Dallas-Love Field

After landing on runway 13R, directional control was lost and the aircraft veered off runway to the right. While contacting soft ground, the nose gear collapsed and the aircraft came to rest. All three occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

On November 22, 2004, about 0615 central standard time, a Gulfstream G-1159A, N85VT, operated by Business Jet Services Ltd., struck a light pole and crashed about 3 miles southwest of William P. Hobby Airport, Houston, Texas, while on an instrument landing system approach to runway 4. The two pilots and the flight attendant were killed, an individual in a vehicle near the airport received minor injuries, and the airplane was destroyed by impact forces. The airplane was being operated under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 on an instrument flight rules flight plan. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident.

The twin-engine airplane impacted the ground during an uncontrolled descent while maneuvering in dark night instrument meteorological conditions in the vicinity of Lewisville, Texas. The commercial pilot contacted the approach controller and stated that his attitude indicator was "not helping" and needed "a little bit of help with trying to keep it straight." The pilot was instructed by approach control to maintain an altitude of 3,000 feet msl. The approach controller confirmed with the pilot that he could not fly headings, and instructed the pilot to turn right. Seconds afterwards, the pilot was instructed to turn left and the controller would tell him when to stop the turn. The pilot acknowledged. There were no further communications between the pilot and air traffic control. The airplane initially impacted in a near vertical attitude into a wooded area adjacent to a rural paved road, slid across the road, and impacted a residence. Radar data showed that the airplane's magnetic heading was erratic throughout the 5-minute flight. The gyro instruments found at the accident site were the copilot's direction gyro (vacuum), a turn and bank indicator (electric), and the pilot's attitude indicator (vacuum). The gyros were disassembled, and visually examined. The co-pilot's direction gyro examination revealed rotation signatures on the gyro and the gyro housing. The turn and bank indicator revealed a "faint" rotational signature on the gyro. The pilot's attitude indicator gyro had no rotational signatures, and exhibited blunt impressions corresponding to the gyro buckets on the inside of the gyro-housing wall. A maintenance repair data plate ("Functional Tested") was found on the attitude indicator's instrument housing dated 12/2/02. Due to the extent of the fire damage, no instrument readings could be obtained. Seven days prior to the accident flight, a company pilot who flew the accident airplane reported that the pilot's attitude indicator (part number 102-0041-04, serial number 92B0346) "rotated" and the flight was aborted. The next day, the attitude indicator was removed and bench checked, cleaned, and adjusted. The attitude indicator was reinstalled and an operational check on the ground was performed. Three days prior to the accident the pilot's attitude indicator was again removed for an overhaul. According to company maintenance personnel, the attitude indicator was reinstalled the night prior to the morning of the accident, and an operational check on the ground was performed. Radar data showed that the aircraft did not stabilize on a particular heading throughout the flight. Physical evidence showed that the pilot's attitude gyro was not "spooled" at the time of impact.

The commercial pilot flew the airplane on a cross-country flight of at least 2 hours and 47 minutes before dropping of his passengers, and flew back for 2 hours and 7 minutes without refueling. The pilot reported that as the airplane turned onto final approach, the right engine began to surge. He reduced the power on the right engine and increased power on the left, but the airplane started to roll right so he elected to reduce the power on the left engine and land in an alley. Prior to impacting wires, the pilot retracted the landing gear and brought the condition levers to "cut-off." A witness observed the airplane prior to impact and noted that the "motor wasn't on." The airplane impacted power lines, a tree, a natural gas meter, two residences, and a fence. The fuel tanks were compromised during the impact sequence, and the fire department sprayed the area with fire retardant foam. A test of the water runoff revealed "negative results for petroleum risk." Examination of both engines' fuel lines between their respective firewalls and fuel heaters, and fuel pumps and fuel control units revealed that they were void of fuel.

According to witnesses, the airplane collided with two deer shortly after touchdown. Following the collision, the airplane continued down the runway with the tires smoking, veered off the right side of the runway near the end, crossed a taxiway, impacted into a ditch and burst into flames. After the accident, the captain and first officer both reported that the thrust reversers failed to operate after they were deployed during the landing. Examination of the landing gear found all three gear collapsed. The right and left main tires had areas of rubber that were worn completely through. The flaps were found extended, and both thrust reversers were found in the stowed position. Examination of the cockpit found the throttles in the idle position, and the thrust reverser levers in the stowed position. Aircraft performance calculations indicate that the airplane traveled 1,500 feet down the runway after touchdown, in 4.2 seconds, before striking the deer. The calculations also indicate that the airplane landed with a ground speed of 124 knots. At 124 knots and maximum braking applied, the airplane should have come to a complete stop in about 850 feet. However, investigation of the accident site and surrounding area revealed heavy black skid marks beginning at the first taxiway turnoff about 1,500 feet down the 5,010 foot runway. The skid marks continued for about 2,500 feet, departed the right side of the runway and proceeded an additional 500 feet over grass and dirt. The investigation revealed that deer fur was found lodged in the squat switch on the left main landing gear, likely rendering the squat switch inoperative after the impact with the deer, and prior to the airplane’s loss of control on the runway. Since a valid signal from the squat switch is required for thrust reverser deployment, the loss of this signal forced the thrust reversers to stow. At this point, the electronic engine control (EEC) likely switched to the forward thrust schedule and engine power increased to near takeoff power, which led to the airplane to continue down the runway, and off of it. Following the accident, the manufacturer issued an Airplane Flight Manual revision that Page 2 of 8 ATL01FA021 changed the name of the “Inadvertent Stow of Thrust Reverser During Landing Rollout” abnormal procedure to “Inadvertent Stow of Thrust Reverser After a Crew-Commanded Deployment” and moved it into the emergency procedures section.
[This Brief of Accident was modified on April 5, 2010, based on information obtained during NTSB Case No. DCA08MA098.]

Freezing rain, mist, and ice pellets were forecast for the destination airport with temperatures 34 to 32 degrees F. During the daylight IMC descent and vectors for the approach, the airplane began to accumulate moderate clear ice, and a master warning light illumination in the cockpit indicated that the horizontal stabilizer heat had failed. The airplane was configured at 120 knots and 10 degrees flaps in accordance with the flight manual abnormal procedures checklist; however, the crew did not activate the horizontal stabilizer deice backup system. The aircraft touched down 1,500 ft down the runway, which was contaminated with slush, and did not have any braking action or antiskid for 3,000 ft on the 7,753-ft runway. Therefore, 3,253 ft of runway remained for stopping the aircraft, which was 192 feet short of the 3,445 ft required for a dry runway landing. Upon observing a down hill embankment and support poles beyond the runway, the captain forced the airplane to depart the right side of the runway to avoid the poles. After the airplane started down the embankment, the nose landing gear collapsed, and the airplane came to a stop.

On October 25, 1999, about 1213 central daylight time (CDT), a Learjet Model 35, N47BA, operated by Sunjet Aviation, Inc., of Sanford, Florida, crashed near Aberdeen, South Dakota. The airplane departed Orlando, Florida, for Dallas, Texas, about 0920 eastern daylight time (EDT). Radio contact with the flight was lost north of Gainesville, Florida, after air traffic control (ATC) cleared the airplane to flight level (FL) 390. The airplane was intercepted by several U.S. Air Force (USAF) and Air National Guard (ANG) aircraft as it proceeded northwestbound. The military pilots in a position to observe the accident airplane at close range stated (in interviews or via radio transmissions) that the forward windshields of the Learjet seemed to be frosted or covered with condensation. The military pilots could not see into the cabin. They did not observe any structural anomaly or other unusual condition. The military pilots observed the airplane depart controlled flight and spiral to the ground, impacting an open field. All occupants on board the airplane (the captain, first officer, and four passengers) were killed, and the airplane was destroyed.
Crew:
Michael Kling,
Stephanie Bellegarrigue.
Passengers:
Payne Stewart,
Van Ardan,
Bruce Borland,
Robert Fraley.

The twin-engine airplane impacted the ground in an uncontrolled descent following the inflight separation of the right wing during a normal descent. The airplane had accumulated a total time of 20,457 hours and had been flown 52 hours since the most recent annual inspection, which was performed by the current operator 3 weeks prior to the accident. Available maintenance records indicated that since 1988, maintenance personnel had made numerous repairs to the right wing, including repairing skin cracks, working rivets, wing stub spar straps, and the right main landing gear. Metallurgical examination revealed that the right wing's front spar failed due to fatigue that started at an area of mechanical damage and rough machining marks. The presence of primer covering the mechanical damage strongly suggests that the damage was produced during the manufacturing process. It could not be determined whether the mechanical damage or the machining, acting alone, could have caused the fatigue cracking to initiate. Fatigue cracking found on the rear spar and the forward auxiliary spar is most likely secondary fatigue due to load shedding as the crack grew in the front spar.

The first officer of AirTran Airways flight 890, which preceded AirTran flight 867 in the accident airplane, identified and reported a leak from the right engine of the Boeing 737-200 during a postflight inspection at William B. Hartsfield Atlanta International Airport (ATL), Georgia. AirTran mechanics at ATL identified the source of the leak as a chafed hydraulic pressure line to the right thrust reverser. They found the part in the illustrated parts catalog (IPC), which was not designed as a troubleshooting document and does not contain sufficient detail for such use. One of the mechanics telephoned an AirTran maintenance controller in Orlando, Florida, for further instructions. The mechanics who initially identified the source of the leak had little experience working on the Boeing 737 because they had worked for ValuJet Airlines, which flew DC-9s only, until ValuJet and AirTran merged in September 1997. On the basis of the information provided by the mechanic, and without questioning his description of the line or verifying the part number that he had provided against the IPC or some other appropriate maintenance document, the maintenance controller instructed the mechanic to cap the leaking line and deactivate the right thrust reverser in accordance with AirTran's Minimum Equipment List procedures. However, instead of capping the hydraulic pressure line, the mechanics capped the right engine hydraulic pump case drain return line. The mechanics performed a leak check by starting the auxiliary power unit and turning on the electric hydraulic pumps to pressurize the airplane's hydraulic systems; no leaks were detected. Although the mechanics were not required by company procedures to test their repair by running the engines, this test would have alerted the mechanics that they had incorrectly capped the hydraulic pump case drain line, which would have overpressurized the hydraulic pump and caused the hydraulic pump case seal to rupture. However, because the mechanics did not perform this test, the overpressure and rupture occurred during the airplane's climb out, allowing depletion of system A hydraulic fluid. Depletion of system A hydraulic fluid activated the hydraulic low-pressure lights in the cockpit, which alerted the flight crew that the airplane had a hydraulic problem. The crew notified air traffic control that the airplane would be returning to ATL and subsequently declared an emergency. The flight crew's initial approach to the airport was high and fast because of the workload associated with performing AirTran's procedures for the loss of hydraulic system A and the limited amount of time available to perform the procedures. Nevertheless, the crew was able to configure and stabilize the airplane for landing. However, depletion of system A hydraulic fluid disabled the nosewheel steering, inboard flight spoilers, ground spoilers, and left and right inboard brakes. The flight crew was able to land the airplane using the left thrust reverser (the right thrust reverser was fully functional but intentionally deactivated by the mechanics), outboard brakes (powered by hydraulic system B), and rudder. The flight crew used the left thrust reverser and rudder in an attempt to control the direction of the airplane down the runway, but use of the rudder pedals in this manner had depleted the system A accumulator pressure, which would have allowed three emergency brake applications. The use of the right outboard brake without the right inboard brake at a higher-than-normal speed (Vref for 15-degree flaps is faster than Vref for normal landing flaps) and with heavy gross weight (the airplane had consumed only 4,650 pounds of the 28,500 pounds of fuel on board at takeoff) used up the remaining friction material on the right outboard brake, causing it to fail. (The left outboard brake was still functional at this point.) The lack of brake friction material on the right outboard brake caused one of the right outboard brake pistons to overtravel and unport its o-ring, allowing system B hydraulic fluid to leak out; as a result, the left outboard brake also failed. Loss of the left and right inboard and outboard brakes, loss of nosewheel steering, and use of asymmetric thrust reverse caused the flight crew to lose control of the airplane, which departed the left side of the runway and came to rest in a ditch.

The captain reported: 'Shortly after V1...there was a loss of power to the left engine....' (FAR Part 1 defines V1 as takeoff decision speed.) However, the first officer, who was the pilot flying, stated the captain retarded power on the left engine as a training exercise. The first officer stated there was no preflight discussion of emergency procedure practice. The airplane became airborne about 3,500 feet down the runway; the crew subsequently lost control of the aircraft, and it crashed to the left of the runway, and a fire erupted. The crew escaped with minor injuries. A teardown of the left engine was performed under FAA supervision at the engine manufacturer's facilities; the engine manufacturer reported that damage found during the teardown 'was indicative of engine rotation and operation at the time of impact....' Both airspeed indicator bugs were found set 9 to 11 knots below the V1 speed on the takeoff and landing data (TOLD) card. No evidence of an aircraft or engine malfunction, to include inflight fire, was found at the accident site.