Crash of a Learjet 36A in Forli: 5 killed

Date & Time: Dec 10, 1979 at 2145 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
I-AIFA
Survivors:
Yes
Site:
Schedule:
London - Forli
MSN:
36-021
YOM:
1976
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
1
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
5
Circumstances:
The airplane departed London on an executive flight to Forli, carrying two pilots and one passenger, Mr. Serafino Ferruzzi, founder and owner of the Italian Group Ferruzzi S.p.A. The approach to Forli Airport was initiated by night and poor weather conditions. On short final, the crew failed to realize his altitude was too low when the left wing struck a tv antenna located on the top of a hill, some 2,300 meters short of runway 12 threshold. The airplane lost height and crashed on a house. All three people on board the aircraft as well as two people in the house were killed. At the time of the accident, the horizontal visibility was limited to 300 metres due to heavy rain falls and the runway 12 ILS glideslope was inoperative.
Crew:
Enzo Villani, pilot,
Roberto Cases, copilot.
Passenger:
Serafino Ferruzzi.
Those killed on ground were Fiorella Ricci et Libero Ricci.

Crash of an Avro 748-260-2A in Bogotá: 4 killed

Date & Time: Aug 22, 1979 at 0540 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
FAC-1101
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Site:
MSN:
1702
YOM:
1971
Country:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
4
Circumstances:
Parked at Bogotá-El Dorado Airport, the airplane was stolen by a 23 year old man who had been fired after working as a mechanic at the airport. Following a night takeoff, the pilot completed low passes when the airplane crashed into several houses located in a populated area near the airport. The aircraft and few houses were destroyed. The 'pilot' and three people on the ground were killed while seven others were injured.

Crash of a PZL-Mielec AN-2T in Petropavlovsk

Date & Time: Jun 16, 1979 at 0400 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
CCCP-44920
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Site:
Schedule:
Petropavlovsk - Petropavlovsk
MSN:
1G24-20
YOM:
1962
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
Parked at the airport, the single engine airplane was stolen in the early morning by a drunk pilot. After takeoff, while flying at low height over the city, the pilot initiated a sharp turn to the left when the aircraft struck a pillar. Out of control, it nosed down and crashed against the facade of an office building. Upon impact, the pilot was ejected and was slightly injured while the aircraft was destroyed.
Probable cause:
Loss of control at low height after collision with obstacles. Pilot intoxicated.

Crash of a Beechcraft E18S near Burton: 1 killed

Date & Time: May 9, 1979 at 0005 LT
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
N438A
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Site:
Schedule:
Youngstown - Pontiac
MSN:
BA-452
YOM:
1959
Location:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
1
Captain / Total flying hours:
8600
Captain / Total hours on type:
5000.00
Circumstances:
The pilot, on a cargo flight from Youngstown to Pontiac, decided to make a low pass over his mother's house. By night, the airplane struck tree tops and crashed in flames. The aircraft was destroyed and the pilot, sole on board, was killed. He was the leader of a formation of three aircraft when the accident occurred.
Probable cause:
Collision with trees after the pilot misjudged clearance. The following contributing factors were reported:
- Exercised poor judgment,
- Unwarranted low flying,
- Inadequate supervision of flight crew.
Final Report:

Crash of a Canadian Vickers PBV-1A Canso A in Chiguayante: 3 killed

Date & Time: Apr 18, 1979 at 1520 LT
Registration:
CC-CDS
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Site:
MSN:
CV-281
YOM:
1941
Flight number:
Canso 31
Country:
Crew on board:
3
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
3
Circumstances:
The crew was engaged in a fire fighting mission under callsign 'Canso 31'. While approaching the fire zone at low height and ready to drop 5,000 liters of water, the airplane struck a pine tree with its left wing. Out of control, it crashed in a garden located in the district of Manquimávida, northeast of Chiguayante. Both pilots were killed instantly while the third occupant was seriously injured. He died while being transferred to the hospital.
Crew:
Carlos Paris Maldonado, pilot,
Rolf Taucher, copilot,
Jaime López Morales, observer.
Probable cause:
Poor judgement on part of the flying crew who failed to see and avoid obstacles while flying at low height.

Crash of a Hawker-Siddeley HS.121 Trident 2E in Beijing: 192 killed

Date & Time: Mar 14, 1979 at 0852 LT
Operator:
Registration:
B-274
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Site:
Schedule:
Beijing - Beijing
MSN:
2172
YOM:
1976
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
12
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
192
Circumstances:
The crew departed Beijing-Xijiao Airport for a local training mission. Shortly after takeoff, while in initial climb, the three engine airplane lost height and crashed in a huge explosion into a factory located near the airport. All 12 occupants as well as at least 180 people in the factory were killed.
Probable cause:
It was reported that the pilot-in-command has limited experience and was not familiar with this type of aircraft.

Crash of a Douglas DC-8-61 in Portland: 10 killed

Date & Time: Dec 28, 1978 at 1815 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N8082U
Survivors:
Yes
Site:
Schedule:
New York - Denver - Portland
MSN:
45972/357
YOM:
1968
Flight number:
UA173
Crew on board:
8
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
181
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
10
Captain / Total flying hours:
27638
Captain / Total hours on type:
5517.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
5209
Copilot / Total hours on type:
247
Aircraft flight hours:
33114
Circumstances:
United Airlines Flight 173, departed New York-JFK on a scheduled flight to Portland International Airport (PDX), with an en route stop at Denver (DEN). The DC-8-61 took off from Denver about 14:47. The planned time en route was 2 hrs 26 min. The planned arrival time at Portland was 17:13. There was 46,700 lb of fuel on board the aircraft when it departed the gate at Denver. This fuel included the Federal Aviation Regulation requirement for fuel to destination plus 45 min and the company contingency fuel of about 20 min. At 17:05, Flight 173 called Portland Approach and advised that its altitude was 10,000 ft and its airspeed was being reduced. Portland responded and told the flight to maintain its heading for a visual approach to runway 28. Flight 173 acknowledged the approach instructions and stated, "...we have the field in sight." At 17:07, Portland Approach instructed the flight to descend and maintain 8,000 ft. Flight 173 acknowledged the instructions and advised that it was "leaving ten." At 17:09, Flight 173 received and acknowledged a clearance to continue its descent to 6,000 ft. When the DC-8 was descending through about 8,000 ft, the first officer, who was flying the aircraft, requested the wing flaps be extended to 15 degrees, then asked that the landing gear be lowered. As the landing gear extended, an unusual sound was heard and the aircraft yawed. At 17:12, Portland Approach requested, "United one seven three heavy, contact the tower, one one eight point seven." The flight responded, "negative, we'll stay with you. We'll stay at five. We'll maintain about a hundred and seventy knots. We got a gear problem. We'll let you know." Portland Approach replied, "United one seventy-three heavy roger, maintain five thousand. Turn left heading two zero zero." The flight acknowledged the instructions. At 17:14, Portland Approach advised, "United one seventy three heavy, turn left heading, one zero zero and I'll just orbit you out there 'til you get your problem." Flight 173 acknowledged the instructions. For the next 23 min, while Portland Approach was vectoring the aircraft in a holding pattern south and east of the airport, the flight crew discussed and accomplished all of the emergency and precautionary actions available to them to assure themselves that all landing gear was locked in the full down position. The second officer checked the visual indicators on top of both wings, which extend above the wing surface when the landing gear is down-and-locked. About 17:38, Flight 173 contacted the United Airlines Systems Line Maintenance Control Center in San Francisco. The captain explained to company dispatch and maintenance personnel the landing gear problem and what the flight crew had done to assure that the landing gear was fully extended. He said they were planning to land in about twenty minutes. About 17:44, the captain and the first flight attendant discussed passenger preparation, crash landing procedures, and evacuation procedures. At 17:46, the first officer asked the flight engineer, "How much fuel we got...?" The flight engineer responded, "Five thousand." About 17:50, the captain asked the flight engineer to "Give us a current card on weight. Figure about another fifteen minutes." The first officer responded, "Fifteen minutes?" To which the captain replied, "Yeah, give us three or four thousand pounds on top of zero fuel weight." The flight engineer then said, "Not enough. Fifteen minutes is gonna really run us low on fuel here." Some calculations were made and at 17:52 the flight engineer talked to Portland and discussed the aircraft's fuel state, the number of persons on board the aircraft, and the emergency landing precautions at the airport. A fuel check at 17:57 learned that there were 1,000 lb in each tank, totalling 4,000 lb of fuel. From 17:57 until 18:00, the captain and the first officer engaged in a conversation which included discussions of giving the flight attendants ample time to prepare for the emergency, cockpit procedures in the event of an evacuation after landing, whether the brakes would have antiskid protection after landing, and the procedures the captain would be using during the approach and landing. At 18:01, the flight engineer reported that the cabin would be ready in "another two or three minutes." At 18:02, the flight engineer advised, "We got about three on the fuel and that's it." The aircraft was then about 5 nmi south of the airport on a southwest heading. Portland Approach then asked Flight 173 for a status report. The first officer replied, "Yeah, we have indication our gear is abnormal. It'll be our intention, in about five minutes, to land on two eight left. We would like the equipment standing by. Our indications are the gear is down and locked. We've got our people prepared for an evacuation in the event that should become necessary." At 18:03 Portland Approach asked that Flight 173 advise them when the approach would begin. The captain responded, "...They've about finished in the cabin. I'd guess about another three, four, five minutes." At this time the aircraft was about 8 nmi south of the airport on a southwesterly heading. At 18:06, the first flight attendant entered the cockpit and reported that they were ready in the passenger cabin. At this time the aircraft was about 17 nmi south of the airport on a southwesterly heading. The captain then said, "Okay. We're going to go in now. We should be landing in about five minutes." Almost simultaneous with this comment, the first officer said, "I think you just lost number four ..." followed immediately by advice to the flight engineer, "... better get some crossfeeds open there or something." At 18:06:46, the first officer told the captain, "We're going to lose an engine..." At 18:06:49, the first officer again stated, "We're losing an engine." Again the captain asked, "Why?" The first officer responded, "Fuel." The captain replied, "Why?" Between 18:06:52 and 18:07:06, the CVR revealed conflicting and confusing conversation between flight crewmembers as to the aircraft's fuel state. At 18:07:06, the first officer said, "It's flamed out." At 18:07:12, the captain called Portland Approach and requested, "...would like clearance for an approach into two eight left, now." The aircraft was about 19 nmi south southwest of the airport and turning left. This was the first request for an approach clearance from Flight 173 since the landing gear problem began. Portland Approach immediately gave the flight vectors for a visual approach to runway 28L. The flight turned toward the vector heading of 010 degrees. At 18:09:21, the captain advised Portland Approach, "United, seven three is going to turn toward the airport and come on in." After confirming Flight 173's intentions, Portland Approach cleared the flight for the visual approach to runway 28L. At 18:10:17, the captain requested that the flight engineer "reset that circuit breaker momentarily. See if we get gear lights." The flight engineer complied with the request. At 18:10:47, the captain requested the flight's distance from the airport. Portland approach responded, "I'd call it eighteen flying miles." At 18:12:42, the captain made another request for distance. Portland Approach responded, "Twelve flying miles." The flight was then cleared to contact Portland tower. At 18:13:21, the flight engineer stated, "We've lost two engines, guys." At 18:13:25, he stated, "We just lost two engines - one and two." At 1813:38, the captain said, They're all going. We can't make Troutdale." The first officer said, "We can't make anything." At 18:13:46, the captain told the first officer, "Okay. Declare a mayday." At 18:13:50, the first officer called Portland International Airport tower and declared, "Portland tower, United one seventy three heavy, Mayday. We're--the engines are flaming out. We're going down. We're not going to be able to make the airport." This was the last radio transmission from Flight 173. About 18:15, the aircraft crashed into a wooded section of a populated area of suburban Portland about 6 nmi east southeast of the airport. There was no fire. The wreckage path was about 1,554 ft long and about 130 ft wide. Two crew members and eight passengers were killed, 34 other occupants were injured.
Probable cause:
The failure of the captain to monitor properly the aircraft's fuel state and to properly respond to the low fuel state and the crew member's advisories regarding fuel state. This resulted in fuel exhaustion to all engines. His inattention resulted from preoccupation with a landing gear malfunction and preparations for a possible emergency landing. Contributing to the accident was the failure of the other two flight crewmembers either to fully comprehend the criticality of the fuel state or to successfully communicate their concern to the captain. The following findings were reported:
- Except for the failure of the piston rod on the right main landing gear retract cylinder assembly, with the resulting damage to the landing gear position indicating system switch, there was no evidence of a failure or malfunction of the aircraft’s structure, powerplants, flight controls, or systems,
- All of the aircraft’s engines flamed out because of fuel exhaustion about 1815, one hour and 3 minutes after it entered into hold and 3 hrs 27 min after it departed Denver,
- Fuel exhaustion was predictable. The crew failed to equate the fuel remaining with time and distance from the airport,
- No pertinent malfunctions were found during examinations of the fuel quantity measuring system,
- The captain failed to make decisive timely decisions,
- The captain failed to relate time, distance from the airport, and the aircraft’s fuel state as his attention was directed completely toward the diagnosis of the gear problem and preparation of the passengers for an emergency landing. The gear problem had a disorganizing effect on the captain's performances,
- Neither the first officer nor the flight engineer conveyed any concern about fuel exhaustion to the captain until the accident was inevitable.
Final Report:

Crash of a Piper PA-31-325 Navajo C/R in Dallas

Date & Time: Dec 20, 1978 at 0711 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N27604
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Site:
Schedule:
Dallas - Oklahoma City
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
6
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
5310
Captain / Total hours on type:
429.00
Circumstances:
After takeoff from Dallas-Love Field Airport, while climbing, one of the engine failed. The pilot elected to return for a safe landing when the aircraft lost height and crashed into residences by the airport. All seven occupants were seriously injured while no one on the ground was injured. The aircraft was destroyed.
Probable cause:
Engine malfunction during initial climb and subsequent collision with residences due to improperly serviced aircraft by ground crew. The following contributing factors were reported:
- Improper fuel grade,
- Operational supervisory personnel: deficiency, company maintained equipment, services, regulation,
- High obstructions,
- Partial loss of power on one engine,
- Complete engine failure one engine,
- Forced landing off airport on land,
- The truck use to refuel the airplane was supposed to be 100LL fuel but contained Jet A fuel,
- The fuel farm tank vent covers were improperly marked.
Final Report:

Crash of a Beechcraft D18S in San Juan: 6 killed

Date & Time: Sep 26, 1978 at 1845 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N500L
Survivors:
No
Site:
Schedule:
Aguadilla – San Juan
MSN:
A-415
YOM:
1948
Country:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
5
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
6
Captain / Total flying hours:
4365
Captain / Total hours on type:
46.00
Circumstances:
On final approach to San Juan-Isla Verde Airport, the pilot lost control of the airplane that crashed onto several houses located in the district of Barrio Obrero, about 4 km short of runway 10 threshold. The aircraft was destroyed and all six occupants were killed. Few people on the ground were injured.
Probable cause:
Uncontrolled descent on final approach due to wake turbulences. The following contributing factors were reported:
- Failed to follow approved procedures,
- Vortex turbulences,
- Communications and navigation equipment: transmitters and/or receivers malfunction,
- Unable to communicate on terminal radar service area frequency.
Final Report:

Crash of a Boeing 727-200 in San Diego: 142 killed

Date & Time: Sep 25, 1978 at 0902 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N533PS
Survivors:
No
Site:
Schedule:
Sacramento - Los Angeles - San Diego
MSN:
19688/589
YOM:
1968
Flight number:
PS182
Crew on board:
7
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
128
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
142
Captain / Total flying hours:
14382
Captain / Total hours on type:
10482.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
10049
Copilot / Total hours on type:
5800
Aircraft flight hours:
24088
Aircraft flight cycles:
36557
Circumstances:
The crew was completing flight PS182 from Sacramento to San Diego with an intermediate stop in Los Angeles. While descending to San Diego-Lindbergh Field runway 27, the crew was informed about the presence of a Cessna 172M registered N7711G and operated by the Gibbs Flight Center. The single engine airplane just departed San Diego Airport for a local training mission with one student pilot and one instructor on board. At 0901:47, at an altitude of 2,600 feet and 3 NM northeast of San Diego Airport, both airplane collided. Out of control, they dove into the ground and crashed into several houses and the 805 highway located between the districts of Altadena and City Heights. Both aircraft disintegrated on impact and all 137 occupants in both aircraft were killed as well as seven people on the ground. Nine other people on the ground were seriously injured as dozen houses were destroyed.
Probable cause:
The failure of the flight crew of Flight 182 to comply with the provisions of a maintain-visual-separation clearance, including the requirement to inform the controller when visual contact was lost; and the air traffic control procedures in effect which authorized the controllers to use visual separation procedures in a terminal area environment when the capability was available to provide either lateral or vertical separation to either aircraft. Contributing to the accident were:
- The failure of the controller to advise Flight 182 of the direction of movement of the Cessna;
- The failure of the pilot of the Cessna to maintain his assigned heading;
- The improper resolution by the controller of the conflict alert.
Final Report: