Russia

The accident was the consequence of a loss of control that occurred during initial climb by night over the sea after the pilot-in-command suffered a spatial disorientation due to an excessive neuropsychic stress combined with fatigue.

The accident was caused by the combination of the following factors:
- Absence of standard operating procedures issued by the operator of how to conduct NDB approaches,
- Violation of procedures by tower who only transmitted information about snow fall and recommended to perform a low pass over the runway but did not transmit the actual visibility was 1900 meters below required minimum
- Absence of information that the visibility was below required minimum, the last transmission indicated minimum visibility was present,
- Presence of numerous landmarks (abandoned ships, ship cranes, fuel transshipment complex, ...) covered by snow within 700-1000 meters from the unpaved runway which could be taken as runway markers by flight crew,
- Presence of a number of "bald spots" due to the transitional period of year where the underlying surface became visible making it difficult to visualize and recognize the unpaved runway covered with snow (it was the first flight into Belaya Gora for the crew in the winter season, they had operated into the aerodrome only in summer so far),
- Insufficient use of the available nav aid on final approach which led to lack of proper control of the aircraft position relative to the glide path,
- Lack of possibility for tower to watch the aircraft performing the NDB approach from his work place.

Controlled flight into terrain following the decision of the pilot to fly under VFR mode in IMC conditions in an uncontrolled area. Poor flight planning and flying without a copilot were considered as contributing factors.

Fatal accident with Аn-2 RA-33462 agricultural aircraft occurred during aerial works on crop-dusting and was caused most probably by the piloting error consisting in unintentional descent when performing a turn for the next crop-dusting round which resulted in the aircraft controlled flight into terrain.
Most probably, the following factors contributed to the accident:
- The PIC not trained for crop-dusting flight without first officer,
- The PIC conducting the flight with a passenger on first-officer’s seat,
- The presence of alcohol in PIC's and the passenger's bodies,
- A possible transfer of the aircraft control from PIC to the passenger (former An-2 pilot) made by PIC,
- Violations of An-2 AFM and FAR-128 requirements on maintaining heights, bank angles during turns and flight speed while crop-dusting,
- Krasny Kut Civil Aviation Flight School management not controlling crop-dusting operations at the fields.

Most probably the accident with An-2 RA-54828 aircraft after its takeoff in order to perform crop dusting was caused by inadvertent engine cut-off due to water ingestion into fuel flow system. Most probably water ingestion into engine fuel flow system was due to violation of refueling procedure by the crew. The aircraft sustained significant damage during the emergency landing on slush soft surface.

The right engine caught fire during takeoff for unknown reasons.

The fatal air accident to the Boeing 737-8KN A6-FDN aircraft occurred during the second go around, due to an incorrect aircraft configuration and crew piloting, the subsequent loss of PIC’s situational awareness in nighttime in IMC. This resulted in a loss of control of the aircraft and its impact with the ground. The accident is classified as Loss of Control In-Flight (LOC-I) occurrence.
Most probably, the contributing factors to the accident were:
- The presence of turbulence and gusty wind with the parameters, classified as a moderate to-strong "windshear" that resulted in the need to perform two go-arounds;
- The lack of psychological readiness (not go-around minded) of the PIC to perform the second go-around as he had the dominant mindset on the landing performance exactly at the destination aerodrome, having formed out of the "emotional distress" after the first unsuccessful approach (despite the RWY had been in sight and the aircraft stabilized on the glide path, the PIC had been forced to initiate go-around due to the windshear warning activation), concern on the potential exceedance of the duty time to perform the return flight and the recommendation of the airline on the priority of landing at the destination aerodrome;
- The loss of the PIC’s leadership in the crew after the initiation of go-around and his "confusion" that led to the impossibility of the on-time transition of the flight mental mode from "approach with landing" into "go-around";
- The absence of the instructions of the maneuver type specification at the go-around callout in the aircraft manufacturer documentation and the airline OM;
- The crew’s uncoordinated actions during the second go-around: on the low weight aircraft the crew was performing the standard go-around procedure (with the retraction of landing gear and flaps), but with the maximum available thrust, consistent with the Windshear Escape Maneuver procedure that led to the generation of the substantial excessive nose-up moment and significant (up to 50 lb/23 kg) "pushing" forces on the control column to counteract it;
- The failure of the PIC within a long time to create the pitch, required to perform go around and maintain the required climb profile while piloting aircraft unbalanced in forces;
- The PIC’s insufficient knowledge and skills on the stabilizer manual trim operation, which led to the long-time (for 12 sec) continuous stabilizer nose-down trim with the subsequent substantial imbalance of the aircraft and its upset encounter with the generation of the negative G, which the crew had not been prepared to. The potential impact of the somatogravic "pitch-up illusion" on the PIC might have contributed to the long keeping the stabilizer trim switches pressed;
- The psychological incapacitation of the PIC that resulted in his total spatial disorientation, did not allow him to respond to the correct prompts of the F/O;
- The absence of the criteria of the psychological incapacitation in the airline OM, which prevented the F/O from the in-time recognition of the situation and undertaking more decisive actions;
- The possible operational tiredness of the crew: by the time of the accident the crew had been proceeding the flight for 6 hours, of which 2 hours under intense workload that implied the need to make non-standard decisions; in this context the fatal accident occurred at the worst possible time in terms of the circadian rhythms, when the human performance is severely degraded and is at its lower level along with the increase of the risk of errors.
The lack of the objective information on the HUD operation (there were no flight tests of the unit carried out into the entire range of the operational G, including the negative ones; the impossibility to reproduce the real HUD readings in the progress of the accident flight, that is the image the pilot was watching with the consideration of his posture in the seat trough the stream video or at the FFS) did not allow making conclusion on its possible impact on the flight outcome. At the same time the investigation team is of the opinion that the specific features of the HUD indication and display in conditions existed during final phase of the accident flight (severe turbulence, the aircraft upset encounter with the resulting negative G, the significant difference between the actual and the target flight path) that generally do not occur under conditions of the standard simulator sessions, could have affected the situational awareness of the PIC, having been in the highly stressed state.