Airport (less than 10 km from airport)

The accident occurred during the second of a two-leg nonscheduled cargo flight. The initial leg of the flight departed the preceding evening. The pilots landed about 3.5 hours later for fuel and departed on the accident flight an hour after refueling. The flight entered a cruise descent about 39 miles from the destination airport in preparation for approach and landing. The pilots reported to air traffic control that they were executing a wide base and were subsequently cleared for a visual approach and landing. The landing clearance was acknowledged, and no further communications were received. No problems or anomalies were reported during the flight. The airplane was briefly established on final approach before radar contact was lost. The airplane impacted trees and terrain about 0.5 mile short of the runway and came to rest in a trucking company parking lot. A postimpact fire ensued. Damage to the landing gear indicated that it was extended at the time of impact. The position of the wing flaps could not be determined. Disparities in the propeller blade angles at impact were likely due to the airplane’s encounter with the wooded area and the impact sequence. No evidence of mechanical anomalies related to the airframe, engines, or propellers was observed. A review of air traffic control radar data revealed that the airplane airspeed decayed to about 70 to 75 kts on final approach which was at or below the documented aerodynamic stall speed of the airplane in the landing configuration. Although there was limited information about the flight crew’s schedules, their performance was likely impaired by fatigue resulting from both the total duration of the overnight flights and the approach being conducted in the window of the circadian low. This likely resulted in the flight crew’s failure to maintain airspeed and recognize the impending aerodynamic stall conditions.

The pilot reported that, while holding short of the runway, he set the parking brake while waiting for his takeoff clearance. Upon receiving takeoff clearance, he reached down to the parking brake handle and, "quickly pushed the parking brakes back in"; however, he did not visually verify that he disengaged the parking brake. During the takeoff roll, he noticed that the airplane was not accelerating beyond about 70 knots and decided to abort the takeoff. The airplane subsequently veered to the left, exited the departure end of the runway, and impacted an airport perimeter fence. The pilot reported that he must have not fully disengaged the parking brake before takeoff and that there were no mechanical issues with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation. Postaccident examination of the airplane revealed that the parking brake handle was partially extended, which likely resulted in the airplane’s decreased acceleration during the takeoff roll.

The airplane was parked at gate 530 (Terminal 3) at Beijing Capital and being prepared for flight CA183 to Tokyo-Haneda. 14 crew members were on board as well as 147 passengers when an abnormal sound was heard coming from the L2 door connected to the jetbridge. The cargo smoke alarm came on in the cockpit while smoke spread in the cabin. The pilot declared an emergency and decision was taken to evacuate all 161 occupants and no one was injured while the aircraft was partially destroyed by fire. The origin of the fire is still under investigation.

On 27 Aug 19, M/s Air Charter Services Pvt Ltd Cessna Citation 560 XL aircraft (VTAVV), while operating a flight from Delhi to Aligarh (Dhanipur Airstrip) was involved in an accident during landing on runway 11.The operator is having a maintenance facility at Aligarh Airport and aircraft was scheduled to undergo ADS-B modification. There were 02 cockpit crew and 04 SOD onboard the aircraft. The aircraft was under the command of a PIC, who was an ATPL holder duly qualified on type with a CPL holder co-pilot, duly qualified on type as Pilot Monitoring. This was the first flight of the day for both pilots. Both, PIC and Co-Pilot had prior experience of operating to Aligarh airport, which is an uncontrolled airport. As per the flight plan, ETD from Delhi was 0800 IST and ETA at Aligarh was 0820 IST. The crew had reported around 0630 IST at Delhi airport and underwent BA test. The MET report to operate the aircraft to Aligarh was well within the VFR conditions. The aircraft Take-off weight was within limits including 1900 Kgs of fuel on board. As per the statement of PIC, the Co-pilot was briefed about pre departure checklists including METAR before approaching the aircraft. Once at the aircraft, prefight checks were carried out by PIC before seeking clearance from Delhi delivery (121.95 MHz). Aircraft was accorded start up clearance by Delhi ground (121.75 Mhz) at 0800 IST.ATC cleared the aircraft to line up on runway 11 and was finally cleared for takeoff at 0821 IST. After takeoff, aircraft changed over to Delhi radar control from tower frequency for further departure instructions. Aircraft was initially cleared by Radar control to climb to FL090 and was given straight routing to Aligarh with final clearance to climb to FL130. Thereafter, aircraft changed to Delhi area control for further instructions. While at approximately 45 Nm from Aligarh, VT-AVV made contact with Aligarh (personnel of M/s Pioneer Flying Club manning radio) on 122.625 MHz. Ground R/T operator informed “wind 100/2-3 Kts, QNH 1005, Runway 11 in use” and that flying of Pioneer Flying Club is in progress. Further, he instructed crew to contact when at 10 Nm inbound. After obtaining initial information from ground R/T operator, VT-AVV requested Delhi area control for descent. The aircraft was cleared for initial descent to FL110 and then further to FL080. On reaching FL080, aircraft was instructed by Delhi area control to change over to Aligarh for further descent instruction in coordination with destination. At approx 10 Nm, VT-AVV contacted ground R/T operator on 122.625 MHz and requested for long finals for runway 11. In turn, ground R/T operator asked crew to report when at 5 Nm inbound. As per PIC, after reaching 5 Nm inbounds, Aligarh cleared VTAVV to descend to circuit altitude and land on runway 11. Aircraft had commenced approach at 5 Nm at an altitude of 2200 ft. Approach and landing checks briefing including wind, runway in use were carried out by PIC. During visual approach, Co-pilot called out to PIC “Slightly low on profile”. As per PIC, Co-pilot call out was duly acknowledged and ROD was corrected. Thereafter, PIC was visual with runway and took over controls on manual. Co-pilot was monitoring instruments and parameters. While PIC was focused on landing, a loud bang from left side of the aircraft was heard by PIC when the aircraft was below 100 feet AGL. Aircraft started pulling towards left and impacted the ground short of runway 11 threshold. After impact, aircraft veered off the runway and its left wing caught fire. The aircraft stopped short of airfield boundary wall. Crew carried out emergency evacuation. Co-pilot opened main exit door from inside of the aircraft for evacuation of passengers. Aircraft was destroyed due to post crash fire. The fire tender reached the crash site after 45 Minutes.

The crew was conducting an on-demand charter flight with eight passengers onboard. As the flight crew taxied the airplane to the departure runway, the copilot called air traffic control using his mobile phone to obtain the departure clearance and release. According to the pilot, while continuing to taxi, he stopped the airplane short of the runway where he performed a rudder bias check (the last item in the taxi checklist) and applied the parking brake without verbalizing the parking brake or rudder bias actions because the copilot was on the phone. After the pilot lined up on the runway and shortly before takeoff, the flight crew discussed and corrected a NO TAKEOFF annunciation for an unsafe trim setting. After the copilot confirmed takeoff power was set, he stated that the airplane was barely moving then said that something was not right, to which the pilot replied the airplane was rolling and to call the airspeeds. About 16 seconds later, the pilot indicated that the airplane was using more runway than he expected then made callouts for takeoff-decision speed and rotation speed. The pilot stated that he pulled the yoke back twice, but the airplane did not lift off. Shortly after, the pilot applied full thrust reversers and maximum braking, then the airplane exited the departure end of the runway, impacted a ditch, and came to rest 1,990 ft beyond the departure end of the runway. The airplane was destroyed by a postcrash fire, and the crew and passengers were not injured.

The crew was engaged in a local test flight at La Carlota-General Francisco de Miranda AFB in Caracas. During the takeoff roll, a tire burst on the right main gear that collapsed and was torn off. The airplane veered off runway to the left then the left main gear collapsed as well and the airplane came to rest on its belly with the nose gear still extended. There were no injuries among the crew.

Following an uneventful flight from Nairobi-Wilson Airport, the crew landed on a gravel runway at Kichwa Tembo Airport. After touchdown, the aircraft collided with two wildebeests. Upon impact, the left main gear was torn off and the aircraft veered off runway to the left and came to rest. All occupants evacuated safely and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair. Both wildebeests were killed.

The pilots were conducting a visual flight rules cross-country flight with three passengers onboard. The preflight, departure, and cruise portions of the flight were uneventful. During the initial approach to the airport, the flight crew discussed having some difficulty visually acquiring the airport. They also discussed traffic in the area and were maneuvering around clouds, which may have increased the pilots' workload. As the approach continued, the airplane crossed a ridgeline at 710 ft above ground level (agl), which triggered a terrain awareness and warning system (TAWS) alert. Further, the flight crew made several comments about the airplane flying too fast and allowed the airspeed to increase well above the reference speed (Vref) for the approach. At 1535:57 (about 1 minute 52 seconds before landing), the pilot pulled back the throttles to idle, where they stayed for the remainder of the approach. In an attempt to slow the airplane for landing, the pilot partially extended the speedbrakes when the airplane was below 500 ft agl, which is prohibited in the airplane flight manual (AFM). Five seconds before touchdown, the airplane's descent rate was 1,500 ft per minute (fpm), which exceeded the maximum allowed for landing per the AFM of 600 fpm. When the airplane first touched down, it was traveling about 18 knots above Vref. The pilot did not extend the speedbrakes upon touchdown, which the landing checklist required, but instead attempted to deploy the thrust reversers immediately after touchdown, which was a later item on the landing checklist. However, the thrust reversers did not unlock because the airplane bounced and was airborne again before the command could be executed, which was consistent with system design and logic: the thrust reversers will not unlock until all three landing gear are on the ground. The airplane touched down four times total; on the third touchdown (after the second bounce), when all three landing gear contacted the runway, the thrust reversers unlocked as previously commanded during the first touchdown. Although the pilot subsequently advanced the throttles to idle, which would normally stow the thrust reversers, the airplane had bounced a third time and had already become airborne again before the thrust reversers could stow. When the airplane became airborne, the system logic cut hydraulic power to the thrust reverser actuators; thus the reversers would not stow. The thrust reversers were subsequently pulled open due to the aerodynamic forces. The pilot attempted to go around by advancing the throttles when the airplane was airborne. However, the electronic engine controls prevented the increase in engine power because the thrust reversers were not stowed. When the airplane touched down the fourth and final time, the pilot attempted to land straight ahead on the runway; the airplane touched down hard and the right main landing gear then collapsed under the wing. The airplane departed the paved surface and came to rest about 600 ft beyond the runway threshold. The passengers and crew eventually evacuated the airplane through the main cabin door, and the airplane was destroyed in a postaccident fire. A postaccident examination of the airplane systems, structure, powerplants, and landing gear revealed no evidence of mechanical malfunctions or anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. The airplane's approach was unstabilized: its airspeed during the approach and landing well exceeded Vref and its descent rate exceeded the maximum allowed for landing just seconds before touchdown. Both the pilot and copilot commented on the airplane's high speed several times during the approach. During short final, the pilot asked the copilot if he should go around, and the copilot responded, "no." Although the copilot was the director of operations for the flight department and the direct supervisor of the pilot, the pilot stated that the copilot's position did not influence his decisions as pilot-in-command nor did it diminish his command authority. Neither the pilot nor copilot called for a go-around before landing despite awareness that the approach was unstabilized. As the airplane touched down, the pilot failed to follow the AFM guidance and used the thrust reversers before the speedbrakes. According to the airplane manufacturer's calculations, the airplane could have stopped within the length of runway available if the airplane had not bounced and the speedbrakes and wheel brakes were used at the point of the first touchdown. After the third touchdown, when the airplane became airborne again, the pilot attempted a go-around; the AFM prohibits touch-and-go landings after the thrust reversers are deployed. It is critical for pilots to know the point at which they should not attempt a go-around; a committed-to-stop (CTS) point is the point at which a go-around or rejected landing procedure will not be initiated and the only option will be bringing the aircraft to a stop. Establishing a CTS point eliminates the ambiguity for pilots making decisions during time-critical events. The FAA issued Information for Operators 17009, "Committed-toStop Point on Landings," to inform operators and pilots about the importance of establishing a CTS point; however, the director of operations was not aware of the concept of a CTS point during landing.

Shortly after takeoff from Moscow-Zukhovski Airport runway 12, while climbing to an altitude of 750 feet in excellent weather conditions, the airplane collided with a flock of birds (sea gulls). Some of them were ingested by both engines that lost power. It was later reported by the crew that the left engine stopped almost immediately while the right engine lost power and run irregularly. Unable to maintain a positive rate of climb, the captain decided to attempt an emergency landing in a cornfield. The airplane belly landed approximately 3,5 km past the runway end and slid for dozen meters before coming to rest with its both engines partially torn off. All 233 occupants were able to evacuate the cabin and it is reported that 23 people were slightly injured.

On final approach to Los Ángeles-María Dolores Airport, the airplane crashed in a wooded area located about 412 metres short of runway 18, bursting into flames. The aircraft was destroyed by impact forces and a post crash fire and the pilot, sole on board, was killed. The accident occurred 19 minutes after sunset.