Country
code

Krasnodar Krai

Crash of a PZL-Mielec AN-2R in Prochookopskaya: 2 killed

Date & Time: Jul 15, 2022 at 2127 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
RA-02240
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Prochookopskaya - Prochookopskaya
MSN:
1G235-11
YOM:
1989
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
1
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
2
Captain / Total flying hours:
6647
Captain / Total hours on type:
6647.00
Aircraft flight hours:
4871
Circumstances:
The single engine airplane was engaged in a local flight in Prochookopskaya. While attempting to land at night, the airplane collided with the cables of a power line and crashed in a wooded area, coming to rest upside down. The wreckage was found some 10 km north of the Armavir Airport. Both occupants were killed.
Probable cause:
The aircraft collided with the wires of an overhead power line, which had no night markings, with subsequent collision with trees and ground.
The following contributing factors were identified:
- Inadequate experience of the pilot in night flying conditions,
- Violation of the AN-2 flight manual, which prescribes instruments night flights,
- Decision to fly at night to a landing site without adequate light equipment,
- Flying at an altitude lower than the prescribed altitude of unlit obstacles, of which the pilot was aware,
- Decision of the pilot to perform the flight in a reduced crew configuration (without a copilot).
Final Report:

Crash of a Boeing 737-8AS in Sochi

Date & Time: Sep 1, 2018 at 0258 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
VQ-BJI
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Moscow - Sochi
MSN:
29937/1238
YOM:
2002
Flight number:
UT579
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
6
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
164
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
13995
Captain / Total hours on type:
6391.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
12277
Copilot / Total hours on type:
5147
Aircraft flight hours:
45745
Aircraft flight cycles:
23434
Circumstances:
On 31.08.2018 Boeing 737-800 VQ-BJI operated by UTAir Airlines conducted the scheduled flight UT 579 from Moscow (Vnukovo airport) to Sochi (Adler airport). During the preflight briefing (at 19:50) the crew was provided with the necessary weather information. At 20:15, the crew had passed the medical examination at Vnukovo airport mobile RWY medical unit. The Daily Check line maintenance (DY) was done on 30.08.2018 at Vnukovo airport by UTG aviation services, ZAO; job card # 11465742. The A/C takeoff weight was 68680 kg and the MAC was 26.46 %, that was within the AFM limitations for the actual conditions. At 21:33 the takeoff from Vnukovo airport was performed. The flight along he prescribed route was performed on FL350 in auto mode and without any issues. The F/O acted as the pilot flying (PF). When approaching the Sochi aerodrome traffic control area, the flight crew was provided by the aerodrome approach control with the approach and descending conditions, as well as with the weather conditions near the aerodrome. After descending to the height specified by Sochi Approach, the pilot contacted Sochi Radar, waited for the weather that met his minimum and was cleared for landing. In course of the first approach to landing (from the altitude about 30 m) when RVR got down because of heavy showers, the PIC took controls and performed the go-around. In course of the second approach, the crew performed the landing but failed to keep the airplane within the RWY. The airplane had landed at about 1285 m from the RWY threshold, overrun the threshold, broke through the aerodrome fencing, and came to rest in Mzymta river bed. This ended with the fire outbreak of fuel leaking from the damaged LH wing fuel tank. The crew performed the passenger evacuation. The aerodrome alert measures were taken and the fire was brought under control. Eighteen occupants were injured while all other occupants were unhurt. The aircraft was damaged beyond repair.
Probable cause:
The aircraft overrun, destroying and damage by fire were caused by the following factors:
- repeated disregarding of the windshear warnings which when entered a horizontal windshear (changing from the head wind to tail one) at low altitude resulted in landing at distance of 1285 m from the RWY threshold (overrunning the landing zone by 385 m) with the increased IAS and tail wind;
- landing to the runway, when its normative friction coefficient was less than 0.3 that according to the regulations in force, did not allow to land.
The factors contributed the accident:
- the crew violation of the AFM and Operator's OM requirements in regards to the actions required a forecasted or actual wind shear warning;
- use of the automatic flight mode (autopilot, autothrottle) in the flight under the windshear conditions which resulted in the aircraft being unstable (excess thrust) when turning to the manual control;
- lack of prevention measures taken by the Operator when the previous cases of poor crew response to windshear warning were found;
- insufficient crew training in regards to CRM and TEM that did not allow to identify committed mistakes and/or violations in good time;
- the crew members' high psychoemotional state caused by inconsistency between the actual landing conditions and the received training as well as the psychological limit which was determined by the individual psychological constitution of each member;
- insufficient braking both in auto and manual mode during the aircraft rollout caused by the insufficient tyre-to-ground friction aiming to achieve the specified rate of braking. Most probably the insufficient tyre-to-ground friction was caused by the significant amount of water on the RWY surface;
- the aerodrome services' noncompliance of Sochi International Aerodrome Manual requirements related to the RWY after heavy showers inspection which resulted in the crew provision of wrong normative friction coefficients. In obtaining of the increased overrun speed of about ≈75 kt (≈140 km/h) the later setting of engines into reverse mode was contributed (the engines were set into reverse mode 16 s later than the aircraft landed at distance of about ≈200 m from the runway end).
Final Report:

Crash of a Tupolev TU-154B-2 off Sochi: 92 killed

Date & Time: Dec 25, 2016 at 0525 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
RA-85572
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Moscow - Sochi - Hmeimim
MSN:
83A-572
YOM:
1983
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
8
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
84
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
92
Aircraft flight hours:
6689
Circumstances:
The airplane departed Moscow-Chkhalovksy AFB at 0138LT on a flight to Hmeimin AFB located near Latakia, Syria, carrying 84 passengers and 8 crew members. At 0343LT, the aircraft landed at Sochi-Adler Airport to refuel. At 0525LT, the takeoff was initiated from runway 24. After a course of 34 seconds, the pilot-in-command initiated the rotation at a speed of 300 km/h. Shortly after liftoff, the undercarriage were raised and the pilot continued to climb with a nose-up angle of 15°. About 53 seconds after takeoff, at an altitude of 157 metres, the captain asked the flaps to be retracted while the aircraft was climbing to a height of 231 metres with a speed of 360 km/h. Following erroneous movements on the control column, the aircraft nosed down and its speed increased to 373 km/h when the GPWS alarm sounded in the cockpit. With a rate of descent of 30 metres per second, the aircraft reached the speed of 540 km/h, rolled to the left to an angle of 50° and eventually crashed in the sea some 1,270 metres offshore, at 05:25 and 49 seconds. The flight took 73 seconds between liftoff and impact with water. The wreckage was found 2,760 metres from the end of runway 24 and 340 metres to the left of its extended centerline, at a depth of 30 metres. The aircraft disintegrated on impact and all 92 occupants were killed, among them 64 members of the Alexandrov Choir of the Red Army, their Artistic Director, nine journalists, seven officers from the Ministry of Defence, two senior officials and one representative of a public Company who were traveling to Hmeimim Air Base to commemorate the New Year's Eve celebrations with Russian soldiers based in Syria.
Probable cause:
The accident was the consequence of a loss of control that occurred during initial climb by night over the sea after the pilot-in-command suffered a spatial disorientation due to an excessive neuropsychic stress combined with fatigue.

Crash of a PZL-Mielec AN-2R in Prototskiye

Date & Time: Aug 6, 2014 at 0715 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
RA-17890
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Prototskiye - Prototskiye
MSN:
1G205-31
YOM:
1983
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Aircraft flight hours:
7503
Aircraft flight cycles:
38974
Circumstances:
The crew was engaged in a crop spraying mission on rice paddy field located in Prototskiye (Krasnoarmeisk district of the Krasnodar region). Two minutes after takeoff, while flying at a height of about 50 metres, the engine lost power. The captain attempted an emergency landing when the aircraft nosed over and came to rest upside down, some 2 km east of Prototskiye. Those parts of the fuselage which were above the water were consumed by the erupting fire and both pilots escaped uninjured.
Probable cause:
The accident with An-2 RA-17890 aircraft was caused by its nosing-over during the emergency landing at the submerged rice bay. The emergency landing was due to the engine power loss in flight caused by the destruction of the can type combustor of the exhaust collector and burnout of the carburetor intake valve with the following high-temperature gases ingestion in the intake areas of the engine carburetor. The fatigue destruction of the can type combustor of the exhaust collector was caused along the main crack near the intake flex socket, it started from the surface of the damaged inlet port under the tube attachment pin towards the exhaust collector. By the moment of the main crack formation both inlet ports in left can type combustor under the tube attachment pin towards the exhaust collector had intolerable damage and size. During the last overhaul of the engine exhaust system of An-2 RA-17890 aircraft the left can type combustor had intolerable damage in its attaching lug to the exhaust collector which wasn't eliminated. The destruction of the inlet port valve was caused by the fusion of the boundaries of it material grains in conditions of acute temperature exposure induced by the destruction of the left can type combustor wall towards the main crack. Inadequate material (aluminum alloy D-16) of the valve specified by the drawing of aluminum allow AL-9T contributed to the valve destruction.

Crash of a PZL-Mielec AN-2R in Vostochnaya: 1 killed

Date & Time: Mar 23, 2013 at 1503 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
RA-02203
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Vostochnaya - Vostochnaya
MSN:
1G234-34
YOM:
1989
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
1
Captain / Total flying hours:
5536
Captain / Total hours on type:
2710.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
61
Copilot / Total hours on type:
61
Aircraft flight hours:
3612
Aircraft flight cycles:
16267
Circumstances:
The crew was engaged in a crop spraying flight on agricultural field in Vostochnaya, about 70 km northeast of Krasnodar. The day prior to the accident, the engine failed in flight and the crew made a forced landing in a field. As the carburetor was broken, it was replaced and an engine test run was performed. On 23 March, one minute after takeoff, while climbing to a height of 30 metres, the engine failed again. The crew attempted an emergency landing when the aircraft stalled and crashed in the Bakhotinski Lake, coming to rest upside down. The copilot escaped with minor injuries while the captain was killed. The wreckage was recovered three days later.
Probable cause:
The accident was caused by its nosing during the emergency landing on water surface. The emergency landing was caused by the engine power loss and flameout in the air due to the destruction of the exhaust collector can type combustor and burn through of the carburetor intake valve followed by high temperature burnt gases ingestion into the engine carburetor intake. The destruction of the exhaust collector can type combustor most probably occurred on the corrosion mechanism energized in conditions of the material heat during the engine operation using motor petrol. Power factor resulted in initial crack formation most probably was caused by residual tenses in the material of manufacture origine caused during can type combustor manufacture. In accordance with the passport the latest can type combustor overhaul was performed on January 27, 2009 in "Shakhtinsky ARZ DOSSAAF" CJSC. The commission didn't find the actual confirmation of the can type combustor overhaul as the marking at the single remained label indicates that the specified section had overhaul at the plant n° 420GA in October 1983.
Final Report:

Crash of a PZL-Mielec AN-2R in Zasovskaya

Date & Time: Oct 9, 2011 at 1128 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
RA-81514
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Zasovskaya - Zasovskaya
MSN:
1G208-14
YOM:
1984
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
13000
Aircraft flight hours:
6449
Aircraft flight cycles:
30385
Circumstances:
The pilot, sole on board, was completing a spraying mission on sunflower plantations in Zasovskaya. While flying at a height of about 20 metres, preparing for a new low pass, the single engine aircraft collided with power cables, stalled and crashed upside down in an open field, bursting into flames. The aircraft was destroyed and the pilot was seriously injured.
Probable cause:
The cause of the accident without casualties to the plane An-2 RA-81514 was a violation of the established safe obstacle clearance in the performance of aviation-chemical works, which led to a collision with the lightning protection wire transmission line and the ground. A contributing factor was the performance of an incomplete flight crew. According to the An-2 Flight Manual the minimum crew for aerial chemical works is the commander of the aircraft and a copilot.
Final Report:

Crash of a PZL-Mielec AN-2R in Baranikovskiy: 1 killed

Date & Time: Aug 28, 2011 at 0854 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
RA-01105
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Baranikovskiy - Baranikovskiy
MSN:
1G239-50
YOM:
1991
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
1
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
1
Aircraft flight hours:
1208
Aircraft flight cycles:
4247
Circumstances:
The single engine aircraft was dispatched in Baranikovskiy to perform a crop spraying mission on rice paddy field. Before flight, the tank was refueled with 250 litres of E95 fuel. The technician told the pilot the fuel was abnormally yellow but the pilot decided to proceed with the flight. Prior to take off, he asked the copilot to stay on ground and replaced him by the owner of the zone to be treated which is against the published procedures. During the takeoff roll, the aircraft did not accelerate as expected but the pilot continued. After liftoff, at a height of about 30 metres, the pilot initiated a 90° left turn when the engine lost power. He started to drop the load of chemicals then attempted an emergency landing when the aircraft impacted ground. It continued for about 134 metres then struck an irrigation drain, nosed over and came to rest, bursting into flames. The pilot was killed and the passenger was seriously injured.
Probable cause:
The accident was caused by a loss of engine power because the aircraft has been refueled with fuel dedicated to automobile.
The following contributing factors were identified:
- The pilot's lack of knowledge about the flight area and the layout of cultivated fields,
- The pilot failed to brake properly during the emergency landing,
- The absence of a copilot on board,
- The Operator certificat was revoked 3 days prior to the accident.