Kemerovo oblast

Controlled flight into terrain following the decision of the pilot to fly under VFR mode in IMC conditions in an uncontrolled area. Poor flight planning and flying without a copilot were considered as contributing factors.

The accident was caused by a stall, spin and impact with the ground resulting from a combination of the following factors:
1. The decision by the PIC to allow an unqualified and unauthorized outsider (his son) to occupy his duty station and intervene in the flying of the aeroplane.
2. The execution of demonstration manoeuvres that were not anticipated in the flight plan or flight situation, with the PIC operating the autopilot while not at his duty station.
3. Application by the outsider and the co-pilot of control forces that interfered with the functioning of the roll channel of the autopilot (and are not recommended in the A310 flight manual), thus overriding the autopilot and disconnecting it from the aileron control linkage.
4. The copilot and PIC failed to detect the fact that the autopilot had become disconnected from the aileron control linkage, probably because:
- The A310 instrumentation has no declutch warning. The provision of signals in accordance with the requirements of Airworthiness Standard NLGS-3, para. 8.2.7.3., and international recommended practices, could have enabled the crew to detect the disengaged autopilot in a timely manner.
- The copilot and PIC may have been unaware of the peculiarities of the declutching function and the actions to be taken in such a situation because of a lack of appropriate information in the flight manual and crew training programme;
- It was difficult for the co-pilot to detect the disengagement of the autopilot by feel, either because of the small forces on his control column or because he took changing forces to be the result of Eldar's actions;
- The PIC was away from his position and distracted by the conversation with his daughter.
5. A slight, unintentional further turn of the control wheel(s) following disengagement of the autopilot caused a right roll to develop.
6. The PIC and copilot failed to detect the excessive right bank angle, which exceeded operating limits, and were late in re-entering the aircraft control loop because their attention was focussed on determining why the aircraft had banked to the right, a manoeuvre they interpreted as entry into a holding area with either no course line or with a new (false) course line generated on the navigational display.
A strong signal indicating that the aeroplane had exceeded the allowable operating bank angle, taking account of the delay in recognizing and assessing the situation and making a decision, could in this situation have attracted the crew's attention and enabled them to detect the bank at an earlier stage.
7. The aeroplane was subjected to buffeting and high angles of attack because the autopilot continued to perform its height-keeping function even after the actuator declutched and as the right roll developed, until the pilot disconnected it by overriding its longitudinal channel.
8. Inappropriate and ineffective action on the part of the copilot, who failed to disconnect the autopilot and to push the control column forward when the buffeting occurred and the aeroplane entered an unusual attitude (high angles of attack and pitch). These actions, which caused the aeroplane to stall and spin, could have resulted from:
- the presence of an outsider in the left-hand pilot's seat and the resulting delay before the PIC re-entered the aeroplane control loop;
- the less-than-optimum working posture of the copilot, whose seat was pushed back to its rearmost position;
- the occurrence, 2 seconds following the onset of buffeting, of an unintentional pitching up of the aeroplane, which sharply increased the angle of attack and reduced lateral controllability;
- unpreparedness of the crew to act in this situation because of lack of appropriate drills in the training programme;
- temporary loss of spatial orientation in night conditions.

The crew decided to continue the flight in below weather conditions and failed to return.

The exact cause of the loss of speed could not be determined.

It was determined that the pilot of the LI-2 registered CCCP-L4534 deliberately decided to modify his flight path and flight level without prior permission from ATC. Doing so, he flew into the flight path of the second aircraft that was flying to a heading of 90°. It was reported that the pilot at fault had been degraded to the co-pilot position in July 1952 due to lack of discipline and loss of direction. He had returned to his captain position last February despite serious shortcomings in piloting techniques. The low position of the sun was considered as a contributory factor.

It was determined that the pilot of the LI-2 registered CCCP-L4534 deliberately decided to modify his flight path and flight level without prior permission from ATC. Doing so, he flew into the flight path of the second aircraft that was flying to a heading of 90°. It was reported that the pilot at fault had been degraded to the co-pilot position in July 1952 due to lack of discipline and loss of direction. He had returned to his captain position last February despite serious shortcomings in piloting techniques. The low position of the sun was considered as a contributory factor.

It is believed that the accident occurred when the crew was attempting an emergency landing due to severe icing conditions.

Engine failure in flight.