seattle-Tacoma Intl Airport, the crew noted a right engine power loss and decided to return for a precautionary landing. After lowering the landing gear, a massive fire was discovered in the right engine nacelle. After landing, directional control and all braking were lost. The aircraft departed the left side of the runway 16L after the left power lever was moved to flight idle. The f/o advised tower that the aircraft was out of control. The aircraft rolled onto the ramp area where it struck a runway designator sign, ground equipment, and jetways B7 and B9. The aircraft was subsequently destroyed by fire. Investigation revealed that during overhaul the high pressure fuel filter cover was improperly installed on the engine and the improper installation was not discovered drg company installation of the engine on the aircraft. This led to a massive fuel leak and the nacelle fire. The fire/explosion caused the loss of the engine panels, reducing the effectiveness of the fire suppression system and allowing other systems to be damaged.
Probable cause:
Improper installation of the high-pressure fuel filter cover that allowed a massive fuel leak and subsequent fire to occur in the right engine nacelle. The improper installation probably occurred at the engine manufacturer; however, the failure of airline maintenance personnel to detect and correct the improper installation contributed to the accident. Also contributing to the accident was the loss of the right engine centre access panels from a fuel explosion that negated the fire suppression system and allowed hydraulic line burn-through that in turn caused a total loss of airplane control on the ground.
Final Report:

Crash of a Piper PA-31-350 Navajo Chieftain off Coffs Harbour: 3 killed

Date & Time: Apr 7, 1988 at 2113 LT
Operator:
Registration:
VH-AOX
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Brisbane – Coolangatta – Coffs Harbour – Port Macquarie
MSN:
31-7552013
YOM:
1975
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
6
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
3
Circumstances:
The aircraft was operating a scheduled service from Brisbane to Port Macquarie with planned intermediate stops at Coolangatta and Coffs Harbour. Weather conditions over the route were influenced by a widespread unstable airmass. The terminal forecast for Coffs Harbour indicated a surface wind of 360/15, visibility in excess of 10 km, 5 octas stratus at 1000 ft, 5 octas cumulus at 2000 ft. Thunderstorms, associated with visibility reduced to 2000 metres were also forecast for periods of up to 30 minutes. The actual weather conditions at Coffs Harbour were generally consistent with the terminal forecast. Runway 03 was in use throughout the evening. Coffs Harbour airport was equipped with NDB, VOR and domestic DME radio navigation aids. A VOR/DME procedure was published for runway 03 approaches. For aircraft not equipped with DME, a VOR or NDB approach was available using common tracking and minimum altitude criteria. Runway 03 was also equipped with a 6 stage T-VASIS and 3 stage runway lighting. All facilities were reported as functioning normally, with the exception of the VOR which was experiencing intermittent power failures due to the effects of heavy rain. The VOR was able to be reset manually from the Coffs Harbour control tower. Although the tower was scheduled to be unmanned before the arrival of VH-HOX, the duty air traffic controller elected to man the tower until the aircraft had landed. The controller also called out a technician to attend to the VOR. The aircraft was equipped with dual ILS/VOR and ADF receivers, plus International DME. Domestic DME equipment was not fitted to the aircraft, although required by ANO 20.8. After descending in the VOR/NDB holding pattern, the aircraft was cleared for an instrument approach. The pilot had been told of the intermittent operation of the VOR and had said he would revert to the NDB. At that time the weather conditions were fluctuating about the circling minima of 950 feet (QNH) and five km visibility. The controller advised the aircraft of a heavy shower to the south of the field. The aircraft subsequently completed the approach and the pilot reported "visual". The controller said he saw the lights of the aircraft in a position consistent with a right downwind leg for a landing on runway 03. The aircraft was then cleared to land. Shortly after, the controller saw the lights of the aircraft disappear briefly, consistent with the aircraft passing through a localised area of rain/cloud. The lights then reappeared briefly, as though the aircraft was turning onto finals, before disappearing. This was immediately followed by short series of "clicks" on the tower frequency. The aircraft was called immediately but failed to respond to any calls. The accident site was located about 1070 metres short of the landing threshold, and about 750 metres to the right of the extended runway centreline. The aircraft was found to have initially struck a nine metre high tree in a nose low attitude, steeply banked to the right, on a track of 050 degrees. After striking the tree with the outboard section of the right wing, the aircraft struck other trees before hitting the ground and overturning. A fire broke out shortly after the aircraft came to rest. As a result of his remaining on duty, the controller was able to provide immediate notification of the accident to the emergency services. This action facilitated the rescue of survivors.
Probable cause:
A subsequent examination of the aircraft structure, systems and components, found no evidence of any pre-existing defect or malfunction which could have contributed to the accident. The pilot was properly licenced and qualified to conduct the flight. Evidence was provided to show that the pilot had probably flown a total of 930 hours in the previous 365 days, thereby exceeding the ANO 48 limitation of 900 hours. Other breaches of Flight and Duty Limitations were found to have occurred during the previous 12 months, however, during the three months prior to the accident no significant breaches of ANO 48 were found which could have contributed to the accident. Specialist medical advice considered the 30 hour exceedence of the 900 hour limitation was not significant in this accident. Other specialist advice was obtained concerning the possibility of the aircraft being affected by low level windshear or a microburst during the final stage of the night circling approach. It was considered this was not a factor in the accident. Considerable evidence was presented during a subsequent Coroners' Inquest concerning allegations of irregular operating practices by the operator over a period of several years prior to the accident. Much of this evidence was only provided after the granting to witnesses of immunity from prosecution. Despite this, no new evidence was presented which related to the accident flight. The investigation concluded that, on the evidence available, the aircraft was turning onto a short right base leg when it entered a localised area of rain and low cloud. The pilot was required to look out of the right cockpit window to enable him to maintain visual reference with the approach end of the runway. It is considered probable that the pilot briefly diverted his attention from the flight instruments while attempting to maintain that visual reference as the aircraft passed through an area of reduced visibility. During that period the aircraft continued to roll to the right, resulting in an inadvertent loss of height. The pilot was unable to effect a recovery before the aircraft struck trees.
The following factors were considered relevant to the development of the accident:
1. Low cloudbase, with localised rain squalls and reduced visibility.
2. Low level, right hand, night circling approach.
3. Pilot lost visual reference at a critical stage of the approach.
4. Pilot did not initiate missed approach.
5. Pilot probably diverted attention from the flight instruments.
Final Report:

Crash of a Boeing 727-21 near Cúcuta: 143 killed

Date & Time: Mar 17, 1988 at 1317 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
HK-1716
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
No
Site:
Schedule:
Bucaramanga – Cúcuta – Cartagena – Barranquilla
MSN:
18999
YOM:
1966
Flight number:
AV410
Country:
Crew on board:
7
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
136
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
143
Captain / Total flying hours:
9727
Captain / Total hours on type:
4050.00
Copilot / Total hours on type:
340
Aircraft flight hours:
43848
Circumstances:
Avianca flight 410 was destroyed when it impacted El Espartillo Mountain after takeoff from Cúcuta Airport in Colombia. All 143 occupants sustained fatal injuries. The aircraft, a Boeing 727-21 operated flight AV410 from Bucaramanga to Barranquilla, with en route stops at Cúcuta and Cartagena. Because the originally planned aircraft was not available, HK-1716 was prepared for the flight. This resulted in a departure delay of 2 hours and 30 minutes. The flight landed at Cúcuta at 12:28 local time. At 13:06, the pilot requested clearance to start, but he was told there was a 10-minute delay because of three incoming aircraft. The crew immediately requested clearance for a climb on course ("Why not clear us to climb on course to avoid delaying this flight further? We're: pretty far behind") and the tower granted their request at 13:08: "OK, cleared for engine start, climb on course VMC, report ready to taxi, temperature 28°". This, added to the anomalous presence in the cockpit of another pilot whose loquaciousness continually disrupted the work of all the crew members, affected the way in which the pilot supervised the actions of his co-pilot, who was Pilot Flying. There was no crew briefing, nor did the pilot-in command give any instructions for the VMC departure. Two minutes later the tower controller instructed them to taxi to runway 33. At 13:12 the tower reported, "Cleared to Cartagena via Uniform Whisky 19, Whisky 7, Whisky 10, climb and maintain two six zero after takeoff, climb on course VMC, QNH ....correction transponder Alpha 2216". Take-off clearance was issued at 13:13. The initial climb path followed the extended runway centre line to the inner marker, at which point the aircraft entered a continuous left turn. At 13:17 the pilot said to the copilot, "In any case, start turning right." Subsequently the aircraft struck the peak of El Espartillo at an elevation of 6,343 feet.
Probable cause:
The accident was the consequence of the following active and passive factors:
1. Active:
A. Personnel factors - Pilot-in-command - Procedures, Regulations and instructions
a) Diverted attention from operation of aircraft and failed to exercise adequate and constant supervision over the performance of his co-pilot;
b) Tolerated inappropriate interference with cockpit discipline by authorized persons with access to the flight deck;
c) Continued VFR flight into IMC.
B. Personnel factor - Non-crew pilot in cockpit - Procedures, regulations and instructions
Interfered constantly with the normal operation of the aircraft, distracting the crew from the efficient execution of their duties.
2. Passive
A. Personnel factor- Crew- Procedures, regulations and instructions: lack of teamwork on the part of the crew, reflected in the failure to coordinate the instructions needed to take off and climb out in VMC using a profile established in accordance with the specific conditions.
B. Other factors - Meeting the schedule: The delays resulting from the change of aircraft for mechanical reasons contributed to the decision by the pilot-in-command to give inappropriate support to company priorities and request to depart, rather than waiting as recommended by the Control Tower, in order to avoid adding to the delays already experienced."

Ground fire of a Tupolev TU-154B-2 at Veshchevo AFB: 9 killed

Date & Time: Mar 8, 1988 at 1910 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
CCCP-85413
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Irkutsk - Kurgan - Leningrad
MSN:
80A413
YOM:
1980
Flight number:
SU3739
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
8
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
76
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
9
Aircraft flight hours:
11411
Aircraft flight cycles:
4669
Circumstances:
At 1453LT, while in cruising altitude over Vologda on a flight from Irkutsk to Leningrad via Kurgan, a group of 11 hijackers (all from the same Oveshkin Family) informed the cabin crew that a bomb was on board and requested to be flown to London. The captain explained that he did not have sufficient fuel to fly to UK and proposed to make a stopover in Finland. In accordance with the authorities and his corporate, the captain eventually landed at the Veshchevo Airbase located 105 km northwest of Leningrad, near the Finnish border. After landing, hijackers realized they were not in Finland and open fire in the cabin. As a door could be open by a crew member, police officers entered the cabin and open fire as well. When the hijackers realized their hijacking attempt failed, two of them committed suicide. The aircraft was partially destroyed by fire and nine people were killed, five hijackers, one stewardess and three passengers. 19 other people were injured in the event.
Probable cause:
It was determined that the group of 11 hijackers were all from the same family Oveshkin, members of the jazz band christened 'Seven Simeons'. After several concerts in Japan, they were making a tour in the Soviet Union but wanted to escape to Europe. Investigations determined that one of the band bag containing a double bass was too big to be brought in the cabin but the passengers convinced the personnel at the airport to have it in the cabin. Visual and tactile controls performed by the ground security personnel was inadequate, so they failed to realize that few hand grenades and two sawed shotguns were placed in the double bottom of the double bass bag.

Crash of a Fairchild-Hiller FH-227B in Machault: 24 killed

Date & Time: Mar 4, 1988 at 0637 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
F-GCPS
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Nancy - Paris
MSN:
546
YOM:
1967
Flight number:
IJ5230
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
3
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
21
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
24
Captain / Total flying hours:
10226
Copilot / Total flying hours:
4431
Aircraft flight hours:
33142
Aircraft flight cycles:
55843
Circumstances:
Following an uneventful flight from Nancy-Essey Airport, the crew started the descent to Paris-Orly Airport and was cleared to reduce his altitude to 6,000 feet. At that time, weather conditions were marginal with poor visibility due to fog. Suddenly, the aircraft pitched down and entered an uncontrolled descent with a rate of 16,000 feet per minute during the last 20 seconds. Out of control, the aircraft struck the metallic pylon of a high voltage powerline and eventually crashed at an excessive speed of 630 km/h in an open field located in Machault, about 46 km southeast of Paris-Orly Airport. The aircraft disintegrated on impact and all 24 occupants were killed.
Probable cause:
It was determined that the electrical system failed in flight while the crew was flying under IFR mode in IMC conditions. Technical analysis and investigations were unable to determine with certainty the exact cause of the loss of control and the fatal descent. After eliminating various assumptions invalidated by the established facts and findings and after reviewing the results of flight tests conducted at its request, the commission assigned higher probability to the hypothesis that the electrical fault caused a loss of attitude reference and autopilot disconnect which would have occurred while the aircraft was configured 'out of trim' in a nose down attitude. In the absence of independent standby horizon, the crew had no usable attitude reference immediately available while the aircraft was in a high-speed dive.
The following findings were reported:
- The loss of control occurred in icing conditions,
- A third person (non crew) aged 18 was seating in the cockpit at the time of the accident,
- The aircraft's speed upon impact was 100 km/h above the max allowable speed certification.

Crash of an Embraer EMB-110P1 Bandeirante in Germiston: 17 killed

Date & Time: Mar 1, 1988 at 1728 LT
Operator:
Registration:
ZS-LGP
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Phalaborwa – Johannesburg
MSN:
110-402
YOM:
1982
Flight number:
MN206
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
15
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
17
Circumstances:
On approach to Johannesburg-Jan Smuts Airport, the twin engine aircraft suffered an in-flight explosion, broke in two and crashed in a industrial area located in Germiston, about 13 km southwest from the airport. The cockpit was found about 250 meters from the main wreckage and all 17 occupants were killed.
Probable cause:
It was determined that the accident was the consequence of an in-flight explosion caused by the detonation of a bomb. A mineworker encountering marital and financial problems boarded the plane at Phalaborwa Airport with a bomb consisting of nitroglycerin and ammonium nitrate. He recently contracted an important life insurance.

Crash of a Tupolev TU-134A in Surgut: 20 killed

Date & Time: Feb 27, 1988 at 0607 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
CCCP-65675
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Minsk – Kuybyshev – Tyumen – Surgut
MSN:
2 35 17 05
YOM:
1972
Flight number:
SU7867
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
6
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
45
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
20
Aircraft flight hours:
18900
Aircraft flight cycles:
12656
Circumstances:
Following an uneventful flight from Kuybyshev, the crew initiated the descent to Surgut Airport by night. The visibility was reduced due to marginal weather conditions. On approach, ATC instructed the pilot to modify his trajectory and to follow the glide as the aircraft deviated to the left. At this time, it is believed that the captain got distracted. After the crew passed the decision height, the captain continued the approach despite the fact he did not establish any visual contact with the runway lights and failed to initiate a go-around. At a height of 38 meters and a speed of 286 km/h, the aircraft passed 50 meters to the left of the threshold and the captain decided to continue. ATC instructed the crew to go-around when, one second later, the aircraft touched the ground of a snowy field some 714 meters past the runway threshold and 113 meters to the left of the runway. With a positive acceleration of 4,8 g, the aircraft lost its right wing and came to rest upside down, bursting into flames. 31 people were injured while 20 others were killed, among them the copilot.
Probable cause:
It was determined that the crew adopted a wrong approach configuration and took the decision to continue the approach after passing the decision height without establishing any visual contact with the runway lights. The following contributing factors were reported:
- The captain got distracted,
- The crew failed to initiate a go-around procedure,
- The approach lights were not activated,
- The visibility was reduced due to the night and marginal weather conditions,
- Poor flight preparation,
- Poor approach planning,
- Inaccurate information were transmitted to the crew related to weather conditions and visibilty.

Crash of an Antonov AN-2 in Barnaul

Date & Time: Feb 27, 1988
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
CCCP-66092
Flight Phase:
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
0
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
The engine failed shortly after takeoff but the crew reaction was inappropriate and the aircraft crashed. Occupant's fate unknown.